


NOVEMBER 1949



# JOURNAL



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
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
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#### Vice-Presidents of the Council

Field-Marshal the Viscount Alanbrooke, K.G., G.C.B., O.M., D.S.O., has accepted the invitation of the Council to become a Vice-President in the vacancy caused by the death of Brigadier-General the Earl of Lucan, P.C., G.C.V.O., K.B.E., C.B., T.D.

The Council, with much regret, have to record the death of General Sir Walter M. St. G. Kirke, G.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. General Kirke became a Vice-President in 1947. He was Chairman of the Council in 1944-1945.

Field-Marshal the Earl Wavell, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., C.M.G., M.C., has accepted the invitation of the Council to become a Vice-President in the vacancy caused by the death of General Sir Walter M. St. G. Kirke.

#### Elected Members

Lieut.-General O. L. Roberts, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., has been elected a Member of the Council in the vacancy caused by Lieut.-General Sir John Harding, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., taking up an appointment overseas.

Brigadier Sir George S. Harvie-Watt, Bt., T.D., A.D.C., K.C., D.L., has been elected a Member of the Council representing the Territorial Army.

#### Ex-Officio Member

Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Daniel, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., has accepted the invitation of the Council to become an ex-officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of Commandant of the Imperial Defence College.

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Major F. LeG. Whitting, Royal Artillery.

Major D. C. B. L. Esmonde-White, M.C., Royal Artillery.

Major Iqbal Ahmed Qureshi, The Baluch Regiment.

Captain P. J. L. Phelps, 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.

Lieut.-Colonel T. M. Niven, T.D., Royal Signals.

Captain H. H. Barnsley, 67 Regiment, Royal Artillery.

Captain D. J. Bottomley, The Green Howards.

Captain D. H. G. Rice, The Queen's Bays.

Captain R. M. Matthews, Royal Signals.

Major A. Bailey, R.A.S.C.  
 Major G. E. McLaren, R.A.S.C.  
 Captain Bashir Ahmed, Guides Cavalry.  
 Captain G. E. Dennison, R.A.O.C.  
 Major K. L. Murray, R.C.E.M.E.  
 Captain J. H. Manning, Royal Artillery.  
 Lieut.-Colonel G. M. Forteach, D.S.O., M.B.E., The Seaforth Highlanders.  
 Brigadier W. J. O'B. Daunt, C.B.E., Colonel The Royal Norfolk Regiment.  
 Major A. M. Hlawaty, R.A.C.  
 Captain L. A. D. Harrod, Grenadier Guards.  
 Colonel J. R. Hall, T.D., The Cheshire Regiment, T.A.R.O.  
 Major P. N. J. Wilkins, R.A.S.C.  
 Major G. M. Roy, M.C., Wellington College Training Corps.  
 Captain N. G. Gunton, Royal Signals.  
 Major D. A. C. Rasch, Grenadier Guards.  
 Captain G. M. Auld, R.A.O.C.  
 Lieut.-Colonel A. G. ff. Powell, The Royal Welch Fusiliers.  
 Major W. D. Scott, 5/6th Bn. The Highland Light Infantry.  
 Major B. D. Mackenzie, Royal Engineers.  
 Captain J. H. A. Bryden, Royal Artillery.  
 Lieut.-Colonel R. B. Jay, R.A.S.C. (T.A.R.O.).  
 Captain R. E. Chandler, Royal Artillery.  
 Captain J. D. Nixon, M.C. The, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.  
 Captain Ahmad Zahir-Ud-Din, Guides Cavalry (10th Q.V.O.F.F.).  
 Lieutenant J. T. Boyes, 10th Gurkha Rifles.  
 Major N. Crookenden, D.S.O., The Cheshire Regiment.  
 Brigadier G. B. S. Hindley, O.B.E.  
 Major A. N. B. Ritchie, Scots Guards.  
 Major P. M. Leslie-Jones, Royal Engineers.  
 Captain M. G. M. Archer, The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment.  
 Major W. A. T. Morecombe, Royal Signals.  
 Major-General H. E. Pyman, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., 56 (Lon.) Armd. Div. T.A.  
 Captain E. M. Turnbull, M.B.E., The Life Guards.  
 Brigadier Nawabzada Mohammad Sher Ali Khan, Royal Pakistan Army.  
 Major J. C. D. Montgomery, Royal Engineers.  
 Captain H. M. A. Knight, M.C., R.A.O.C.  
 Major-General J. G. Elliott, C.I.E.  
 Captain P. A. Angier, The Gloucestershire Regiment.  
 Captain W. B. J. Crawshay, XII Royal Lancers.  
 Major R. O. H. Carver, Royal Engineers.  
 Lieutenant M. J. Allison, Royal Engineers.  
 Captain D. A. Barker-Wyatt, Royal Engineers.  
 Major B. G. Hickey, M.C., 1/6 Gurkha Rifles.  
 Brigadier Sir George S. Harvie-Watt, Bt., T.D., A.D.C., K.C., D.L.  
 Captain J. M. Brockbank, 12th Royal Lancers.  
 Captain F. H. Smith, R.E.M.E.  
 Major P. C. Lal, Mahar M. G. Regiment, I.A.  
 Lieut.-Colonel D. P. Gimi, 5th Bn. 8th Gurkha Rifles.  
 Major I. H. Lyall Grant, M.C., Royal Engineers.  
 Captain M. M. Karim, Royal Pakistan Artillery.  
 Lieutenant J. W. Smith, 4th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery.  
 Chief Commander D. H. I. Wilson, W.R.A.C.  
 Major-General C. M. Barber, C.B., D.S.O.  
 The Hon. Mr. Justice J. A. Bell, M.C., Judge of the High Court, Madras; late T.A.R.O.  
 Major Ç. C. Metcalfe, M.C., The Dorsetshire Regiment.



ROYAL AIR FORCE

Flight Lieutenant B. Spray, R.A.F.  
 Wing Commander H. N. Chatterjee, D.F.C., R.I.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader C. M. Clementi, O.B.E., R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant A. E. Richmond, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant D. Mercer, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader D. S. Dickins, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader W. Kemplay, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant H. M. Carson.  
 Flight Lieutenant S. J. Steel, R.A.F.  
 Wing Commander T. Thomas, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader R. S. Crawford, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant K. F. W. Tapper, M.B.E., R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader G. D. Sise, D.S.O., D.F.C., R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant E. L. Wallane, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant S. R. Dixon, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant D. D. Whitsun-Jones, R.A.F.  
 Wing Commander I. L. B. Aitkens, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant J. L. Causton, D.F.C., R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader F. S. R. Johnson, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant E. L. Harris, B.A., R.A.F.  
 Flying Officer A. S. Wright, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant J. J. Cooper, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant G. T. Hands, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant B. D. Godsell, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader P. O. Gibson, R.A.F.  
 Flying Officer B. H. Scrivener, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant R. H. Burr, R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader N. B. Freeman, A.F.C., R.A.F.  
 Squadron Leader J. D. Beresford, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant C. E. Blackburn, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant F. D. Leatherdale, D.F.C., R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant T. M. Armstrong, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant J. G. Bishop, R.A.F.  
 Flight Lieutenant P. F. Reed, R.A.F.  
 Wing Commander B. Robinson, R.A.F.  
 Wing Commander D. N. Prakash, R.I.A.F.

COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

The Council hope that many more Members will support the Scheme for Covenanted Subscriptions, details of which have been circulated to all Members.

This materially assists the Institution because it enables Income Tax at the full current rate to be reclaimed on each subscription.

To date there are 1,462 Annual and 739 Life Covenanted Members.

Any Member who has not received his copy of the Scheme or who requires new forms is requested to communicate with the Secretary.

LIAISON OFFICERS

The following alterations or additions to the list of Liaison Officers published in February and amended in May and August, have taken place :—

ROYAL NAVY

R.N. Barracks, Portsmouth ... Lieutenant-Commander M. F. R. Ainslie, D.S.O.,  
 D.S.C., R.N.  
 Reserve Fleet ... Commander G. F. Blaxland, O.B.E., R.N.

## ARMY

Scottish Command	...	...	Lieut.-Colonel G. M. Forteath, D.S.O., M.B.E.
Western Command	...	...	Major J. S. Freeland.
B.A.O.R.	...	...	Lieut.-Colonel S. R. M. Hamblin.

## ROYAL AIR FORCE

Bomber Command	...	...	Wing Commander R. D. Stubbs, D.F.C.
Maintenance Command	...	...	Group Captain C. H. E. Lyster, M.B.E.

## TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1949

The following essays have been received :—

"Sir Brian woke one morning and he couldn't find his Battleaxe."

"Rikki-Tikki . . . sat back on his tail."

"Platybasia."

## ADMITTANCE TO LECTURES

Tickets will *not* be required to admit Members to any of the remaining lectures of the Session 1949-50; but it is advisable that guests should have tickets, and Members are requested to apply for these in good time.

## MUSEUM

## ADDITIONS

A framed photograph of the Carrier Pigeon "Royalty" (9437). Given by Mrs. G. E. Knowler.

A Union Flag which, with one other, was the last flown at a British Military Establishment in India. It was hauled down at the British Holding Camp, Deolali, India, on 14th November, 1948. (9438) Given by Colonel A. C. Clayton.

A coloured Print of a view of the Taking of Quebec on 13th September, 1759 (9439), and a Print of Major-General James Wolfe, Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Forces in the Expedition against Quebec, 1759 (9440). Both given by the Quebec House Trustees.

## JOURNAL

Members are invited to offer suitable contributions for the JOURNAL. Confidential matter cannot be used, but there is ample scope for professional articles which contain useful lessons of the War; also contributions of a general Service character, such as Strategic Principles, Command and Leadership, Morale, Staff Work, Naval, Military and Air Force history, Customs and Traditions.

The Editor is authorized to receive articles from serving officers and, if found suitable, to obtain permission for their publication from the appropriate Service Department.

Army Officers are reminded that such articles must be accompanied by the written approval of the author's Commanding Officer.

## REQUEST FOR BACK NUMBERS

The Editor will be grateful if Members who have finished with them will return copies of the JOURNAL for August, 1942, February, August and November, 1946, and February, 1949.

## SALE OF SURPLUS JOURNALS

There is an excessive stock of *some* of the back numbers of the JOURNAL from 1869 to 1944, inclusive. These can be supplied to Members at 1s. each, post free. Applications, stating the exact JOURNAL (year and month) required, should be made to the Secretary.

Copies of JOURNALS of which there is only a limited stock and of all numbers issued subsequent to 1944 can be supplied to Members at 4s. each.

The price of all single copies of JOURNALS to non-Members is 7s. 6d.

#### BOUND VOLUMES OF THE JOURNAL

There are a few bound copies of the JOURNAL from 1900-1929 for disposal. Most of these are in good condition. Offers for the set or for individual volumes should be made to the Secretary.

#### CHANGES OF ADDRESS

Members are particularly requested to notify any change of address which will affect the despatch of the JOURNAL.

Naval Officers are strongly advised to keep the Institution informed of their address, as JOURNALS sent to them via C.W. Branch of the Admiralty are invariably greatly delayed.

#### CHRISTMAS CARDS

Christmas cards, specially designed for Members of the Institution, will be on sale shortly, and orders can now be booked.

Card A has a coloured picture of Queen Elizabeth reviewing her troops before they embarked to fight the Spanish Armada. Inside is the Institution's crest. The price, including envelopes, is 12s. per dozen.

Card B has the crest of the Institution on the outside and inside is a reproduction of a black and white sketch of the exterior of the Banqueting House. The price, including envelopes, is 9s. per dozen.

Postage in each case is 6d. for one dozen, and 2d. extra for each additional dozen.

Members are requested to make early application for the number of cards they require, stating which design, A or B, and enclosing the requisite remittance with their order.

#### FOR SALE

##### THE NEW NAVAL SIGNAL CODE

A limited number of spare copies of the coloured frontispiece of the JOURNAL for November, 1948, showing all the flags of the New Naval Signal Code, are available to Members at 1s. each, post free.

#### "WHAT TO READ"

The articles on "What to Read," which have appeared in the JOURNAL, have been brought up to date and published in pamphlet form. Copies can be supplied, price 1s. 6d., post free.



*By courtesy of G. Esparcieux, Fontainebleau*

# THE WESTERN UNION COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF COMMITTEE



# **THE JOURNAL**

*of the*

## **Royal United Service Institution**

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[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers.]

All communications, except those for perusal by the Editor only, should be addressed to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution.]

### **THE WESTERN UNION AND ITS DEFENCE ORGANIZATION**

By FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN,  
K.G., G.C.B., D.S.O.

On Wednesday, 12th October, 1949

MARSHAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE LORD NEWALL, G.C.B., O.M.,  
G.C.M.G., C.B.E., A.M., in the Chair

**THE CHAIRMAN :** The Field-Marshal requires no introduction from me. We all know him for his magnificent achievements during the War.

The number of applications from people wishing to come and hear about the Defence Organization of the Western Union has been such that I regret to say many Members have had to be turned away. I am afraid that we have not got a big enough hall for a lecture of this sort.

I should like to say one word of warning before the Field-Marshal addresses us. You will all appreciate that a lot of the subject about which he will speak is particularly delicate. You will not, therefore, be able to get all the answers to questions which you may put to him, any more, I am afraid, than the Field-Marshal will be able to tell you all that he would like to tell you if it were possible to do so.

#### **LECTURE**

**T**HE Western Union may be destined to play a significant role in history, and it is well that its constitution, progress and evolution should occupy the minds of all thinking people. Within the framework of the Atlantic Pact and, in turn, of the United Nations Charter, it forms the foundation of collective security in Western Europe. Born of the fear of aggression from the East, the Defence Organization is nourished by the determination of the Western European Countries to ensure that never again will their homelands be invaded by a foreign enemy.

#### **THE BRUSSELS TREATY**

The Treaty which was signed in Brussels on 17th March, 1948, by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, provided for co-operation between the five Countries to strengthen the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united. Furthermore, they pledged themselves to afford assistance to each other in accordance with the Charter of U.N.O. in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any renewal of a policy of aggression. For the purpose of consulting together on all the questions dealt with in the Treaty, a Consultative Council was created.

**A**

## THE CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL

The supreme authority in the Brussels Treaty Organization is the Consultative Council. Composed of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Powers, it meets whenever it is necessary, at least once in every three months, successively in the five capitals. The Council receives the reports from the different organizations of the Brussels Treaty which are presented to it by the Permanent Commission, and it gives these organizations directions for the realization of the objectives of the Treaty.

The first meeting of the Council was held in Paris on 17th April, 1948. In the course of this meeting the Council decided on the creation of the Permanent Commission and the Military Committee.

In the Autumn of 1948, the Council examined the results of the preliminary conversations held in Washington during the Summer on the problem of North Atlantic Security and it accepted the principle of a defensive Atlantic Pact.

## THE PERMANENT COMMISSION

The Permanent Commission, which met for the first time on 24th April, 1948, represents the Consultative Council during the intervals when the latter is not sitting. The Commission is composed of the Heads of the four diplomatic missions in London, and a British representative with the rank of Ambassador. It is established in London, meets at least once a week, and is assisted by a Secretariat-General organized on an international basis which also serves the Consultative Council.

The Permanent Commission is the organ of consultation between the five Countries on the political level, and co-ordinates and directs the activities of all the organization: Defence, Economic, Financial, Cultural and Social Committees.

## DEFENCE ORGANIZATION

The Brussels Treaty was the first concrete step towards the ideal of European unity. But while that ideal remains the ultimate aim, the political complex of the Continent compelled the Brussels Powers' statesmen to embody in the Treaty measures for collective self-defence. The five nations were confronted with the need to build up their military strength, in conjunction with economic recovery, in order to re-arm and re-equip themselves for self-preservation.


Under Article IV of the Brussels Treaty the Five Powers agreed to render all military and other aid and assistance in their power to any party attacked. In order to implement this Article, a Five-Power Military Committee was established in London in May, 1948. From the original military committee a comprehensive military defence organization developed.

The tasks confronting the Western Union Defence Organization were briefly:—  
(a) To strengthen, co-ordinate and integrate the military and supply effort of each Country.

(b) To study the strategic and tactical problems of the defence of Western Europe.

(c) To provide a command organization to meet any emergency.

The Defence organization started its task in April, 1948, and six months later it had shaped sufficiently for the command organization to be set up. I will deal to-day first with the higher direction organization, and secondly with the command organization.



## WESTERN UNION DEFENCE COMMITTEE

The Western Union Defence Committee consists of the five Ministers of Defence. It is the governing and controlling body responsible for the defence of Western Europe. It meets at least once in every three months, in one of the capitals. It ensures the higher direction and control of the whole organization in the name of the heads of the Five Governments. Serving this Committee are two high level official bodies—the Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Western Union Military Supply Board.

## WESTERN UNION CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

The Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee (W.U.C.O.S.) advises on all matters affecting the defence of Western Europe as a whole, and considers in common all matters which may be referred to it by the Western Union Defence Committee. World-wide commitments are taken into account in reaching decisions on major policy. The Committee consists of the National Chiefs of Staff of Land, Sea and Air Forces of the five nations, although usually each nation is represented on the Committee by one Chief of Staff. The Committee meets regularly, normally in London.

In order that those problems which affect only one Service may be fully studied, periodical meetings are also held by the National Chiefs of Staff of the individual Services.

## MILITARY COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION

The Permanent Military Committee is composed of representatives of the national Chiefs of Staff of the Five Powers, and sits in London; in effect they are the permanent staff of the Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee. They arrange their meetings, are responsible for the preparation of the necessary documents for their consideration, and are also responsible for the co-ordination of all work which is done on behalf of the Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee.

At the same level as the Military Committee is the Principal Administrative Planning Committee, which is responsible to the Western Union Chiefs of Staff. The role of this Committee is to examine from the international and inter-Service point of view administrative problems connected with the raising and maintaining of forces, with mobilization, and with operational plans for Western Union Defence. The Committee, which meets as and when required, consists of one high level administrative representative from each of the Five Powers.

The remainder of the organization serving the Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee, under the Permanent Military Committee, can be considered under three headings:—

## (a) SERVICE ADVISORY COMMITTEES

For each of the three Services there is an Advisory Committee sitting in London composed of permanent members representing their respective Departments in their own Countries. They are concerned in the standardization of equipment and methods in the Forces of the Five Powers, and other single-Service policy matters. All three Service Advisory Committees have set up a number of Sub-Committees to deal with specialized matters. These are composed of representatives of the Departments concerned in each Country, meeting together from time to time.



(b) INTER-SERVICE COMMITTEES

There are a number of Inter-Service Committees to deal with policy matters of an inter-Service nature, and in certain respects to arrange executive action. They are composed of representatives of the Departments concerned in each Country, meeting together as required.

(c) PLANNING DIVISIONS

It has been necessary to establish certain Planning Divisions in London whose functions are to carry out examinations for the Military Committee and the Principal Administrative Planning Committee; to co-ordinate, on behalf of these committees, planning done by various national and international bodies; to make effective the more general Five-Power plans, such as that prepared by the Commanders-in-Chief Committee; and to prepare projects for approval by the five Governments where financial provision, concerning more than one Country, is required. The Planning Divisions are normally composed of one representative from each Country who represents all three Services, but, so far as is possible, the members themselves are drawn from the three Services. The Planning Divisions maintain close liaison with the Service Advisory Committees and with the Inter-Service Committees.

### WESTERN UNION MILITARY SUPPLY BOARD

The Western Union Military Supply Board was set up in September, 1948, and it is on the same level as the Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee, coming under the Defence Ministers.

Its tasks are broadly :—

- (a) Advice on production of equipment and supplies;
- (b) Recommendations as to how military requirements can be met;
- (c) Implementation of production programmes.

In view of these tasks it must work in close collaboration with the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The division of responsibility between the two is that, whilst the Supply Board is responsible for production and maintenance, the Chiefs of Staff Committee must define the military aim to be achieved in types of equipment, scales of reserves, etc.

The Supply Board itself consists of one representative of high standing from each Country.<sup>1</sup> It meets as required and is served by a permanent staff in the form of the Supply Executive Committee, which is analogous to the Military Committee and works in close consultation with it.

The tasks of the Supply Executive Committee naturally go into greater detail and cover the matching of production possibilities with requirements in the widest sense, e.g. raw materials, labour, siting of plants, economy in production, size of available plants, etc. The Executive Committee arrives at recommendations in broad outline and thereafter the problems are passed to specialist sub-committees, e.g. tanks, mechanical transport, small arms, aircraft, etc., where they are completed for the contract stage, and standardization is closely watched. Selection of prototypes is done in close consultation with the Military Committee and its Service Advisory Committees.

<sup>1</sup> The British representative is Sir Harold Parker—Chairman of the United Kingdom Joint War Production Staff.

The permanent staff consists of national delegations of Service as well as civilian members, comprising experts from the various supply departments of each Country.

#### FINANCE AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

The Finance and Economic Committee which was established in November, 1948, is not part of the Western Union *Defence* Organization but serves the Finance Ministers and is part of their staff. It does, however, work in close collaboration with the Military Supply Board.

It deals with problems arising out of the interchange of supplies and services between the Defence Forces of the Five Powers and makes recommendations for barter arrangements and currency transfers. An example of the difficulties to be resolved is that, whereas the currencies of Belgium and Luxembourg are hard, those of the remaining Powers are soft.

It consists of one delegate with a small personal staff from each national Finance Ministry, and meets only as required, sharing the permanent secretariat serving the Permanent Commission.

#### COMMAND ORGANIZATION

At the beginning of October, 1948, the Governments of the Five Powers appointed a Commanders-in-Chief Committee to study the tactical and technical problems of the defence of Western Europe.

I was officially appointed as Chairman of this Committee in October, 1948, and the appointments were announced of General de Lattre de Tassigny, as C.-in-C. Land Forces, Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb as C.-in-C. Air Forces, and Vice-Admiral Jaujard as Flag Officer Western Europe.

The Commanders-in-Chief Committee is responsible to the Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee for the preparation of plans for the defence of Western Europe. It receives its orders and directives from the Defence Committee at Governmental level, through W.U.C.O.S.

No member of this Committee exercises executive command in peacetime, but it is intended that the members should assume command of such forces as may be placed at their disposal in the event of aggression in Western Europe. Steps are being taken to ensure that effective command will be able to be exercised immediately at the outbreak of a conflict.

The Committee has no responsibility for the purely home defence problems of individual Countries, with one exception in regard to territorial air defence, which I will explain in a moment. There must be, however, a constant interchange of plans in order that proper co-ordination is achieved. Most of the measures which must be taken to implement the Committee's plans are the concern of the national authorities alone, as the Commanders-in-Chief have no executive command in peacetime. The Committee must therefore be authorized to provide additional information to the national authorities, and to offer such guidance as may be required. In the same way the plans of the national authorities may well be the concern of the Commanders-in-Chief, in order that they may satisfy themselves that what is being done links in with their own plans and meets their requirements.

#### C.-IN-C. AIR FORCES

In regard to territorial air defence, as I have just mentioned, there have to be special arrangements. The Commander-in-Chief Air Forces in wartime would not

only be responsible for commanding all Tactical Air Forces placed at the disposal of the Supreme Commander, but also of the air forces assigned to the territorial defence of North-East France and Benelux. These forces would come under an inter-allied Air Command.

This organization is necessary because the areas of operations of the Air Defence and Tactical Air Forces overlap. To make the best use of these air forces it is essential to have centralized control. The controlling authority will also need to be in direct contact with the United Kingdom Fighter Command and the Air Defence Organization covering the rest of France, i.e. the West and South-West.

#### FLAG OFFICER WESTERN EUROPE

The position of Flag Officer Western Europe warrants a word of explanation as it is unusual and, to a certain extent, without precedent. His functions and responsibilities are hence not so obvious and clear cut. His title is possibly misleading.

Although he is a full member of the Committee for planning purposes in peacetime and will be directly responsible to the Supreme Commander in the event of war—in other words, precisely on the same level as the C.s-in-C. of the Land and Air Forces—he is not a Commander-in-Chief in the same sense as they are, as, except for forces which may be allocated to him for special tasks, he does not exercise command over the naval forces operating in Western European waters.

The reason for this is that the sea communications of Western Europe cannot be viewed in isolation from the North Atlantic communications and, hence, from the great sea lanes of the World. The operation of major naval forces, in so far as they affect the land battle in Western Europe, must therefore be considered as part of a strategic whole, which is world-wide, and which must take into account the many commitments outside Western Europe.

Thus the Flag Officer Western Europe has two rather separate functions, firstly as a full member of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee in all aspects of the planning, and secondly to act as a link between the Supreme Commander on the one hand and the appropriate National naval authorities and the National Admiralties on the other, in order that the requirements of the Land and Air Forces may be met in the best possible way.

His responsibilities can therefore be defined as follows:—

(a) To bring the naval point of view into the planning and deliberations of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee and to participate as a full member of the team in their responsibilities.

(b) To ensure that the Logistic support for the Land and Air Forces arriving in Western Europe is routed when and where required.

(c) To transmit to the naval authorities concerned the requirements of the Supreme Commander for support or amphibious operations and, under given conditions, to take operational control of these forces.

To exercise these functions his headquarters must be alongside that of the Supreme Commander; he is thus a "landlocked" Admiral with no sea-going command.

As there still seems to be some misunderstanding as to why Flag Officer Western Europe did not fly his flag at sea during the recent Naval Exercises, I would like to emphasize that the Fleets were representing a convoy coming in from the Atlantic, passing up the Channel and finally becoming several cross-Channel convoys. During

this time the Flag Officer Western Europe was exercising his proper function at his headquarters alongside that of the Supreme Commander, where his organization was in operation. After the Exercises he attended the final conference to see how his part had linked up with the rest.

The nearest analogy, possibly, to Admiral Jaujard's position is that of Admiral Ramsay in S.H.A.E.F. after our forces had established themselves in North-West Europe.

#### METHOD OF WORK IN THE C.s-IN-C. COMMITTEE

The method of work in the C.s-in-C. Organization is similar in many respects to that in the Western Union Defence Organization. That is to say, matters peculiar to a single Service are handled by the appropriate headquarters within the framework of the joint plan. Matters of common interest and all matters of policy are dealt with through the machinery of joint staffs whose members are drawn from the four separate Headquarters—Chairman, Land, Air and Sea. Each Headquarters is organized on the four-bureaux system—G.1 for Personnel, etc.; G.2, Intelligence; G.3, Operations and Training; and G.4, Logistics.

Since its establishment the Committee, consisting of the Chairman, two Commanders-in-Chief and Flag Officer Western Europe, has had many meetings, some in England and some in France. The early meetings were formal, followed by the issue of very full minutes, sometimes amounting almost to a verbatim report. As time went on it became clear that better results would be obtained if meetings were less formal, followed by the issue of a short record of decisions reached and rulings given.

A Chiefs of Staff Committee has proved an essential link in the C.s-in-C. Organization. Apart from reaching agreement on matters of minor importance not requiring decision by the Commanders-in-Chief themselves, the four Chiefs of Staff are responsible for approving the terms of reference on which the Combined Planning Staff and other inter-Service bodies will carry out their various studies. The Chiefs of Staff Committee is responsible for presenting all business to the Commanders-in-Chief Committee and also for taking subsequent action to give effect to their decisions.

On the operational side there is a Combined Planning Staff, analogous to our Joint Planning Staff in Whitehall. This Combined Planning Staff works on instructions received from the Chiefs of Staff Committee and is served by a permanent secretariat. In order to ensure the co-ordination of all planning and to assist the various secretaries, a Principal Secretary has been appointed. In point of fact this individual combines this duty with that of Brigadier General Staff of the Chairman's Paris Echelon. I should like to take this opportunity of stressing how small the whole organization is. Four nations each with three Services (Luxembourg must, for obvious reasons, remain a minor partner, militarily) provide a total of under 150 staff officers for the Commanders-in-Chief Organization.

When an instruction has been considered by the Combined Planning Staff it is sometimes decentralized to a working sub-committee. Such a sub-committee may be specially organized for the purpose, and composed of members of the Arms and Services affected by the subject to be considered. Precise terms of reference, including the date by which it is to report, are given by the Combined Planning Staff to such a sub-committee. If the question to be considered has logistical problems, they are handled by the Combined Administrative Staff which works parallel to the C.P.S.

A Combined Administrative Planning Staff—the counterpart of our Joint Administrative Planning Staff—is composed of the senior administrative planning



officers of the four Headquarters. It works in accordance with directives issued by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In order to ensure that due weight is given to the administrative aspect it is permanently represented on the Combined Planning Staff by one member.

Under present conditions all intelligence for the C.s-in-C. Committee is obtained through the Military Committee and is handled, in our organization, by an Intelligence Committee. Signal planning is carried out by a Joint Signal Board, in close collaboration with the Combined Planning Staff. Both these staffs report direct to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

U.S. Liaison Officers are accredited from the U.S. Zone of Occupation in Germany to advise us in our planning at Fontainebleau and to maintain liaison with the U.S. European Theatre of Operations.

#### THE CHAIRMAN'S HEADQUARTERS

The need for maintaining close contact with the Military Committee and, indeed, with the whole of the higher direction organization—which is based on London—has made it necessary to organize the Chairman's Headquarters in two Echelons.

The Paris Echelon takes its place in the Combined set-up in Fontainebleau. The London Echelon provides the link with superior Western Union Authorities. With the London Echelon the three C.s-in-C. maintain their own rear link organization.

#### UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN OBSERVERS

It was evident to the United States authorities that the Brussels Treaty Powers were anxious to secure U.S. participation in their military conferences, and on 15th July, 1948, a formal invitation to them to send military experts to London was made by the Western Union. The invitation was accepted the next day and a Delegation arrived in London on 18th July. Since then the United States have participated in work on a non-membership basis.

The U.S. Delegation, known as D.E.L.W.U., and headed by a Major-General, is an inter-Service delegation under the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. D.E.L.W.U. is accredited to the Military Committee; but by invitation it also took part in the work of the Military Supply Board and Supply Executive Committee until April, 1949, when a Mr. Joseph Taggart was appointed on a permanent basis.

The task of D.E.L.W.U. is to represent the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Committee and its sub-agencies, to participate in discussion of military plans, and to assist in the drawing up of a co-ordinated military supply plan. They also ensure that in the work in London all planning between the military authorities in Germany is taken into account, and they therefore maintain very close touch with the U.S. Military Commander in Germany.

The Head of the U.S. Delegation is the Senior Army Member and he has under him a Senior Navy and Senior Air Force member. Their staff is organized in three sections:—

Plans and operations.

Intelligence.

Logistics.

This provides representation in every branch of the Military Committee's activities.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff are similarly represented by one Brigadier and one Group Captain. The First Economic Secretary at Canada House—Mr. A. E. Ritchie, is Canada's representative on the Supply Board.

In their work the United States and Canadian Staffs are active observers, making suggestions where appropriate, offering informal comments, and making formal statements on occasions based on guidance from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff (whom they keep fully informed). But, being accredited on a non-membership basis, they do not sign any papers or endorse any conclusions or recommendations.

By invitation, the Head of the U.S. Delegation used to attend W.U.C.O.S. meetings and, occasionally in the early stages, Commanders-in-Chief Committee meetings. In October, 1948, the Five Powers formally invited U.S. participation in the work of the Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee, and at the end of December, 1948, the U.S. Military Commander in Germany was designated for this duty. He is, likewise, answerable to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff representative attends W.U.C.O.S. meetings by invitation.

Through D.E.L.W.U. and Canadian participation, planning has been enabled to proceed on sound lines, taking into account U.S. views, in particular as regards the U.S. Forces in Europe. It has been possible to avoid many assumptions which would otherwise have had to be made and which would have robbed much of the work of the Western Union Defence Organization of reality.

#### GENERAL REMARKS

I would like to conclude by putting before you some lessons that I have learnt during the past year. It is never very easy to start a new organization from scratch. It is obviously less easy when that organization involves five nations.

The organization which I have described may prove to have a great significance in the history of attempts by mankind to organize and guarantee World peace. In the past, such efforts have invariably depended upon the attempt to superimpose at the beginning a superior organization, such as the League of Nations, upon the existing Governments of Treaty Powers. In the present case, the approach to the problem is different. Activated by a common fear, the Western European Powers formed a military organization to strengthen their combined defence. The requirements of military co-operation at once involved supply and financial questions. Political co-operation at all levels inevitably followed. In this organization, therefore, there is an element of evolution, and it is by the evolutionary process that the affairs of mankind, and of nations, are most readily settled.

Let me say at once that we have made admirable, in fact, remarkable progress, far beyond what is normally considered possible in peacetime. Indeed, we have achieved results that fifteen or twenty years ago would have appeared impossible to attain on this international basis. We take pride in the fact that from the start of our work there has always been complete and absolute agreement concerning the fundamental strategic conception for the defence of Western Europe.

You will not expect me, for reasons of security, to go into any details concerning the progress made. But I can tell you that in the spheres of planning and preparation, and of standardization of operational procedures and of equipment, the results already achieved are most significant. I am therefore extremely optimistic concerning the future of Western Union co-operation and integration.

It would, however, be quite wrong to give the impression that this organization has and does always work with complete harmony and smoothness. It has not. It must be obvious that any international organization in peacetime meets troubles

and difficulties. Under peace conditions, nations are particularly conscious of their individual sovereignties and of their national pride. Moreover, in approaching many problems, national attitudes are affected by individuality of language, tradition and customs. These variances are not easily swept away. It has been a difficult year. But it is quite clear to me that *provided the problem is understood*, and provided nations will face up bravely and with *good intentions* to the difficulties and "snags," then it is fully possible to reach agreed solutions and to make progress in building up united strength in Western Europe. Let us examine some of the requirements that are necessary if we are to succeed in this great task. I will deal with these requirements from the point of view of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee.

## REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESS

### I. CLEAR POLITICAL DIRECTION AND DECISIONS

Immense difficulties arise when five nations decide to co-operate closely in peacetime in political, economic and military spheres. Close co-operation should be far easier to achieve quickly in the military sphere than in the economic sphere. But to achieve progress in the military sphere, political direction and decisions are an essential prerequisite. Lack of direction, and political indecision or hesitation, are fatal to progress of any kind.

The real difficulties begin when generalities are left behind and concrete measures have to be taken. It is one thing to agree politically to co-operate in a Pact or Union; it is quite another thing, and far more difficult, to implement that decision by practical measures. There must come a time when principles have actually to be applied in practice. That is the time when those responsible for taking practical measures need help and sympathetic guidance from their political chiefs. Political decisions will be required on points which were unforeseen before the detailed examination of the problem began; these decisions need to be given promptly when asked for.

Therefore the first and great requirement is clear political direction, and political decisions without delay when asked for.

### 2. RAPID AND PRECISE DECISIONS FROM A SUPERIOR BODY

From a purely military point of view, there are grave disadvantages in the committee system of management. In all but the highest levels the military custom is to examine a problem in all its aspects, and then for a Commander to give a decision. Occasionally it is necessary to seek a decision or ruling from a senior authority. Once the decision is given the staff machinery can go straight into action to achieve the desired object. Relative to this, an international committee system is complex, cumbersome and slow.

It has been decided that for planning purposes we are to work on the assumption that *in wartime* there will be a Supreme Commander with three Commanders-in-Chief under him. But in peacetime the present committee system has got to be made to work in our Command organization.

The Western Europe Commanders-in-Chief Organization is an international and inter-Service set-up. It is essential that there should be a superior body which is capable of producing rapid and very precise decisions when required. When, for example, the Western Europe Commanders-in-Chief Committee find that they cannot agree on any given matter, the subject is referred to the Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee (and ultimately, if necessary, to the Western Union Defence Ministers) for decision. Such cases must be dealt with rapidly, and the decision given

must be definite, very clearly defined, and final. Once given, the decision must be accepted loyally by all concerned. Only in this way can efficiency and confidence be maintained.

### 3. THE NEED TO BE INTERNATIONAL

For reasons which should now be clear, I believe it to be an essential condition for success that the members of the Western Europe Commanders-in-Chief Organization must hold the status of international servants. They are required to consider their problems from an objective and overall point of view, and have to be careful to avoid any tendency to be influenced by local national arguments in their countries of birth. It is thus of first importance that they should be relieved of any purely national appointment. Any attempt to combine responsible international status with local national responsibility undermines confidence in the impartial character of the Organization and, at the same time, causes confusion in the hierarchy and Armed Forces of the country concerned.

Every problem must be viewed through European eyes in the first instance. If a closer view is needed it must be through an international telescope—and through the right end of it; any attempt to use a national telescope can never be permitted.

The international spirit must grow and develop; if it does not we cannot succeed. There is no place in our Organization for anyone who says: "Only a French officer can do this"; or "only a British officer can do that." And similarly for other nations. There can be only one qualification for any task and that is "ability to do the job." The best man must be chosen in every case and it should not matter in the least what his nationality is. The approach to every problem must be truly international.

A good safe way to be truly international is never to see Ministers of your own Nation, unless they themselves ask to see you. I frequently visit the Ministers of the Continental nations of the Western Union. In order to have a clear conscience I never visit British Ministers. And, very wisely and quite rightly, British Ministers never ask to see me: I would like to see this procedure adopted.

### 4. POOLING OF SOVEREIGNTY

When nations decide to co-operate for a common cause, they will never get real and effective co-operation unless each is prepared to suffer, if necessary, some small loss of sovereignty. It is quite illogical for nations to agree on a common cause and then not to pool their sovereignty in order to pursue that cause, when it may well be a matter of life and death to them. Hesitation, timidity and a failure to face facts in this respect, might well mean disaster for everyone.

### 5. POOLING OF RESOURCES

Can any one nation say that through its membership of Western Union it has saved much in money or in manpower in re-shaping its military Forces?

If each nation is to continue to strive for self-sufficiency in defence, what value will it get from the Western Union? No nation in the Western Union is strong enough *by itself* to deter an aggressor, let alone to stand up against attack; the defence of its homelands can no longer be considered in isolation. The territories of the Western Union must be regarded as *one comprehensive whole*. This implies a joint system of defence and the building up of united strength. This in turn implies the pooling of resources. The pooling of resources may involve certain risks in that some one



Ally might fail ; but the risks must be taken. The only alternative is for each nation to be self-sufficient in defence ; this is clearly impossible in any case.

Unless a nation is prepared to accept the risks involved in a joint system of defence, the benefits of a defensive alliance will be greatly lessened. There is no place in our Organization for the reluctant partner.

#### 6. CONFIDENCE AND MUTUAL TRUST

It is essential that each nation should have faith in the sincerity, good intentions, and wholehearted co-operation of the others. Once a nation conceals things, or is not frank and open, or hesitates when it becomes necessary to take practical measures to implement agreed principles, then suspicion creeps in ; and once that happens the results may be catastrophic.

The only sound Allied motto is :—

“ One for all, and all for one.”

There must be no ambiguity. We must all mean what we say, and say what we mean.

#### 7. PROPER LINGUISTIC QUALIFICATIONS

It has become very apparent that the members of the working staffs must have adequate linguistic qualifications to enable them to work together with sympathy and understanding. We have learnt by experience that differences of language can lead to great misunderstandings, which sometimes require considerable efforts to resolve. Two languages are used, English and French.

In my view it is essential that nations should set and demand a high standard in their interpreter examinations. I am doubtful if this is done at present in all cases.

#### 8. A FINAL REQUIREMENT

A final requirement, equal in importance to any of the others, is that we must all have a very clear realization of the truth contained in the old proverb :—

“ God helps those who help themselves.”<sup>a</sup>

It is rather well put in J. de la Veprie's *Les Proverbes Communs*, printed in Paris about the year 1498 :—

“ Ayde toy dieu taidera.”

We must not develop a tendency to look across the Atlantic and say we cannot do this, or we cannot do that, unless America will *first* do something else. *We* must all act first and must get on with the job. Our friends will rally to our support in their own good time, and will do so with greater eagerness when they see we are taking every possible step to help ourselves.

#### CONCLUSION

In conclusion I would like to say again that I am full of hope and optimism about the future of Western Union Defence. Our triumphant cry should be :—

“ Strength through Unity.”

And this strength can easily be obtained given an international outlook, faith in the task, and whole-hearted unselfish co-operation—all leading to Unity.

<sup>a</sup> See *Oullandish Proverbs*, selected by George Herbert, 1640.

## DISCUSSION

LIEUT.-COLONEL TOBIN: Are Spain and Germany being considered in the Western Union?

THE LECTURER: The inclusion of any nation or any group of nations in the Western Union has nothing whatever to do with me or with any military authority. It is entirely a political matter. We work on the basis laid down by the Foreign Ministers. So far they have given us five nations, and we work with those five nations.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET LORD CORK AND ORRERY: I was not clear about the relationship between the Western Union Commanders-in-Chief Committee and W.U.C.O.S. I understood that if the Western Union Commanders-in-Chief cannot decide on a question, they pass it to W.U.C.O.S.; but surely that is referring a question which they cannot decide to their own staff officers?

THE LECTURER: No; W.U.C.O.S. are not my staff officers. I often wish they were, but they are not! They are a superior body composed of the national Chiefs of Staff of the five nations. The members of W.U.C.O.S. are the British Chiefs of Staff, French Chiefs of Staff, Belgian Chiefs of Staff, Dutch Chiefs of Staff and the Luxembourg Chief of Staff. Normally only one national Chief of Staff attends W.U.C.O.S. meetings and he represents the Chiefs of Staff of his Country. Thus when W.U.C.O.S. are sitting they represent the military side of the five nations. They must, therefore, give my organization answers on military matters, and if we want an answer on a political question, it is put up through W.U.C.O.S. to the Ministers of Defence.

ADMIRAL SIR PLUNKETT E. E. DRAX: In view of the large number of persons in the whole Organization, is not it a matter of some difficulty to prevent the leakage of official secrets?

THE LECTURER: I rather hoped that I had conveyed the impression that the numbers in the Organization were amazingly small. I am sorry that you think they are large!

In our whole set-up, which is combined headquarters and operational headquarters for the defence of Western Europe—planning and everything else—the total is 150 staff officers drawn from five nations. I think that is extremely small. You withdraw that remark?<sup>2</sup>

As to the second part of the question, secrecy is, of course, a great problem in any superior military organization. But, as is quite normal, certain matters do not go down below certain levels. We have found—I have my own Chief of Staff here and the Secretary-General of the Military Committee and they can confirm whether I am right—that during the year we have been in operation, there has not been one single leak of secrecy in our business.

(The Chief of Staff and Secretary-General of the Military Committee who were present agreed that that was the case.)

On my staff and in the whole of the combined set-up there are five nations—British, French, Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg—and the same applies to the Military Committee at 36 Whitehall. There has been no leak in any way of secrecy anywhere and I must say that I think that is good.

COMMANDER T. B. R. WOODROOFE, R.N.: Can the Lecturer say anything about the geographical limits, if I may put it that way, of Western Europe? In other words, what are you defending? Are you defending Italy, for instance?

THE LECTURER: My Organization is defending the territory assigned to us by our political chiefs at the top. We are defending the territories of the five Western Union nations. We are quite willing to defend anything else that our political chiefs may give us, but at the moment we are defending five nations.

<sup>2</sup> Admiral Drax subsequently explained that he had in mind, not only the 150 officers, but the politicians, secretaries, typists, etc., associated with the Organization.

**MAJOR JOHN NORTH :** Is there a distinction between Western Europe Commanders-in-Chief and the Western Union Commanders-in-Chief ?

**THE LECTURER :** Our Committee has always been the Western Europe Committee and perhaps my Chief of Staff will tell me why !

**THE CHIEF OF STAFF :** The reason is to avoid confusion, since Western Union has wider geographical commitments than the C.s-in-C.

**CAPTAIN G. R. M. CLIFT, R.A. :** Is there any intention to set up an Allied Services Staff College ?

**THE LECTURER :** I should not, personally, subscribe to that. I think that at the moment we are going on very nicely. We all send students to each other's staff colleges and other schools ; in addition, the harmonization of tactical methods, weapons and so on is all being thoroughly handled within our existing Organization. But, of course, one cannot change the character of a nation. Some nations fight in one way, others in another ; and no nation would tell another that it must not fight in its own way any more. My answer to your question would be " No, not at the moment."

**CAPTAIN E. ALTHAM, R.N. :** The Field-Marshal has given us a very clear description of the Western Union Organization, but I wonder whether he could make it even more clear that it is a very different ' outfit ' from that fatal idealism known as " Collective Security."

He has emphasized that the whole success of the existing Defence Organization depends upon each of the nations participating. From what I recollect of the " Collective Security " scheme it turned out to be collective weakness with everybody relying on the other chap to produce the strength. May we take it that the Western Union is entirely different in that we do not rely on anything ' collective ' except collective strength ?

**THE LECTURER :** That is a very good point. You will understand, of course, that the Western Union is an inter-allied integrated organization. You will also understand that the Western Europe command is quite definitely an operationally integrated command organization, and we regard the whole of the Western Union as one front. Nobody bothers which part of it is French, Belgian, Dutch or anything else. It does not make the slightest difference. It is one operational whole. It is the first time in history, to my knowledge, that this has happened between five nations. On previous occasions we have gone in for collective security with everybody hoping for the best. We hope for the best this time, but with a difference, for now we have a properly integrated organization whose responsibility it is to see that we make the best use of our joint resources. As there is no precedent for such an organization we have had to feel our way very carefully, but now we have been going a year we have learned a great deal.

**GROUP CAPTAIN A. F. BRITTON :** As I understood the position, the control which you have of the Air Force only extends to fighter and tactical air forces. Bearing in mind that there is no tactical air force in the Royal Air Force at the present time, do you consider that that extent of control is sufficient in scope ?

**THE LECTURER :** I am only too pleased to pass that question to the Air Commander-in-Chief !

**AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JAMES ROBB :** The tactical air force which we require for our purpose is based on the Royal Air Force in Germany. It is not a tactical air force of the old description of which you are aware—First, Second, and so on. It is a tactical air force in B.A.F.O.

**BRIGADIER F. C. CURTIS :** May I revert to the distinction between Western Europe and Western Union ? I think that the title of the Commanders-in-Chief may reflect the fact that their responsibilities are more particularly concerned with a certain area, whereas interests of the Western Union Countries do exist outside that area.

**REAR-ADMIRAL R. M. DICK :** I am not, I fear, asking a question, but I should like to make clear that there is a naval side to this point. As the Field-Marshal has told us,

Western Union does take in the whole of the geographical interests of the Countries which, of course, includes the question of sea lanes of the North Atlantic, as well as the approaches to what one might call the Continental Theatre of Western Europe. Certainly from the naval point of view I think that is one of the reasons why in the Navy we find that differentiation between the broader Western Union definition and the more precise Western Europe nomenclature a valuable one.

THE CHAIRMAN : Do you think that you will ever get a Commander-in-Chief Naval Forces as you have for land and air forces ?

THE LECTURER : My view would be no, because the Supreme Commander in Western Europe cannot be concerned with the great sea lanes of communication.

The Flag Officer is concerned with the ports and the approaches to the ports. He is also concerned with minesweeping and anti-submarine work. What he is called does not matter : he might be called the Naval Commander-in-Chief ; but he cannot possibly exercise command over a great naval force in the Atlantic and over the great sea lanes.

REAR-ADMIRAL R. M. DICK : The reason that the Flag Officer was not called Naval Commander-in-Chief was in order to make precisely that differentiation between operational control and his post which is an advisory one.

THE LECTURER : He is not a Commander-in-Chief in the sense that other Commanders-in-Chief are. They automatically take command of land and sea forces of Western Europe on the outbreak of war, but he cannot take command of the naval forces.

GROUP CAPTAIN D. I. COOTE : Is it true that each nation will retain responsibility for the air defence of its own home territory ?

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JAMES ROBB (in reply) : I am not prepared to give any details at the present time. All I need say is that comparatively recently the air defence of Benelux countries and North Eastern France has been placed under the command of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Western Europe.

MAJOR A. F. J. G. JACKSON : Might I ask if there is any eventual intention to provide Western Union with troops in some form ? I am thinking particularly of an experimental infantry division, because it seems to me that in that way we should more quickly get an international outlook of the kind to which the Lecturer has already referred as being so important.

THE LECTURER : Do you mean that we ought to form a Western Union division composed of elements of five nations ?

MAJOR A. F. J. G. JACKSON : Yes, as an experiment.

THE LECTURER : I think that is one of the things which may come, but at present I think that it would be better to have British divisions, French divisions, Dutch divisions, Belgian divisions and Luxembourg battalions (they do not have divisions). Perhaps in a few years time we may have a Western Union division, but not yet.

MAJOR F. R. WEBSTER : I am not clear as to how American Forces would fit in with the set-up. There is the Commander-in-Chief, Western Union Land Forces, who would duly have command in the event of war, but if the Americans brought in a large number of troops, how will that command set-up be adjusted ?

THE LECTURER : In peace time you have a Chairman of the Committee and in war time a Supreme Commander with three Commanders-in-Chief under him. That command organization would handle any forces allotted to them in Western Europe—land, air or sea of whatever nation. The Western Union is a region in the wider Atlantic Pact umbrella. Whatever forces were put into Western Europe, they would fight under this command organization.

CAPTAIN P. W. HODGENS : Might I ask the Lecturer whether there is any representation or observers from the other dominions apart from Canada at Fontainebleau ?



**THE LECTURER:** I do not think that we have any nations represented at Fontainebleau except those which have forces in the continent of Europe. The only forces in Western Europe apart from ourselves are American, so they have Liaison Officers at Fontainebleau. There is a proper organization for full Dominion consultation in defence matters through the national Chiefs of Staff, and that would be the normal way for them to come in on this business.

#### THE CHAIRMAN

No doubt you will agree with me that we have had a most interesting and instructive talk from the Field-Marshal.

It is obvious from what he said that the whole Organization of the set-up is very complex. I imagine that there are trip-wires in every direction, but it seems to me—if I may presume to say so—that you, Sir, have in the short time in which you have occupied this office, gone a very long way towards achieving what in the old days we used to think was impossible, that is the surrender of a certain amount of sovereignty and the pulling together in the same direction.

I am sure that it is your wish that I should propose a hearty vote of thanks to the Field-Marshal for his most interesting and instructive lecture.

The vote of thanks was carried by acclamation.

**THE LECTURER:** Thank you very much indeed.

## THE AMERICA AND WEST INDIES SQUADRON

By ADMIRAL SIR WILLIAM TENNANT, K.C.B., C.B.E., M.V.O.

On Wednesday, 19th October, 1949, at 3.0 p.m.

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN EDELSTEN, K.C.B., C.B.E., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not think the Lecturer needs any introduction from me. He has had a very distinguished career full of high-lights. For the last two and a half years he has been, as you probably know, Commander-in-Chief of the America and West Indies Station. I should like to make two remarks on his period out there, because I think they are appropriate. On one occasion he received the thanks of the Foreign Secretary. On a subsequent occasion he received the thanks of the Prime Minister. I think this is unique, and shows, as we would all expect, that, even in peace conditions, you cannot keep a good man down.

### LECTURE

THE America and West Indies Station, with its six ships and something over 30,000 miles of coastline—omitting that of the innumerable islands on the Station—entails by far the greatest steaming of any ships in the Royal Navy and, owing to the smallness of the Squadron, it is perhaps less well-known in the Navy as a whole, and certainly I feel sure by the civilian ashore, than any other part of the World where it is the duty of the Royal Navy to "Show the Flag."

It is delightful, in these days of austerity at home, to spend two years always in lands of plenty and nearly always in warm and sometimes calm seas. Possibly there are some without great knowledge of the Station who picture the life out there as a glorious one of rushing from one cocktail party to another. In this there is some truth, but there is a good deal more besides. I calculate, as a rough estimate, that H.M.S. "Sheffield's" officers entertained on board, during her two years commission on the Station, something in the neighbourhood of 15,000 people, and that some 175,000 came on board and walked over the ship when she was open to visitors.

Figures are dull at the best of times and I should hate to inflict you with the number of speeches in French, English and Spanish made by the Admiral, Captains and some of the senior officers during these two years. But they would be considerable and entail a great deal of work and thought. In this connection, however inefficient the speaker may be in Spanish or French, it is quite amazing how it pleases the average Latin American or French Canadian audience if an Englishman makes some attempt at talking to them in their language.

As you all know, the Squadron consisted of two cruisers and four frigates, reduced now to one cruiser and three frigates, and the base is Bermuda. Subject to the approval of the Admiralty and the guidance of the Foreign Office, it is up to the Commander-in-Chief to arrange for that force to visit all the more important ports on the Station. He is, of course, also guided by the Ambassadors and Ministers and Governors, who are in all cases asked to recommend what ports in their territories should receive a visit. The normal routine is that the Squadron spends five months of the year at Bermuda and the remaining seven months cruising. The frigates to a large extent carry out the same routine and the same cruises with special regard to the lesser ports, with the proviso that there is always at least one in the Caribbean Area or at Bermuda in case of any emergency in the British West Indian Islands.

Life abroad on a foreign station now assumes a very different complexion for both officers and men, since they are permitted, provided accommodation can be found, to have their wives on the Station, and are given a free passage for them

each way and, in addition, the Admiralty have made generous Overseas Lodging Allowances to enable the families to compete with the ever-rising cost of living. Cost of living is to-day, I suppose, the greatest drawback of this Station. Rents asked for the smallest cottage in Bermuda are fantastic, and in some cases they are many times the rents that would be asked for similar quarters in the United Kingdom.

The old Dockyard at Bermuda began its life in 1807 and was principally built between about 1820 and 1840, and much has remained largely unchanged ever since. Some of the old casemates and stores with their walls ten to twelve feet thick, and the gallows where offending prisoners were strung up, remain to this day.

The fantastic wages paid for labour in Bermuda, as in all parts of the Station, is undoubtedly one of the reasons that adds to Europe's difficulties in the prices they have to pay for imports, the costs of which are always rising.

#### NEWFOUNDLAND

Newfoundland will always be remembered for the large and important part it played in the Battle of the Atlantic during the War. If you settle there, you will get free wood and free fish, and those of us who visited it between June and September can strongly recommend it. But the Winter is long and wearisome and life somewhat of a struggle. Fish, lumber and some iron ore are its only staple products, and the Island has generally been a drain on the Exchequer which, after the recent plebiscite, will now be laid at Canada's door.

There is a distressing amount of tuberculosis in the northern part of the Island, largely accounted for by little ventilation in the houses in Winter and lack of vegetables. But the Grenfell Mission has done what it can to alleviate this. Incidentally, off the tip of Newfoundland in the Summer one can always rely on a good display of icebergs—excellent free targets for the guns.

The centre of the Island to-day is till largely unexplored. If one goes on fishing trips up some of the rivers—a slow process in small canoes (one moment one would be shooting rapids and another getting out and hauling them up the shallows)—one realizes that this is the only means of communication between many parts of the Island.

Newfoundland abounds with very fine harbours, and many of its inhabitants are good seamen. The "Sheffield" invited 150 children at St. Johns to come to a children's party on board. One thousand came, due to an over-enthusiastic broadcaster ashore.

#### CANADA

Let us now move on to Canada, although it will be only to the coastline and river section of that vast Dominion, as seen from the sailor's eyes. East and West, both in climate and the people who live there, are as different as the British South African to the Australian. At Halifax (Nova Scotia) one is nearer to Great Britain than one is to Vancouver, and so it is not difficult to understand that parts of the same Country so far apart and connected only by a comparatively narrow strip of habitable territory, are bound to be very different.

The Eastern States of Canada are, I think it can be said, evolving rather faster than those of the West. While thoroughly loyal to the King, they are at the same time keen to have "O Canada" played whenever possible in addition to the National Anthem, and when one goes up the river to Quebec and Montreal one is confronted with the strange sensitiveness of the French-speaking Canadians. Go into a shop

in Quebec and ask in even the worst French for something you want ; the shopkeeper, after replying in French, will break into English and do anything for you. But if you go in and start talking English you will either be served last or be told they have not got any of it. French-speaking Canadians are in a peculiar position : while they admire France and French fashions, they broke adrift from France and have no desire to go back. Neither have they any desire to join up with the United States and, little as they collectively love Great Britain, the one thing they do not want is to be under Ontario. Therefore, their present somewhat aloof position is undoubtedly the arrangement that suits them best.

Our reception was not too enthusiastic, but after a few days when they began to know the sailor they warmed up to him and were, I think, very sorry to see us go.

Montreal is so vast and so rich that the impact of one cruiser makes remarkably little impression on the city, but it is magnificent and undoubtedly a visit by a cruiser of the Squadron yearly, and by the flagship every two years, does something to remind them of the Old Country.

While we are up in these latitudes let us go over to the West Coast of Canada. British Columbia, as I mentioned earlier, is totally different in every way and I fancy the people are a democratic version of what people at home were like fifty to seventy years ago. Their affection for the Union Jack is of a very high order. There is a part of Vancouver Island where a large number of retired officers and Civil Servants have settled. Except that it rains most of the year, the climate is delightful and never very cold and never very hot. Timber, fish, and some coal are the chief products. Farming is losing ground due to the very high wages asked, and so more and more people live on tins from Texas. Parts of the Old Dockyard of Esquimalt were first put in commission about 1850, and have been occupied, off and on, ever since. It has now been taken over by the Royal Canadian Navy, and to-day Esquimalt has one of the largest dry-docks in the World.

A striking difference, I think, between England and Canada is that in England we talk of places a hundred miles away and things that are a thousand years old, whereas in Canada—and the States too for that matter—people talk of things that are a hundred years old and of places which are a thousand miles away.

The one outstanding feature with which I was particularly struck in Vancouver Island and to a lesser degree Vancouver itself, besides the magnificent scenery, was the excellence of the gardens and the keenness of everyone apparently to make a good show in his garden.

Everywhere we went in Canada the Royal Canadian Navy were our principal hosts. All their senior officers, having been brought up in the Royal Navy, talked in every way the same language, and they could not have done more to welcome both officers and men of our ships.

#### THE UNITED STATES

Between the "Sheffield," "Kenya," "Glasgow" and the frigates, all the principal ports of the United States were visited during our time on the Station. Unhappily, when the temporary axe fell, reducing my Squadron, like all others, the "Kenya" and two frigates were taken away, and this has now happened again.

The great bond in the War between the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy does not seem to be waning at all. Invariably after the exchange of calls, the Admiral Com-



manding the Base arranged a Reception at which all officers would have an opportunity to make friends ashore ; and again during nearly all visits a dance was arranged for the Ship's Company on two separate nights to cater for each watch early in the visit.

One of the early duties of the Senior Officer arriving in any American port is to interview the Press ; depending on the local popular enthusiasm caused by the visit, the number of reporters might be anything from two to twenty-five. This always provided an opportunity for the Senior Officer to get across anything he had in mind that would foster Anglo-United States relations. In most American ports one found, particularly among the older generation, a full appreciation of what Britain had done for civilization—mainly single-handed between 1939 and 1943, and I think it may be said that this is realized far more than the Press shows. As Mr. Hoffman expressed it the other day, the great mass of Americans entertain towards us feelings of deep and abiding friendship. In my speeches I occasionally reminded them of the young candidate for the Foreign Office who was asked what are the three most important things in life and he replied : " God, Love and Anglo-American relations." He Passed.

Unfortunately in this great Country of contrasts the Press differs as much as anything else. Quite frightful things are said about us by a section of the Press in New York, where cinemas showing British films were recently being picketed, and shops selling obviously British made goods also had pickets at their doors in an attempt to turn buyers away—though they did not seem to be achieving a great deal. A prominent Chicago Daily editor was even paid for putting in an anti-British article on the front page throughout the War.

By our standards even the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* are not real national papers and only reach a very small proportion of the population. Other papers are relatively local and it is not they but the columnists, who are syndicated all over the Country, who are potentially dangerous. Anything taken up by major agencies, such as the United Press, or especially on the radio, is of course a more serious matter.

We were actually in New York at the time when feeling was running pretty high over the Palestine situation—distressing evidence of what newspaper propaganda can achieve, for I am very sure that many of the people who were reading the vitriolic stuff about Britain's enormities in that Country had little knowledge of its very existence some ten years ago.

Suppression of news may be as harmful as lying propaganda. On one occasion one of my officers, at a dinner party in Bermuda, was asked by his next door neighbour—an American woman, how it was, when the invasion of Normandy took place, no British troops took part in it. More recently, when we were over on the West Coast, the local papers quoted 18th September as the day the United States signed the treaty of peace with Japan. Therefore on every public occasion, and there were a good many at which one had to make speeches in the States, one always tried to make some reference to the effort made by Great Britain and the Commonwealth during the War in the early days before the United States came in.

#### THE U.S. NAVY

In several of the principal ports we entered we would find a " Mothball " fleet as it was called ; ships tucked away in reserve with no men on board, of a size corresponding to the total of Britain's naval strength to-day. In one port alone we

counted about forty-five carriers, and in another one would see about the same number of cruisers.

On some occasions we were able to work with ships of their active fleet and frequently they supplied us with aerial targets. Everything we ever asked them to do was done with the greatest readiness and efficiency.

#### EAST COAST PORTS

Of the principal East Coast ports, Boston greatly resembles our North Country. The city has a large Irish element and, while they refitted large numbers of ships during the War and are perhaps more closely akin to the British than any other part of the Country, that element was the only sign we found of hostility to us in all our travels around their Country. The Commanding Admiral of the District remarked to me that he could think of no better way to improve Anglo-American relations than to send a cruiser with such a fine ship's company into their ports.

We next went to New York—that fantastic city which, when it lights up half an hour after sunset, is perhaps one of the most picturesque sights that it can fall to the lot of the sailor to see. But it is so vast that even the largest cruiser is lost there. The Press was kind to us, and those papers which did not want to make any reference to our visit just left us out altogether, but on the whole we had a remarkably good reception.

The whirl of the States was very well shown when I was taken to call on the Mayor—a journey from the quayside which normally takes say up to forty minutes was achieved in the middle of the forenoon with screaming outriders passing across all centres of traffic, disregarding lights whether red or green, in a matter of about eight minutes. While we were in New York several speeches fell to my lot and, amongst others, one to the Chamber of Commerce. One of their most treasured possessions is the Charter given them by George III, whose picture and those of the earlier Presidents of the Chamber of Commerce adorn their magnificent Meeting Hall to this day.

I fancy the combined capital owned by my audience at lunch would probably have exceeded the national revenue of several of the countries of Europe.

During the five or six days we were in New York, the Jew element, who were trying to work up their hatred of Britain, dropped leaflets containing such things as: "Have nothing to do with the Pirates of the Palestine coast!" Their efforts were a complete failure, and all that we ever saw or heard of them were a few boos in the distance when the American Admiral and I, followed by several of my officers, went into a large dance given by War Veterans in the Armoury Hall.

Following New York was a visit to Washington and here the "Snipe" took my flag and acted as a platform for calls and exchange of calls with the American Government and Chiefs of Staff. The result of this was that she fired salutes amounting to some 184 guns during the first day. Hearing these, an American lady remarked, "What are these British doing up here, are they taking Washington again?"

During one of the calls, I was talking to Mr. Forrestal, who I had previously met when he was head of their Navy, and who was now Secretary for Defence, and he was saying how much good our visit did, when he remarked, "Admiral, I think it is a great pity you cannot steam your ship into the Middle West."

Norfolk, Virginia, I think, requires special mention. In addition to being a Naval Base about the size of Portsmouth and Plymouth combined, the civil side of the port consider themselves, with some pride, to be far nearer the English than any

of the rest of the United States, and the Mayor shows you with great pride his Mace, given by the Lord Mayor of London years ago in the early Colonial days.

All down the East Coast they have a thirst for speeches and addresses, and one soon has to learn to get used to this and not let it spoil your meal, for otherwise one would go hungry.

#### WEST COAST

On the West Coast one found several brand new beautifully fitted up and efficient naval bases and vast fleets laid up in reserve. The kindnesses and apparent pleasure in receiving the British Navy again were most charming. The visits of the "Kenya" and the "Sheffield," "Snipe" and "Sparrow" were the only opportunities there had been since the war days, when many ships went to their ports to be refitted. On one occasion when visiting a naval base, the White Ensign was flown from the flagstaff throughout the hours we were present.

Weshall remember Los Angeles from the XXth Century Fox and the Constitution aircraft. With Long Beach and San Pedro, which all run into each other, they are, I think, unique in the World to-day, for they are some forty miles by twenty of nothing but numbered, perfectly straight streets of bungalows. When you drive anywhere it never seems to be less than twenty-five miles—all quite hideous and no gardens. Oil pumps pump, day and night, in the back yards of the houses in the Long Beach area. Here there has been built a magnificent harbour and Naval Yard during the War. The population of this area is said to be increasing at the rate of 2,000 a month, but I never before saw a town which seemed to have less roots in the ground than this conglomeration. In this ever-growing city it is being seriously discussed whether water in the future will have to be piped some 600 miles from rivers further North.

It is said that in 1840 the State of Oregon was lost to Canada and went to the U.S.A. because, as one of the voters said, "the salmon of that coast would not take the fly." Here, undoubtedly, the sailors were particularly welcome and our visit did much I fancy to strengthen the ties between the State and the Old Country.

We must not leave the United States without some reference to their totally different country of the Mississippi area. The old French section of New Orleans is of the greatest interest, with beautiful old French architecture. I believe Louisiana was sold by Napoleon for twopence an acre. Their French interests continue to be very strong to this day, notably in the Mardi Gras celebrations. These are fantastic: I believe it costs "the king," who has to deck-out all his courtiers, at least \$20,000, and certainly the display would, I think, make Henry VIII's Field of the Cloth of Gold look very small.

#### LATIN AMERICA

##### MEXICO

Here we will leave the United States and move on to the Southern and Latin American countries, starting with Mexico. It was many years since an official visit had been made by a British Commander-in-Chief to Mexico City and we were not too certain of our welcome. The confiscation of British oil interests and of affairs and estates owned by foreigners, though of the past, had not been entirely forgotten. In spite of this, our welcome in Mexico City seemed to out-do or certainly rival any other that we had on the Station.

The Press seemed very anxious to make an event of our visit. Sixty-five attended the Conference at the Embassy and they seemed to appreciate my halting Spanish. Thousands appeared, quite unexpected by the police, at the usual wreath-laying ceremony on the National Monument. The "Sheffield's" Guard and Band had a great reception, and we were all very nearly swamped.

A very good official reception was given by the Foreign Secretary to which 800 people were invited. All his invitations, including those sent to the foreign representatives, appeared to have been accepted except by the Guatemalan who had unfortunately a cold in the head!

A few days later another very successful ball was given by the British Ambassador at which Admirals, Generals and Ambassadors could be seen dancing the conga round the British Embassy, where such an event had not taken place, I was informed, for thirty years. Again all the foreign missions were present save the Guatemalan who, we were given to understand, was very incensed at Mexico giving such a welcome to the hated "Sheffield," which ship had taken such a prominent part recently in the "Belize incident." In fact, I heard later that after we had left Guatemala made a formal protest to the Mexican Government on this score, but I fancy they did not get much change.

#### CENTRAL AMERICA

The Central American countries are difficult to keep in step with politically, and there is not much love lost between them. It is said that the President of Guatemala would like to be the dictator of that area. The division is approximately Guatemala, Cuba and Costa Rica on the one hand; and on the other Honduras, Nicaragua and Santo Domingo. In the middle of the road, to-day, are Mexico, Colombia, Salvador and Venezuela. Revolutions are liable to happen at any time; my Flag Captain and I got into the middle of one in Panama one evening when we were returning from the British Legation.

One had the impression that Colombia was the most stable of them all until they were made to look so foolish when a revolution broke out during their International Conference at Bogota. There is much jealousy and manœuvring for position between Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. There is no love at all lost between Dominica and Venezuela—and so it goes on.

#### VENEZUELA

I was told to go in the "Sheffield" to La Guaira, and then on to Caracas for the inauguration of the popularly elected President. Some forty nations were present and it was six days of eternal receptions, wearing the hottest and most uncomfortable of rigs. For the part that Great Britain played in the support of Simon Bolivar, British troops and sailors to this day are allowed to march in the streets of Caracas with their bayonets fixed, and they did so again on this occasion, and put up a very fine performance.

The whole affair reminded one more of the Congress of Vienna than of this modern and austere age, with the picturesque uniforms from the last Century and the stars of scores of orders. The women's dresses were mostly from Paris for the occasion.

After such a fine send-off the President's removal from office some months later was rather an anti-climax.



## COLOMBIA

In Colombia their Navy talked unceasingly of the British Naval Mission, which, until the beginning of the late war, had run it; and many were the regrets one heard from those who wished it had continued to this day. If Colombia ever took its naval requirements seriously, they would be great, for it has its Caribbean and Pacific seaboard and its shipping in the upper regions of the Amazon.

## THE BELIZE INCIDENT

The "Sheffield" was at Cartagena and I had gone up to carry out my official duty at Bogota—the capital (9,000 feet up), when an order reached her from the Admiralty saying that she was to sail immediately for Belize with the Commander-in-Chief on board. On passage she was rapidly converted from polish and pipeclay and showing the flag to a ship of war once again. Landing parties were mustered and equipped, and bombardment shells fused. The immediate programme ahead was cancelled. The Governor of British Honduras was told that the "Sheffield" could land two platoons and still be ready for bombardment.

It became obvious that troops would be required, and happily the "Devonshire" with Cadets on board was at Antigua. The Admiralty very shortly ordered her to Jamaica to fill up with troops, stores and equipment.

The "Sheffield" arrived at Belize after a 26-knot passage to find the place looking very peaceful—one always expects to find a place otherwise after a rapid passage and an impending emergency. I at once had a meeting with the Governor and his officials and the Commander of the local volunteer forces and the Chief of Police.

The news from Guatemala city was confused and certainly not good. They had then some aircraft capable of transporting a few hundred soldiers and, if they arrived on the aerodrome, Belize would be theirs until we had mustered sufficient forces to eject them. It was obvious, therefore, that the first thing was to prevent an air "bolt from the blue"; and to provide defences for the aerodrome. This the Royal Marines did shortly after arrival. Fortunately the aerodrome is in the dry ground behind the mangrove swamp out of which the little wooden town of Belize rises; nevertheless there were mosquitoes. The "Q" side went well, and the Royals arrived with all their stores, except that the first evening after a talk on the importance of keeping off mosquitoes the antidote was found to be silverine paint instead of scat!

Marines occupied the aerodrome, sailors the port, and other platoons marched through the town and showed the flag. A combined headquarters with a duty officer and telephone was set up. Bofors guns were also landed and mounted, for there can scarcely be any town in the World that would burn better from one fire bomb than Belize: it is all wood.

The only communication with the frontier is the ninety-mile road from Belize to El Cayo. This was a very possible line of attack and, although it was not thought so likely a means of assault as that by air, a platoon was sent up to El Cayo—eight miles from the frontier, without their trailing their coats or causing any provocation whatever. After we had taken our initial steps we got a report from our Minister in Guatemala City that things were very uncomfortable and uncertain there, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had refused to receive him and that the Guatemalans could muster some twenty-nine aircraft, of which half were troop-carriers, and an

Army of 25,000 with medium and light tanks. Quite a problem for a cruiser to deal with! The chief danger seemed to be that, if the Guatemalan Government were to fall, and hotheads seized power, anything might happen; so for a few days the situation was, to say the least of it, anxious. The last possibility of invasion was by sea; but the cruiser in the anchorage and the platoon of sailors on the quay were an adequate guard against this. The Press arrived from all over the World and by talking to them readily and giving them a buffet lunch on board the flagship, they played the game and were helpful—only the *Chicago Tribune* was kind enough to describe our efforts in Guatemala as those of "the exhausted British Lion flexing his flaccid muscles on the poor little state of Guatemala."

H.M.S. "Devonshire" arrived with 400 officers and men of the Gloucestershire Regiment under Colonel Bewell, with their guns, stores, equipment and provisions for six weeks. The cover plan was to make them look like 4,000 troops. The Cadets did unusual and very good work in loading and unloading a man-of-war used as a transport.

Thereafter our position was secure, though many days of uncertainty and total lack of news of what was happening in Guatemala City followed. Of the locals I should say that never had we encountered so utterly loyal a Colony. They were 100 per cent. for the Union Jack, and said so. They passed a long resolution which was forwarded to the King, in which was recalled "the memorable day 150 years ago when the people of Belize made secure to themselves and to their descendants for all time their proud and sacred British heritage," and saying, "we are resolved with the aid of the Mother Country to defend to the death our rights and liberties with the British Empire . . ."; then, mentioning their gratitude to the Government for sending assistance, it concluded, "We reaffirm our pledge of unswerving loyalty to His Majesty the King."

An insulting and uncivilized assault was made on the British Legation in Guatemala City, where they climbed the walls, hauled down the flag, hoisted the skull and crossbones, and behaved in such a manner that in Palmerston's day would have produced a punitive expedition; but thereafter things calmed down, although their running sore still remains, due to political propaganda and teaching in the schools that Britain robbed Guatemala of its province, regardless of the fact that we have been there more than a hundred years, in fact, even before Guatemala became a state.

You will remember the political action, how the Foreign Secretary offered to refer the whole dispute to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, and how Guatemala would have none of it. They closed the frontier and I believe it still remains officially closed.

After a little under three weeks the "Sheffield" sailed, leaving two Bofors behind for the Army—a company of soldiers still remains.

While all this was going on the "Snipe," assisted by the "Nigeria," was down in the ice and my last remaining ship was standing by in the Leeward Islands waiting to see which way the strikers on the sugar plantations were going to jump. Such were the many calls on the Squadron.

The British West Indies are changing fast and there are difficult days ahead. The coloured men who originally came from Africa as slaves in the sugar plantations are now breeding at great speed, and it does not seem that their morale, their politics, or their energy are improving. It would have stood us in good stead if the present Colonial campaign could have taken place many years ago. We are as good or better

colonizers than any others, but all the West Indian Colonies—and they represent some 2½ million people, mostly coloured—are an increasingly difficult problem. Sometimes the story is this—the intelligent young politically-minded coloured man with brains gets sufficient money to come to a University in England where, possibly due to colour bar, he drifts to the left, and returns to his island as a political agitator and can lead his own people like sheep. In many of the islands, the extremists are already talking of the days when they will have the islands to themselves.

The remedy, I suggest, is more education: University Education to be made available, as is the intention in the West Indies, where instruction will be given on local problems of finance, economy, hygiene, housing; also greater encouragement to work and improve their homes.

The hurricanes are always rather a headache and anxiety; a frigate is always present in the West Indies between July and November. Bermuda had three in 1947 and 1948, whereas the average is one in eight years.

The hurricane warning system is very efficient to-day. An observer in, say, Bermuda or New York may get as much as ten days' notice of a hurricane that may eventually hit him. However, as one cannot take full precautions for each of the perhaps eight or ten hurricanes which start in the West Indian area, there is always the excitement and uncertainty as to whether it is going to recurve again over you at the last minute or not.

### SOUTH AMERICA

In South America, everyone with even a remote British connection talks of England as "Home." In the Squadron in former years, it must have been a magnificent life of sport for the few, but to-day I must regretfully say that shotguns are just as well left in England for the Squadron has to visit all these countries in their Summer.

#### BRAZIL

That huge Country, Brazil: it takes ten days to steam along her coast at 15 knots; everything seems to be found there. Is it possible that Brazil in 1948 is approximately in the same position as was North America in 1748? The Governor of St. Palao said to me, "If only we had your people with your energy we could do anything in this Country."

Except in the southern corner, communications are practically nil. To go from Rio to Pernambuco by air takes about two hours if you don't have a forced landing. (I did!) But by road I was told it would take about twenty-three days.

The Brazilians are very fond of Britain; they are proud that they took part in the War with their Navy, and they are sorry that they have not got a British Naval Mission. They have been very loyal and helpful to us in more than one International Conference.

#### URUGUAY

From the front at Montevideo it is still possible to see the fighting top of the "Graf Spee" at low water. Many of the inhabitants will tell you exactly where they were and exactly what they saw of the battle, and how later the German ship committed suicide. In fact, you begin to think they had all taken part in it; in a way they did, and their moral support in both the last wars for Britain needs no stressing.

Many people have said to me, what do you mean by "showing the Flag"? I think the best answer is an example. The scene is the square in Montevideo; a large review is being held for the inauguration of the President, and thirty-nine nations are represented, of whom eight have Navies. After many parties have marched past, there is a pause, silence, and then the "Sheffield's" guard and sailors' landing party go by to their own band. The White Ensign has a great reception. I think every Ambassador present in the President's Box went either to the British Ambassador or to me to say how well they had marched past. Of such is one aspect of showing the Flag.

After some experience of the Latin-American Countries that begin with Mexico and end at Cape Horn, one is impressed by the similarity of their politics, their economics and their manner of living. Money is all important; many of their politicians seem to give up their offices as rich men. This, perhaps, is one of the factors which produce the eternal scheming for power which erupts into a full revolution in one Country or the other about every six months.

#### THE ARGENTINE

The Argentine to-day, judging by two short visits and a superficial glance, seems very unstable. Four years ago she was one of the richest Countries in South America; now she is hard put to pay for any imports at all. Labourers or the labouring classes who put the President into power have gained enormously, in fact so much that if the present reduced work and increased pay continues, the Country will get into very serious difficulties.

The President and Señora Evita Peron visited the "Glasgow" as they had the "Sheffield" two years before, and could not have been more affable and pleased with everything. The Argentine Navy showed the greatest friendliness in spite of the fact that we were about to sail for the Falkland Islands, which they claim and call Las Malvinas.

The British community in Buenos Aires are some 20,000—all feeling a little anxious as to the future. Their kindness and individual entertainment of the sailors was most generous, and the whole ship's company behaved in their usual exemplary manner. On the other hand, these British people welcome with both hands the chance of their children going on board and seeing a ship of the Royal Navy manned by British sailors.

We haven't heard the last of the cry by the Argentines over the Falklands; it is likely to be brought out when, due to internal difficulties, a bit of nationalism may help to unite the Country.

The Station is certainly one of contrasts and extremes in work and temperature. Forty-eight hours after leaving the River Plate and a temperature of 82°F. one is shivering in the low forties—the next step to the South, as carried out by the "Snipe" in 1948 and the "Sparrow" in 1949; and the temperatures may bump down to 15°-20° of frost.

#### ANTARCTICA

Much has been said of the rival claims in this frozen South. The Government policy was to avoid the use of force on all occasions unless the other side used it first. At one time, in 1947, the Argentine sent down a sizeable fleet, big enough to swallow



my "Snipe," but beyond the exchange of notes, the ships met and behaved in a courteous and friendly manner.

Undoubtedly, if we had not had a ship down there during the last two years, the South American countries would have considered their claims acknowledged.

The strategic value of the area is not great, nor has any other product than whale, seal and penguin been discovered. The Meteorological Stations are valuable, or at least one is most desirable; for the rest it seems an expensive luxury.

The "Snipe" did an original and fine job amongst the southern gales and the ice-packs and, worst of all, the growlers, worthy of the tradition of the old explorers who were, incidentally, in much more suitable ships. Growlers are dangerous things for a ship with only one skin of comparatively thin plating. Another trouble in those waters is to find water shallow enough to anchor in. In view of our reduced squadron, the "Nigeria" came to help and had a terrific punch from South Africa to the Falklands, meeting a very heavy gale and then almost immediately innumerable icebergs—a most unpleasant time. But her visit and her voyage to the South were a great help to the reduced America and West Indies Squadron. The "Glasgow" more recently has been among the icebergs and the whaling fraternity of South Georgia; a most interesting spot for a short visit for those who like the wild life and scenery. The average temperature throughout the year is 35°F., yet it is remarkable what an appeal the frozen South seems to have to all that sail there.

The Antarctic is certainly a man's country and gales rise in ten minutes and sweep down off the glaciers at 100 m.p.h. Small, stout, and preferably sheathed ships are essential.

The "Sparrow" gave me some anxious days. She was going round the Falkland Islands Dependency Bases and was in Admiralty Bay near to the Summer limit of the ice-pack whence she was due to sail North to rendezvous with me in the "Glasgow" and to get her stores. She was nearly out, having been in the South without any replenishment for five months; then an easterly gale set in and the dreaded sea ice was blown across the Bransfield Strait and into Admiralty Bay where she became firmly wedged in. The Summer was half gone, and so were the "Sparrow's" oil and provisions. *The Antarctic Pilot* says that Admiralty Bay and the South Shetland Group remained frozen up all the Summer of 1902. Was the "Sparrow" locked in with no food till next Summer? We got as far as transferring half her Ship's Company to the sheathed F.I.D. ship "John Biscoe," and the flagship was sailing to her relief with stores, when suddenly the ice eased up and she steamed out.

Frigates with their projecting propellers so near the surface are most unsuitable for dealing with ice. A sheathed ship with one propeller deep down and a strong stem is the only type that can play fast and loose with pack ice.

#### THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

The Falkland Islands are so like the Shetlands if for sea trout and heather you substitute penguins and kelp. Their strategic value might be very great in a naval war of the future if for any reason the Panama Canal was not available.

Port Stanley is shortly to have a *frijorijico* which will greatly help the farmer and the exporting of meat from the Islands.

#### CHILE

We have not yet touched on Chile. It is a little hard to realize that it extends over 35° of latitude, and could stretch from, say, London to the Cape Verde Island.

It therefore has everything, including wealth and poverty, desert and lush growth, glaciers and volcanoes. A fascinating Country and a very hospitable and pro-British people.

Cochrane, St. Martin and Pratt might have only died about thirty or forty years ago instead of a hundred and more. The old battleship "Canada," now the "La-torre," was lying off Valparaiso as the fleet flagship. She and I were the only things present that had taken part in the Battle of Jutland.

Chile and the Argentine seem to have agreed to agree over the Antarctic and are both against us over this—the only thing, I think, in which it may be said the Chileans have against us.

All Chilean Admirals talked with affection of the British Naval Mission, and in their Clubs and Messes showed me with pride photographs of the Heads of Missions. It is a pity that Chile is quite so far away.

#### PERU

I shall always remember Peru as being the scene of my first effort at a Spanish speech when I had left my notes behind, and by the Peruvian Trans-Andean railway. The Country seemed restless and poor, and revolutions are frequent.

#### CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most important duty of the America and West Indies Squadron is to maintain close touch with the United States of America and their Navy, and, of course, with Canada and her Navy. That we should all stand together and that our fleets should work as one is a platitude.

With all I have said it may be thought that little attention or time for that matter was paid to or left for weapon and fleet training. This was really not the case, for by dint of an Exercise period whenever the Squadron was leaving or returning to Bermuda, and generally a fortnight's combined exercises every year with all available ships of the Royal Canadian Navy, we were able to remember that we were men-of-war and keep our hands in.

On occasion we would encounter the R.C.N. Squadron at sea, fight a "battle," join up and cruise on as if we were all the same Squadron just out from the same harbour instead of from bases 7,000 miles apart in the case of the R.C.N. ships from British Columbia.

The Communist and left-wing elements in Latin America, which recently have found fruitful ground on which to flourish, are a real force in Colombia, Peru and Chile. In the Argentine and Brazil, for different reasons, they are in abeyance, to say the least. If their people worked harder and there was greater integrity in high places, they would become rich and flourishing Countries. Incidentally, let us not forget that it was we who gave freedom to South America and we who first suggested the Monroe doctrine.

I hope I have given you a brief glance at this vast Station as seen through the sailor's eyes. I came away from it feeling that the prestige of Britain in that Continent stands immensely high. They believe in our integrity if they don't all practise it themselves. They believe in the solid worth of British goods and British manufacturers. I can only hope that the America and West Indies Squadron will in the future, as in the past, foster these good relations and that good feeling.

We never left a single port on that Station but someone came up to me and remarked on the exemplary behaviour of the sailor. It will be a sorry day, if it ever comes, that we have to retrench from sending him abroad to show the Flag.

## DISCUSSION

REAR-ADMIRAL L. W. MURRAY: There is one point about the America and West Indies Station which may not be understood by people who have not served there, and it is that at most places—I am not certain about South America, and in Canada it is all right, but in our own Colonies in the West Indies—there is nobody of the social standing of the common sailor. When we go into any of the ports of our own Colonies in the West Indies, anybody who is less than half-black considers that he is in the same social standing as the officer and expects to meet officers and attend some of the officers' parties on board. The sailor goes ashore and there is nobody for him to consort with and no one of his own kind to talk to. In that sense it is difficult on this Station for the officers to keep the men happy.

I know from my experience of the Station that it was always a great help to the ships to be able to take that trip up to the West Coast of Canada one year and the East Coast of Canada another year. There the sailors did meet people of their own kind and, particularly on the West Coast, they got a very friendly reception.

At the Central American ports that I know and of which I have had experience, it is the great joy of the British colony to receive a visit from one of these ships. They come on board and organize parties for the sailors, not for the whole of the ship's company in general, because the whole ship's company could not be organized for these parties, but for 50, 60 or 100 of them. But that is not the same as the men going ashore and finding hat pegs for themselves, as in the home ports in this Country and on other stations.

There is one thing I have experienced on the Station which may have happened to some of you. It was very forcibly impressed upon me. I wonder how much we realize what we owe to being born British. An experience of mine goes to Costa Rica in 1921. We went to the port of Punta Arenas on the Pacific Coast. The British colony at San José, the capital, gathered round and impressed upon the Government the importance of the visit of a British ship—as a matter of fact it was a Canadian ship, but they looked upon us in the same way. A special train was sent down by the Government and a party (the Captain and twelve officers) were invited up as guests of the Government for a four-days' stay in the capital. They visited the National Opera and such things as that, and they were very pleasantly received by the British colony.

After they had been there for two days (I cannot imagine it was unexpected, but in some way it had not been thought of before), a ship of the Italian Navy arrived at a port on the East Coast. The Government scratched their heads and decided to do the same thing. They sent a special train and brought up the officers and Captain of the Italian ship.

This is where the contrast comes in. Whereas we had been entertained and were living in the homes of the British colony and were being received in a very friendly way, the Italian delegation, on arrival, were met at the railway station by the Italian colony. The Italian colony at Costa Rica were not the men of big business in the Country; they were the shoe-blacks, fruit sellers and people of a similar sort.

Just remember, gentlemen, when you go abroad again what a blessing it is to be born British.

THE LECTURER: I agree entirely about the West Indies themselves. It was exactly the same story in the East Indies. There the sailor has no counterpart ashore. But over nearly the whole of the rest of the Station it was extraordinary how people in North and South America were perfectly ready to open their homes whatever their social standing might be and have so many sailors to tea and to supper, and that sort of thing. The position in the smaller Latin American Countries does bear out exactly what Admiral Murray says. As I said in my talk, the prestige of Britain and the arrival of the White Ensign is very often the event of the year at most of these ports around the coast, except, of course, the very big ones.

CAPTAIN E. ALTHAM, R.N.: I want to ask the Lecturer two questions. First, he mentioned the "John Biscoe" as having played a part in the events in the South Arctic

waters. What is really her mission and what is her standing? She appears to be commanded by a Commander of the Royal Navy, but is she under the Admiralty?

The other question (I must be careful how I word this, with a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty sitting next to me!) is—I will put it like this: Is not the America and West Indies Station a very vast task for the number and kind of ships which are available to compete with?

THE LECTURER: The "John Biscoe" is paid for by the Falkland Island Dependencies, and a large amount of the revenue we get from South Georgia goes in paying for her. She is commanded by Commander Kirkwood, R.N. Her job is to go down and relieve these stations. We have many of them down there—some eight, I think. The staffs do a certain amount of surveying and exploring and meteorology. They require relieving every year. There is one down at St. Margaret's Bay which they were unable to relieve last year and of which you read in the newspapers. What the strategic value is, it is perhaps difficult to say, but there is intense rivalry, particularly over Deception. You know the procedure of handing of Notes—"You have no right here" and the reply "You have no right here." Shortly afterwards, the respective Navies meet in those barren wastes and have a drink together.

As regards the size of the Station for the number of ships, I suppose it is all a matter of proportion really. You could not possibly say "Take away ships from the Mediterranean," where nearly always there is some most urgent political problem, "and send them to increase the strength of the America and West Indies." Undoubtedly, if we look back at the pre-war days when, at one time, there were five cruisers and three frigates, it gave a much better chance of showing the White Ensign round the Station. I suggest that the answer is a matter of supply and demand.

CAPTAIN R. L. B. CUNLIFFE, R.N.: Sir William Tennant mentioned casually that occasionally he made speeches in a foreign language. I had the privilege of arranging some visits to Quebec and Montreal, and I should like to tell you what an effect those speeches in French had. The fact that he was always prepared to talk their language to them made a most tremendous impression.

CAPTAIN G. B. H. FAWKES, R.N.: Having had the honour of being Admiral Tennant's Flag Captain I was very glad to hear him say how hard we all worked, more especially as I now have the honour of serving under the Chairman who will, I am sure, no longer feel tempted to pull my leg about a two years' holiday!

I think that one of the chief impressions I have after two years on that Station is the wonderful welcome that we had. It was extraordinary. Everywhere we went, we had this amazing welcome just because we were British. In the old days I think the Station was regarded as one where the officers had a wonderful time and the ratings did not. I think it is true to say that all the officers have to work so hard nowadays when showing the Flag that the ratings have a very much better time than they do. It is most noticeable that the ratings are asked and go to people's homes. That was, of course, naturally the case in Canada and the United States, but it was very definitely so also in the South American Countries, particularly in Chile and at Monte Video. There were also many cases in the West Indies—Belize, Kingston and Trinidad—where coloured people would ask and have sailors into their homes. In that way things have, I think, changed quite a lot.

There is no doubt, and rightly so, that a very great deal is done for the sailor, but he does live up to it by his fine behaviour and bearing. I remember that at the first two ports we visited, in the commission I was naturally very pleased when local officials said, "How marvellously your sailors behave themselves. We had no trouble at all." After the third or fourth port of call, I felt myself tempted to reply "What the hell else do you expect of British sailors. That is how they behave themselves everywhere."

May I put in a plea for the Royal Marines and their band? I know that they cannot be carried in frigates, but I do hope that the cruisers on the Station (there is only one now) will always have their Royal Marines, because they do have a magnificent effect upon



the local populace and also ginger up the sailors to be as smart as they are. The competitive spirit between the Royal Marine guard and the Royal Naval guard is an excellent thing to foster.

Finally, I am certain that Admiral Tennant's past Captains who are all here to-day will agree with me that none of the ships in the America and West Indies Squadron could have done the job which they did do, without his inspiring leadership and example.

#### THE CHAIRMAN

We have listened to an extremely interesting lecture. I had the pleasure of being on the South American Station thirty years ago and in the West Indies in 1934. Captain Fawkes spoke just now of the welcome that is given to the British ships. I think that if you look round that vast Station, you will find that it was the British who really got those Countries going to a large extent, ably supported by the British sailor. Ever since those very early days, it is the White Ensign which time and time again has brought help and succour either to starving people or to people knocked out of their homes by earthquakes, and so on. I am sure Captain Fawkes will agree with me that this welcome to the White Ensign is very noticeable to-day even in little Countries like Costa Rica.

I remember going to Costa Rica in about 1934. The German training battleship had been there about a week before. When I was dining with the President, he said to me, "A fortnight ago we had the Germans up here and they sent a band of 70 and 300 sailors, who marched through the streets. Would you like to do the same?" My band consisted of five people and I think the ship's company was 105. I said, "Obviously, Mr. President, if you really want it, of course we will do so, but is there any necessity to advertise British sailors?" He was overcome with confusion. I said, "If you want my band, have it at once." I won a diplomatic victory. He kept on apologising for the rest of the evening for having even suggested that we were not well-known enough and required to publicize ourselves.

I should like to stress the importance of the question of language. I know from my private intelligentsia that Admiral Tennant made a very successful effort to address people in their own language. The importance of being able to do so cannot be too strongly emphasized. I cannot talk a word of anything, except English, and that badly.

I have only two other remarks to make. One is that throughout South America they still have a tremendous respect for the British and particularly for the White Ensign. There is no getting away from it. From early days they have had the expression in Spanish *Palabra inglesa*. If an Argentino is making a contract with somebody and says *Palabra inglesa*, there is no need to sign a contract at all. It means an Englishman's word, and that is good enough. When you think they are not altogether very scrupulous with regard to their transactions, it says a great deal for their respect for our own honesty.

The other point refers to Admiral Tennant's remarks about Quebec. I remember going there, and I went to a small town, I think called Three Rivers, on the St. Lawrence. I met a very charming mayor and after dinner I said to him, "I cannot understand, Mr. Mayor, why there are so many French tricolours flying here." He said, "But we are French." I said, "Maybe, but that is not the flag you ought to be flying. You should have the blue flag with three gold *fleur-de-lys*. All those tricolours should come down." Believe me, they came down. I read in a paper, and I should like to ask whether it is true, that the three *fleur-de-lys* on a blue background is the flag now flown in Quebec.

THE LECTURER: They were sometimes, but not everywhere.

THE CHAIRMAN: Only when you were coming!

THE LECTURER: Perhaps.

THE CHAIRMAN: I could tell many stories about the Station, but I think I have said enough. It is only left for me to thank Sir William Tennant very much indeed for his interesting lecture. He has been very modest. I can assure you that the two-and-a-half years he spent as C-in-C. A.W.I. rendered a great service not only to the Navy but to the Country. (Applause.)

The vote of thanks to the Chairman was proposed by Commodore Harrison, R.N.R., and carried with acclamation.

## THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

By MAJOR-GENERAL RICHARD HILTON, D.S.O., M.C., D.F.C.

On Wednesday, 26th October, 1949

FIELD-MARSHAL THE EARL WAVELL, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.,  
C.M.G., M.C., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: Major-General Hilton is going to lecture to us on "The Soviet Armed Forces." He has been Military Attaché at Potsdam with the Russians and then in Moscow for two years up to about the middle of last year. I know that we shall all look forward with absorbing interest to what he has to tell us about what goes on in the Armed Forces behind the Iron Curtain.

### LECTURE

**B**EFORE embarking on a study of the Soviet armed forces themselves, I think it advisable to mention some of the difficulties which attend the collection of data for a lecture on this subject. I do so, not so much to excuse my own lack of knowledge as to give you certain clues as to the objects of this security and the type of things that they are trying to hide.

Never having been a military attaché in any other Country, I cannot of course compare, from personal experience, the Soviet practice and technique in dealing with foreign attachés with that of other nations. All that I can say with certainty is that, from a military attaché's point of view, matters could hardly be worse anywhere else. General Seraev—the officer detailed to act as sole link between foreign attachés in Moscow and the High Command, once told me candidly that, in the opinion of the Soviet authorities, all foreign attachés were *ipso facto* spies. We were certainly treated accordingly!

Not once during my sojourn in Moscow was I ever invited to attend any military parade, exercise, or demonstration (other than the bi-annual ceremonial parades in the Red Square, to which I will refer later). I was never invited inside any barracks, camp, or other military establishment except to Red Army House—a huge officers' club, to a cocktail party on Red Army Day. I was never invited to the private house or flat of any Soviet officer. I wrote many letters to General Seraev, asking to be shown something at least of mild military interest, no matter how innocuous, but he did not even answer these letters.

Nor is it only in matters strictly military that the Soviet authorities exercise this intense security. They regard the whole Country and its population as being one vast war machine. There is consequently hardly a single activity of social or economic life (except perhaps the ballet) which does not, in their view, have some bearing upon the nation's readiness for war or otherwise. Practically everything that goes on is therefore a military secret. To ask a peasant what the local potato crop had been like would most certainly be construed into an act of economic espionage. On top of all this it must be remembered that draconian laws are in force to prevent any conversation, other than officially approved conversation on restricted subjects, between Soviet citizens and foreigners. To ensure this, an elaborate technique of shadowing by plain-clothes detectives was put into force against us. Our telephones were of course tapped. Listening equipment was installed in the walls

of our flats. In short, all the resources of the M.V.D.<sup>1</sup> and other police forces were available to ensure that we lived ostracized within an invisible security barrier.

This intensive emphasis upon security cannot fail to give foreign observers the impression that the Soviet High Command's over-ruling anxiety is to conceal the true state of affairs not only militarily but also socially and economically. But are they concealing strength or weakness? That, of course, is the vitally important question. I shall not attempt to answer it this afternoon beyond indicating certain factors which may help you to form your own opinions on the matter. It would be wrong to discuss the official view, even if I knew it. My own personal opinion is no more likely to be right than yours.

In this connection may I emphasize the fact that I am speaking here to-day purely as a private individual—a retired officer with no official status at all. Any opinions expressed will be merely my own.

Whether you decide to think that the Soviet Union is concealing strength or weakness, one thing at least is certain—i.e., that things “are not what they seem” on the surface. The whole Country is a hot-bed of propaganda. Practically nothing can be accepted safely at its face value. The control of “Truth” is so complete that the authorities can almost make black seem white. It is specially important to treat with suspicion anything which is gratuitously offered to the public gaze of foreigners. This, I personally believe, applies particularly to the great military parades on the Red Square—the only warlike functions that foreign attachés (except of course those of the “satellite” Countries) are ever invited to see.

Not only were we invited, but every facility was given us to have a first-class ring-side view. In a Country where everything else is rigidly concealed behind a profound cloak of security, this gratuitous display seems simply too good to be true. Not only are they security-minded to an intense degree, they are also past-masters in window-dressing and propaganda. It is not likely, I suggest, that we were shown much of real value on a parade of that kind; indeed, it seems far more probable that these functions are deliberately planned to give the outside world false impressions about Soviet preparedness, or to lead us to ascribe to them future trends of strategic or tactical policy which may be quite different to their real ones. I myself know of two instances at least where such a trick was attempted.

In spite of this intensive drive for security I do not want to give you too gloomy a picture of their success in keeping things from us. Even the strictest security cannot entirely prevent a foreign resident in *any* Country from seeing and hearing things quite openly and legitimately, things which may enable him to make deductions and draw conclusions; and Russia is no exception. I must not forget that my words will be published in the JOURNAL, and that a copy will assuredly find its way to Moscow. When General Seraev reads my last remark he will probably claim it to be a proof that all attachés are spies. He is welcome to any comfort that this may give him, but of course it is not so at all. Any old soldier who is reasonably observant can see quite a lot of the true state of affairs without in any way transgressing the correct etiquette of a diplomat. The training which one gets on many a barrack-room inspection in peace-time, and the resultant skill in spotting the dust beneath the “eye-wash,” stands one in very good stead on such a job as this! On the surface these Red Square parades undoubtedly look impressive, magnificent, and impeccable. But so does many a barrack-room till you peep under the beds.

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<sup>1</sup> Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh D'el,

## THE SOVIET OUTLOOK ON DEFENCE MATTERS

Those responsible for war-preparedness in the Soviet Union enjoy several advantages over the staffs of other nations in their approach to the problem. Firstly, they are entirely free from all "mental shackles of the past" to an extent which cannot possibly apply to fighting Services with venerable traditions, such as our own. Most of us know cases where some logical reform has been delayed, or has only been applied in a watered-down form, because a completely ruthless application of logic would have offended against Service tradition or upset the susceptibilities of one fighting Service or another. Even our most junior Service, in spite of its youth, is not free from this weakness. Not so the Soviet armed forces. With them no traditional fads or private susceptibilities of this or that arm of the Services are permitted to stand in the way of logical progress, and a ruthless application of the best weapon for each job regardless of any vested interests.

Secondly, they have the enormous advantage of being able to regard the entire Soviet Union as one vast war-machine. With them this is no mere theoretical conception of how a nation *ought* to be organized for war. Every social or economic activity, even in peace-time, is subservient to the requirements of war.

Thirdly, this logical and ruthless alignment of everything on a war footing under strong centralized control has brought about an integration of the three fighting Services, in strategic conception if not in outward form, far closer than has been achieved by any other nation. Though the Russians have not yet invented a word corresponding to the German *Wehrmacht*, I personally am convinced that in what really matters, namely strategic planning and perhaps also the actual conduct of combined operations, they have got much nearer than the *Wehrmacht* ever did to the ideal of one united war machine—"The Armed Forces."

If the impossible were to happen—if one could persuade a senior Soviet officer to define to you his conception of the fighting forces of his Country—he would not, as most of us would, speak of three distinct Services—Navy, Army and Air Force; he would, I feel sure, think of *four* distinct elements in the Soviet war-machine. These four would be:—

- (a) *The Armed Forces*—regarded and used as one weapon.
- (b) *The "Rear"*—the whole nation or "Home Front," organized as one industrial and agricultural and man-producing machine for the maintenance of the armed forces.
- (c) *The M.V.D.*—the essential security police force to keep the "Home Front" up to the mark, to prevent sabotage, fifth column activities, idleness, or any other waste or diversion of war effort.
- (d) *Fifth Column*—subversive activities of all kinds abroad. These may cover anything from open civil war down to the dissemination of a defeatist or "go slow" policy among the dupes of Communism. This includes "Partisans" when applicable.

It is important, I think, to realize that the Soviet leaders have got this much broader conception of what constitutes a war organization. They would no more think of planning a war without giving full consideration to these four items than an air-minded soldier of to-day would start planning military operations without giving full consideration to the air.



The importance attached to full development of the "Rear" can be judged by the stream of official propaganda in the papers, on the wireless, and on the cinema. In spite of several "Five Year Plans" and ruthless slave-driving by the M.V.D., this particular item in Soviet war-preparedness is still their weak point. It may not be so for long because tremendous efforts are being made and progress is visible; but they have some way to go yet. For example, the very size of the Soviet Union, immense war asset that it will be when fully developed, is a source of weakness while long-distance communications remain inadequate. The road and rail system of the Soviet Union is far below the standard of development required for the upkeep of an intense industrial effort during a long war.

I will say no more about Fifth Column activities in other Countries, because it lies outside the scope of this lecture. I only wish to emphasize once more that these enter into their calculations just as much as do tanks, artillery, submarines, or any other recognized implement of war.

Likewise the M.V.D. can only be spared a few minutes of our time. This sinister force is the king-pin of the entire Soviet system. Without it the whole thing would collapse like a pack of cards. It is an army superimposed on the ordinary army, composed of carefully picked officers and men who undergo longer and more efficient military training than the ordinary run of soldiers, and who enjoy many privileges above the common herd. It is a complete fighting force of all arms—its own tanks, artillery, etc., and it is organized partially into its own mobile divisions. Above all, it enjoys the services of an intelligence system, thanks to which there is little that goes on within Soviet territory (or even abroad) without the M.V.D. knowing about it. It gets its results by terror. There is no doubt whatever regarding the effectiveness of this terror and the complete grip which it gives the M.V.D. over the entire life and activities of the nation, not excluding the Armed Forces themselves. As a sideline, the M.V.D. runs the slave-labour camps and the munition factories and mines which are worked by such labour. They also man the fire services.

The existence of this force absolves the armed forces proper of much of the onus of having to act "in aid of the civil power" against open or clandestine sedition. The effect of this is to keep relations between the Armed Forces and the civil population cordial. While the M.V.D. is hated and dreaded by the people, the Armed Forces themselves are identified very closely with the civil population. Every effort of propaganda is made to foster popular pride in "our" Red Army, Red Air Force and Red Fleet. A strong propaganda drive is directed toward the notion of brotherhood between Red Army men (and their comrades in the other Services) and the workmen and peasants who form the Home Front.

This relationship has obvious advantages, but there are also certain drawbacks. In a community such as the Soviet Union, with its sixteen (nominally autonomous) states and its enormous variety of nationalities and languages, care is necessary to prevent regional patriotism from creeping into this laudable popular pride in the Armed Forces. It is definitely contrary to Soviet policy, for example, to foster the growth of an Ukrainian Air Force, comparable to the Royal Canadian Air Force or the Royal Australian Navy. These "dominions" of the Soviet Union are allowed their own postage stamps, but not their own armed forces. It is a small point, but perhaps significant, that the expressions *Russian Army*, *Navy* or *Air Force*, are never used by Soviet officialdom. In the Soviet Zone of Germany, when I was there, the correct term was the "Soviet Army." The expression "Red Army" was frowned upon, having recently been abolished by official decree. When I got to Moscow a year later,

however, I still found the term "Red Army" in vogue even on official occasions, though the decree of abolition, as far as I know, had not been rescinded. What subtle implication (if any) lies behind this I do not know. Possibly the authorities subsequently found that sentiment for the term "Red Army" was too strong and have shut their eyes to it. At any rate, both these labels alike avoid any emphasis upon nationality.

Another disadvantage of identifying the armed forces closely with the people is that the armed forces, like the people, have to be placed under constant political surveillance. The old system of appointing a "political officer" to every unit of the Army or ship of the Navy has *officially* been abolished. But, as so often happens in a propaganda-ridden country, it is one thing to abolish on paper but quite another thing in fact. The "political officers" may not be called so any more. They may not wear a distinctive uniform. But they are there just the same! After a little practice one can easily recognize them at a glance among the plain but honest combatant officers around them. I personally encountered many instances of obvious and undignified "kow-towing" by a senior combatant officer to some comparatively junior officer on his staff. I will return to this matter of "political officers" later.

#### INTER-RELATIONSHIPS OF THE SERVICES

As I have said, in spite of wearing distinctive uniforms and being named "Red Army," "Red Air Force" and "Red Fleet," the three fighting Services are united to a far greater extent than I have seen anywhere else.

The predominant partner, without a shadow of doubt, is the Army—naturally, in view of their vast territories and continental situation. The Red Army exists to win any war by large scale land operations. The other two exist to help the Army in its task. That is undoubtedly still their primary function. Whether it is still their sole function or whether they are starting to study and develop a separate "air strategy" and/or a separate "naval strategy" remains to be seen.

#### THE RED ARMY AND AIR FORCE

There is a Ministry of the Armed Forces, but each of the three is self-running to a limited extent. Connection between the Army and Air Force is very close indeed. Though the latter wears a distinctive uniform it is not nearly as distinctive as that of the Navy, in fact, hardly more so than that of the Artillery or Tanks. It would not be far wrong to say that, although the Air Force is not integrally part of the Army to quite the same extent as the old Royal Flying Corps used to be part of our Army, yet it is much more intimately connected with the land forces than is the Air Force of any other nation to-day. Until recently, it was certainly regarded exclusively as a tactical weapon of the land war, and it was so used in 1941-45. There is in the Red Army Museum in Moscow a big painting showing Soviet heavy bombers attacking Berlin by night. Indeed, I have heard propaganda claims made that the Russians were the first to attack Berlin in this way and that most of the damage was due to them! Whatever the exact truth may have been, strategic bombardment played little if any part in their use of air power. They possessed a formation called the Long Range Group, but even this was used to assist the land war by attacking the lines of communication of the German armies. It only formed a very small portion of the total Air Forces. The great bulk of that Service was equipped with aircraft specifically designed for participation in land battles. They firmly believed that the

correct use of air power was almost 100 per cent. direct participation in the land battle, and who can claim, in view of their successes in land fighting, that they were wrong?

There is still undoubtedly a very strong and influential school of thought which adhered strictly to this notion of the use of air power. There may also be an opposing school of thought (headed perhaps by Marshal Stalin's son) who advocate the development of a strong strategic bomber force and the pursuit of an independent air strategy. Colour has been lent to this belief by the recent appearances of heavy bombers in the "fly past" at Red Square parades. Once more I would like to suggest that what we were shown "in the shop window" in Moscow may be a very different thing to what is being prepared on a much vaster scale "under the counter," i.e., far out of sight of foreign eyes in the centre of Siberia. Why should they be so obliging as to warn the World that they are taking up strategic bombing?

Before leaving the Air Force it may be as well to mention the activities of DOSAV—an officially sponsored society for co-operation with the Air Force. Under the auspices of this society innumerable light aeroplane clubs all over the Soviet Union are carrying out elementary flying training of the younger generation, both male and female. They have not the same ideas that we have—that flying is something only to be undertaken by carefully picked supermen who have passed through a complicated medical test. It is almost as easy for a village youth or maiden to learn to fly as it is in other Countries to learn to drive a lorry. Consequently, they are able to turn out elementary pilots almost by the million.

Admittedly this training is very elementary indeed, and a great deal more would have to be done to turn any of these novices into pilots of jet fighters or heavy bombers. Not much is required, however, to turn them into quite useful tactical bombers for the land war, or to employ them in several other forms of army co-operation, some of which may seem impossibly unorthodox to our more hide-bound way of thinking. It is a factor of some importance, I think, that the whole nation is being made "air-minded," even to this limited but very practical extent. We must remember that the Soviet authorities suffer under no inhibitions against the adoption of a given tactical method of war merely on the grounds that it would cost them immense casualties.

#### THE RED FLEET

Turning next to the Navy, this has always been, and still is, the Cinderella of the Soviet fighting forces. Traditionally the Russians have never been "deep water" sailors in spite of the urge of Peter the Great and the more recent propaganda of the Kremlin. They suffer, amongst other disadvantages, from their geographical need to maintain, not one great fighting fleet, but several little separate ones. Thus they have to keep up:—

- (a) The White Sea Fleet.
- (b) The Baltic Fleet.
- (c) The Black Sea Fleet.
- (d) The Far Eastern Fleet.
- (e) The Caspian Flotilla.

I do not know to what extent there may be interchange of personnel and ideas between these, but it can hardly be as easy to arrange as between the various parts of our own Royal Navy.

I am indebted to the help and advice of two distinguished senior naval officers for what I am going to say now. Both of them have had considerable dealings with the Soviet Navy.

It does not seem likely that the Soviet Government will build an oceanic battle fleet against the Western Powers or aspire to *surface* supremacy on the oceans. It is, however, quite possible that they may aim at blockading the ocean routes by submarine and air attacks on merchant shipping on a scale more intense even than that achieved by Germany in either of her wars. They have at their disposal the services of many German scientists and technicians, and perhaps German naval officers also, experts in submarine war. Giving them the credit of having studied the Battle of the Atlantic very closely, it seems only common sense to assume that their combined strategy may aim at a seizure of certain ports on the Atlantic by the Red Army to enable submarines and aircraft to operate effectively across the western approaches to Great Britain. This strategy has nearly succeeded twice in our history. They may well think "third time lucky."

Apart from this venture into separate naval strategy the remaining activities of the Red Fleet are likely to be limited to operations in coastal waters or narrow seas in very close co-operation with the other Services. This might include getting *surface* command of the Baltic or Black Sea to facilitate an offensive move of the Red Army across one or the other of these seas.

#### SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS

The chief point to remember here is that the Kremlin has at its disposal the technical services of many German scientists and experts. We can be very sure that they are exploiting this advantage to the full. We must also remember that they have got the entire industrial resources of the Soviet Union geared, as a first priority, to warlike production. Thirdly, they are entirely free from scruples against the use of any new weapon on grounds of humanity or any consideration for their own people. These three advantages are formidable, and might be expected to enable them to spring upon the World something rather unpleasant in the way of technical surprises. But fortunately they suffer from two compensating disadvantages.

The first of these is a lack of technically educated Soviet citizens in sufficient quantities to manipulate highly complicated scientific weapons in decisive numbers. I will try to show what I mean by an example from artillery technique. As all gunners and many non-gunners know, it is not sufficient to put into the field vast numbers of powerful guns and a great mass of ammunition. You must also have quite a complicated technical organization for connecting those guns with their targets by survey or other semi-scientific methods. This demands a large staff of junior technicians of sufficient mathematical ability to work out the relevant sums. These brainy young men are needed in huge numbers to deploy artillery or any other scientific weapon in war-winning quantities. It is just this very stratum of Soviet society which is most lacking—so much so that in the recent war they were forced, on account of this weakness, to deploy their artillery masses in ways that we should call "bow and arrow." It worked, but only at the expense of heavy losses among artillerymen. What is true of artillery is true of any other scientific innovation, so there is some hope that the lack of junior technicians may hinder deployment of such weapons on a grand scale.

Their second disadvantage is the all-pervading suspicion to be found everywhere in Russia. Nobody trusts anybody else. So, even if some decisive new weapon is



evolved, their exaggerated sense of security may prevent them from letting sufficient people into the secret so as to deploy the new weapon in decisive numbers. The German use of gas at Ypres in March, 1915, and our own first use of tanks illustrate how futile it is to spring a new surprise on too small a scale for fear of letting one's own people into the secret.

Turning now to the weapons and equipment actually in the hands of the troops, it is sufficient to say that these are, on the whole, robust, practical and up-to-date. Weapons generally are better than transport. Maintenance of the latter has improved considerably since I first saw parts of the Soviet Army on the road. There was certainly room for improvement, and there still is. The Russian as a whole is definitely not a good mechanic nor is he sympathetic to his machine.

### DISCIPLINE, MORALE AND WELFARE

Discipline in the Red Army, as might be expected of their ideological background, is very different from our own. For all that, it is most effective. It seems to be based on two rather conflicting ideas, i.e., comradeship (of the Communist variety) when off duty combined with a more than Prussian ferocity in all official dealings between one rank and another. You have the curious phenomenon of criticism which manifests itself in articles written to the papers by junior ranks, including N.C.O.s and privates, condemning in very forceful terms anything which they consider to be lax or remiss on the part of their commanding officers. It is common also to see groups of young soldiers gathering round an officer or N.C.O. and arguing with him in a most friendly but off-hand manner. On the other hand, there is no other Service in the World, I should think, where minor differences in rank count for so much. For example, at a conference whose presiding officer is a full Colonel it would be contrary to etiquette for any Lieut.-Colonel to express an opinion unless he was called upon to do so, even if he happened to be the only expert on the subject under discussion. When a senior officer is giving orders to a junior officer it is quite normal for him to adopt a special "parade ground manner"—a ferocious and bullying attitude.

Officers seem far more callous of their men's comfort and welfare than is the case with us. I came across many instances of this. They are also far from punctilious in returning the salutes of their juniors. The saluted often ignores the saluter's existence altogether, or else looks at him as though he were a bit of dirt. But this curious behaviour does not seem to be taken amiss. Both discipline and morale are undoubtedly very good throughout most of the Red Army. Of course, there are bad units; a few of the units in the Soviet Zone of Germany were very bad indeed. But it is fair to say, I think, that they were the exception and not the rule. Dress and general smartness in demeanour of all ranks, at any rate near Moscow, compares favourably with that of most conscript armies of the Western nations to-day.

### OFFICER CLASS—SELECTION AND PRIVILEGES

As is only to be expected of a propaganda-ridden Communist state, theoretically the officer class is in no way distinct from the rest. In reality it is very distinct. Selection, not only for junior officer ranks but also for N.C.O.s of the permanent cadre of instructors, is based primarily upon education. Youths who have reached certain advanced standards in the universal curriculum of the state schools commence their period of military training earlier than the general mass of their contemporaries, so that by the time of the general call-up the "brighter boys" are ready to fill vacancies in the junior officer or N.C.O. training cadres.

This would be fair enough if everybody had an equal chance of attaining to this higher standard of education. Actually there is a great deal of nepotism and political bias, particularly the latter. Sons of officers, specially of the more senior officers, stand a far better chance than others. But, even more than the professional standing of the father, the political background comes very strongly into the picture. There was a time when the authorities realized that a good professional soldier need not necessarily be a fervent Communist and vice-versa. Those were the days when commanders were appointed because of their ability in war without worrying too much about their zeal for the Party. That was why it was necessary in those days to have "political officers" in every unit to keep the honest fighting men on the rails. As I mentioned earlier, that system has been abolished "on paper." They may intend eventually to abolish it in reality and replace it by a system where every combatant officer is a trusty and loyal supporter of the Party.

There are signs that this is the trend, both in the selection and early education of the new generations of officers. The Lenin Academy of Political Science for the Armed Forces plays its part in this policy by indoctrinating courses of young and "middle piece" officers up to the rank of Lieut.-Colonel at least. But, on the principle that it is easier to keep a fervent young Communist fervent than to inspire enthusiasm into the middle-aged, it is reasonable to believe that growing importance is being attached to the candidate's record as an earnest *Komsomol* when selecting junior officers.

As regard officer's privileges, these differ in no special way from those enjoyed by the whole official hierarchy. The only point to emphasize here is that Communist talk about the abolition of class privilege in the Soviet Union is arrant nonsense. The entire system is based on the idea that the higher up the official tree one climbs, the better become the "perks."

On account of the leper-like isolation meted out to foreign attachés, it was harder to get an insight into the character and abilities of senior officers than it would be in a civilized country. But in the course of a year in Potsdam and another in Moscow it was possible to form a sort of composite representative picture of the average senior officer. The first impression that sticks out is that one and all of them are constantly in fear for their own futures. This impression is most marked, and I do not think that there can be any mistake about it. Many of the combatant Generals (i.e., those who were not "political officers") gave me the feeling that, if left to their natural inclinations, they might have been quite decent normal beings with whom it would have been possible to find a lot in common. But they all have to act a part, and assume the character of mannerless boors.

Most of the successful war-time commanders that I met seem to have owed their success to a ruthless force of character and toughness of "drive" rather than to the profundity of their grasp of the higher art of war.

Coming to the "middle piece" ranks, the most common characteristics are lack of personal initiative and an almost inexhaustible capacity for hard work. The former trait—lack of initiative, might almost be called the Achilles' heel of Soviet fighting efficiency as a whole. It is undoubtedly caused by the draconian penalties which attend failure, even when failure has been caused by a minor error of judgment. Nobody cares to take this risk. They all prefer, if possible, to "pass the baby" and get a ruling from higher up, even if this wastes time. I came upon many glaring instances of this.

We used to see quite a lot of the non-commissioned ranks in the Soviet Zone of Germany, e.g., by giving them lifts on the road, etc., I found the simple soldiers and junior N.C.O.s most likeable chaps—far more so, in fact, than most of their officers. They were amazingly ignorant of the outer World, but showed no anti-foreign feelings at all. Nor, in the Soviet Zone, had they any objection to talking freely on non-military subjects provided that they were certain that they were not being observed. Most of them had the minds of peasants, and oriental peasants at that. I got the same feeling that I used to get when talking to primitive villagers in India. It was significant how many talked of a coming war with the West. They spoke of it without rancour or enthusiasm or any other strong feelings—in quite a matter-of-fact way, as of any other inevitable event, such as the snows of Winter.

### SUMMARY

I have tried to give you, in the time available, my own general impressions of the Soviet Armed Forces—their inter-Service set-up, their outlook on war and politics, their principal strong and weak points, and some of the characteristics of the troops, their leaders, and their equipment. I have avoided exact figures or details, partly for security reasons and partly for lack of time. The remaining time will be more profitably used, I suggest, if I try to answer questions.

The general impression which I should like to leave with you is that of a formidable fighting machine, but one by no means free from very serious weaknesses. However good the actual fighting forces may be, their ability to sustain a long world war will depend on the economic state of the Soviet Union and on its people's enthusiasm for the war. In both these respects the Soviet Union still has a long way to go. They know this as well as anyone and they are certainly not "marking time."

### DISCUSSION

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR G. LE Q. MARTEL : I should like to start by congratulating General Hilton on his lecture. I know a certain amount about Russia, and I find myself in agreement with practically everything that he said. The only point where I think I might disagree a little with him is that I found the officers—and particularly the junior officers—did look after their men well. Perhaps the difference is that I saw them at the front and General Hilton perhaps saw them in the back areas. But that is only a minor point.

The Russians gave me a very good tour to the front. I talked to everybody—regimental commanders and all. At Moscow I had for two months three meetings a week with the General Staff, lasting four or five hours. At the end of the War I had a complete picture of things.

A very important point, which is rather an unknown factor and which the Lecturer did not touch on very much, is that right up to the end of the War the Russian Army was almost completely unmechanized. Everything in the way of a lorry that they could lay hands on had to be used to try to keep their long communications open, and even then they had great difficulties. When I was there, they could hardly ever find one motorized division to go with their tanks. That was the situation then, and all my information is that it is much the same to-day. I do not see how it could be otherwise: they still have very long communications; their railways are in a pretty shaky state; and they have bad roads; moreover, the Russians do not look after their lorries too well, and the consumption of lorries is very great. That, to my mind, is a very important point.

I do not think Russia is going to attack us for some time yet, but if she did she could march up to the Middle East or into Europe with something like 300 divisions. Those divisions have quite good weapons but they are unmechanized—they have horse-drawn transport.

To meet this, what are we doing? The Western Union is raising a conscript manpower army which can only be about one-third of the strength of the Russian forces. It can, therefore, have no chance of success. Surely the right answer is to raise a highly mobile, armoured and mechanized army of professional soldiers. Then they will be able to attack the advancing Russian divisions (which have little mobility) in flank or in rear and defeat them.

Why have we gone back to this retrograde policy of a conscript manpower army?

THE LECTURER: That is a question of policy in regard to our own Forces, which is a little bit outside the scope of my lecture.

With regard to mechanization, I think we ought to be careful and not to live too happily in the past. I know that the Russians did end the War with a very great mass of their Army animal-drawn; but even in the very short time that I have seen them they have made great strides in the way of turning horse-drawn divisions into motorized divisions.

I quite agree that their weak point is still largely lack of mechanical sense and also the fact that they have these enormously long communications which, undoubtedly, in view of their really appalling roads and inadequate railways, judged by Western standards, will cause some extra demand upon their mechanized transport for communications purposes as opposed to use in formations. But I think they have realized that very fully and are making tremendous efforts with the whole of that great industrial machine to turn out lorries to a greatly increasing extent.

MR. JUSTICE J. A. BELL: Would it be possible for the Lecturer to indicate the size of a normal Russian division to-day?

THE LECTURER: It is a good deal smaller than ours, but bigger than an infantry brigade.

MR. JUSTICE J. A. BELL: In one of the newspapers, the Military Correspondent said that the Russians had already mobilized 175 divisions; but what that amounts to depends on whether they are the size of brigades or of the old-fashioned divisions.

THE LECTURER: They are certainly smaller than our own.

VICE-ADMIRAL H. T. BAILLIE-GROHMAN: Could the Lecturer tell us what is the present position of von Paulus and his troops? Will they be formed into a Russian fighting army? Also, will any German submarine commanders be in the Russian fighting navy?

A further question I should like to ask is about the news that was received about the atomic bomb. I take in a weekly paper called *The Intelligence Digest*, and seven months ago this gave full details about the Russians' atom bomb and the approximate date it was to be exploded, yet the public Press in England said nothing about it. It struck me that the Press may be acting in the same way as they did before the late war, when they did not publish a good deal of news which they had about what was going on in Germany. Would the Lecturer like to make some remarks about that?

THE LECTURER: With regard to the present position of General von Paulus, all I know about that, from my own factual knowledge, is that while I was in Moscow he was undoubtedly installed in headquarters not so far from Moscow and he was a participant in frequent conferences with the Soviet Armed Forces officers of very high rank. But (and I am giving a purely personal opinion) I got the impression that his future was marked out not so much as a commander in the field in any future war, but as being groomed to be the future dictator of the Eastern Zone.

The same thing applies to the German forces which they are training there. The possibility is that they are the people who will march into the Eastern Zone and become the German armed forces there when the Soviet make a pretence at giving up there.



With regard to the use of German prisoners generally, undoubtedly a very large number of them have been drafted into these special formations of Germans, but I think those are picked for political reliability rather than for military efficiency. Compared with the two million or so German prisoners they are supposed to have, I do not think that the number of armed Germans is very great. They are still using the great bulk of them—and we frequently used to see them—just as slaves on the roads.

VICE-ADMIRAL BAILLIE-GROHMAN: Do they use Germans as instructors?

THE LECTURER: No, not ordinary instructors in the sense of instructors of gunnery, and so on. They have their own people for that. But they are using the very highly technical Germans as advisers and on research.

With regard to the atomic bomb, that again is rather a question of policy in our own country. Why did they not announce it before? We did know about it. I did myself. It was anyone's guess that they were working on the atomic bomb very hard during the last few years and they were making use of German scientists. But why we did not make an announcement until just recently, I am afraid I do not know.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. WATERHOUSE: To what extent do they mix their European and Asiatic troops in units and in formations?

THE LECTURER: When the War ended, the units which I saw in the Soviet Zone of Germany were organized very much on a territorial basis, and one saw complete battalions of Mongols and so forth; but during the last year in Moscow I noticed an opposite tendency—to have battalions in which there would be Mongolians and white men all mixed up together; and white men, above all, from different parts of the Soviet Union. I believe that is partly due to the fear that they might gradually develop, without meaning to do so, territorial armies instead of a Red Army.

COMMANDER M. G. SAUNDERS: Could the Lecturer tell us something about the system of strategic and tactical control in war-time—how it operated and how it is likely to operate? We know a great deal about the German system, particularly on the Eastern front, and the way in which Hitler possibly helped the Russians considerably to achieve their startling successes there by his grave errors and his method of acting against the advice of skilled Generals. I think it would be very interesting to know to what extent any such defects occurred in the late war, or would be likely to occur in a future war, on the Russian side.

THE LECTURER: I think that the method of selecting senior officers in the Soviet Forces might throw some light on that point. It certainly is a worry to them to know that a man can be a first-class soldier and an excellent commander in war, and yet be a very poor Communist, and *vice versa*.

As we know, they covered that in the early days by a system of political commissars. Then they abolished the word "commissar" and called them political officers. Now, on paper, they have abolished the political officers. As far as outward appearance goes, every officer is treated as a trusted man and there is no political bias either way, but in actual fact they have these political officers just the same, and I think they will have them for many years. Within two minutes of talking to a senior officer, you can tell whether he is a real soldier or a political officer, although they wear the same uniform. They have a large number of people who they have put into positions of great responsibility because they are efficient, honest-to-God soldiers. They have others who they have put into very highly responsible and powerful positions in the Armed Forces because they are reliable Communists. So, when it comes to war, they will have people of both those kinds in high places.

But, above all, they are realists. I do not think they will make the mistake of trying to let politicians butt in upon purely military decisions. Their propaganda may give rather an opposite impression at the moment, for when one sees a film about the last war, practically everything from a small infantry patrol upwards appears to have been

planned by Stalin himself : he is shown poring over maps at almost every turn of the film. But that is pure propaganda. I think that in reality they have separated the two and that they will give the real soldiers their head when it comes to war, only watched in the background, so far as their political activities go, by these political officers.

FLIGHT-LIEUTENANT E. L. HARRIS : Could the Lecturer tell us something about the employment of airborne troops with the Russian Army, and would he comment, perhaps, on the fact that, although they did a certain amount of experimental work in airborne forces in the early thirties, they did not make much use of them during the War ?

THE LECTURER : They were the first people to try airborne landings in some manœuvres between the wars, on a fairly large scale—I think a brigade. They did so in 1936. I think I am right in saying (I would like General Martel to confirm or deny this) that they used little or no airborne forces during the War.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR G. LE Q. MARTEL : None at all. They had not sufficient aircraft to do it.

THE LECTURER : And also, I suppose, they had such large forces of partisans already behind the lines that they could use them ?

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL MARTEL : They dropped some people behind the enemy lines, but not forces.

THE LECTURER : With regard to the present time, they are certainly treating this matter as being of great importance and are developing the idea of airborne troops and the technique and machinery for using airborne troops.

FLIGHT-LIEUTENANT J. G. BISHOP : Are they trying to make the Red Air Force an all-weather air force, both from the point of view of aids and pilot training, or do they tend to be a fair-weather air force ?

THE LECTURER : I would say that they are very much behind us in the technical machinery for acting as an all-weather air force. In other words, they do not go in for radar and all those things for guiding aircraft in to aerodromes to the same extent as we do. This applies also to civil aviation. Their civil lines converge on Moscow, and only fly in the old-fashioned way by the light of nature, such as following a railway line. But when it comes to the question of whether they are going to be an all-weather air force or only a fair-weather air force, I think we must remember, again, their complete callousness in regard to casualties. If they think that a certain operation is worth while doing in very bad weather at the expense of tremendous losses in pilots and aircraft, I think they will do it.

#### THE CHAIRMAN

We are all very greatly indebted to General Hilton for a most absorbing lecture on a subject which is of the deepest interest to us all. It was certainly of extreme interest to me to hear about his experiences with the Russian Army during these last years, because I have at various times seen a good deal of the Russian soldier. I attended their manœuvres in 1911, 1912 and 1913 ; I was for six months with the Russian Army during the First World War and saw the first Russian Revolution. In 1936 I was on a mission to their manœuvres with General Martel and I went across to Russia again for two short visits in 1941 and 1942.

I have the very greatest admiration for the Russian soldier as a fighting man. But it was interesting to me to hear the Lecturer bring out all the same sort of points about him as I should have done from my experience of the Czarist Army which, as I say, I knew pretty well from having been, in one way and another, with it for the best part of eight or nine months.

The Lecturer spoke of the lack of care for the welfare of the soldiers by the officers. General Martel says that that was not so during the War. On all the manœuvres that I saw, as soon as the troops got into camp the officer went off and made himself comfortable

and he did nothing whatever for his men. I do not think it was heartlessness; it was just, so to speak, the custom of the Service. I was a little surprised to learn that that still goes on. When I saw the Red Army in 1936, I should have said that the relations between officers and men were a good deal closer.

There was also the point which the Lecturer brought out about the lack of initiative and fear of taking responsibility among the "middle-piece" officers. That certainly was a very marked characteristic of the Russian officers of similar rank that I knew. I remember that at the first manoeuvres I ever attended a brigade commander with whom I happened to be riding asked me to take a message to one of his battalion commanders to tell him to go to village A, where he thought the field kitchens were, and feed his men while the conference was going on. I went to the battalion commander and gave him the message. As he was marching off, he said to me, "Of course, our field-kitchens are not in village A, but in village B." I said, "I know what the brigade commander wanted—that you should have eaten and be ready to march. If you go to village B, I will tell him where you have gone." He absolutely refused. He said, "I cannot go; the brigade commander has ordered us to go to A and I cannot possibly go to B." I tried to persuade him, but it was of no use; so I started to ride back to the brigade commander. He suddenly came galloping after me and said, "I have a bright idea. Will you give me an order?" So I gave him the order, he saluted me, and marched the battalion off to village B. I do not know whether anything like that happens in the Russian Army to-day. I should have thought that they had outgrown that, because they certainly bring up and educate their officers very carefully. General Martel will remember some of the schools that we visited in 1936. I should have said that they were, on the whole, as far as military purposes go, of a better quality than in the old Czarist Army—from the military point of view.

The lack of education of the soldier is, of course, nothing new. It will be a very long time indeed before the Russian peasant is really educated, particularly now that he is not allowed to know anything about what goes on outside his own Country.

A thing that impressed me most strongly about the Russian Army was that their weakest point was behind the lines in their transport. That was certainly so in all the manoeuvres I saw before the First World War and certainly it was so during the First World War, particularly in the Caucasus, where I was for six months and where the transport arrangements absolutely and completely broke down during the Winter, and the troops at the front almost starved.

When I went to the manoeuvres in 1936 with General Martel, I tried to avoid as far as possible looking at the sort of set piece manoeuvres which were really got up for the benefit of the foreign military missions and were carefully laid on. As far as possible, we tried to get away and motor round the rear of the troops. I must say that I expected to find a great many broken down tanks and a good deal of disorganization. As General Martel will remember, we did not find much of that. I do not think we ever saw a broken down tank, although they were using a lot of vehicles; and I know that General Martel was rather impressed with both their tanks and the way they looked after them. On the parade at the finish of the manoeuvres, I remember that they put past the saluting point over 1,000 tanks without a single breakdown, which in 1936 was a very considerable achievement and one that no other army at that time could have done.

But their transport arrangements are certainly their weak point. They have enormous distances in Russia, of course, and they have very poor roads. Transport will be, I think, for some time a weak point of the Russian Army. But we have to remember, on the other hand, that they have much fewer requirements in the way of transport than we have. They do not worry much about the welfare of the troops. They do not have all these elaborate arrangements for cinemas and N.A.A.F.I's and very varied rations, and everything of that kind. They do not bother so much as we do about the wounded—whether

they get away in time or not. So all their arrangements in that way are very much simpler than ours would be. Therefore, their transport probably works where ours certainly would not.

The only other thing worth saying is that it is, of course, of the greatest interest to us as to what the attitude of Russia towards the rest of Europe really is. My own view would be that she is not at present aggressive. I do not think that Russia wants at present to dominate Western Europe physically, though she will penetrate it with her pernicious Communistic doctrines as far as possible. Russia is not bothered with the desire for *lebensraum* which made the Germans aggressive. They have plenty of room for development in their own Country. Nor has Russia got that arrogance of the Germans, who think they can run any country much better than anybody else. The Russians (certainly the people at the top) are quite aware that Russia is a great many years behind the rest of Europe in civilization, and I think they know that they would find the very greatest difficulty in running any more of the World than they have got.

I do not think that they are inspired by those two motives which largely made Germany so aggressive. But what they are actuated by is a most profound fear of another German invasion. They have been invaded twice within a generation by Germany, who penetrated right into the heart of their Country, occupied the best part of half of European Russia and, certainly in the late war, both in their advance and in their retreat, did it with the utmost brutality. General Martel probably knows better than I do, but I should think that the casualties of Russia in this last war in killed—troops, civilians and so on, were probably somewhere in the neighbourhood of about 15,000,000, or something like that. I have never heard the figure put much lower than 11,000,000 or 12,000,000.

The Russians are quite determined that that shall not happen again if they can possibly help it. They have therefore put this Iron Curtain, this protective barrier, across Europe to try to prevent it and to safeguard their Eastern frontier. They do not trust the Western Powers not to rearm Germany against them. I think that is really what is very largely at the back of their present attitude. General Martel will remember in 1936 how Marshal Voroshilov, who at that time was Second-in-Command to Stalin, asked us to come and see him when we were in Moscow at the end of the manoeuvres and talked to us for about three-quarters of an hour about their fear of German invasion and aggressiveness and asked what Great Britain would do to help them. I always remember that episode. I think that is the clue very largely to the Russian attitude at the present time.

But that does not mean to say that it is not extremely dangerous, because you have here a very highly armed and quite ruthless nation and, if anything does set them off, they may quite well attack us. So that we have got to be very much on our guard.

I am sure you will all join with me in thanking General Hilton most deeply and sincerely for his extremely interesting lecture. (Applause.)



## TARGET FOR TO-MORROW

By J. M. SPAIGHT, C.B., C.B.E.

**W**ERE the huge forest fires which devastated the Landes in August, 1949, a portent of things to come? A British air line pilot who flew near them said that they dwarfed anything he had seen when he was serving in Bomber Command. If he waits until the next war he may see something bigger still. European cities may stage conflagrations which will set nature a new standard of comparison; and the tragedy will be that the sacrifice to Moloch will largely be wasted, nugatory, and as barren in military results and as unrelated to any military necessity as have been those forest fires in France. Such is the prospect that looms ahead of us if industrial towns become targets for atomic bombs or, for that matter, for incendiary bombs, dropped as they may be in even greater masses than in 1943-45. It is not generally appreciated that of the total volume of destruction of life and property by air attack in those years the greater part was due to incendiaries. In three night raids on Hamburg at the end of July, 1943, 60,000 people perished in the fire tornados; as many, that is to say, as in *all* the German raids on Britain. In Tokyo, in one raid on the night of 9th March, 1945, when incendiaries only were dropped, 83,000 were killed, that is more than a hundred times as many as in Rotterdam on 14th May, 1940, and more than two hundred times as many as in Coventry on the night of 14th November, 1940.

It is evident, therefore, that even if an enemy has no atomic bombs he will still be able to set cities ablaze, for he will certainly have incendiaries. Yes, it may be said, but the American atomic bombs will end the war out of hand by blowing his capital, with the evil junta in it, sky-high, and then the other big cities, if that is necessary. Perhaps, but it is a gamble. It may not come off. If it does not end the war (and a large Country can stand a lot of earth-scorching) it will start a hideous cycle of devastation of which none can foresee the end. Will *any* nation be the gainer when the final reckoning is made?

It appears from statements made by American war leaders that the United States Air Force will be responsible for strategic bombing if the States of the Atlantic Pact are forced into war by a Russian aggression. General Hoyt Vandenberg has stated that B36 bombers, using atomic bombs, would be able to check such an aggression by striking, for example, at the enemy army poised on a European frontier. General Omar Bradley has spoken of the possibility of atomic attack on troops, ships and material; concentration of shipping along the French coast for the invasion of England, he said, would be made impossible. Well and good; but he spoke, too, of "an eventual climactic counter-attack," which implied action further afield, and General Vandenberg was more specific still: he contemplated the disruption of production of war equipment and attacks on the enemy's industrial system for that purpose. Now, if these attacks are also made with atomic bombs, what is in question is the re-staging in Europe of the ghastly tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One recoils from the thought that the great crusade of Christianity against Communism is to be so conducted.

Is there no escape from the fate which seems to overhang Europe—no escape, that is, which would not be an abandonment of all hope of victory for the free nations in the life-and-death struggle that may be coming? Need great cities be burnt to the ground? Need tens of thousands of their inhabitants perish? Has strategic air power no other than blazing arrows in its quiver? Before one can come to grips with these questions one must hark back to some events of the last war.

The United States Army Air Force, as it was then, favoured "precision" bombing, that is to say, the attacking of specific military objectives, preferably key-targets. The British Air Force, after starting with the same preference, switched in mid-1941 to "target area" bombing. In both cases there was and still is a good deal of uncertainty about what these target systems amounted to in practice. "Precision" bombing certainly did not mean that the actual objective—a factory, for instance—could be attacked with such accuracy that it, and it alone, was hit. There must always be a spill-over of bombs dropped from 20,000 feet or more.

Actually, "precision" bombing was not very different from "target area" bombing in the original and legitimate sense, that is, the bombing of the known location of a war factory or other military objective. It is clear from replies to questions in the House of Commons in 1943, that this was what the responsible Ministers understood by the term. The identification of the actual target was often made impossible by the intensity of the defence or by clever camouflaging, but there was no doubt about its existence, and the practice of bombing the site was a justifiable one in the circumstances, provided the attack was reasonably circumscribed. Later, however, the practice changed—degenerated, the present writer would say—into a form of attack that came disconcertingly close to indiscriminate bombing. In the campaign against the Ruhr in 1943, the practice was adopted of dropping high explosive and incendiary bombs in the middle of a town, usually the old civic centre and devoid of factories, in the hope that as the fires started by the incendiaries spread they would engulf any factories there might be in the perimeter. The effect was to cause general devastation on a scale far exceeding anything that would have resulted from an attack with high explosive bombs on the factory district alone. The destruction caused was spectacular but, truth to tell, the results, as we now know, were disappointing. War production was not stopped; on the contrary, it was steadily on the increase until mid-1944, after which a decline did set in.

Such a fashion of bombing marked a distinct change from that which we had followed in the earlier stages of the War. We assured President Roosevelt in response to his appeal at the beginning of September, 1939, that only military objectives would be bombarded. We honoured that promise in our raids of 1940. The first strategic attack made by either side in the air war between ourselves and Germany—that of the night of 17th May, 1940, when a force of Hampden bombers attacked oil targets at Hamburg and one of Whitleys similar targets at Bremen, set the pattern for the operations that followed.<sup>1</sup> Only when the *Luftwaffe* made its ham-fisted attack on London did we relax the rule that air crews must bring back their bombs if they could not identify their assigned targets. There was a suggestion at this time that we should no longer confine our attacks to military objectives. It was not approved. Mr. Churchill minuted General Ismay for the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 19th November, 1940: "It was not solely on moral grounds that we decided against retaliation upon Germany. It pays us better to concentrate upon limited high-class military objectives."<sup>2</sup>

That, too, was the American view, and it was not modified when the Royal Air Force took to target area bombing. The United States Army Air Force still believed in specific as opposed to blanket bombing. At the Casablanca Conference in January, 1943, the question arose whether the United States should come into line with the

<sup>1</sup> Our attacks on the German lines of communications between 10th and 16th May were tactical operations.

<sup>2</sup> *Their Finest Hour*, 1949, page 321.

British practice; the decision was that it should maintain its policy of precision attack by day but that fighter escort should be provided. The Directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 21st January, 1943, reflected the compromise that had been reached. It began by laying down as the "primary object" of the two Bomber Commands in the United Kingdom "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened." That formula was elastic enough to cover the target area bombing which the Royal Air Force wished to continue. It went on, however, to name a number of "primary objectives" which satisfied the American demand for selective bombing. Among them were "transportation" and "oil plants," and in naming these the Directive scored a bull shot. They were to be proved in the end to be the most profitable of all classes of targets attacked by the two Air Forces. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey's reports leave no possibility of doubt upon that score. They were key targets, master targets. Destruction of oil plants deprived Germany not only of liquid fuel but of nitrogen, methanol (a constituent of explosives), and rubber. Attacks on transportation strangled her coal economy and reduced her steel production. The campaigns of 1944-45 against oil and transportation contributed, directly and indirectly, more than anything else to Germany's collapse. The Survey suggests that they, with power stations, should have been attacked in force much earlier than they were. German experts interrogated after the Surrender expressed the opinion that if the all-out attack on the oil and chemical industry had begun six or twelve months sooner than it did, the end of the War would have been advanced proportionally.

The American official history confirms the Survey's finding. Electric power, it says, might well have been given a higher priority and ball-bearings a lower one, but "probably more important than either the inclusion of bearings or the exclusion of electric power was the failure to concentrate at an earlier date on oil."<sup>3</sup> One cannot help feeling that a great opportunity was missed at Casablanca to cap the blunder that it is now generally accepted was made there. The blunder was the announcement of insistence upon "unconditional surrender." That probably prolonged the War; so did the delay in adopting a massive air offensive against the targets that mattered most of all. That would have meant that the Royal Air Force would have had to turn from general to specific attack, and the latter had not proved very effective when tried in 1940-41. By the beginning of 1943, however, the radar aids known as Oboe and H2S had been developed, as well as the comparatively disappointing Gee. The Pathfinder force, moreover, had been formed in the Autumn of the previous year. There was a better prospect of success for a programme of specific bombing than there had been in mid-1941 when target area bombing began. Such a programme would not have involved necessarily any reduction in the total weight of bombs dropped by Bomber Command during the War; it would have meant only that the figures of 431,000, 138,000 and 98,000 tons used against industrial towns, transportation and oil targets, respectively, would have been adjusted downwards in the first case and upwards in the other two. It would have been no less effective in keeping the war over Germany's living space, of immobilizing there an immense host for active and passive defence, and of causing Germany to concentrate on the construction of fighters rather than of bombers, thus relieving our own home front.

<sup>3</sup> *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. 2, page 367.



If the experience of the last war is a true guide, the Western Allies will have little to lose and much to gain if they follow in a future conflict the line which the British Air Force took in 1940 and returned to in 1944, and to which the American Air Force adhered in Europe to the end—the line of attack on “limited high-class military objectives.” The taking of a decision to that effect would not be prompted by a desire to “be kind to the poor enemy” or anything of that sort. It would be based on hard-headed military expediency. The Americans would not have favoured selective bombing if it did not pay. It is true that in the Far East they switched in March, 1945, to blanket bombing with incendiaries. That change was inspired, one can hardly doubt, by the specially inflammable nature of the Japanese towns. As early as 1940, Major-General C. L. Chennault had advocated a policy of incendiary attack on oriental cities. His chief, General H. H. Arnold, demurred to the suggestion. He wrote to Chennault that “the Air Corps was committed to a strategy of high-altitude precision bombing of military objectives” and that “use of incendiaries against cities was contrary to our national policy of attacking only military objectives.” “Four years later,” says Chennault, “the 20th Air Force’s B-29s spent nearly a year in ineffectual high-altitude bombing of Japan with high explosives before Major-General Curtis LeMay threw away Arnold’s text book and sent them in at 5,000 feet and overloaded with fire bombs, to burn the heart out of the industrial cities that nourished the enemy’s military strength.”<sup>4</sup>

East is East, however, and West is West, and it is quite clear from the facts that have come to light since the War that in Europe the incendiary bombing of the towns had a less decisive influence on the final issue than the specific bombing of key targets such as oil and transportation. If to these are added power stations, the allied atomic bombers will have their hands full.

#### TACTICAL TARGETS

There may be tactical targets to be dealt with, too, not only the assembled enemy troops and their material but the bridges, viaducts and railway junctions over which their reinforcements are carried. The chaos which attacks of this kind upon the German communications in France caused in 1944 was described in General Eisenhower’s dispatch of 13th July, 1945. Behind the theatre of operations the armament factories in the towns will also claim attention. To spare them would be to grant to the enemy the privilege of sanctuary not only for his war production but for his troops if he chose to cram them into the towns. They will certainly not be left alone, but they can be attacked with high explosive, not incendiary, still less atomic bombs.

Only high explosive bombs were in contemplation when the doctrine of the strategic air offensive which allows attack on urban objectives was first formulated; atomic attack, or for that matter incendiary attack, was not thought of at that time, nor were such abominations as V.1 or V.2 projectiles, the effect of which is indiscriminate destruction. Aimed attack with high explosive is likely to have a comparatively localised effect and is less open to some objections which have been raised, not without reason, to the incendiary and atomic bombings of towns in 1943–45. One of the objections is that such bombings, conducted as they were in those years, make it impossible even to attempt to observe one of the rules of civilized war. This is that in bombardments steps should be taken as far as possible to spare

<sup>4</sup> C. L. Chennault, *The Way of a Fighter*, 1949, page 97.



hospitals and similar institutions. It is a rule obligatory under treaty (Conventions No. IV and IX of The Hague, 1907) for land and naval forces and applicable by analogy to air forces. No honourable fighting man would wish that humanitarian precept to be set at naught. None would like to see a repetition of what happened at Hiroshima, when 42 out of 45 civil hospitals were wrecked, as well as the two army hospitals, more than 180 out of the 200 doctors in the town were killed or injured, as were also 1,654 out of 1,780 nurses.<sup>5</sup> Another objection is that incendiary or atomic bombing of towns must leave necessarily as its legacy an appalling problem of urban reconstruction which makes any post-war settlement enormously more difficult than it need be. For these reasons alone, and there are others that could be added if space allowed, it is submitted that the Western Powers would do well to refrain from dropping atomic or incendiary bombs on towns.

If they do refrain, the enemy is unlikely to start the practice. He will not feel very sure of himself when it comes to strategic bombing; he will know that he is no match for the Americans at that game. He will probably play for time and not try to force the pace. We have been warned, it is true, that a war will start with shattering attacks on western cities; it has been one of the arguments for the dubious claim that in the recruiting drive for technicians the Air Force's need is more urgent than the Navy's. We had warnings of the same kind before 1939. The submarine menace was quite secondary, we were told, to that from the air. The war was to begin with tremendous onslaughts on London and other cities. "During the next war," the Earl of Munster said when replying for the Government to the debate in the House of Lords on 13th December, 1937, "air raids on this Country will be at their maximum intensity at the beginning of the war." The debate was on the Air Raid Precautions Bill, the second reading of which was moved by Lord Swinton in a speech explaining the elaborate precautions against gas attack, etc., which had to be ready by zero hour. Actually, as we know, nothing happened here at home; the "phoney" war stage lasted in the air for about ten months; but the U-boat war began in deadly earnest at once. There may be another "phoney" stage at the beginning of the next war. A sort of "lukewarm" war would appeal to an enemy who had been waging "cold" war for years and was in no hurry to turn on the heat. It would give his fifth-columnists and fellow-travellers time to show what they could do for him before the shooting war began. It will be strange in all the circumstances if the Western Allies are not in a position to call the tune in the air.

<sup>5</sup> United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effects of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki*.

## AIR POWER IN ECONOMIC WARFARE: A COMPARISON WITH NAVAL BLOCKADE

By AQUILA

**I**T is theoretically possible for air forces to strike at any target within their range. Naturally the exponents of surface strategies conceived this power as a weighty adjunct to their battles. However, from the first days when men launched themselves into the air, novelists and speculative thinkers had foreseen the possibility of using the skies as a highway along which to carry death and destruction to the very heart of nations, outflanking surface forces and leaving them, if needs be, undefeated in the field or on the seas.

This trend of thought was stimulated during the 1914-18 War by the well-nigh catastrophic deadlock on land and sea. "If," asked the exponents of the new strategy, "our approaches to the heart of the enemy are barred on land and sea, then why not conduct a direct offensive against the sources of the enemy fighting potential along the open highways of the air?" Between 1920 and 1930, General Giulio Douhet developed his theories of war in which he saw air striking power as the main weapon of national offence and defence. The 1939-45 War demonstrated that the effort required to bring a nation to its knees by this means was far greater than Douhet had estimated. As a result of this recent experience there are many who think that although by the end of the War we had built up air striking forces which were within measurable distance of being powerful enough to bring about the result which Douhet had foreseen, the cost was too great. They suggest that the more effective way of prosecuting war would have been to use the air striking effort exclusively in support of surface strategies.

Meanwhile, the extension of economic warfare from naval blockade to air attack, and the consequent great increase in our capacity to wage aggressive economic warfare, had produced enthusiastic exponents. It may be said that their very enthusiasm has been a factor in producing a school of reactionaries. But if we are to see the problem of using air striking power to its best effect for the national purpose in true focus, it is important to understand the history of economic warfare and its relation to the defensive and offensive use of the weapons of war involved. To this end we can find many lessons in the study of sea power as it used to be understood in the days of Mahan, which are applicable to our conceptions of air power to-day.

### THE ANALOGY OF NAVAL BLOCKADE

The first function of the Navy has always been to secure our sea communications on which we are vitally dependent. The method of performing this function, as expounded by Mahan, was to maintain naval ascendancy over hostile Powers or combinations of Powers. "The true end is to preponderate over the enemy's navy and so control the sea . . ." and maintain " . . . that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which by controlling the great common, closes the highways . . ." This involved ultimately the ability to defeat the enemy in an overt challenge. And so naval strategy was a matter of making the best possible use of the available naval forces, "breaking up the enemy's power on the sea," and so wearing him down that an overt challenge between the concentrated navies of both belligerents would find us in a position to achieve a decisive victory.

The doctrine of "seeking out and destroying" the enemy naval forces was directed towards achieving this position of predominant sea power. The ruses adopted to lure the enemy into situations in which he could be destroyed were manifold: attacking his overseas possessions and forcing him to disperse his force in their defence, attacking his commerce thereby forcing him to protect it piecemeal, blockading his naval ports and thereby locking up part of his naval strength and so forth.

Using the terms "defence" and "offence" in the same sense as Mahan,<sup>1</sup> these operations to gain ascendancy at sea were strategically defensive, although tactically offensive. In fact, it was not until after a favourable situation had been created at sea that naval resources could be spared to go over to the offensive development of economic blockade. Thus our naval strength was required primarily to command the sea, and when this was done it was put to good use in blockading the enemy.

It is important to recognize that the economic blockade was adopted as the best offensive use that could be made of the weapon which was essential to our security, when and only when surplus strength became available as a result of its success in establishing command at sea. It is not difficult to see, therefore, why little argument arose as to the chances of achieving decisive success against our enemies by economic blockade, or whether, indeed, it was economical to try to win the war by economic blockade; for it was a matter of putting to their best offensive purpose weapons of war which we had to afford in any case to guarantee our very security.

#### INTERPRETATION OF AIR WARFARE

With the opening up of the air as a highway for commerce and warlike purposes we can draw useful parallels from the conduct of war at sea. Of course, the importance of the air as a highway for commerce is as yet negligible compared with the sea, but on the other hand its importance as a highway for the passage of destructive missiles to the heart of the enemy is obviously enormous. Therefore, the first function of the air force is to command the air in order to ensure the security of our Country. As at sea, the method of doing this is to destroy the hostile air forces capable of challenging our ascendancy in the air. As also at sea, this involves the ultimate ability to defeat the enemy in an overt challenge.

The detailed course of the war in the air may follow slightly different lines from naval warfare in the past, because of the nature of the air and the technical weapons and vehicles used in it. One difference is that an air battle will not normally be as decisively won or lost in a single action or in a period of a few hours or in a narrow geographical area as a sea battle. Some of the reasons for this are to be found in the nature of the forces engaged and the versatility and the opportunities for evasion which the air permits. There are, for instance, many more units in an air force; they take a far shorter time to construct; the destruction of a unit is therefore less decisive, and the chances of recuperation in a comparatively short time are greater. The ability of an air force to strike at any vital point within the whole territory of a country makes greater calls upon the passive defences, fighters and anti-aircraft guns, than sea raids made upon the coastal defences provided by the army in the days of predominant sea power. The importance of these air defences is further emphasized by the tactical difficulties of blockading enemy air forces in the same way that navies could be blockaded.

<sup>1</sup> See *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, page 87 (note).

However, just as the watchword in creating our ascendancy at sea was "... to seek out and destroy ..." so it is also the watchword in creating our ascendancy in the air. But naval forces were not able to attack the industry supporting the hostile navy with such facility as air forces obviously can. As at sea, so in the air every kind of ruse may be used to dissipate the enemy's strength—diverting it to idle tasks, attacking it when it is on the ground and as useless as, but in itself more vulnerable, than ships used to be when locked in their ports.

As at sea, the act of "seeking out and destroying" his air strength wrests the initiative from the enemy and forces him to fight where he is on the defensive. It is essential to maintain the offensive in the air in order to retain the initiative, just as it was at sea.

In the air, surface geography has less influence upon the movements of aircraft because the air ocean sweeps its unbroken expanse across the face of the whole Earth. However, the problem of bases is similar for air forces as for navies. The speed factors are so greatly increased in the air and the time of flight so comparatively short that the strategic manoeuvring which might have taken months at sea becomes but a tactical incident in air operations. Thus the method of wresting the initiative from the enemy in the air is to maintain the offensive against his air strength including his aircraft, his air bases and his air industry.

When a sufficient ascendancy had been achieved at sea, the only way of keeping the enemy on the defensive and forcing him to fight at a disadvantage was to operate against him in such a way as to do him as much harm as possible. Thus, the process of imposing the economic blockade forced him to do all in his power to free himself from the strangling grip of our Navy and to fight on the defensive; this might give still further chances of weakening his naval strength and increasing our command of the sea. Similarly in the air, the best method of retaining the initiative is to maintain the offensive, using our forces in such a way that they will hurt him most. This places him on the defensive and gives us further chances of weakening his air strength and increasing our ascendancy and our degree of command in the air.

As at sea, this offensive strategy forces the enemy to struggle to tear the strangling fingers from his throat, instead of using his air strength to hit out against our own country. And thus, during the late war the enemy was compelled to fight the immensely destructive air war over his own bases and national territory.

As the Navy uses blockade to maintain the offensive pressure against the enemy, so the Air Force also uses its power to produce economic disruption. Clearly, if it is essential to develop this form of economic warfare in the interests of purely sea or air strategy to achieve and develop the command of the sea, as it used to be, and the command of the air, as it is to-day, then this form of warfare should also be exploited to achieve as great an overall reduction in the enemy's war potential as possible. This will help to prepare the way for further operations when the time is ripe. Indeed, if this weapon can also be developed to a point where it is capable of delivering the *coup de grâce* to the enemy's war potential as a whole, so much the better. It will in this case be a great economy in our national fighting potential and a corresponding contribution to our national strength and security.

#### CONCLUSION

Thus we must avoid repeating the error made by the Spanish in Queen Elizabeth's time and later by the French, of regarding navies as auxiliaries to armies. In referring to the French faith in *guerre de course* tactics, Mahan says, "Ultior



objects brought to nought the hopes of the allies (continental) because, by fastening their eyes upon them, they thoughtlessly passed the road which led to them." And again, "The harassment and distress caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce will be conceded by all. It is, doubtless, a most important secondary operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned until war itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a most dangerous delusion, when presented in the fascinating garb of cheapness to the representatives of a people. Especially is it misleading when the nation against whom it is to be directed possesses, as Great Britain did and does, the two requisites of a strong sea power . . . a widespread healthy commerce and a powerful navy. Where the revenues and industries of a country can be concentrated into a few treasure ships, like the flota of Spanish galleons, the sinews of war may perhaps be cut by a stroke; but when its wealth is scattered in thousands of going and coming ships, when the roots of the system spread wide and far, and strike deep, it can stand many a cruel shock and lose many a goodly bough without the life being touched. Only by military command of the sea by prolonged control of the strategic centres of commerce, can such an attack be fatal; and such control can be wrung from a powerful navy only by fighting and overcoming it."

Adjusting these values to our own time, we see that we are particularly vulnerable to air attack. Only by command of the air can our vulnerability be protected on the one hand, and on the other only by prolonged control of the air and its consistent use to disrupt the economic system of our enemies can such attack be effective against industrialized nations; and such control can be wrung from a powerful enemy air force only by fighting and overcoming it.

Thus, let us be quite clear that our air striking forces are required first and foremost to command the air. If in the same endeavour we can reconcile the ulterior objective, what was formerly an "important but secondary operation of war," with that predominating aim to command the air, so much the better. Therefore, any speculation as to the expense or feasibility of bringing a country to its knees by the economic disruption caused by air power alone, or as to the use of striking power in support of surface forces, in no way affects the need for preponderant air striking power as the only guarantor of our command of the air and the vital security of our own national territory.

## GERMAN HIGHER STAFF ORGANIZATION FOR WAR

By COMMANDER M. G. SAUNDERS, R.N.

**I**N Germany shortly before the outbreak of the late War it was common to see displayed in hotels and public buildings a large bronze plaque, featuring the heads of three men—Frederick the Great, Bismarck and Hitler. This pretentious emblem symbolized the successful demagogue about to emulate the Titans. But it also revealed the misconception prevalent among Germans—including many high officers of the armed forces—as to the character and capacity of their elected ruler.

Frederick the Great, son of the founder of the Prussian Army, combined in himself the functions of head of the State, head of the government, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. This enlightened autocrat used the Army as the instrument of his adroit diplomacy. He shattered the Europe of Maria Teresa and Louis XV, and raised the Prussian State to the rank of a great Power. But the system that he alone had built up collapsed when, in 1786, the guiding hand was withdrawn. Goethe described him as "the pole-star round which Prussia, Germany and the World seemed to revolve."

Prussia was not again to take a leading part in the affairs of Europe until Bismarck's ruthlessly competent statesmanship led, in 1866, to Königgrätz and the formation of the North German Confederation, followed in 1871 by Sedan and the founding of the German Empire. Bismarck shared with his illustrious predecessor that sense of limits which is the rarest gift of statecraft, and he was fortunate in having at his elbow a first-rate military adviser—Moltke. Both these strong characters were disciples of Clausewitz, but the relationship between them was not always happy. To Bismarck the Army was an organ of the State, and he had no intention of becoming a political tool of the General Staff. On the other hand, Moltke refused to allow Bismarck to be both Chancellor and Chief of the General Staff, and insisted that no civilian should dictate strategy. In this attitude he was supported by the King, who was himself a trained soldier.

Frederick and Bismarck each evoked from the people a high degree of military preparedness, and in times of stress each could count on unquestioning obedience. To the Prussian mind this tradition of discipline and the association of these great names with historic events appealed strongly enough to survive the disaster of the 1914-18 War. In the 1920's many German homes consoled themselves with pictures of Frederick, Bismarck, and Field-Marshal von Hindenburg—the victor of Tannenberg and the only heroic figure of the lost war. In 1925, when Ebert died, Hindenburg was elected President of the Republic.

The world depression of 1929 started a chain of events which, by 1932, saw the Weimar Republic on its last legs. Hindenburg was re-elected, his only serious competitor being Adolf Hitler—leader of the National Socialist Party—who at that time was promising the six million unemployed that he would give them work. On 30th January, 1933, the aged President, who as a young officer had witnessed the proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles, reluctantly sent for Hitler to form a Government. In taking this constitutional step, Hindenburg must have been aware that the security of the State was being entrusted to an adventurer. For already an ominous feature had impressed itself on the German scene—the various political armies, of which the S.A. and S.S. alone numbered over 300,000 men, or three times the size of the regular army. This new force and its leader constituted a challenge

to the orthodox military hierarchy. The date is significant, for the challenge was never met, either by the legitimate Parliament or by the regular armed forces. Henceforward Germany was to surrender herself to the machinations of one man.

Did the massacre on the night of 30th June, 1934, perchance cause the Titans to stir in their slumbers? Who shall say whether all this untidiness might not have been avoided if only the great ones in their day had taught the people to govern themselves?

One of the last acts of the dying President was to remind the regular armed forces to preserve their traditional aloofness from politics. In retrospect this directive seems to have been inadequate, for on the death of Hindenburg in August, 1934, Hitler immediately proclaimed himself *Führer* and Chancellor of the Third Reich, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. From that moment politics were prohibited for the whole population. All members of the armed forces were obliged to take the oath of loyalty to the *Führer*—a process which in former times the German soldier had solemnly interpreted as a pledge of honour and duty to his Sovereign.

The fateful years between 1933 and 1938 were marked by two internal events whose impact on the conduct of Germany's war—if not on its outbreak—was profound. Firstly, the advent of Hitler saw the immediate rise to power and influence of Hermann Göring. He was Prussian Prime Minister and head of the State Police, and became Air Minister in 1934, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force in 1935, administrator of the four-year economic plans, chairman of the Reich defence council, and holder of many other titles. Vain and inordinately ambitious, a *dilettante* in matters of warfare, he proved a serious obstacle to the professional soldiers and sailors who still controlled the other two fighting Services. He, together with Hitler and Himmler, constituted the grim triumvirate before whom the ebbing forces of moderation were soon to disappear.

The second event was the dismissal, early in 1938, of Field-Marshal von Blomberg—War Minister and executive Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The departure of Blomberg was unimportant in itself but the resulting assumption by Hitler of the *executive* command of the Armed Forces was crucial. He now removed from office General von Fritsch who, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army since 1934, had been responsible for its rapid expansion and improvement. Fritsch is credited with having shown increasing aversion to Hitler's aggressive policy, believing that it would lead to another great war and inevitable defeat.<sup>1</sup> One further move was needed to eliminate the last resistance from the Army: General Beck, Chief of the Army General Staff—a silent and reputedly shrewd staff officer—resigned in September, 1938,<sup>2</sup> being replaced by General Halder, of whom we shall hear more. Behind all these moves lurked the ambitious Göring, whom Hitler would never quite trust. When war came, only Admiral Raeder still retained the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, which he had assumed in 1928. Meanwhile the political army had grown to 1,500,000 men.

<sup>1</sup> *Der Fritsch Prozess* by Graf von Kielmansegg, recently published in Germany, describes the court-martial of General Fritsch on a "trumped-up" charge. The three Service Commanders-in-Chief were members of the Court, the only witness for the prosecution being a notorious blackmailer. Although acquitted the General was not reinstated, and he is alleged to have regretted not using the occasion to lead the Army in a revolt against Hitler. Documentary evidence in support of these statements is almost non-existent. Fritsch went into the front line with his old regiment in September, 1939, and was killed by a Polish sniper.

<sup>2</sup> A book on General Beck by the German military historian W. Foerster is due for publication shortly.

## MOLTKE'S SYSTEM

Before proceeding to examine Hitler's system of strategic control in war, it seems appropriate to outline the principal changes in the higher staff organization since Bismarck's day. At the time of the Franco-Prussian War three personalities controlled the destiny of Prussia. The King was Commander-in-Chief, Moltke was Chief of the General Staff, and Bismarck was Chancellor. In reality the Army was commanded and controlled by Moltke who enjoyed the complete confidence of the King. With Moltke it was a fundamental principle that the successful prosecution of a war frequently required policy to adapt itself to the military needs rather than strategy to adapt itself to policy. He used the period between 1866 and 1870 to perfect the Federal Army, welding it into an instrument suitable for carrying out Bismarck's planned and definitive policy. Had he not obtained the credits to achieve this, he would have refused to accept Bismarck's policy, or would have delayed it until the Army was sufficiently strong. Moltke had been Chief of the General Staff for thirty years, retiring in 1888 when the Emperor died. At his death, in 1891, Moltke bequeathed to his successors a high standard of professional responsibility and achievement.

The well-known Schlieffen occupied the post from 1891 to 1905, being succeeded by Moltke's nephew.

In 1908, when the German Navy was rapidly expanding, it was suggested to the Chancellor—Prinz Bülow, that the time was ripe for a new form of integrated Defence Committee, to include representatives of the Navy and the war industries. But he refused to proceed with this proposal on the grounds that the Kaiser, being sole Commander-in-Chief, was alone responsible for co-ordinating the Country's war resources and would be averse to any changes in peacetime. Thus at the outbreak of the First World War the Moltke system had not undergone any radical change. According to the German constitution the King of Prussia in his capacity as German Emperor was vested with the supreme command of all naval and military forces. The actual control of the land forces in war was entrusted to the Prussian Chief of the General Staff, and the Imperial Navy was controlled by the Chief of the Naval Staff. It was tacitly accepted that in questions affecting both Services, the Chief of the General Staff would give the casting decision. In effect, therefore, he held the authority of a Supreme Commander. Several higher officers, such as the War Minister and the Secretary of the Navy, the Admiral Commanding the High Seas Fleet, and the Army Group Commanders had the right of direct access to the Kaiser, but the Ministers, although they were serving officers, had no independent executive authority. In 1914, the younger Moltke was Chief of the General Staff. He had none of the genius of his uncle, and was replaced after the Battle of the Marne by Falkenhayn, who was succeeded in 1916 by Hindenburg.

By the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was permitted an Army of 100,000 men, but no General Staff. Under the Weimar Republic there was a Defence Minister, under whom were the War Office and the Navy Office. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army had his own Chief of Staff who, however, had none of the powers or responsibilities associated with former Chiefs of the General Staff. This organization remained in force until the advent of Hitler. He at once made Blomberg Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.



## HITLER'S DICTATORSHIP

We have seen how, in 1938, Blomberg and two of the "educated" Generals were eliminated by Hitler.<sup>3</sup> He at once created his own machinery for planning and conducting the war by forming the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (O.K.W.). He chose General Keitel as his Chief of Staff and, in September, 1939, Major-General Jodl as Chief of the Operational Staff. These two were assisted by a considerable number of subordinates, drawn mostly from the pool of trained General Staff Officers. Attached to O.K.W. were representatives from each of the three Services, carrying no higher equivalent rank than that of Colonel. The duties and responsibilities of Keitel in no way resembled those of the great Moltke or his successors. His function was to draw up the strategic plans and, with Jodl, to draft the main operational orders—strictly in accordance with Hitler's expressed intentions. The relationship between Hitler and these two acolytes is vividly illustrated by a statement of Jodl's: "In Berlin in October, 1939, I attempted for the first time to present to Hitler a verbal appreciation of the general situation, as is customary in higher military circles. But after the first few sentences Hitler stopped me and said what he wanted to say. I then realized that he expected his operational staff merely to translate his decisions into orders." Keitel and Jodl remained with Hitler throughout the War.

After the outbreak of war, the three Commanders-in-Chief—Raeder, Brauchitsch and Göring, were usually summoned separately and at different dates for their periodical discussions with Hitler. Keitel and Jodl were present when Raeder or Brauchitsch arrived, but Göring's visits became less frequent and mostly he saw Hitler alone. When the proposals of one Service involved action by the others, a decision was usually—but not always—deferred until the views of those concerned had been obtained. Hitler's decisions were then issued in the form of directives, whose introductory sentences were often drafted by himself. The sum of these directives forms a precise chronology of the German war strategy.

This system of individual appointments with Hitler was responsible for much inefficiency in the higher direction of the War. A study of the *Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs* (released by the British Admiralty in 1947) reveals a number of important questions which were left in the air because a decision had to await Hitler's discussion with the somewhat independent Göring. There was no equivalent to the various British co-ordinating bodies, such as the Imperial Defence Committee, the Chiefs of Staff Committee or the War Cabinet. It must suffice here to give one or two examples of the German system in operation.

## THE PRELUDE TO WAR

Hitler's *Masslosigkeit*—his lack of measure and balance, is well illustrated by his address to the assembled Commanders-in-Chief and other high authorities at the Obersalzberg on 22nd August, 1939, when with the Russian pact in his pocket he

<sup>3</sup> The word "educated" is used in the sense of the following passage from C. Grant Robertson's *Bismarck*, p. 331:—"Moltke (after 1871) was determined that for all the slavish copying of Prussian technique by Prussia's rivals, the real secret, 'the secret of the higher command,' should remain an inviolable monopoly. Other nations would produce soldiers, but Germany alone would continue to educate Generals. And Bismarck in the *Reichskanzlerpalais* had the same determination. The secret of higher command in policy, won by the blood and sweat of a lifetime, must be kept by the same blood and sweat. If Germany once allowed the quality of that right judgment in all things on which her prestige in diplomacy was built to deteriorate, disaster would follow. No material strength could compensate for an inferiority in the higher direction."

outlined the impending aggression against Poland. The three accounts of this speech that have survived differ as to his exact words, but the most moderate version is that of Admiral Boehm, Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, from which the following extracts are taken:—

" . . . I have unified the German people, whose confidence I enjoy to a degree which no successor could hope to surpass. At any moment I might be the victim of an attempt on my life by some madman, or I might die a natural death. Thus my existence is of the greatest importance in solving our problems to-day. The same applies to Mussolini. . . . To reach decisions involving bloodshed is difficult, yet for us it is relatively easy, for we have only the choice between going ahead and losing. . . . In view of an *eventual* war in the West—which I consider to be unavoidable—the right military procedure is to test the armed forces in this single task (i.e. the attack on Poland).

" . . . It is incorrect to attribute our failure in 1918 to shortage of materials for in that year we were better off in this respect than in 1915 or 1916. But we lacked the spiritual condition for enduring, which is everything. Frederick the Great held out for years entirely because of his spirit, until fortune smiled on him again.

" . . . The aim is to annihilate Poland's military strength, even if this should lead to war in the West. The speedier the operation, the greater the likelihood of limiting the conflict. . . . I do not think it probable that the Western Powers will intervene. . . . Naturally they will try to save face. . . . Perhaps they will recall their Ambassadors, or institute trade sanctions.

" . . . My plan of action certainly involves a great risk for Germany. . . . There have always been such risks, as with Hannibal at Cannae, Frederick the Great at Leuthen, and Hindenburg-Ludendorff at Tannenberg."

Frederick, who so often anticipated how the Powers would act, could hardly endorse this misuse of his name by the unbridled and insufficiently educated inheritor of his authority.

#### IGNORANCE OF SEA POWER

The failure to integrate strategy and policy, or to co-ordinate means and ends, is illustrated by the following entry in Raeder's files, dated Berlin, 3rd September, 1939: "On this day war has broken out with England and France. According to the *Führer's* previous statements we would not have to reckon with this war before about 1944. In his address to the Commanders-in-Chief at the Obersalzberg on 22nd August, he said that up to the last moment he had hoped that it could be avoided, even if this meant postponing a final settlement of the Polish question. At the turn of the year 1944-45, by which time, according to the *Führer's* instructions, the 'Z' plan would have been completed, Germany could have started a war against Great Britain with the Navy at the following strength . . ."

An early example of the Dictator's unbusinesslike wartime methods is provided by the incident of the naval guns. On 18th December, 1939, that is, five days after the pocket battleship "Graf Spee" had sought refuge in Montevideo from Rear-Admiral Harwood's squadron, a directive, signed by Keitel, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, ordering him to arrange for the construction of railway mountings for naval guns of over 20-cm. calibre, "as it was possible that in the event of a long war the big ships would be laid up and disarmed." The Commander-in-Chief was told to ascertain from naval depots which guns were involved. It was through a subordinate naval commander that Raeder first heard of this surprising

order. He was naturally angry, and having secured a copy, he commented that the order would have a demoralizing effect on the Navy. But when, on 26th January, 1940, he raised the matter with Hitler in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, he merely said he had "recently got the impression that the conduct of the war is at present governed by continental ideas." He quoted this order as an example, and gave the reasons why at least four battleships were needed to continue the naval war.

This incident reveals Hitler's defeatist attitude in naval matters, and foreshadows the crisis that developed after the unsuccessful operation by the "Hipper" and "Lützow" against a convoy off the North Cape on 31st December, 1942, when the *Führer* lost his temper, and once again told Keitel to take down a directive, which this time ordered the de-commissioning of all the big ships. For Raeder this was the last straw, and he resigned.<sup>4</sup>

All the later naval events of Germany's war were characterized by this inadequacy of means to an end. The U-boat campaign, on which so many hopes were pinned, started with very small numbers, and although 1,100 U-boats of all types had been built and commissioned by the end of the War, the building programme for the first and most vital eighteen months was governed by Hitler's allocation of priorities for labour and raw materials. This in turn depended on his belief—held with fluctuating intensity up to the Autumn of 1941—that Great Britain would give up the War "when she saw that she could not win."

#### LACK OF A NAVAL AIR ARM

The attempt at co-operation, before and during the War, between the German Air Force and Navy—particularly the U-boats—is a dreary story of friction, in which the absence of a comprehensive strategic directive is no less conspicuous than Göring's persistent refusal to subordinate any of his air units to the operational control of the Navy. He would not acknowledge the need for specialized training for air crews operating with naval forces or against sea targets. He argued that his Air Force had proved successful in Army co-operation, and should be able to achieve similar results with the Navy. He persuaded Hitler that Germany's strained war economy would not stand the extravagance of a separate naval air arm. Raeder, after the War, commented in these words: "The utter inadequacy of the naval air arm as a weapon was due to the personal attitude of the Commander-in-Chief of the *Luftwaffe*, as well as to Hitler's ignorance of naval affairs, so that he failed to use his influence in support of the Navy."

In connection with surface ship operations Raeder also gives an interesting picture of Hitler's headquarters: "It was understandable that the loss of the 'Graf Spee,' and later of the 'Bismarck,' noticeably affected Hitler's nerves. But the effect of such events usually became magnified through his discussions with his personal advisers at O.K.W., none of whom had the smallest technical knowledge of naval affairs. It was at these discussions that he formed his judgment, which I then had to rectify by means of heated argument when I next visited his headquarters." Raeder resigned on 30th January, 1943. On taking leave of Hitler he said: "Please protect the Navy and my successor from Göring."

It is evident that the effectiveness of the Navy was materially reduced through the antagonism of these two Service chiefs. According to Raeder, it was Hitler's belief that he could get the best results by playing one senior officer against the next. Whatever we may think of this assertion, it is clear that co-operation on the highest

<sup>4</sup> See "The German Navy in Defeat" in the *JOURNAL* for August, 1947, p. 383.



level depended to an absurd degree on personal relationships. Thus the defects of the leader emerged in his subordinates and vitiated the whole system of strategic planning.

#### THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

Hitler's decision to attack Russia was prompted by inherent antagonism to communism and his concern over her increasing influence in the Balkans and the Baltic. The recent unsatisfactory negotiations with Molotov and the ineffective intervention of Italy in the Balkans also contributed to his decision. He wanted to strike before the danger of an attack from the West materialized. Confident that the campaign would be short and decisive, he hoped to exploit the rich regions of the Ukraine and so ensure Germany's economic independence in the event of a protracted war. The first directive to prepare for the attack on Russia ("Barbarossa") was issued on 18th December, 1940. On 27th December, Raeder reminded Hitler of the deterioration in the Eastern Mediterranean. Not for the first or last time he pleaded for a concentration of effort on the destruction of British shipping and the conquest of the Mediterranean, and he had the strongest objection to embarking on "Barbarossa" before Great Britain had been defeated. As usual, Raeder's plea was ineffective; Hitler replied that he had finally decided to eliminate the last continental opponent before he could come to grips with England. He believed that the spectacular successes of his Army and Air Force in Western Europe in 1940 could be repeated in Russia in 1941. According to Halder, the Army General Staff "were extremely sceptical." The plan of attack, as drawn up by the latter and approved by Brauchitsch, was designed first to defeat the main Russian concentrations in the direction of Moscow, for in all other sectors it would be possible for the Russians to withdraw in face of the initial onslaught. But by 19th July, 1941, when the Centre Army Group had made satisfactory progress towards Moscow, it was suddenly ordered by Hitler to send reinforcements South and South-East to support the Southern Army Group's attack on the Russian 5th Army, and so Field-Marshal von Bock was left with only infantry divisions to continue his advance.

The Battle of Kiev, launched on Hitler's order on 21st August, may be said to mark the turning-point in the Russian campaign, for although this operation gave the Germans over 600,000 prisoners, it did not break the Russian Army. The order to strengthen the weakened German Centre Army Group for the attack on Moscow was not issued until 5th September, and Bock was allowed only ten days to build up his forces before attempting to smash the enemy East of Smolensk and capture Moscow in the ensuing pursuit. The plan envisaged further reinforcements from the Northern and Southern Army Groups as soon as the situation at Leningrad and Kiev permitted. But in fact the regrouping could not be completed before the end of September—a delay which proved fatal. The recapture of Rostov by the Russians on 28th October, marked their first important success. By the middle of November the Centre Army Group was advancing slowly towards Moscow under increasing difficulties. Halder admitted at this time that the Germans had counted on a maximum of 200 Russian Divisions, but found that they had 360.

On 19th December, Brauchitsch resigned, and Hitler then made himself Commander-in-Chief of the Army. He is alleged to have told Halder, whom he retained as Army Chief of Staff: "Anybody can deal with the small amount of operational control, but the function of the Commander-in-Chief is to educate the Army in the National Socialist spirit. I know of no General who could do this according to my conception, and so I have decided to take personal command of the Army." Hence-



forward Hitler devoted a large part of his time to the Russian campaign. He forbade any withdrawal, regardless of the local tactical situation. Jodl wrote after the War : " From the time of the crisis on the Eastern Front in the Winter of 1941-42 Hitler's mistrust of his Generals increased and sometimes assumed grotesque forms. He became obdurate and uncompromising, and made bad decisions which I could no longer understand. In August, 1942, I asked permission to take up a command on the fighting front, but this was refused."

The German offensive, starting at the end of June, 1942, aimed at reaching the middle Don and the Volga at Stalingrad, but according to Halder the sudden withdrawal of the Panzer units of the Sixth Army for an entirely new operation southward across the Don wrecked the offensive. He blames Hitler : " the military decisions no longer bear any relation to the age-old principles of strategic planning ; they are the fitful actions of a disordered mind."

Halder was finally dismissed in September, 1942. In his recent book (which quotes no documentary sources and should therefore be accepted with reserve) he maintains that when Hitler suddenly ordered an advance towards the Persian Gulf, the Army General Staff refused to countenance this new commitment in view of the further one and a half million Russian troops that now faced the German Army. Hitler was furious, said that the Russians were finished and accused the intelligence officer making the report of spreading Stalin's propaganda. But when Halder insisted that the report must be accepted Hitler enumerated the frequent occasions on which he had been opposed by his Generals, quoting the exact dates from memory, and he added : " These scenes have cost me half my nervous strength. The future of the German Army is not a matter of technical competence, but of National Socialist ardour. Even with Moltke the secret of success lay in the fervour of his monarchist faith." Lieut.-General Warlimont, who was Jodl's assistant and in close touch with the Commanders in the field, says that by September, 1942, after the failure of the Caucasus campaign, Hitler should have realized that he could not accomplish his aims in Russia. But he could not or would not admit this fact, and continued his preoccupation with destroying Russia.

#### THE FAILURE OF AMATEUR STRATEGY

These few examples provide the key to a wider picture. The system of control allowed no discussions on the interaction of policy and strategy. Sometimes the military decisions were right, but often wrong. In the first flush of superior power hurled against an unprepared Europe the defects were not apparent, but when organized resistance began, the German war machine creaked in the effort to adapt itself to the strategic improvisations of its controller. The organization, discipline and technical proficiency on the lower levels were responsible for the protracted resistance long after the leadership had failed.

Twice within two years Hitler staked the future of Germany on his own faulty intuition. In August, 1939, he believed that the Western Powers would not intervene, and in June, 1941, he was certain that Russia could be defeated within three months. Those German Generals who to-day so readily offer explanations in mitigation of professional failure would do well to remember that it was their own subservience to a corrupt leadership which, as much as any other factor, contributed to the ultimate collapse. The events of 1933-38 sealed Germany's fate, for it was in those years that her civil and military leaders lacked the vision and integrity which alone could have saved her from the contempt of the civilized World.

## WHY WELLINGTON WON SOME LESSONS FROM THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN

By LIEUT.-COLONEL ALFRED H. BURNE, D.S.O.

I MAKE no apology for the catch-penny title for this article. Titles, in my view, should be self-explanatory, and the three words "Why Wellington won" point to its content more succinctly than any others. The great wars of the XXth Century have had the effect of drawing a curtain over those of the preceding century, and it is probable that the Duke of Wellington is little more than a name to most regimental officers of to-day. This is a pity, for there is a good deal still to be learnt from a study of his generalship. It must be confessed that most of his operations (Salamanca being a bright exception) appear at first sight rather dull and plodding when compared with those of his great rival, Napoleon. Yet Wellington was never defeated, while the Corsican lost four campaigns in succession. What were the reasons for this astonishingly uniform success? His victories in the field cannot be dismissed with the explanation that they were simply due to the fact that the bigger and better army won—even when this was true. It was certainly true of the closing stages of the Peninsular War, but this does not detract from interest in the campaign of 1813 which drove the French army out of Spain. Wellington's army was superior to Soult's; can we find any other reason for Wellington's successes? I think we can. But a casual reading of that campaign—even with the aid of good maps—is not likely to provide the reason; at least it never provided it for the present writer. I have recently visited the scene of these operations: standing where Wellington stood, or clambering where he rode, I came to see gleams of greatness and generalship that had previously been hidden from me. I should like to pass on these gleams, for what they are worth, to readers of the JOURNAL. I visited the sites of four battlefields and one siege—that of San Sebastian. The four battles were those of Vitoria, Sorauren, the Bidassoa and the Nivelle. I will deal with these battles in turn.

### VITORIA

Even a casual glance at the map discloses the fact that this battle was engaged on an extremely wide front for those days, and for an army of the same size as that of Waterloo. On that occasion Wellington's front was about 2,000 yards, while at Vitoria it was practically twelve miles. Moreover, whilst Hill's corps on the right advanced North-East, Graham's on the left advanced due South. Wellington was in fact deliberately staging a battle on exterior lines, a thing he had never done on such a scale before.


Now it is a well-known fact that, although such an attack, if carried through according to plan, should lead to decisive results, the difficulties in co-ordinating the dispersed columns—considerable even with improved modern communications—were almost prohibitive in 1813. Moreover the approach to the battlefield of every column was over mountainous country where roads were few and bad, and communications between columns correspondingly precarious. Why then did Wellington attempt it? The easy answer is that "the proof of the pudding is in the eating"; the attempt *did* come off, although not as fully as he had hoped. Communications being as bad as they were, Wellington undoubtedly took a tremendous risk. This is brought home to one when standing on the ground where he stood, alongside the 4th Division in the centre. For hour after hour he held it back, waiting for the faint sound of Graham's guns, which I fancy he was lucky to hear at all (Oman presumes that he did hear them), for the distances seem enormous on the ground.

But Wellington held resolutely to his plan, and never was iron resolution more necessary. Dalhousie on the left centre was cautious if not timid, Graham on the extreme left was sticky to a degree; but all turned out well in the end and the great victory of Vitoria had repercussions all over Europe.

We see here boldness in planning, and at the same time a nice appreciation of what was possible, an insight into the opponent's mentality (Wellington gauged correctly that Joseph would not dare to attack his dispersed columns), and that cool determination on the battlefield itself of which I have just spoken: to sum up, generalship of a high degree.

#### SORAUREN

On the morning of 27th July, Wellington was at Almandoz. Twenty miles due South the main army of Soult was concentrated, facing Cole's 4th Division. Wellington had no idea Cole had retreated so far South, but as he had no news he decided to go and see for himself what was happening. Setting off on his twenty-mile ride early in the morning, he reached the tiny village of Sorauren at 11 a.m., accompanied only by Lord Fitzroy Somerset. An alarming situation confronted him. A short description of the ground together with a simple diagram should make it clear.



The two armies were drawn up on two parallel mountain ridges, each about 1,000 feet above the valley bottom which separated them. From summit to summit is 1,200 yards. Now look at the diagram. Wellington, all unsuspectingly, was approaching Cole's column from in rear of the French army. The Duke was riding at a rapid pace down the right bank of the river Ulzana. As he approached Sorauren his quick eye detected hostile troops on the heights on his immediate left, just across the river. Now he had given orders for reinforcements to follow him down the valley, but it was obvious that this was impracticable. Something had to be done, and that quickly. Most fortunately Wellington has himself given us a detailed account of what happened. It is worth quoting:

"Why, at one time it was rather alarming, certainly, and it was a close run thing. When I came to the bridge at Sorauren I saw the French on the hills on one side. . . . I determined to take the position but was obliged to write my orders at Sorauren. . . . I stopped therefore to write accordingly,

(Spanish) people saying to me all the time 'The Frenchmen are coming! The Frenchmen are coming!' I looked pretty sharp after them, however, now and then, until I had completed my orders and then sent them off, and I saw them near one end of the village as I went out at the other end."

He wrote his historic order, which resulted in the victory of Sorauren, whilst dismounted on the bridge, resting his paper on the parapet. The bridge of Sorauren is thus of some historic interest.<sup>1</sup>

Having written his orders, Wellington sent them off by Somerset. He was now utterly alone, almost mid-way between the two opposing armies and surrounded by a crowd of jabbering Spanish villagers. He then remounted his horse and made a dash for it towards the English lines. There are now only a dozen houses in the village, and if it was no bigger then the French must have been within a couple of hundred yards of him when he commenced his famous ride. For famous it was. Who has not heard of the dramatic scene, well described by Napier, when a solitary mounted man was seen riding up the steep mountain slope from the direction of the enemy. The troops gazed intently. Could that lone horseman on a thoroughbred and wearing an old cocked hat be the Commander-in-Chief? It could! As doubt merged into certainty a spontaneous cheer swept the line, spreading like wild-fire from regiment to regiment. Wellington had arrived: there would be no more retreat; the crisis was over.

The ride of that solitary horseman up the slopes of Cole's Ridge had saved the situation. Soult himself from the opposite mountain top, 1,200 yards away across the intervening valley, was a witness of the spectacle, and Wellington, with his uncanny gift of reading his opponent's character, made the bold but remarkable forecast, "Yonder is a great commander, but he is cautious and will delay his attack to ascertain the cause of those cheers. That will give time for the 6th Division to come up, and I shall beat him." All happened exactly as Wellington had forecast.

The opportune arrival of this *deus ex machina* made a forcible impression on the whole army. News of it reached the army besieging San Sebastian where an artillery officer—Augustus Frazer, wrote home describing "our noble commander's towering spirit" in the affair.

The lessons of this dramatic episode need not be laboured. Wellington never showed up better than on that anxious July morning. Standing on the bridge where he stood, one can trace the obvious route by which he must have ascended the hill: a rough mountain track runs along the ridge all the way and it is easy to follow—and rather a thrilling experience. Going gently on foot it is nearly an hour's climb. I reckon it took Wellington about 15 minutes—fifteen momentous minutes. The personality of a single individual had saved the day.

#### THE CROSSING OF THE BIDASSOA

It is a well-known fact that rivers, even broad ones, are not as serious military obstacles as mountain ranges can be; yet the Bidassoa near its mouth at high water looks utterly uncrossable in the face of an enemy. At high water no doubt that is, or was, true; but at low water large sandbanks appear and it is fordable in places.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is so ancient that it is possible that the Black Prince and his army crossed by it on 16th February, 1367, on his way to the battlefield of Najera.

<sup>2</sup> The accompanying sketch shows the estuary at low water. Two columns crossed from right to left.





Nevertheless, it has the appearance of being a really formidable obstacle. Between Fuenterrabia and Hendaye, where Wellington proposed to attempt a crossing, it is a good half mile wide; moreover, Soult had been busily fortifying the heights on the French side when, in October, Wellington decided to push forward into France.

Wellington's method was interesting and instructive, and had it been copied at the beginning of the battle of the Aisne in 1914, that river line would probably have been carried more speedily and bloodlessly than it was. Two principles should be observed in such operations, both rather obvious to be sure. The first is that crossings should be attempted at a large number of places simultaneously: the fact that so many points have to be watched may distract attention from one or more of them. The second principle is that in such operations, above all, very careful preliminary reconnaissance and planning must be carried out. Wellington observed both these principles. He detailed no less than ten crossing places on a front of three miles in a straight line, and about six miles allowing for bends in the river. From the heights of San Martial he was able to view the whole of this front, and here he made good use of his famous telescope. In addition, his agents were assiduous in collecting detailed information about the river and estuary.

The orders for the crossing were among the most detailed and intricate that Wellington ever issued. By various means he induced Soult to believe that the attack would come on the other flank: indeed subsidiary attacks were made all along the line. In any case Soult could not bring himself to believe that a crossing would be attempted over the wide estuary, and consequently the garrison of this part of the line was weaker than anywhere else. Anyone crossing over the road or railway bridge into Spain and looking seawards will agree with Soult as to the hazardous nature of such a venture.

Yet Wellington made the attempt; as at Vitoria, he took the difficult course, but his appreciation was so sound that here again it was justified. He had appreciated factors and possibilities correctly, whereas his opponent had not. Among these factors was the morale of his troops. It requires morale of a high order to wade into seemingly deep water on a chilly October morning and to plod slowly onwards, heavily burdened with arms and equipment for a ghastly half-mile of completely open water and mud in full view of whatever enemy there may be on the far side and expecting at any moment to hear the rattle of musketry or artillery fire. But his experience at Sorauren no doubt encouraged him to make big demands on his troops, for he sensed their implicit confidence in himself, and his confidence in them was not misplaced. "Nothing succeeds like success," as Wellington, and Montgomery after him, so well realized. Recollections of Seringapatam probably fortified him in his decision.

The attack succeeded all along the line with trifling losses, and the last obstacle to the invasion of France had been surmounted.

#### THE NIVELLE

The all-conquering Allied army crossed the Pyrenees in two bounds. The battle of the Bidassoa took them to the top of the ridge, and the battle of the Nivelle took them down the northern slopes into the plains of France. At first sight it might seem that the second bound was much the easier, but examination of the ground on the spot shows a difficulty not so obvious from the map. The highest point on the western end of the range is known as the Grande Rhune, over 3,000 feet high. This mountain was then in our possession, and it formed the fulcrum of our position. But immediately to its North, the Petite Rhune, though 1,000 feet lower, formed a formidable barrier to any further advance, and was the fulcrum of Soult's defence system. Long spurs stretch down from it to East, North and West, giving it a commanding position over the ground to either flank. Wellington, having made his usual prolonged reconnaissance—this time from the summit of the Grande Rhune—recognized that the Petite Rhune must be taken before progress could be made elsewhere: it was the key to the position. So he set about compassing its downfall. He allotted the task to the Light Division, and with its commander, Alten, he methodically built up his plan.

There is no need to go into details. As in the case of the Bidassoa, Soult's attention was to be riveted if possible on other parts of the field. Soult was obliging. Not content with the natural strength of the Petite Rhune, he had fortified it and allotted it a very strong garrison. As a result he was confident that wherever else Wellington might attack, he would scarcely attack here.<sup>3</sup>

To the 43rd Foot fell the honour of capturing the Petite Rhune, supported of course by other regiments. A really stiff climb was entailed. Having climbed it myself (but without arms and equipment) I can but marvel that any troops could do it, and that their commander should even ask them to. Yet here again we get an instance of that correct appreciation of what was feasible and what in fact would happen. It all went exactly as Wellington had planned and foreseen: the Petite Rhune was gloriously captured, thus allowing the remainder of the long Allied line to advance into France. Soult was again utterly misled; later, in a moment of petulance and candour, he wrote: "I had not conceived it possible that it and the neighbouring posts could be captured without a loss to the Allies of 25,000 men."

<sup>3</sup> I have here followed closely the words of the German secret report on the Hindenburg Line referring to the Bellenglise sector—the very place where we broke the Line.

Thus we see that in all these battles Wellington's clear vision, cool but bold planning, and accurate appreciation of his opponent and of his own troops produced the right plans for victory; and the astonishing morale of his troops in every case brought it about.

#### LESSONS

In reviewing the foregoing operations, I have confined myself to noting those qualities in Wellington's generalship which appear to have been the chief factors in achieving victory. That does not mean that there are no other lessons to be learnt from a study of these battles, including some which might apply to the conduct of modern war. Let us see what more can be deduced.

*Fire Power.*—One of the contributory causes of the victory at Vitoria was the massed artillery fire of the British guns. Although this was due almost as much to luck as to good management on the part of the artillery commander, it remains none-the-less the most notable application of this form of artillery fire since Marlborough's massed battery at Malplaquet, and it was equally successful in pounding and weakening the centre of the French line. Here, by a stroke of luck, the bulk of our artillery was concentrated upon a single road owing to the absence of good roads in the mountainous country. Alexander Dickson was quick to take advantage of this unforeseen concentration to mass his guns in the centre. A good example also of the influence of topography on tactics.

*Excessive Caution.*—Vitoria, though a victory, was marred by the hesitation and slowness of Generals Dalhousie and Graham; but for this it would have been even more decisive.

It is easy to criticize leadership when looking at a map on the study table; but a personal visit to the battle ground gives a better viewpoint from which to assess correctly the conduct of the participants. Yet these instances of failure to show initiative when in a position of isolation cannot be regarded as exceptional. It may be our native caution, but there can be no doubt that we have had too many examples of reluctance to take the offensive by our Generals when cut off from the higher command. Graham was a fine soldier, yet even he had this weakness. During the Peninsular Campaign, two other fine Generals—Picton and Cole, showed the same timidity before Sorauren, falling back for miles before Soult's advance because they would not take the responsibility for making a stand.

Wellington recognized this tendency towards excessive caution on the part of his Generals; he has, indeed, been blamed for it; but I do not think this is justifiable. I believe it is a national trait, perhaps most noticeable in Scotsmen and less so in Irishmen (Wellington was an Irishman).

*Logistics.*—The part played by logistics in these four victories deserves comment. It was most notable, in a negative form, in Soult's offensive that carried him to Sorauren. In his invasion of Spain, Soult concentrated his whole army on two mountain roads, and the resulting congestion and supply difficulties so slowed up his progress that Wellington was just given time to take counter measures. Yet Soult perhaps set too great store by logistics. He held up his advance on Pamplona until his long, spidery columns could close up, forgetting that the time required for this purpose would also allow his enemy to bring up greater forces against him.

The eternal question in war is whether time is on our side or the enemy's? Generally we fancy it to be on ours and as often as not we are wrong. This is another



way of saying that you must take risks in war, and "strike while the iron is hot" regardless of the unknown dangers that may lie ahead.

*Offensive Action.*—The advantage that is inherent in the offensive is well illustrated in all four operations. The attacker strikes at the time and place favourable to himself, and unfavourable to the enemy who, unless he makes a lucky guess, cannot concentrate in time against the point attacked. In all three of Wellington's offensives we see the good results of this, while Soult owed his failure in the offensive to being a less bold and resolute commander than his greater opponent.

*Surprise.*—The value of surprise is well illustrated in the crossing of the Bidassoa and in the Nivelle battle, and it is interesting to examine how Wellington brought it about. In the first case he selected the most unlikely looking place, at the same time making feint attacks further along the line. Soult was utterly misled by this. In the second case Soult correctly divined the area where the attack might be made and consequently fortified it till it was the strongest place in his line. Wellington then deliberately attacked the strongest point, just as Montgomery afterwards did at Alamein, and each achieved surprise thereby.

*Political Factors.*—Wellington showed a nice appreciation of how far to observe prudence, as opposed to boldness. Prudence dictated to him that France should not be invaded until the fortresses of San Sebastian and Pamplona had fallen. Prudence also proclaimed that it would be better to drive the French out of Catalonia before venturing into France. But there were big political advantages to be expected from an invasion of France at that moment. On purely military grounds Wellington felt that the Andalusian objective was the sounder, but he recognized that political factors must sometimes override purely military factors when he decided against this course. Writing to Lord Bathurst he put the matter clearly: "I think I ought to, and will, bend a little to the views of the Allies if it can be done with safety to the Army, notwithstanding that I acknowledge I should prefer to turn my attention to Catalonia." It is fortunate that he paid such heed to the political factors in this matter. They forced upon him a bolder course than he would otherwise have taken, the result being his final victorious advance through the South of France.

*Morale.*—When examining these political, strategical and logistical factors we are in danger of overlooking what is perhaps the most important "strand" of all, namely the private soldier, the man who leads the advance. Unless he can advance with confidence, the best laid plans will "gang aley," the tool will fall to pieces in the hand of the General, and his plans will not be carried out. This strand was particularly strong in Wellington's army at this stage in the war. Not only British, but Portuguese and Spanish soldiers had become well trained, fit and embued with confidence in the leadership of the lean, hawk-nosed Irishman. It is perhaps significant that the troops who led the cheers on that memorable day on the mountain top at Sorauren were not British but Portuguese. So much had one man done to inspire an army, almost as varied as that of Marlborough, with implicit confidence in themselves and in him. Morale more than anything else was the winning strand in the Peninsular War.



## THE GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN—1942-43

By LIEUT.-COLONEL H. E. FOOKS, O.B.E.

**T**HE Guadalcanal Campaign has naturally received more attention in the United States than in this Country, but it merits our interest both as Allies who played a minor part in it and as students of the War as a whole. The following brief account of the operations which took place between May, 1942, and February, 1943, will, it is hoped, stimulate that interest.

Guadalcanal is an island in the Southern Solomon group in the Pacific.<sup>1</sup> It is a British protectorate, lying 500 miles East of East Cape in New Guinea and about 850 miles from the nearest point of Australia. It is a mountainous island having a range running from sea level up to over 8,000 feet. This range occupies the southern half of the island. The northern half is lower and quite flat along the coast line; it is covered with thick jungle, except where there are large palm plantations run by the firm of Lever Brothers for the production of Copra and Coconut oil. The inhabitants are Melanesians, who, in the days before British occupation, were wild cannibal head hunters.

In May, 1942, when this story opens, the war situation from an Allied point of view was gloomy. In Europe, the Germans were driving the Russians eastward, and they were doing much the same to the British in North Africa. In the Pacific the Japanese had pushed the Americans out of the northern Philippines and it was only a question of a few weeks before they would have the whole of those islands. They had taken the Dutch East Indies and, having captured Malaya, were driving the British out of Burma into India. What is more, they had almost complete supremacy over the sea routes in the Pacific. Japanese troops were moving eastward along the North coast of New Guinea. They took Salamaua and then, suddenly, on 3rd May, they occupied the small island of Tulagi off the South coast of Florida island, some 25 miles to the North of Guadalcanal, where there was a very good harbour.<sup>2</sup> Obviously, this was a threat to Australia and to sea communications between that Country and the United States, and counter-measures must be taken without delay. It was decided that the most effective way to stop the Japanese advance would be to attack them in their island positions.

With this object in view, the South Pacific Command was formed under Vice-Admiral R. Ghormley, U.S.N. The orders given him by Admiral Nimitz, U.S.N., commanding the Allied forces in the Pacific area, were:—

1. Hold the island position.
2. Support operations in the South-West and Central Pacific.
3. Launch an amphibious offensive against positions held by the Japanese.

Vice-Admiral Ghormley received these orders on 12th May, 1942, and at once left to take up his headquarters in Auckland, New Zealand. By this date the Japanese had extended their lines to East of Salamaua in New Guinea, Rabaul in New Britain, and Bougainville in the Northern Solomons.

### THE BATTLES OF THE CORAL SEA AND MIDWAY ISLAND

By the first week of May a strong force of Japanese was making South from the Bismarck Archipelago, with the intention of capturing Port Moresby in New Guinea and bombing with carrier-borne aircraft Townsville in Australia, where American

<sup>1</sup> Latitude 10° South; Longitude 160° East.

<sup>2</sup> See Map at the end of this article

forces were being assembled by General MacArthur. An American fleet engaged the Japanese by attacking them with carrier-borne aircraft as they came into the Coral Sea. The result was a victory for the American naval aircraft, and the Japanese retired to the North.

Both sides lost a carrier<sup>3</sup> and one or two minor vessels, but it was the first naval success against the Japanese since they had entered the War, and this battle may be regarded as having marked the change over of the Allies in this area from the defensive to the offensive.

A month later the Japanese attacked Midway Island—an American outpost in the Central Pacific. Here, again, an American fleet engaged them and in another naval air battle defeated them with heavy loss. The Japanese lost four carriers and one cruiser for the American loss of one carrier.<sup>4</sup>

Both this battle and the battle of the Coral Sea were remarkable for the fact that none of the opposing ships ever got within sight of each other. All the damage was done by carrier-borne bomber or torpedo aircraft.

After the battle of Midway the Allies realized that the Japanese were off their balance, and that the sooner they were hit again the better. On 2nd July, Vice-Admiral Ghormley received orders to attack the enemy as soon as possible. A few days later he learned that the Japanese had occupied the northern shore of Guadalcanal, and that they had erected wharves and were making clearings for airfields. He decided to make this island his first objective, and detailed Major-General Vandegrift, commanding the 1st Division of U.S. Marines, to make the attack; he reinforced that Division with part of the 2nd Marine Division to carry out the task.

The 1st Marine Division had only just arrived in New Zealand, where they were to have disembarked and spent the next six months in training up to what was considered battle standard. But this plan had to be upset. No sooner had they landed than they had to unload their transports and reload them. The transports had been loaded as for a peacetime voyage: tanks and guns not likely to be needed at once were at the bottom of the hold with light stuff on top. Now the ships had to be re-loaded for battle. Time was very short: "D" Day had been set for 1st August, which meant that the force would have to leave a fortnight before that date. The weather was bad and in spite of day and night shifts at loading, it was obvious that it could not be done, so "D" Day was put off to 8th August. The expedition sailed on 22nd July, and on the journey a landing rehearsal was carried out. Owing, however, to the success of the real operation depending on surprise, wireless silence had to be maintained and this fact caused the rehearsal to be inconclusive.

American Intelligence had been hard at work trying to discover all that was possible about Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Charts and maps of these areas were as scarce as they were inaccurate. Australians who had lived on the islands were traced and consulted, and bit by bit sufficient information was obtained upon which plans could be built. It was believed that the strength of the Japanese force on the two islands was about seven thousand, of which two thousand were on Tulagi and two small islands near it. The garrison on Guadalcanal was well supplied with aircraft and artillery. A labour battalion of a thousand men had already made docks at Kukum and at Lunga Point; a radio station had also been erected at Lunga. Three air

<sup>3</sup> U.S. carrier "Lexington"; Japanese carrier "Shoho."

<sup>4</sup> U.S. carrier "Yorktown." Japanese carriers "Hiryu," "Kaga," "Soryu," "Akagi"; cruiser "Mikuma."

strips were almost completed at Henderson field, South of Lunga Point. The largest portion of the garrison was concentrated at Kukum, a small village near Lunga Point, the remainder were in detachments varying in size from companies to platoons along the North shore of the island.

#### THE FIRST AMERICAN LANDING ON GUADALCANAL

The basic operation plan for this attack depended, as already mentioned, on surprise, so great care and secrecy had to be maintained. It provided for three major Task Forces. Two of these were placed under the command of Vice-Admiral Fletcher, U.S.N., and were known as "Negat" and "Tare." "Negat," under Rear-Admiral Noyes, U.S.N., consisted of three carriers supported by a battleship, five heavy cruisers, one A.A. light cruiser, and six destroyers, organized in three groups. "Tare," under Rear-Admiral Turner, U.S.N., was the landing force with twenty-three transports, escorted by six heavy cruisers (two of them Australians), one light cruiser (Australian) and about twelve destroyers. Four of these cruisers, including the Australian ships, were commanded by a British officer—Rear-Admiral Crutchley, V.C., and formed a screening group. The third Task Force, under Rear-Admiral McCain, U.S.N., consisted of all Allied land-based aircraft at Efate, Noumea, Tongatabu, Fiji, and Samoa.

The transports were organized so that each one carried one combat team and thirty days supplies. For every three combat teams there was a fourth transport carrying another thirty days supplies. Thus the division was self-supporting for sixty days.

The Marines were divided into two landing forces:—

*Force I.*—Major-General Vandegrift, for Guadalcanal.

*Force II.*—Brigadier-General Rupertus, for Florida Island and Tulagi.

Throughout the night of 6th/7th August the covering fleet and transports—about eighty vessels of all kinds, steamed towards Guadalcanal. There was bright moonlight and at 1.30 a.m. on the 7th the island came in view. At 2.45 a.m. Task Force "Tare" split into two, one part passing to the North of Savo Island to attack Tulagi, and the other to the South of Savo to attack Guadalcanal. The Japanese had radar ashore, but it did not appear to be effective as the approach of the expedition was not detected. At 5.30 a.m.—one hour before the sun rose, U.S. aircraft groups were air-borne and in spite of one jittery bomber dropping a bomb which burst in the sea, the Japanese were still not alarmed. The surprise was so complete that the surprisers were themselves surprised.

At 6.13 a.m. the fighting ships opened fire, bombarding the shore and a few minutes later the aircraft joined in. The Japanese at last awoke and replied by some very weak and ineffective anti-aircraft fire.

It had been arranged that the landings on the two islands should be simultaneous. The Marines landed on Guadalcanal at 7.45 a.m. at Beach Red, between Lunga and Koli Points. Except for a few snipers they met no resistance, the Japanese having retired into the jungle. The invaders pushed on inland, and about noon that day they had their first sight of the enemy in the shape of aircraft flying overhead, but they had no casualties owing to the cover afforded by the thick jungle. The next morning Henderson Field and the airstrips were captured, and it was realized, from the stores left behind and the uneaten food on the tables, that the enemy had made a very hurried departure.

Brigadier-General Rupertus' force had a much harder task. Florida Island gave no trouble; but on Tulagi was a force of 300 Imperial Japanese marines under Lieutenant Yoshimoto, and they put up a fanatical defence for twenty-two hours. At the end of that time the survivors—three in number, surrendered. The U.S. Marines lost ninety men, of whom a third were killed.

Two miles to the East are two small islands joined by a causeway—Gavutu and Tanambaga. They are rocky and full of caves, and the Japanese had fortified them heavily with blockhouses and dugouts. Here the American landing craft were allowed to ground, but as the Marines charged the beach they were mown down by machine gun fire. Tanks had to be brought into action to subdue the defence, which they were able to do by the evening of the 8th, although the enemy held out in some of the caves, and it was some days before they were completely eradicated. The Japanese lost 1,500 killed and 23 prisoners. The Americans lost 8 officers and 100 men killed, and 7 officers and 133 men wounded. A few Japanese may have escaped by swimming over to Florida Island.

The Americans had attacked before 8 a.m. on the 7th August. The Japanese Eighth Fleet at Rabaul, some four hundred miles to the North-West, soon learned of the attack and took prompt measures to counter-attack by air and by sea. The air attack came in that afternoon and several air battles took place before sundown, when the Japanese retired, having lost twenty aircraft to the U.S. loss of twelve. The counter-attack by sea took longer to arrive. Admiral Mikawa with a fleet of seven cruisers and a division of destroyers set off from Rabaul to follow up the aircraft bombing attack with the intention of trying to destroy the American transports unloading supplies. Throughout 8th August, except for heavy fighting in the Tulagi area, the Americans were consolidating their gains on Guadalcanal and extending them. No contact was made with any strong force of the enemy who, according to captured prisoners, had retreated to the West of the island over the Matanikau River.

Owing to Japanese air attacks it was necessary to get all stores and supplies off the transports, and then to get the ships out of the danger area as soon as possible, so as to free the fighting ships for offensive rather than defensive action. Vice-Admiral Fletcher, with his three carriers, originally had a total strength of 99 aircraft; but he had lost 21, destroyed and damaged, in the recent fighting. Petrol consumption had been very high and stocks were now low, so he asked Vice-Admiral Ghormley whether he might withdraw the carriers. He pointed out that the U.S. carrier strength was not equal to the enemy's and it was not worth risking them, short as they were of aircraft and petrol, to destruction by hostile bombers. To this proposal Vice-Admiral Ghormley agreed.

#### THE FIRST BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND

On the evening of 8th August, Rear-Admiral Crutchley, in charge of the screening ships, made his dispositions for guarding the very vulnerable transports which were being unloaded. Having done so, he left in his flagship—H.M.A.S. "Australia," to attend Rear-Admiral Turner's conference on board one of the transports.

Half way between Guadalcanal and Florida is a small island known as Savo. It divides Sealark Channel between the two islands, and makes two entrances from the West—one to the North and another to the South of Savo. Crutchley's disposi-



tions for the screening force were as follows. Between Tulagi and Lunga Point, to act as a screen from attack from the East—two cruisers and two destroyers. Between the western end of Florida island and Savo, to guard approach from the North-West—three cruisers and two destroyers. Between the western end of Guadalcanal and Savo, to guard approach from the West—three cruisers and two destroyers (one of these cruisers was H.M.A.S. "Australia," and was not in position). North-West of Savo was a destroyer—the U.S.S. "Ralph Talbot," and West of the island was another, the "Blue." Both these destroyers were equipped with radar. A line running 125° true from the centre of Savo was the dividing line between the two western groups of the cruiser screen.

About midnight of the 8th/9th August, the northern destroyer—the "Ralph Talbot," gave the alarm "hostile planes in vicinity." Several single aircraft came over at intervals during the next hour and a half: they were reconnoitring for Admiral Mikawa, who by this time was getting very close to Savo, and who, thanks to the information sent back by them, had got a very good idea of where the cruiser screen was. The Japanese fleet actually passed 500 yards astern of the destroyer "Blue" and between her and the land; but owing to the fleet being so close inshore, the "Blue's" radar images were confused by the shore line.

The two U.S. screening groups of cruisers were patrolling on a fixed course around an imaginary square at ten knots. The southern group had reached the end of one side of their square and were about to turn round the corner; consequently the attention of the officers on watch was concentrated more on this manoeuvre than on keeping a look-out for hostile ships. The Japanese, however, who were on the alert, spotted the southern group, and at once attacked with all the guns and torpedoes that would bear. Fire was so hot that H.M.A.S. "Canberra"—a County class cruiser, was hit by twenty-five 5.5 in. shells before she could even get her guns to bear. The Americans fired star shell to show up the enemy, but the shells were of very poor quality and only six out of the forty-four fired functioned. In ten minutes from the first gun fired, the southern group was in complete confusion, with the "Canberra" sinking.

Meanwhile, the Japanese had turned to port, and having then sighted the northern group, proceeded to deal with them as they had dealt with the southern one. Here they were even more successful, for they sank all three cruisers. Fortunately, in the mêlée, two shells hit the "Chokai"—the Japanese flagship, in the operations room, and started a fire which destroyed all the charts before it was quenched. The Japanese, having destroyed the screen guarding the transports, had only to steam on a few miles further East to destroy the unarmed ships at their leisure. But they had lost formation during the fighting, and by the time they had reformed, two hours later, Admiral Mikawa decided that it was too risky an operation. The reasons which he subsequently gave were that he had lost all his charts of that particular area and navigation was not easy; and time was getting on—it would be dawn very shortly, and he had no air cover to deal with the attacks from the American carriers which he knew were in the vicinity.

On his homeward voyage his fleet was met by an American submarine which torpedoed the heavy cruiser "Kako" as she was entering harbour. This was the only loss sustained by the Japanese.

The Allied fleet had taken a very bad licking; how bad, luckily the enemy did not know until some time later.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, he did not gain his objective.<sup>6</sup>

For the next few weeks the Americans had to content themselves by reinforcing and supplying their troops on Guadalcanal. The Japanese, who had collected a strong fleet in the Rabaul area, now started what was to become known as the "Tokyo Express Run": each night fast supply ships and transports, escorted by fighting ships, would come down the Sealark Channel, and while the fighting ships bombarded the American Marines who were hanging on to the beaches and living in their trenches, the Japanese would land fresh troops and supplies.

After receiving these reinforcements, the enemy attacked Henderson Field. There was a sharp action on the banks of the Tenaru River, but the Americans won the day.

#### THE BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS

On 23rd August, Vice-Admiral Fletcher with a strong fleet was cruising about 150 miles South-East of Guadalcanal. He had with him two task forces of a total strength of:—

1 battleship—the "North Carolina."

2 carriers—the "Saratoga" and "Enterprise."

3 heavy cruisers—the "Minneapolis," "Portland" and "New Orleans."

1 light A.A. cruiser—the "Atlanta."

11 destroyers.

On 24th August his reconnaissance aircraft reported that a Japanese fleet, divided into three groups, was approximately two hundred miles away moving South. Its total strength was 3 carriers, 15 cruisers and 15 destroyers, escorting a large number of transports. He realized that the Japanese intention was to reinforce Guadalcanal and drive the Americans out of the island.

In spite of inferiority in numbers, Fletcher attacked at once with his carrier-borne aircraft. The Japanese replied with theirs. After fighting in the air which lasted from dawn until dusk, the enemy fleet retired, having lost a light carrier<sup>7</sup>, a destroyer and a transport sunk, and several ships damaged. They had also lost ninety aircraft. The Japanese plan of capturing Guadalcanal had been wrecked at a cost to the Americans of twenty aircraft lost and the carrier "Enterprise" badly damaged. Unfortunately the U.S. carrier "Wasp," which had been sent South to refuel, was sunk by a submarine; this left Fletcher with only one carrier.

After this battle there was a lull in naval warfare in the Southern Pacific, and it lasted six weeks.

<sup>5</sup> Savo Island battle casualties:—

*Japanese.*—Cruiser "Kako" sunk; "Chokai" damaged.

*Allies.*—U.S. cruisers "Astoria," "Vincennes" and "Quincy" sunk;

"Chicago" damaged. H.M.A.S. Cruiser "Canberra" sunk.

<sup>6</sup> It is interesting to note how this lack of initiative and "follow through" were repeated and lost the Japanese another, and even more golden, opportunity when Kurita failed to attack the uncovered landing forces at Leyte in 1944. See "The Battle of Leyte Gulf," by Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Fooks in the *JOURNAL* for February, 1949, pp. 75, 76.—EDITOR.

<sup>7</sup> The "Ryujo."

The Japanese were still running the nightly "Tokyo Express" convoys, landing troop reinforcements and supplies, and at the same time bombarding the American beaches both from the air and the sea. By 13th September they had increased the strength of their forces on Guadalcanal to well over a division, and knowing that they had superiority in numbers over their opponents, they again attacked Henderson Field. This time it was touch and go for several hours; but finally the Japanese were again driven back, having lost very heavily. This defeat, however, did not prevent them continuing to reinforce their troops, and as time went on, more and more Japanese soldiers were landed on the island. On the other hand, it was absolutely necessary for the Americans to reinforce their battered and tired Marine Division. The men were still holding the Japanese attacks, but they were feeling the strain and it was a great relief for them to hear that large reinforcements were on their way.

#### THE ACTION OFF CAPE ESPERANCE

Both sides had made up their minds to hold Guadalcanal and to drive their opponents into the sea. The Americans had a convoy of 6,000 fresh troops and supplies on the way to Guadalcanal from Noumea. This force was escorted by two strong task forces. A third task force, under Rear-Admiral Norman Scott, which had been brought up to a strength of two heavy and two light cruisers with five destroyers,<sup>8</sup> was told off to watch the western approaches to Guadalcanal. Scott's force was South of the island at 2 p.m. on 11th October, when he received information from Henderson Field aircraft that a force of Japanese consisting of three cruisers and six destroyers was coming down the "Tokyo Express" route. Scott moved his force up to Savo Island which they reached at 10 p.m. that evening. From here he ordered a reconnaissance aircraft to be catapulted from each cruiser. One of these went straight into the sea and burst into flames. This, fortunately, was not seen by the enemy's fleet, which, according to the report sent in by the second aircraft, was North of Guadalcanal, sixteen miles distant from Savo. Scott did not know it, but this hostile force was Admiral Goto's 6th Cruiser Division—the one which had given the Americans such a beating when it sank their screening ships off Savo on the night of 8th/9th August; it was now hoping to get through to bombard Henderson Field so as to cover the landing of Japanese reinforcements at Tassafaronga, 10 miles to the West of Lunga Point.

At 11.45 p.m. the American ships, using radar, spotted the enemy, and at once opened fire. For seven minutes there was no reply from the enemy who apparently thought that they were being fired at by their own transports. After that the battle raged. Admiral Goto ordered his ships to turn to starboard and retire. In the confusion of the battle one of the Japanese cruisers—the "Kinugasa," turned to port, which was very lucky for her, as she thereby escaped almost untouched, yet was able to do quite a lot of damage to her opponents and cover the retreat of her own side. Of the remaining Japanese ships, one heavy cruiser—the "Furutaka," and one destroyer—the "Fubuki" were sunk in the first few minutes. The "Aoba"—Goto's flagship, was repeatedly hit, Goto was killed, and the ship set on fire. With the remaining destroyer hidden in her heavy smoke, she made off as fast as she could (which, according to Japanese reports, was uncomfortably slowly) and managed to escape. The American light cruiser "Boise" was badly mauled, and the destroyer "Duncan" was sunk. This battle was a strategic as well as a tactical victory for

<sup>8</sup> U.S. heavy cruisers "San Francisco," "Salt Lake City"; light cruisers "Boise," "St. Helena"; destroyers "Buchanan," "Duncan," "Farenholt," "Laffey," "McCalla."

the Americans. Not only was Goto and his fleet disposed of, but 6,000 fresh and badly needed reinforcements were landed on Guadalcanal to assist the American garrison.

In spite of this defeat, the Japanese continued to pour troops into the northern Solomon Islands, which from there were run down to and landed on Guadalcanal. Meanwhile their fighting ships covered these operations by bombardments of the beaches. On the night after the destruction of Goto's cruisers, a Japanese task force stood off Henderson Field, and practically destroyed all the aircraft on it by gun fire. The Americans, however, retaliated by torpedoing a Japanese transport carrying a force of 600 marines which had been specially selected to capture Henderson Field after the navy had ceased their bombardment.

Next day the Americans were in difficulties as they had no aircraft left on Guadalcanal fit to fly, but fresh planes were flown in from the South before the enemy were able to take advantage of the situation.

#### THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ

The Japanese were working all out for a combined naval and military operation which would once and for all time eradicate their enemy in Guadalcanal. With this object in view they began to concentrate naval units in the Rabaul area, until they had collected a force sufficiently strong to enable them to carry out their plan.

This force consisted of four battleships, four carriers, and several cruisers and destroyers. To oppose this fleet, the Americans had, as the Japanese well knew, a force consisting of:—

- 1 battleship—"Washington."
- 1 carrier—"Hornet."
- 2 heavy cruisers—"Northampton," "Pensacola."
- 2 light A.A. cruisers—"Juneau," "San Diego."

The only other ships available, except for some destroyers on convoy duty, were those of Rear-Admiral Scott's force:—

- 2 heavy cruisers—"San Francisco," "Salt Lake City" (out of action).
- 1 light cruiser—"Boise" (out of action).
- 2 destroyers—"Laffey," "Buchanan."

Admiral Nimitz realized that this force was hardly a match for the fleet that the Japanese had collected, and which he calculated would be in position to strike not before, but very shortly after, 23rd October, so he took steps to strengthen the American forces as much as possible. He ordered all American airfields, such as Henderson and Esperito Santo, to be reinforced with bomber and patrol aircraft. Aircraft attacks on Rabaul and the airfields in the Bismarck Islands were intensified, and submarines were concentrated in both those areas. At the same time every effort was made to repair the badly damaged carrier "Enterprise" which was in dock at Pearl Harbour.

On 16th October, Rear-Admiral Kinkaid took out a task force from Pearl Harbour. It consisted of:—

- 1 carrier—the "Enterprise," flagship.
- 1 battleship—the "South Dakota."
- 1 heavy cruiser—the "Portland."
- 1 light cruiser—the "San Juan."
- 8 destroyers.



The orders that Kinkaid had been given were to join up with the "Hornet" group under Rear-Admiral Murray and then to work under the command of Vice-Admiral Halsey, who had recently succeeded Vice-Admiral Ghormley, who had retired owing to ill-health. The junction was effected on 24th October.

On 25th October, information came in to Admiral Kinkaid from shore-based patrol aircraft, that a force of two enemy battleships and cruisers was heading South, and that another force, including two carriers, was also approaching. These two forces, when first reported were not nearer than 350 miles away.

The Japanese army were just as active as their navy. On 20th October they began to attack the American lines on Guadalcanal, and day by day the attack became heavier. On the night of 23rd/24th they attacked four times, and each time they were thrown back. On the 25th, a naval force of two cruisers and four destroyers came up to Guadalcanal in pouring rain and landed reinforcements for the Japanese. U.S. aircraft from Henderson Field found this force and attacked it, but not in time to prevent troops from it being landed. On the night of 25th October, the Japanese in a final effort broke the American line at Lunga Point, and things began to look very bad indeed for the U.S. Marines. The Americans, however, rallied and, in a desperate counter-attack, saved the situation. Next morning both sides were too exhausted to do more than look at each other and get their second wind. The Japanese lost between 2,000 and 2,500 men in these attacks. The American casualties, though severe, were not as heavy as those of their opponents. From now on, the American Marines, assisted by army troops, were able to change from the defensive to the offensive. It was the turning point in the Campaign.

While this land battle was in progress, the Japanese fleet, about which information had already reached Kinkaid, was advancing on Guadalcanal. It was a very strong fleet amounting to over forty vessels of various types, divided into three task forces. In the van were two battleships with heavy cruisers and destroyers; then came the carrier striking force of three carriers—the "Shokaku," "Zuikaku" and "Zuiho," with their escorts, and finally the third force of the same strength as the van. Well to the rear, out of aircraft range, came the transports and supply ships. These had to wait until the carriers had cleared the enemy out of the sky.

Early on 26th October, a bomber squadron and a scouting squadron were flown off by the "Enterprise" to search for the advancing Japanese fleet. As soon as this had been found and reported attack groups were launched by both the American carriers, "Hornet" and "Enterprise." The enemy carriers had already launched their attack groups, and very soon afterwards the opposing groups met and a "ding-dong" air battle took place and lasted the whole day.

The Japanese had two carriers very badly damaged. The Americans lost one carrier—the "Hornet," and one destroyer. Damage was done to one battleship—the "South Dakota," a light cruiser and a destroyer. They also lost 74 aircraft, 23 pilots and 10 aircrew. The Japanese lost about 100 aircraft and pilots, and their fleet retired, leaving the field to their opponents.

Admiral Keizo Komura afterwards summed up the battle as follows:—

"Our naval losses were not important, but the combined assault to recapture Guadalcanal, at a time when our forces were stronger than yours, failed. Following that attack you were able to reinforce Guadalcanal and increase your air strength in that area while the naval strength available to us in the November action was reduced by the battle."

"We also lost some of our most experienced pilots in this action. The damage to the carriers and the loss of pilots prevented proper air cover during the November battle.

"We were never again able to reinforce our troops on Guadalcanal with sufficient strength to recapture it. You were able to use Guadalcanal as a base to recapture the other islands.

"I think this was the turning point of the War in that area!"

#### THE NAVAL ACTIONS FOR GUADALCANAL

Until the end of October, the Japanese positions on Guadalcanal were situated at Cape Esperance, between the Bonegi and Matanikau Rivers, between the Lunga and Tenaru Rivers, and a small group near Aola Bay. The Americans held the area South of Lunga Point which contained the air strips of Henderson Field and which extended as far South between Lunga and Tenaru Rivers as their opponents allowed them to go.

After the enemy's unsuccessful attack on Lunga Ridge, at the end of October, both sides sat back exhausted, but the American force under General Vandegrift recovered first and, assisted by a small naval force for bombardment work, drove the Japanese back West over the Matanikau River. Japanese attempts to run reinforcements down the "Express" route (from Bougainville Island between Santa Isabel and New Georgis, South of Savo Isle to Cape Esperance) were now made at great risks to themselves, as the Americans had concentrated over 24 submarines on it and they were sinking ships daily. Nevertheless, early in November they landed 1,500 men at Koli Point. They were spotted by the American navy and a force of cruisers opened fire on them before they had time to consolidate their position on shore. The result was that half the reinforcement and all the supplies were destroyed, the other half retreated inland into the jungle where they were later eradicated by American Marine Raiders (Commandos).

Another result of the Americans having taken the offensive was the release of pressure by the enemy on Henderson Field. This allowed the number of airstrips to be increased and, as a result, the air cover both for the garrison and the fleet in the vicinity was greatly improved. This was a great help to the latter, as their only carrier was the much battered "Enterprise" still undergoing repairs.

Both sides were still trying to reinforce their garrisons on Guadalcanal sufficiently to be able to drive their opponents off the island. The Japanese had collected a force of some sixty ships in the Rabaul and Buin areas. This force included four battleships, six cruisers, two carriers, thirty-three destroyers and over twenty transports carrying an army division. The Americans were trying to land a force of 6,000 army troops, and in order to protect the seven transports required to carry this force they had a naval escort under Rear-Admiral Turner of three heavy and three light cruisers and fourteen destroyers. The Americans wanted to land their reinforcements before the Japanese, who were expected to arrive about 13th November. In support of the naval escort was a group under Rear-Admiral Kinkaid at Noumea, consisting of two battleships, one damaged carrier, one heavy and one light cruiser, and eight destroyers—not quite a match for the fleet that the Japanese were bringing up.

The Americans sent off their transport convoy in three sections and, in spite of frequent attacks by enemy aircraft, landed the much needed reinforcements with very slight loss. The transports were then sent away out of the danger area, and the escort was ordered out to meet the Japanese fleet.

At midnight of 12th/13th November part of the escort, under Rear-Admiral Callaghan, was searching Lengo Channel and the area around Savo Island. The ships were in battle formation and were using their radar to pick up hostile ships, the night being pitch dark. At 1.24 a.m. on the 13th the "Helena"—a light cruiser—reported, "Radar contact. Three hostile groups, range 13 to 15 miles, off port bow." Course was altered to close the enemy, and in twenty minutes from the time of alteration, radar showed that the enemy had two groups, on either side of the American fleet: on the right were two light cruisers with destroyers, to the North and further right one battleship with destroyers. To the left were two heavy cruisers with destroyers, and further left one battleship and destroyers. It appeared as if the American fleet was in a box.

Callaghan ordered ships to stand by to open fire at 3,000 yards. Ships were quite invisible even at that range. At 1.48 a.m. the Japanese switched on their searchlights, and fired their first salvoes. Callaghan ordered "odd ships fire to starboard, even ships to port." At that range in the dark it was a free-for-all fight and co-ordination was negligible. Luckily for the Americans, the Japanese were not prepared for a naval so much as a land engagement, and the ammunition at the ready positions was more bombardment H.E. than armour-piercing shell.

Space does not allow the battle to be described in detail, but at the end of the first ten minutes the heavy cruiser flagship "San Francisco" had been repeatedly hit, her bridge knocked out and Admiral Callaghan and her Captain had both been killed. Admiral Scott, commanding another group of the escort, had also been killed. His light cruiser flagship—the "Atlanta," reported that she had been hit nineteen times by 8-in. armour piercing shell. She was still afloat but dead in the water. In the confusion and the dark, ships were inclined to fire first and identify later and it is possible that some of the damage on both sides was done by their own fire.<sup>9</sup>

Fifteen minutes after the battle commenced the casualties on the American side were the heavy cruisers "San Francisco" and "Portland," both badly holed and on fire; the light cruiser "Atlanta" lying dead in the water and burning, and the "Juneau" crawling away with her back broken;<sup>10</sup> four destroyers sunk and three damaged. Yet within 24 minutes of the first shot having been fired, the Japanese were in retreat, firing at each other. The light cruiser "Helena," which had first reported contact with the enemy, now tried to collect those of the American fleet which could still steam and to retire eastward. She was followed by the "San Francisco," "Juneau" and two destroyers. The "Juneau" was in a very bad state—down by the bow with a list, her steering gear smashed, and only one propeller working, and she could only turn to starboard; so she kept station on the starboard quarter of the "San Francisco." A Japanese submarine put three torpedoes into her and she sank at once with a terrific explosion. The other ships were so damaged that there had been no chance of having a submarine screen out. In fact, they were not even able to stop and pick up survivors. About 120 men were left struggling in the water, and of these ten survived after spending a week on rafts without food.

On the morning of the 13th as soon as it was light, the battle flared up again. The damaged ships of both sides, still afloat but unable to move, started to shoot at each other. Here the Americans had the advantage, for Henderson Field was close

<sup>9</sup> The 8-in. shell which hit the "Atlanta" had been partially filled with green dye for fire-control identification. This colour had been allotted to the "San Francisco."

<sup>10</sup> She was sunk later by torpedo.



by and American aircraft very soon knocked out any Japanese ships that could not escape.

The Japanese losses were one battleship—the "Hiyei," badly damaged and sunk the next day by aircraft from Henderson Field; two destroyers sunk; two cruisers and two destroyers damaged.

Again American losses were far greater than their opponents, yet again they succeeded in keeping the enemy away from Guadalcanal, and in retaining possession of their battle area.

The Japanese force retired towards Buin, reformed, and turned South again to have another try on the next day. On 14th November, aircraft from the "Enterprise" and from Henderson Field went out to look for the enemy. They found his fleet in the afternoon, including the convoy of transports, 60 miles North-West of Savo Island. This was a gift for the Americans and they took advantage of it. By that evening, four transports and supply vessels had been sunk, four set on fire and gutted, and four were beached near Tassafaronga on Guadalcanal. Two cruisers and two destroyers were badly damaged at the same time.

The night of the 14th/15th November was calm and clear and visibility was good. Intelligence reported that there was a small naval Japanese force off Savo Island. Rear-Admiral Lee's task force, which included the battleships "Washington" and "South Dakota" and four destroyers, was rounding the North side of the island, when Japanese radio talk, very close, was heard clearly by all the American ships, indicating that the enemy's fleet was not far away. At that moment Lee discovered that his ships were being shadowed by American motor torpedo-boats, which had mistaken them for the enemy. Realizing the danger he had to break wireless silence, call up Guadalcanal control and ask for these craft to be recalled.

Shortly after this, at midnight, when Lee's force was about 13 miles South-East of Savo two groups of the enemy were picked up by radar. These were three destroyers to the North of the island heading West, and another group of what appeared to be a battleship or large carrier with two cruisers, following the same course as the Americans. The second group was 9 miles distant—6 miles to the East of Savo. Lee turned his fleet and drove straight at the enemy. At 12.15 a.m. his battleships opened fire and a few minutes later the destroyers followed suit. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise; they knew that an American force was approaching, but had no idea that it was so close.

Suddenly a group of six to ten Japanese cruisers and destroyers which had been following some distance behind their battleship "Kirishima," came rushing in from the South-West of Savo to make a torpedo attack on Lee's battleships. His destroyer escort took on the approaching enemy, and having opened fire at 14,000 yards, soon had the range down to point blank. But four destroyers against ten, including cruisers, can only lead to one result, and in a few minutes the escort was done for. Meanwhile the U.S. battleships had been firing very heavily at the battleships and cruisers of the first group that had been seen. Having disposed of these, there was a short lull, when from the direction of Savo there appeared the Japanese battleship "Kirishima," heading a new column of ships. The "Washington" concentrated on the "Kirishima"; the rest of the Japanese ships concentrated their fire on the "South Dakota," and in a few minutes she had taken more than she could stand: her batteries were out of action; her fire directors, radar and wireless were knocked out; her topsides were cut to bits and she was on fire and leaking badly.



Her Captain, realizing that his ship was more of a liability than an asset to Rear-Admiral Lee, decided to retire, but he had no means of letting Lee know what he was doing. Meanwhile the "Washington's" target—the "Kirishima," was reduced to firing one gun only, and she retired, to sink shortly afterwards. The "Washington" then opened fire on the enemy's destroyers who also retired, laying a smoke screen.

As Lee had no wish to be caught in a torpedo trap, he, too, decided to retire. He had no idea what had happened to the "South Dakota" or to his destroyers. He took his ship well to the westward of where he thought the rest of his fleet were so as not to lead the enemy's destroyers on to them, but ran into trouble. From 1.45 a.m. for the next half hour the "Washington" had to avoid no less than seventeen separate torpedo attacks coming in from both quarters. Thanks to luck and fine handling, she dodged them all. Soon afterwards, the "South Dakota" reported by wireless that she was badly damaged, and received orders to retire at her best speed. She had to return to the United States for repairs.

The casualties on both sides after these three days of fighting were:—

	U.S.A.	Japanese
Battleships, sunk...	—	"Hiyei" and "Kirishima"
" " damaged ...	"South Dakota" ...	—
Cruisers, sunk ...	"Atlanta" and "Juneau" ...	"Kinugasa"
" " damaged ...	"Portland," "San Francisco" and "Helena" ...	Three
Destroyers, sunk ...	Seven ...	Three
" " damaged ...	Four ...	Six
Transports and supply ships, sunk ...	—	Six
" " damaged ...	One ...	Four

After this, the Japanese drew in their horns. They moved their ships away from the Buin and Rabaul areas, and they almost ceased running their "Tokyo Express" convoys. On the other hand, their troops in Guadalcanal were fighting hard to clear the Americans out of Henderson Field which they frequently bombed from the air. However, the American garrison by now was firmly established and the Japanese attacks were easily checked. By the end of November the Americans had extended their area on the island to the West of Point Cruz, over the Matanikau River up to the Bonegi River. Plans had been made to clear up the last remaining Japanese position West of the Bonegi River, but it was decided that this could be left for the relieving troops from the Army to do and, until they arrived late in December, action was confined to patrols and raids.

Towards the end of November it was noticed that Japanese ships were again being concentrated in the Buin and Rabaul areas. This could mean only one thing, that the Japanese were about to make another attempt to relieve their troops on Guadalcanal. Ever since the last naval battles, the only American ships in the vicinity which were not under repair (excluding destroyers) were the battleship "Washington," the carrier "Enterprise," and two heavy and one light cruisers. Reinforcements were arriving, however, and by the 27th the fleet was increased by three battleships, one carrier, two heavy and two light cruisers.

Admiral Kinkaid was given a task force which included the four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and four destroyers. This force was considered to be strong enough to stop the new attempt by the enemy to relieve Guadalcanal. Kinkaid made out

the plans for this task, but was transferred to another post in the North Pacific before he was able to give them out to his Captains. He handed over to Rear-Admiral C. H. Wright.

Wright was ready by 29th November, and that evening he received information that a Japanese force of six destroyers escorting six transports was on its way South and should arrive off Guadalcanal the next night. He put to sea at once and by the next evening his force, now increased by the addition of two destroyers, was off Koli Point.

#### THE BATTLE OF TASSAFARONGA (LUNGA POINT)

It was a very dark night and visibility was under two miles. Wright's force was steaming in line ahead formation, with a heavy cruiser leading. At 11.6 p.m. the "Minneapolis" picked up the enemy by radar at a range of just over 7,000 yards. The U.S. destroyers fired torpedoes and shortly after the cruisers opened with gunfire on the enemy ships which had been illuminated by star shell.


At first the fight seemed to be a very one-sided affair, as the enemy, after firing a few wildly aimed rounds without result, turned and ran, and at the end of twenty minutes it appeared to be all over. One minute later the picture completely changed. The Japanese, as they retired fired scores of torpedoes and these now arrived in the target area. Two U.S. heavy cruisers—the "New Orleans" and "Minneapolis," simultaneously had their bows blown off, and the "Pensacola"—another heavy cruiser, got a torpedo in her fuel tanks. The "Northampton" was the next to be hit; she received two torpedoes amidships and sank early next morning.

The enemy retired as fast as they could. They had lost one destroyer sunk. The Americans lost one heavy cruiser—the "Northampton," sunk, and three others badly damaged. They also lost 19 officers and 400 men. But they had stopped the last desperate effort of the enemy to retake Guadalcanal.

From now on the Japanese made continuous nightly efforts to reinforce by means of "Tokyo Express" runs, but the cost of them was becoming heavier each time they tried. American air superiority was growing daily, and in consequence the amount of supplies and men that the Japanese were able to land became less and less, until the plight of their garrison became desperate.

Towards the end of January, 1943, the enemy on Guadalcanal were being rounded up by American Army units which had relieved the Marine Divisions. The Japanese were doing their utmost now to evacuate their troops. On the night of 7th/8th February they made their last run, and completed their withdrawal. It was six months exactly since the first American landing on the island.







# Map of GUADALCANAL and adjacent Islands

*Russell Is*

**Save!**

A map of Florida and the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf of Mexico is labeled at the top. Florida is labeled on the right. In the Gulf of Mexico, three islands are marked: Tulagi I., Tanambogo I., and Gavutu I.

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## THE ROYAL AIR FORCE REGIMENT

By AIR VICE-MARSHAL H. T. LYDFORD, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C.

**T**HE Royal Air Force Regiment is the youngest of the fighting branches of the Royal Air Force, for it was not formed until February, 1942. The formation of this branch of the Royal Air Force was due to the lessons learned during the early part of the 1939-1945 War. From these lessons it is now quite obvious that the Royal Air Force must not only fight in the air but also on the ground.

During the 1914-1918 War the Royal Air Force did not experience serious danger from enemy attacks on airfields: that war, on the whole, was a static one. Therefore, during the period between the wars, i.e., from 1918 to 1939, insufficient thought was given to the need for training in ground combat and in planning for airfield defence. General defence against enemy troops, whether airborne or sea-borne, was the responsibility of the Army and we were inclined to let it rest at that.

The retreat of the Army and the evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940, followed by the collapse of France, made us consider most seriously the possibility of invasion. Such a possibility would threaten the security of our airfields. If, therefore, aircraft could not take off and land from secure bases there was a genuine threat that an invasion might prove successful. Again, in the Spring of 1941, the experience of Crete confirmed the necessity for providing adequate local defence of airfields.

Although certain measures were taken for this defence, the necessary personnel could only be found partly by the Army and partly by the Royal Air Force owing to manpower shortages. This in itself was a source of weakness since there was a tendency for the Army detachments allotted to these duties to be changed at frequent intervals. Moreover, these troops were ill-trained and of a low medical category, and there were the difficulties inherent in divided control. To quote an extract from the report on operations by Fighter Command from 25th November, 1940, to 31st December, 1941, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Douglas:—

"There is no doubt that the problem was a difficult one involving many issues which it lay outside the competence of a Commander-in-Chief to decide and on which even now no opinion can be properly expressed. The solution eventually adopted which led to the formation of the Royal Air Force Regiment did not become effective until after the close of the period with which this account is concerned. . . . Consequently despite much hard work on all levels many Stations in my Command were far from being impregnable during those months of 1941 when enemy landings by sea or air were at least a possibility."

These difficulties were not only confined to the United Kingdom; they were experienced overseas, for we find that Mr. Winston Churchill wrote the following directive after our failures in Greece and Crete in 1941:—

"Every airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air ground men and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers . . . it must be understood by all ranks that they are expected to fight and die in the defence of their airfields."

As a result of these experiences, about May, 1941, the problem of the responsibility for the local defence of airfields was referred to a Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Findlater Stewart. In the final report this Committee recommended that a Royal Air Force Airfield Defence Corps should be formed under the

executive and administrative control of the Air Ministry. The report was approved by the Chiefs of Staff on 16th December, 1941, and later, on 24th December, 1941, approved also by the Defence Committee. Following these approvals the Royal Air Force Regiment, so named by His Majesty The King, was formed in February, 1942.

During that year it was primarily employed in the close defence of airfields—this included Light Anti-Aircraft defence—in the United Kingdom. But in the course of the War, units of the Regiment took part in these types of operations in all the main theatres of war under widely different conditions such as those in the Middle East, South East Asia, and Europe. The Regiment also went over to France on D-Day. It cleared and occupied enemy airfields during the advance in Northern Germany, and saved valuable secret radar equipment which had to be withdrawn quickly during the German offensive in the Ardennes. In addition, when we were suffering from the V.I attacks on the United Kingdom, fifty Royal Air Force Regiment L.A.A. Squadrons were diverted from airfield defence to the defence of London. Since 1944, the Royal Air Force Regiment has provided officers and N.C.O.s for the Levies in Aden and Iraq, and recently for the Royal Air Force Regiment, Malaya. Moreover it was and still is responsible for the standard of training in ground combat throughout the Royal Air Force.

After the 1939–1945 War a decision had to be made concerning the future of the Regiment. Accordingly a Committee was appointed by a Vice Chief of the Air Staff in August, 1945, under the Chairmanship of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt, to make recommendations to the Air Council as to:—

- (a) The ground defence policy to be adopted in the post-war Royal Air Force.
- (b) Whether the Regiment was to be continued post-war and, if so, what would be its function and organization.
- (c) Its place in the Royal Air Force Manning system.

The report was considered by the Air Council early in 1946. It was decided that the Royal Air Force Regiment was to be continued post-war, and that the Royal Air Force should remain responsible for the close defence of its airfields and installations. It was also decided that *all* personnel of the Royal Air Force (excluding the Medical and Dental Services, Chaplains and W.R.A.F.) must reach a high standard of efficiency in ground combat. In addition, the Royal Air Force Regiment was to be a source of staff and instructors for ground combat training and for the provision of British personnel for certain local forces overseas. Moreover the Regiment would provide a nucleus for expansion in war—an element of the strategic reserve, and for the location of squadrons in certain overseas theatres.

As a result of a policy which has been agreed and approved as between the War Office and the Air Ministry the Royal Air Force Regiment will be employed in future as follows and provide:—

- (a) Rifle Squadrons for the close defence of airfields both in the United Kingdom and Overseas.
- (b) L.A.A. Squadrons for the close defence of airfields Overseas outside an organized defence system (this would be probably in connection with a tactical air force).
- (c) Armoured Car Squadrons for use in the Middle East Air Force and British Air Forces of Occupation (Germany).
- (d) Instructors (officers and N.C.O.s) for ground combat training within Commands at Home and Overseas.



(e) Officers and N.C.O.s for locally raised forces in Iraq, Aden, Malaya, and elsewhere if needed.

(f) A Central School and Depot for training Royal Air Force Regiment personnel (officers and airmen).

(g) A L.A.A. School at Watchet.

In June, 1948, the Air Council decided that the status of aircrafthands in the Royal Air Force was to be raised by re-mustering them to the general duties and four orderly trades and by making them members of the Royal Air Force Regiment. It is known as the Orderly Scheme. This places a big responsibility on the Regiment for it involves a considerable training commitment. But the scheme is likely to produce good dividends in peace and war. In peace it will tend to raise the standard of morale, discipline and bearing of the former aircrafthands, and in war they will ensure that a nucleus of airmen more highly trained for ground combat will be available at each Station.

During the past year the Royal Air Force Regiment has taken part in operations in the Western Aden Protectorate. The Regiment was also employed in Palestine and was responsible for many duties during the final stages of the evacuation of that Country. In addition the Royal Air Force Regiment, Malaya, has been fighting in that Country, and one of the squadrons has been selected for and has already arrived in Hong Kong. Finally, there is no doubt that the Regiment has reached a stage where it can be relied upon to provide for expansion in war and to produce instructors for ground combat training in the Royal Air Force as a whole. We are grateful to the Army for all the help and assistance they have given us during the past seven years.

## THE DEFENCE OF SCAPA FLOW

By ADMIRAL SIR HUGH BINNEY, K.C.B., D.S.O.

THE story of the Defence of Scapa Flow never achieved the dignity of a Dispatch, first because the measures taken during the Winter of 1939-40 were ultimately successful, but chiefly because the Country was quickly overwhelmed with much greater events. A short account of what was done to defend the Fleet in its base in the early years of the War may, therefore, be of some interest to the many thousands in all three Services who took part in it, and as a record it should add something to the "lessons learnt" which we expect from all operations of War.

In this account I have confined myself to the critical year of 1940 and also to what may be considered operational. I make no mention of the development of our dockyard, of our middle-West mining town built at Lyness, of the work of putting oil storage underground, of the fleet auxiliaries and hospital ships, the Naval Store Officer's and Superintendent of Civil Engineer's departments, and of the many small craft who attended to the wants of the Fleet, all of whom shared our trials and discomforts.

The history of Scapa Flow in 1939-40 has an uncanny resemblance to the years 1914-15. In each case the Fleet had to evacuate its main base in the early days of the War. In 1914 they proceeded to Loch Swilly, in 1939 to Loch Ewe, and eventually to the Clyde. In each case they were forced to accept a great strategic disadvantage of many extra hours steaming to the focal points in the North Sea, and to the Shetland-Norway passage. In each case the start of the War found Scapa insufficiently protected. In 1914 we had no nets and only a few old guns. In 1939 we had overestimated the effect of the tides in the Pentland Firth, and Scapa was protected only by single lines of anti-submarine nets, a few blockships and eight A.A. guns sited to protect Lyness and the supply ships—not the Fleet. The chief difference in the two wars was that in 1939 the Fleet had to evacuate its base for two very real reasons—the sinking of the "Royal Oak" by a German submarine in October, and the bombing of the "Iron Duke" a week later, whilst in 1914 the evacuation, though necessary until nets could be provided, was actually caused by a false alarm of a submarine in the Flow.

It was, of course, the feat of Lieutenant Prien in penetrating the defences that was the main cause of making the Fleet evacuate its base in 1939. On the scanty information available during that Winter, most of us thought that his submarine had entered through a boat channel which had been left on the Flotta side of the Hoxa net defence. We now know that he entered and left through a hole in the blockships in the Eastern entrances. To those who have seen the tide rush through these entrances at from 9 to 12 knots, our admiration for his feat of seamanship and daring can only be increased by this latter information.

After this disaster things really began to move. A new defence scheme was rapidly devised. Contractors and 5,000 workmen appeared on the scene, and the Admiral Commanding Orkneys and Shetlands (A.C.O.S.) with an increased staff, including a Rear-Admiral, was charged with making the Flow safe for the return of the Fleet in the shortest possible time. The main points of the Defence Scheme consisted of mounting 88 heavy A.A. guns, over 100 searchlights, and many light A.A. guns, the siting of coast defence artillery, the laying of three large controlled mine-fields in the entrances, the doubling of all the anti-submarine nets and the laying

of additional inner lines of nets. In addition, the defence of Kirkwall, as a large convoy assembly port, had to be organized, canteen and recreational facilities for the Fleet had to be built on Flotta, and a start had to be made with the provision of a dockyard for destroyers and below. All this had to go on during one of the worst Winters on record, and in mid-Winter with only six hours of daylight. Accommodation difficulties were acute. One admired particularly the work of the Royal Marines in mounting guns on the Island of Flotta without any adequate piers, but they at least had a ship to live in, whilst the Royal Engineers, doing similar work on mainland and other islands, were largely accommodated during a bitter Winter under canvas. Everyone who came to work in the Orkneys had to provide, and often to build, their own accommodation before they could start work. Some relief was found to this dilemma by the provision of a number of caravans placed near the work, which proved surprisingly warm and comfortable for four or five hundred men who were fortunate enough to get them—two or three in each.

It was a Winter of hard work and great hardship for everybody concerned, nevertheless A.C.O.S. was able to report that on 8th March, Scapa would be sufficiently safe for the Fleet to return: controlled minefields had been laid in the two main entrances and about half the A.A. guns and searchlights were in position. This of course was the very minimum for safety, but was only a fraction of the huge defence scheme which was projected and started with such energy after the sinking of the "Royal Oak." The Fleet to be defended and supplied was much smaller than the Grand Fleet of 1914, but it was just as important for the preservation of the British Empire; further, the ships were individually much stronger and of greater value than in 1914, and needed auxiliaries and supply ships in almost as great numbers. The work of the supply departments was most impressive, and the constant stream of small carriers from Invergordon, Inverness and Aberdeen whose wares had to be unloaded at an inadequate wharf at Lyness was probably unknown to the majority of the Fleet.

These are a few memories of that Winter. First of landing in January on a very dangerous and mud-sodden aerodrome at Wick; and yet within a month this aerodrome was made safe for Hurricanes who operated from it uninterruptedly for the whole War. Also the visit of a very senior Air Officer who, after two days inspection, reported that there were no suitable sites for aerodromes in the Orkneys, and yet, with the help of the bulldozer and concrete runways, the Mainland island soon began to bristle with them.

We had much anxiety over the blockships in the Eastern entrances. Gaps were continually taking place by the removal of individual ships sunk in the strong currents. These had to be replaced in some cases by ships which still had a lot of life in them, to the great distress of their Masters; and many additional miles of nets had to be laid as an extra precaution inside them. It will be recalled that in 1941-43 this problem was eventually solved by joining the islands concerned with concrete emplacements and closing them for all time—a tremendous engineering project.

The work of the Boom Defence parties was outstanding. Only a small proportion was completed by the time the Fleet returned, but eventually the Boom Defence officer employed over 1,000 men and laid no less than 80 miles of nets. No praise can be too great for these men, mostly civilians, who were never deterred by the weather or their hard living conditions. Many of them had been at Scapa when the "Royal Oak" was sunk, and they were infused with the resolution that "it should never happen again."

I think a word should also be said about those who were affectionately known as the balloonatics. They were mostly elderly men. They descended on us in February, 1940, and were an example to everyone in self-help. With so many more important things to think about they got no encouragement from anyone, but they proceeded quietly from their own resources to establish balloons in the most desolate places on the Hoy Moors, and within a year the Fleet had the comfort of a fine balloon barrage, including about twenty moored to drifters in the Flow. Nothing daunted them, not even the sight of the whole barrage being blown over to Norway, which happened at least twice a year.

I have spoken of a few of the schemes which received impetus after the sinking of the "Royal Oak" and the bombing of the "Iron Duke," but Scapa was not in every way ill-prepared on the outbreak of War. Perhaps the most far-seeing preparation for defence was that by September, 1939, the first really efficient radar set had been transferred to the Orkneys, and was situated at Netherbutton, near Kirkwall. In the early days Netherbutton was literally our saviour. We were amused to see the young man in command rise rapidly from Corporal R.A.F. to Sergeant, then Warrant Officer and eventually to Commissioned rank; but from our point of view he might well have been made an Air Marshal, for Netherbutton never let us down. Good communication was established with A.C.O.S. and warning of the approach of aircraft was often given when they were 150 miles to the South-East. Netherbutton's job was, of course, easier when aircraft were flying at height. During 1940 and 1941 a large number of radar stations were established, giving complete cover in all directions. They were very efficient, but in the meantime the Germans had learnt the tip of flying low during their approach, and we never got such good results as in the early days.

A word is necessary about the system of command. A.C.O.S. was given the responsibility of defending the Fleet and, as Fortress Commander, he had operational command of the Orkney and Shetland Division, commanded by a Major-General and comprising the troops manning all the A.A. guns and searchlights and the infantry battalions whose duty was to prevent a landing and to deal with parachute troops. This was, I think, the only case where military A.A. armament came under a naval officer, and certainly the only place in the United Kingdom where A.A. defence was separated from A.A. Command. A.A. Command gave us the benefit of their vast experience and were generous in the provision of the latest light A.A. armament, but the isolated position of Scapa necessitated a separate command. The fighters, of which we had at one time four squadrons stationed at Wick and in the vicinity, were not under A.C.O.S.'s command for the good reason that Fighter Command wished to be able to withdraw squadrons for service in the South should this be necessary. Nevertheless, we had such an excellent understanding with the local fighter group, impressed as they were with the importance of the defence of the Fleet, that in practice it amounted to unified command. Fighters were controlled from the Gun Operation Room at Kirkwall; in the two major attacks they were above their opponents before they came over the Flow and were the chief factor in repelling them.

The system of defence worked extremely well and enabled us to experiment with schemes which would not have been applicable to (say) the defence of London. Chief among these was what became known as the Scapa barrage. Briefly this consisted of using most of the heavy A.A. batteries as aircraft approached the Fleet by putting down a barrage to seaward of the anchorage, right across the Flow in the



approximate position through which aircraft would have to descend to sea level to discharge their torpedoes. The Fleet of course used their own A.A. guns as their main defence, but the knowledge of what the shore guns would do as aircraft approached was a great help to those controlling A.A. fire from the ships, and the barrage ensured that the maximum fire was concentrated on the enemy at the most critical time of the attack. In the early attacks on the Fleet several aircraft were seen to turn away and refuse to face the barrage.

As already mentioned, it was decided that the Fleet should return on 8th March, but in order to test the defences a squadron consisting of three dummy ships was sent up a fortnight earlier in order, if possible, to tempt the enemy to attack. These ships were very excellent replicas of an aircraft carrier and two battleships, but about two-thirds scale size. In fact, during that fortnight no attack took place. Whether the enemy spotted that the ships were dummies is unknown, but it is very doubtful whether, with modern aerial photography, he would have been deceived unless they were full scale models. The ships themselves were an unmitigated nuisance: they had no armament, so it was necessary to remove the crews on an aircraft alarm, and their ground tackle was so weak that whenever it came on to blow they dragged all over the Flow. We were delighted to see the last of them later in the year.

The Home Fleet arrived off the entrance on 8th March, the battle cruisers a day or so earlier. Their arrival has been described by Mr. Churchill who was on board the flagship. About an hour before the battleships were due at the main gate two German aircraft came over and dropped "objects" in Hoxa Sound. There was nothing for it, these objects might have been mines, so the Commander-in-Chief decided to take the Fleet to sea again for twenty-four hours whilst sweeping took place. He returned next day. Mr. Churchill transferred to a destroyer and arrived in the Flow through Switha Sound which he so aptly described as the tradesmen's entrance. One can only reflect on what might have been had these two "objects" really been mines, and had the Fleet proceeded through the Hoxa entrance. This incident drew attention to the great importance of mine-watching. An organization was quickly established and functioned efficiently when the observers were not too far from the splash; but the difficulty of training men to take accurate cross bearings over the huge area of Scapa Flow will be realized by all naval officers.

The Fleet was not left long unmolested and, towards the end of March, the first and only successful air attack took place. This followed the pattern of all later attacks: enemy aircraft approached across the Flow from the East about half an hour after sunset when they were difficult to see and the ships were silhouetted against the last of the westering light. The result was that the cruiser "Norfolk" was hit aft by a bomb which put her out of action for a few months. As so often happens, the enemy thought he had done much more damage, and we read in Admiral Raedar's Conference with the Fuehrer of 26th March, that "five of their battleships are reported at sea and that therefore large cruisers only can have been hit" on this occasion.

The last and largest attacks on Scapa Flow were made on 8th and 10th April, when the Fleet was at sea in connection with the invasion of Norway. On each occasion radar reported about sixty aircraft. On the 8th we claimed to have destroyed fifteen and on the 10th nine. The strength of these attacks was probably exaggerated at the time, as perhaps were the numbers of enemy aircraft shot down; though it is believed that a good many failed to return to their base. Nevertheless, the defence acquitted itself very well indeed—both the fighters who were over the Islands when

the attacks took place and the A.A. gunners, who claimed several hits. By this action the Scapa defence achieved a bad reputation from the enemy's point of view and it is significant that for the remainder of the War no further major attacks took place.

It is interesting to study the reports of Admiral Raedar's Conferences with Hitler at this time. On 9th March we find him advocating laying aerial mines in Scapa Flow and contemplating that our capital ships might have to withdraw to the Faroes. On 26th and 29th March, aerial bombardment is again brought up, and the C.-in-C. Air is directed to carry it out as soon as possible. On 22nd April, Hitler states that the C.-in-C. Air does not consider his forces are sufficiently experienced yet to attack Scapa. On 26th April, Raedar tells Hitler that the mining of Scapa is as urgent as ever. At a Conference on 7th May, (just before the invasion of Holland) it is evident that there is friction between the German Navy and Air Forces over the laying of mines, and subsequent Conferences prove that Raedar was always up against Goering whenever he required the assistance of the *Luftwaffe* against naval targets. Raedar appears to have held the right idea that, in order to defeat Britain with inferior naval forces it was necessary to eliminate her capital ships and surface forces; but he could never get others to co-operate with him.

After the attacks of 8th and 10th April, therefore, Scapa was left alone; the numerous other targets produced by the invasion of Norway must be considered the main reason; friction between the *Luftwaffe* and the Navy was another. But the German is often accused of having a one-track mind; may not his initial failures have convinced him that the game was not worth the candle? If so, the Defences of Scapa can claim that the success of the defence was a contributory reason that after April the attacks were never resumed. And what will history say of the fact that for five years of modern warfare the Fleet's main base was never again attacked, although it was situated only 250 miles from enemy aerodromes?

I have said that the aircraft attacks of 8th and 10th April were the last. This is not quite correct, for in the Autumn of 1940 we were attacked by mine-laying aircraft on two nights. All the mines were located, but to make quite certain the whole area of the Flow had to be swept and re-swept, and no exercises with ships under way could be carried out for a whole month. These attacks indicated what a tremendous nuisance mine-laying in the Flow could have been if they had been persisted in. I think I am right in saying, however, that for the remainder of the War no enemy aircraft visited Scapa except at great height for photographic purposes.

But the Orkneys were not always on the defensive, the days of the Norwegian Campaign included offensive action also. The Hatston Aerodrome near Kirkwall had just been completed and was the home of a Skua and a Swordfish squadron of the Fleet Air Arm. On 9th March, the Skuas—probably one of the finest of the pre-war trained Fleet Air Arm Squadrons—found and destroyed the cruiser "*Königsberg*" in Bergen—almost at the limit of their range; and thereafter they harassed the enemy in various ways in Bergen Fiord. The Swordfish also fitted with extra tanks carried out operations to the South of Bergen at a distance from their base quite unthought of in their pre-War training. In June, when the "*Scharnhorst*" was returning to Germany after sinking the "*Glorious*," six of these torpedo-planes endeavoured to stop her getting back home. They carried out a most gallant attack in a visibility of forty miles against a fully prepared enemy, and only three returned. The aircraft flying from Hatston had many actions to be proud of and it must never

be forgotten that it was from here that an unarmed aircraft piloted by an officer of great initiative found that the "Bismarck" had left Bergen and so set in motion all those operations which led to her destruction.

Other memories of the Norwegian Campaign include the return of the "Suffolk" from a bombardment in the early morning of the same day of the aerodrome at Stavanger. She had been bombed continuously all the way back and had to be beached in Long Hope in one of the positions which had been specially selected for this purpose before temporary repairs could be made to take her South. The provision of these beaching sites was one of the many things we owed to Mr. Thomas Mackenzie—the Salvage Officer. It was he who also saved the "Iron Duke" from sinking, and who personally placed all the blockships in the eastern entrances. His local knowledge and ability in salvage were of inestimable value to the Fleet.

Immediately the Norwegian invasion commenced the Orkney and Shetland Command was enlarged by our occupation of the Faroe Islands. Their importance to the Navy was indicated by the Naval Officer in Charge being made the Fortress Commander. Coast defence and a few A.A. guns were erected, and the main garrison consisted of the Lovat Scouts—a very good selection as the men were largely keepers and ghillies from the North of Scotland who seemed to be completely happy in these desolate islands. On 10th May we occupied Iceland, and for a time the naval defences of that island were under the Orkney and Shetland Command. This was not a very good arrangement as the communications of the Flag Officer in Charge there were much better with the Admiralty than with Orkney, and it was somewhat of a relief when a year later Iceland was transferred to Western Approaches when the Battle of the Atlantic was intensified.

The period May to September, 1940, included the invasion of Holland and France, the evacuation of the B.E.F. from Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain. It was, of course, a time of great anxiety for the Scapa Defences as for everybody else. Fighter defence was necessarily reduced at one time to two squadrons. We all realized the great significance of the Battle of Britain, which if it were lost would make air-borne invasion possible. But the daily sight of Britain's Fleet in the Flow convinced us of the unlikelihood of successful landings from the sea, or even of the ability of the enemy to maintain supplies to a successful air-borne invasion. We felt very strongly that the gallant pilots of the Battle of Britain were doing what was traditionally the Navy's job. We knew that if they failed the Fleet would take up the fight, and we felt every confidence that sea power would defeat invasion; indeed, our chief anxiety was that the authorities might risk capital ships in the southern part of the North Sea where smaller ships would suffice, and so give the enemy his one chance of reducing the Country by starvation through the loss of sea power. However, thanks to the success of the Battle of Britain, the Fleet was never put to that test.

Hitler showed that he knew something of what sea power meant by his attacks on the London docks and other ports, in fact by endeavouring to attack the morale of our seamen and the civilian population; but why were his attacks on the Fleet not renewed? It is certainly arguable that if he had been able to concentrate his aerial attacks in the Autumn of 1940 on the Fleet instead of on the morale of the population he would have done better. When he failed to do so we knew that the Battle of Scapa was won and that for the rest of the War sea-power, as always in our history, would dominate the issue.

These were the problems of 1940. This was one of the reasons that the Shetland defences, under Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork, were strengthened in the Autumn.



What would have happened if an air-borne invasion of the Shetlands had succeeded and we had been faced with enemy aerodromes within 60 miles of Scapa?

Against this background of nothing happening and of what might happen at any moment it was necessary to keep our defences, consisting of 20,000 soldiers and over 5,000 naval men, continually on the alert. The great majority of the soldiers were town-bred men experiencing for the first time life in hutments on the open moor, and they could hardly be expected to enjoy their work. They formed the Orkney and Shetland Division who proudly wore the naval anchor as their Divisional badge. Under the leadership of their General, they were all impressed with the great importance of the safety of the Fleet; many must have yearned for more active service, but they never let us down. Most batteries and searchlights were within sight of the Fleet. The men who manned them were given short lectures on strategy by both naval and military officers and were inspired with the idea that (pointing to the Fleet) "those ships are the most important factor in the British Empire." The seamen were perhaps better off, for in the main they lived in concentrated hutments and many were grateful for a spell away from sea service. Perhaps the happiest of all were the trawler and drifter men, used to living in their small ships and doing a job comparable to their peace-time work. But the dullest jobs of all, though the most important, were those in the stations on Flotta and Howton Head controlling the two main gates, and one felt particularly for the men watching the controlled minefields who spent their war in shifts in a darkened hut watching a spot of light. The inspiration here came from the first war when, after years of watching and only a few days before the Armistice, an enemy submarine was actually destroyed by one of these watchers. In 1940 only one line of mines was blown unnecessarily by the sight of an unusual flicker of the light, and the fact that it was blown added confidence in the watchfulness of the defence. There were, of course, many false alarms outside the gates but these again served to keep everyone on their toes, and we only got worried when for a period there might be no alarms.

After the enemy air attacks in April the defence from the air or from under the sea was never really tested, but it can be said with truth that it would have stood up to anything and that all those taking part in it have reason to be proud of their endurance and watchfulness to prevent "what might have been."



## OFFICER SELECTION<sup>1</sup>

By COLONEL C. M. MACLACHLAN, O.B.E.

QUITE recently a middle-aged business man said to me, "your job of selecting officers must be a very difficult one"; while I pondered this remark he added, "in all my experience of choosing subordinates I have been wrong so many times that I am sure I should not like to take on your job"—yet he was a successful business man and an employer of men in quite a big way. As I thought over his words, I considered my experience in the past four years and decided to write about it. Is officer selection difficult? Let us examine the problem critically. In doing so I propose to cover three periods:—

- (a) The recruit training period in an Army Basic Training Unit (A.B.T.U.).
- (b) The War Office Selection Board period (W.O.S.B.).
- (c) The Officer Cadet School period (O.C.S.).

In the first two it is the selectors who count; in the third the users. If an excursion into the past may be permitted, the A.B.T.U. might be likened to a Remount Depot where likely young horses are gathered together. In the W.O.S.B. are the remount officers, who view the horses critically and reject those unlikely to make. The O.C.S. is the Cavalry Regiment, where the young horses are sent and from which those that do not come up to the required standard are returned to remounts.

### THE SELECTION MACHINE

Before considering the working of the selection machine let us give a brief description of it. After the soldier has been allocated to an arm of the Service and posted to an A.B.T.U., he undergoes certain intelligence tests and is interviewed by a Personnel Selection Officer (P.S.O. for short). If by intelligence and education he comes up to a prescribed standard, the P.S.O. asks him if he would like to be considered as a potential officer. If he agrees, he is next considered by the Regimental Selection Board. If he gets over this hurdle he continues training until it is time for the "remount officers" to have a look at him. He is sent to a W.O.S.B. where he is vetted and put through his paces. If found suitable, he returns to his Training Unit and awaits posting to an Officer Cadet School. Just as the young remount was given some degree of training in the depot, so the young recruit is given some in the A.B.T.U., but to carry the simile further, they both arrive in the Cavalry Regiment, or O.C.S., as comparatively raw articles. The young remount may not catch the eye at first, but if he has the right make and shape and quality he should be persevered with. A Cavalry Regiment which returned to remounts an undue proportion of horses as untrainable, rightly got a bad name. The same applies, or should apply, to the Cadet School.

That then is the machine. It is a complicated one and works at high pressure. Soldiers enter the Army every fortnight and the successful candidate is commissioned about six months after entry. It is clear that the machine requires tending with care.

### ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL OFFICER

Let us now take a look at the "young remount" in the "Depot." There are two sides of his make-up we want to be clear about:—

<sup>1</sup> The writer has had experience in the selection and training of potential officers, both as recruits and officer cadets. For just over a year he has been in a War Office Selection Board. He deals with the selection of officers for the National Service Army and not the Regular Army. This article is also appearing in the R.E. Journal.

(a) Hereditary qualities.

(b) Form.

When considering the merits of a race horse it is usual to discuss both pedigree and form. Neither by itself is convincing. Take the first three horses in this year's Derby, for instance. Before the race the Newmarket watchers were well satisfied with the form of the winner—Nimbus, but his breeding indicated lack of staying power. On the other hand, Swallow Tail, who was third, was considered a genuine stayer by breeding; yet his form prior to the race was considered well below Derby standard. Amour Drake, who was second, was thought to be a stayer by breeding, but there were doubts about his speed; yet towards the end of the race he was gaining on the other two with every stride. He finished a head in front of Swallow Tail and a head behind Nimbus, though he was a neck in front of the winner a stride past the winning post. There is here a good deal of conflicting evidence between pedigree and form; yet all three horses took part successfully in the race. So it is with potential officers. It is unwise to rely entirely on heredity or entirely on form. The two must be considered together and balanced.

Human beings possess hereditary qualities both physical and mental. I propose to discuss only the latter, under three headings:—

(a) Intelligence.

(b) Brains.

(c) Character.

It is just as well to be clear about the meaning of "intelligence." Quite simply, it may be called mother wit. The psychologists, however, define it as "the ability to reason rapidly from known facts to a correct conclusion." It is thus a measurable commodity and can be brought to light by tests. It should not be confused with brightness or ready wit which, for example, one associates with Anona Winn and Jack Train in "Twenty Questions." People can be seemingly bright without necessarily being intelligent, and *vice versa*. (I must add hastily that I am not questioning the intelligence of the well-known B.B.C. personalities referred to!) It is, however, rash to try and assess intelligence without resort to intelligence tests. That is why they form a definite part of selection procedure.

People are born with a certain potential, as regards brains, but brain power cannot be measured in the same way as intelligence. We can, however, examine the use to which people put their brains. Their educational achievements, together with the ages at which achieved, can be noted. For instance, a boy who gets a higher school certificate at the age of 17½ has either got better brains, or made more use of them than the boy who just scrapes through the school certificate by the time he is 18½.

It is interesting to compare intelligence and educational standards. Low intelligence does not automatically mean a low educational standard. For instance, it is noticeable that a low intelligence rating sometimes goes with a pronounced weakness in mathematics. Nevertheless, many intellectual people with a high educational standard are weak in this subject without being unduly handicapped. Some people with a high intelligence rating have a poor standard of education. From the potential officer's point of view, a low standard in both is a great handicap, unless he has compensating qualities of another sort. In practice, a satisfactory combination results from a reasonable standard in both intelligence and education.

As regards character, it is undoubtedly true that heredity plays some part. We all know the expressions, "like father, like son," and "a chip of the old block." The Commanding Officer of an A.B.T.U. once wrote concerning one of his potential

officers: "He's all right. I knew his father who was in the regiment, and his grandfather was in it before that." The Selectors found themselves in agreement with this verdict, but, and this is important, not without examining form as well. Some sons are not always like father. Some are better and some not so good.

In considering form I propose to divide it up as follows:—

(a) Home and School background.

(b) Observed form.

Life at home and at school both affect a boy's background. The things that matter are stability, happiness, and social and educational development. During my own experience I have been struck by the devastating effects which a broken or unhappy home may have on a boy and, at the other end of the scale, by the stabilizing effects produced by a happy home. The same, perhaps to a lesser extent, applies to school life. A boy who is not happy at school loses a good deal of the zest of life. From the social point of view the things that matter are, I think, manners, poise, and interest in people. These can all be acquired in a good home and easily eluded in a bad one. On the educational side both the narrow aspect of acquiring knowledge and the broader one of developing character have to be considered. It is the latter which is so important for the potential officer and which requires to be done both in the home and at school, if good results are to follow. A boy who is taught at home to adopt a responsible attitude to life and encouraged to stand on his own feet, has a great advantage over the one who is over-sheltered and has everything done for him. While at school, leadership experience, whether as a prefect, captain of a game or sport, N.C.O. or under officer in the cadet force, scout leader, etc., is of great value to a potential officer, provided he learns from his experience. By no means all do. Leaving aside the value of leadership experience, however, the importance of a general education, until school certificate has been acquired, and of staying at school as long as possible, cannot be over-stressed. The experience, from the broad point of view, gained between the ages of 17 and 19, can be invaluable. It is between these ages that a boy has the best opportunities to broaden his outlook and learn the meaning of responsibility. Moreover, he is able to develop his character both in the field of sport and from the various social activities in which he becomes involved, during the vital period when he changes from being a boy to becoming a man. The boy who leaves school early may be more sophisticated than the one who stays on, but he is usually more limited in outlook.

So far we have considered past form. Now let us consider present form. At the Basic Training Unit the potential officer can be observed over a period of weeks; at the W.O.S.B. over a period of two and a half days only. I do not propose to make out a list of officer qualities to be looked for; it would not only take too long, but I doubt if much would be gained from it. In the Selection Board the fields for investigation are laid down by the War Office: in the Training Unit, quite rightly, nothing is laid down. It is left to the commonsense and experience of the officers concerned. The success with which selectors ply their trade depends a great deal on the ability with which they form their opinions from the evidence given them by their eyes and ears. I propose to consider this under the following headings:—

(a) First impressions.

(b) Physical appearance.

(c) The candidate's expressed views.

(d) Behaviour.

We often hear people say, "I like to make up my mind quickly about a person" or "first impressions are usually right." By a quick summing up of character, the



really experienced selector may be right more often than he is wrong, but it is in the cases of error where this attitude is so dangerous. In assessing potential officers there is no need to make a hasty judgment, and the wise selector always bides his time. Some people at first sight look very odd. "I can't see that chap as an officer; he just does not look the part" is a remark often made. He may not look the part, but does he perform the part? That is what matters. It is equally wrong to think, "yes, that's a nice looking chap; he looks as if he were good at games; he's bound to be all right." He may turn out to be all right, but the good selector does not make up his mind until he has seen him in action.

An experienced selector does not allow himself to be prejudiced, if a candidate expresses views contrary to his own. He is entitled to his own views, and if he is not afraid to voice them that is an asset rather than a weakness. The "Yes man" who simply trots out things designed to please may not offend the ear, but is not showing great strength of character. It is always wise to remember that if a boy has surprising views which may not seem altogether desirable, they can probably be modified by further training. The selector's golden rule here is never to allow himself to "rise" when he finds himself in disagreement with a candidate—difficult advice perhaps, but from bitter experience the right one!

Now I come to behaviour, and this I think is the most interesting feature in the art of assessment. It is probably true to say that when candidates are being tested as potential officers, the majority behave naturally and can be seen in their true colours: unfortunately, however, experience shows that this is not always the case: consciously or unconsciously, some candidates put up a screen, as it were, to hide their true worth. In some cases this makes them appear better than they really are, and in other cases the reverse. Here are a few examples:—

- (a) Some candidates appear on the surface to be extremely confident. They talk at great length and shove themselves to the fore at every opportunity. Very often the reason for this is that they carry everything in the shop window and have no reserve or depth of character to fall back on. They display their limited qualities with all their might so as to cause a good first impression. The good selector sees through this and watches the candidate carefully to find out if he really has got more in him than meets the eye. In many cases he is unable to maintain his initial efforts and tails off as time goes on.
- (b) Some candidates appear at first sight to be provocative, awkward in manner or self-opinionated. Very often this is due to nervousness, which they try to cover up by a sort of display. This is a good example of the danger of first impressions and the experienced selector waits for the candidate to settle down before forming his opinions about his attitude.
- (c) Other nervous boys appear bored or uninterested at first sight. This may be another screen to cover up their feelings.
- (d) Many quiet and reserved boys remain in the background and do not display their worth unless forced to do so. Some may have nothing to display and their screen of "masterly inactivity" tends to hide the fact. In other cases their behaviour is bound up with a state of mind which tells them that it is "not done" to shove themselves forward. Some genuinely do not want to prejudice the chances of their comrades. Whatever the cause, the good selector recognizes this type of candidate and bides his time, before making up his mind about him. Very often, unlike the "shop window" type, he improves steadily on acquaintance, even if he is a bad salesman.



Within the W.O.S.B. the examples given are of common occurrence, and success in dealing with them lies first of all in their early recognition and, thereafter, by careful observation and the exercise of patience and restraint.

#### THE SELECTION MACHINE IN ACTION

We have had a look at the recruit. We have had something to say about the selectors. It is time to study the selection machine in action.

In the Basic Training Unit the initial selection of potential officers is done by the Personnel Selection Officer. He goes almost entirely on the standard of education and intelligence. Boys with school certificate or higher are nearly all accepted. It is not always possible for the P.S.O. at this early stage to discriminate between those who have officer qualities and those who have not. Consequently, a good many of the latter, in some cases rather to their surprise, are selected as potential officers. Boys who are not up to the educational and intelligence standards laid down may still be selected if accepted by the Regimental Selection Board. This may come to pass by personal application or individual spotting by Squadron (or equivalent) Commanders. It is the job of the Regimental Selection Board to weed out those who are obviously unsuitable. This, however, is not a very easy task, because a boy, once selected by the P.S.O., may not take kindly to being turned down by the Regimental Selection Board. I believe the only satisfactory principle to go on here is to advise him in his own interests to withdraw until he gains further experience; if he will not accept this advice he should be sent to the War Office Selection Board. As one commanding officer told me, "the arbitrary striking off of his name by a C.O. is bad psychology." Another pointed out that the boy's parents are much more satisfied with an adverse decision made by a Selection Board than by a Commanding Officer. Their attitude can be summed up in the words, "how can the Commanding Officer, who commands 1,500 men, know our son well enough to decide that he is not suitable for a Commission? If, however, he appears before a Board of Officers under War Office supervision and undergoes searching tests, then we feel the decision is a fair one." If this principle is followed, the task of the Regimental Selection Board is really simplified and the candidates themselves, to say nothing of their parents, feel much happier.

#### THE REGIMENTAL SELECTION BOARD

The composition and working of the Regimental Selection Board is of interest. The most obvious method is for it to consist of a president and two members, appointed by the Commanding Officer. Candidates appear before the Board for interview and are accepted or otherwise as potential officers. This method is not entirely satisfactory. It is liable to be an ordeal for the candidate, particularly if he is nervous or diffident. Moreover, an interview without corroborative evidence of form may give the wrong impression of the boy's merits. A better method is for the Board to consist of the C.O. as president, and two officers as members, who make it their business to get to know the candidate as well as possible. These should be the candidate's Squadron and Troop Commanders (or equivalent). The Troop Commander sees most of the boy's performance in training and reports on him to the Squadron Commander. The latter keeps a separate dossier for each candidate, giving details of his home and school background and past achievements. He gets to know him both by observation and interview and reports on him to the C.O. The latter can then interview the boy with some knowledge of his background and form, and is in a position to advise him whether to try for a W.O.S.B. or not. The advantages of this method are:—

(a) The members of the Board work together as a team and base their opinions on a reasonable knowledge of the candidate.

(b) The C.O. (as president) has plenty of evidence to go on before he advises the candidate whether to try for a W.O.S.B. or not.

It is the Training Unit's duty to send reports to the Selection Board about candidates before their arrival there. It is not necessary in all cases for the officers who write these reports to decide in their own minds whether a particular boy will or will not make an officer. What they should try and find out are the strong and weak points in his character and leadership ability. If they happen to discover odd behaviour traits it is a good thing to mention them in their reports. These reports can be of invaluable assistance to the W.O.S.B., and an A.B.T.U. selector should never make the mistake of thinking his report will not be examined. Unit reports are read out to the members of the Board and the weight attached to them depends on the care with which they have been compiled. A report of unqualified eulogy for the candidate, which in the W.O.S.B. is seen to be undeserved, naturally carries little weight. The critical report giving strong *and* weak points, always carries weight.

#### THE WAR OFFICE SELECTION BOARD

In the W.O.S.B., as I have already mentioned, the candidate is observed over a period of two and a half days. During the first day he fills up certain forms and does intelligence tests. The former provide useful information about his home and school background, interests, hobbies, and previous experience. During the second and third days he is observed by a team of two officers and by the President (Colonel). The team consists of a Field Officer, known as the Team Leader, and a Captain, known as the P.S.O. The Team Leader sees something of the candidate's performance in tests, indoors and out, but his most important contribution is in interview. From this he is able to form an opinion about the candidate as regards background, past achievements and character. The P.S.O. supervizes all tests, indoors and out, and he assesses the candidate's worth from actual performance. The President sees something of the candidate in action and gives him a short interview. On the third day, on completion of tests, the final Board Conference takes place. The Team Leader and P.S.O. each give the President their views. The unit report is also carefully considered. The Board members then give their recommendations regarding the candidate's suitability or otherwise for Officer Cadet School training, and grading. The President makes the final decision. The main advantages claimed for this system are :—

(a) That it is a good team process.

(b) That the candidate's background and form are carefully considered and balanced before a final decision is made.

On the whole the system works satisfactorily. It cannot be foolproof. What system could be? I think most people would agree that the obviously good and the obviously weak candidates can be recognized. Difficulty sometimes arises in assessing those who are between these extremes. Here I want to try and clear up some misconceptions. Selection Board tests are not conducted like examinations; candidates are not marked; nor is it a question of passing or failing individual tests. Candidates may appear negative in specific tests, but if somewhere they come out clearly in their true colours there is no reason why they should not pass. On the other hand, a candidate may, on the surface, do well in individual tests, and yet not pass. For instance, one who is limited as regards education and breadth of outlook may be good on outdoor tests, where his practical experience stands him in good

stead ; indoors, however, his limitations become plain to the eye. He may be more suitable for an N.C.O. than an officer. A very shy candidate may give negative evidence of his worth in group tests, but may come out in very different colours in the two interviews. I once saw a candidate whose performance in group tests, including his own command test, was distinctly weak. Even in interview he was very shy, but he had quality, brains and intelligence. He was passed. His form at the Officer Cadet School was followed up. He was at first a very doubtful quantity and was relegated. He ended up with an above average grading. Several of my friends have said to me, "I would never have passed a War Office Selection Board if they had been going when I joined the Army." Before I was posted to one I thought the same. Is this remark due to polite modesty or to an inherent distrust of selection methods? I suspect it is both. The doubts are, I think, due to the idea that a candidate must thrust himself to the front to pass. The Selectors themselves often get rather bored with this type of candidate. If they pass him, it is not because of this behaviour, but rather in spite of it.

I have already indicated the lines on which selectors approach the assessment of candidates. By the end of their time in the W.O.S.B. most of them get sorted out into passes or failures, but sometimes one or two remain as doubtfuls. In some cases their unit reports also indicate doubt. They do not show up clearly anywhere, either in tests or interviews. The selectors, of course, watch them with particular care. If in the end a recommendation for training at the Officer Cadet School cannot be made for them, this does not mean they are debarred from having another try. The President may discuss their performance with them after the testing is over and give them advice. If their Commanding Officers consider them worthy of another try, they may recommend this to the War Office. About 50 per cent. of "second shotters" are successful, which is an encouraging fact.

Although a candidate, before he comes to a Selection Board, can be helped greatly by tactful encouragement, I am very averse to the idea that he should be coached with the object of passing, in the same way that a crammer coaches him to pass an examination. If, before his appearance at the W.O.S.B., he is given tests, more or less identical with those he gets there, this may give him a superficial advantage, but it cannot alter his character. It is this which matters far more than his ability in "knowing all the answers." Everyone experienced in selection methods agrees that a candidate does himself more justice, by coming to the Board with an open mind, than by trying to mug up the answers beforehand. Certainly a great many candidates, to whom I have spoken, agree with this view. Apart from this, the time available for their training in the A.B.T.U. before they are posted to the Officer Cadet School is all too brief. Nothing is more short-sighted than to use up some of this valuable time in coaching them for W.O.S.B. On the other hand, training designed to develop confidence, initiative and a responsible attitude towards National Service, is invaluable.

#### THE OFFICER CADET SCHOOL

The last part of the machine to discuss is the Officer Cadet School. From the selection point of view there is one aspect only—the rejection of unsuitable officer cadets. The case against a high rate of rejection is strong. Officer cadets tend to become nervous and strained and cease behaving naturally. Mutual confidence between officers and cadets is destroyed. Mutual confidence between the Officer Cadet School and the War Office Selection Board is also strained. If the W.O.S.B. system was perfect the question of rejection would not arise except on medical or



disciplinary grounds. Unfortunately this is not the case. The selection machine is, however, improving greatly as its users learn by experience, and the rejection rate is, in consequence, decreasing. Apart from this there are a few principles worth discussing.

The key man is the Squadron (or Company) Commander. He gets to know his cadets as intimately as a good housemaster gets to know his boys in a school. To some extent he has to depend on reports from junior officers who instruct and observe his cadets. They work in together with him and, like the A.B.T.U. Squadron Commander, he keeps a separate dossier for each cadet, giving particulars about him. It is a wise principle that an officer cadet should never be put up for rejection without being relegated at least once. Many officer cadets take time to settle down. Early impressions about them may be unfavourable, but also may be incorrect. The experienced Squadron Commander always takes his time to form opinions about his cadets. If, after he has tried his utmost, he finds himself defeated by a cadet, he is entitled to take him to the Commandant for consideration for rejection and return to his unit.

#### CONCLUSION

The various parts of the Selection Machine have been described. The War Office Selection Board is its hub, because without it the other main parts—the Army Basic Training Unit, and the Officer Cadet School, would not work efficiently. Before the late war, Cavalry Regiments did not get their horses direct from dealers. This was the province of the Remount Officers, who sorted out the good from the bad. In the same way the O.C.S. does not get its officer cadets direct from A.B.T.U.'s. The W.O.S.B. sorts out the good from the bad. The officers who tend the machine must have confidence in one another. In particular the W.O.S.B. and the A.B.T.U. should be interdependent. Here the key to success lies in good liaison.

There is still widespread misconception amongst officers in the Army about officer selection. Many mistrust the methods employed. If this article helps to allay their suspicions, it will have achieved one of its objects. Modern selection methods have so far been in operation only for a few years, but I believe they have come to stay. They are by no means infallible, and recognition of this fact by officers in selection is important, because it makes them approach their duties with greater sincerity and thought. In this way improvements are effected and the degree of error lessened.

To the question, "is officer selection difficult?" I would answer, "it is like any other art: it must be learned carefully"; subject to that proviso, there is no reason why it should be particularly difficult. Success in the assessment of the potential officer's character and ability depends on the zeal and efficiency of individual selectors, the extent to which prejudice is eliminated, and the degree to which the selectors work as a team.



## ARMY ORGANIZATION : NUMBERS OR EFFICIENCY

By "ATHOS"

**E**ARLY in the year there was a short-lived flurry in some newspapers on the organization of the Army. Although little interest seems to have been provoked there is undoubtedly a feeling that we are budgeting for large numbers and spending vast sums of money in an attempt to build up a future army of problematical value. In a recent number of the JOURNAL the subject was discussed in an article which, after reviewing our efforts in the past, suggested a method whereby our present-day requirements might be met.<sup>1</sup> The purpose of the present writer is to support the contentions of that article by examining other factors; and finally, to submit a somewhat different conclusion.

There are three main types of Army :—

(a) A long service regular Army.

(b) The continental conscript system, the best example of which is the old Imperial German Army.

(c) A "democratic" militia, the unhappy child of utopians and others.

Our existing Army is not any of these, and it is doubtful if we can afford, or could obtain by voluntary enlistment, a professional army large enough to meet all our requirements. The second system, though it has undoubted advantages in suitable circumstances, will not produce the army we need. The third type is of no military value.

A consideration of the characteristics of the second and third types, and of our present situation, will show that there is cause for the unease which undoubtedly exists. The Army to-day is neither one thing nor the other; it is a combination of (a) and a modified form of (b), with a tendency towards the development of some of the weaknesses of (c).

### THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

The standard continental army had two annual classes with the Colours, so that every unit had at least fifty per cent. of its strength with over twelve months service. In addition, the strong cadres of officers and N.C.O.s were professional soldiers. By the late Summer—always the dangerous period—the first-year men had finished individual, company and battalion training; the second-year men had completed the cycle twice; and the units possessed cohesion and were, in fact, living entities. Manœuvres and formation training to exercise commanders and staffs were then possible before the men who had finished their term of service were dismissed in the early Autumn, and replaced by the new annual contingent.

To bring these "active" units up to war establishment on mobilization the last class returned to civil life was recalled. The older classes were incorporated in reserve formations on cadres partly provided by the "active" army, and partly by reserve officers and N.C.O.s specially selected and trained during their Colour service. The system needs an intricate and well-planned organization with adequate staffs. In 1914 the French second-line formations turned out, as was expected, inferior to the "active" divisions. But the German reserve corps proved, on the whole, to be of greater efficiency than anticipated.

Experience has shown that this system begins to go wrong if the term of service is shortened, even to eighteen months, and efficiency declines to a startling degree

<sup>1</sup> See "The Foundations of Our Home Defence," February, 1949, page 62.

with twelve months service. The best example of this is provided by the French Army which suffered continual changes owing to the struggle between those who wanted a good army and the politicians who had other views on the subject.

At the beginning of the XXth Century, service in the French Army was for three years; it was reduced to two years in 1905, but this did not satisfy the left-wing demagogues who clamoured for a national militia of eight months service. In 1912, however, owing to the growing strength of the German Army and the declining numbers of the French annual contingent due to the falling birth rate, the politicians were persuaded with great difficulty to agree to the restoration of the three-year rule. This was, of course, a temporary expedient, but when the time came the Army started off in good fettle.

In 1920, however, the agitation started again, and in the end the requirements of national defence were subordinated to politics. The term of service was reduced first to eighteen months, and in 1930 to one year. But the Colonial Army retained the two-year rule, and special long-service units were maintained abroad, for even the French Government of that period realized that short-service conscripts are unsuitable for employment overseas.

The result was that France had no army at home, only 240,000 recruits in training who, as soon as they began to shape as soldiers, made way for the next annual contingent. During this recession the badly-paid professional officers and N.C.O.s became disheartened and, in consequence, the standard of young men competing for entry to the military college of St. Cyr deteriorated as the better types sought careers elsewhere. The term of service was increased again just before 1939, but it was too late to affect more than the first-line units. The "spirit" of France had been destroyed by politics and pacifism, the traditional *élan* of the soldier had evaporated, and the people took no interest in their own security. And so the stage was set for the worst *débâcle* ever suffered by the French Army. The half-trained, undisciplined, and ill-equipped reserve divisions who met the shock of the German thrust on the Meuse in May, 1940, were brushed aside after a barely token resistance. This melancholy event served to justify the assertion made by Von Seeckt in 1928 that: "A conscript mass whose training has been brief and superficial is 'cannon fodder,' in the worst sense of the word, if pitted against a small number of practised technicians on the other side." All this surely holds a lesson for ourselves.

#### A PEOPLE'S MILITIA

The traditional programme of the social-democrats has always included a militia. The old-fashioned Continental liberal politician in the early decades of the XIXth Century mistrusted, or pretended to mistrust, the standing army as being the chief support of tyranny, and because the officers were supposedly aristocratic. But, in spite of the fact that governments became more liberal in outlook as time went on, the antipathy of the left-wing politicians to a regular army remained. It is only reasonable to surmise that these people preached or acquiesced in the militia idea either through sheer ignorance, or political expediency, or, most probably, because a standing army seemed an obstacle to their aims.

This type of militia bears no resemblance to our old Constitutional Force—a relic of Saxon days, which never furnished complete units for overseas operations. The "citizen army" proposed by the left-wing is a "democratic" non-professional force liable for a few months service, held together by "mutual comradesly discipline and

respect." In such conditions there is barely time for individual, certainly not for unit or formation training, and the units do not become living entities. Such an "army," untrained and lacking military spirit or morale, would be useless in modern war, but it is not difficult to understand why a certain type of politician still wishes to substitute this type of force for a professional army; in fact they say so in print. So the old shibboleths are repeated.

The Swiss Army, which is always held up as a model by the protagonists of a militia, has never been tested in war. The Spanish Government Militia was defeated by Franco's regular troops and better leadership—the Italian intervention being quite ineffective. The armies of the minor European states were little better than militias owing to their short service, and the lack of prestige and experience of their professional elements. In modern times they have either not been engaged or have put up a very limited resistance if they were.

#### THE RUSSIAN EXPERIMENT

It is modern Russia which, unexpectedly perhaps, provides the most outstanding example of an original belief in militia, followed by a complete change of outlook, and the ultimate rejection of this type of service. After the Revolution a scratch force—the "Red Guard," run by local *soviets* came into being; but, faced by German invasion, and later by a civil war, Lenin was forced to seek some solution because Marx and Engels had left no ready-made theory to cope with such a situation. So, in January, 1918, the formation of the "Red Army" was decreed. But it was to be a voluntary organization, a "class-conscious army of workers and peasants"; the *bourgeoisie* were not to be eligible, except in labour units. Trotsky, organizing it under central control and trying to introduce some discipline and order, had, as was to be expected, to contend with a good deal of opposition and unbelievable chaos. However, before long, utopian ideas had to be discarded; conscription was resorted to, and the problem of finding trainers and leaders was solved by employing ex-officers and N.C.O.s of the old Imperial Army who were obtained either voluntarily or by threats and compulsion. Holding no rank, they were classed as "military specialists," and graded as senior and junior "Commanding personnel." By August, 1920, some 45,000 ex-officers and 250,000 ex-N.C.O.s were serving, besides doctors, veterinary surgeons and military officials of the old Czarist Army.

After the Civil War there were interminable arguments in favour of reverting to a "people's militia" but the idea was definitely shelved, and a standard conscript army was built up with Colour service ranging from two to four years according to the arm. Gradually the cadres became professionalized; every effort was made to get the best educated young men, whatever their antecedents, to adopt the army as a career; normal ranks were re-instituted; strict discipline was enforced; and the formerly detested officers' gold lace epaulettes were re-introduced. So the realists gained a victory over the idealists. But such is human folly and credulity that exactly the opposite was taking place at the same time in France, where there was even more need for preparation, the best use of the available manpower and no possibility of help either from climate or vast distances.

#### OUR POSITION TO-DAY

Our defence problems have always been unlike those of any other Power, and are now intensified by post-war conditions in Europe and Asia. For everyday Imperial defence, which includes the maintenance of our vital communications, we must have garrisons all over the World and be prepared to relieve or reinforce them



if necessary. We can economize in British troops by using Gurkhas and Africans in certain areas, but we must have sufficient troops fully trained, equipped and immediately available in emergency. The sea is no longer our "sure shield," therefore adequate provision must be made for home defence from the outset, and we must never again gamble on being allowed time for uninterrupted preparation and development of our resources. Neither a short-service conscript army nor a militia can meet all these requirements.

With these observations in mind let us examine the existing condition of the Army. Even last March, before the Hong Kong crisis, it was said to be stretched to the limit. How much greater must the strain be to-day—a strain which does not seem likely to decrease.

The ranks of the regular fighting units are now filled with conscripts, but the present-day system does not even possess the advantages of the standard conscript organization. The period of service is too short, recruits arrive in dribbles instead of once a year, so the units never settle down, and higher training suffers. Also consider the waste of time, and the money spent in continually drafting these semi-trained youngsters to distant stations, and then bringing them home again after a few months.

Another factor is that we have not the regular cadres to train the "National Service" men after they return to civil life or to mobilize them for war. So the plan is to rely on the part-time, under-strength Territorial Army for this purpose. At the present rate of call-up—120,000 a year—the Territorial units will soon have more than they can manage, even if they ever reach the establishment proposed, which they are barely half way to doing. And what is likely to be the standard of efficiency and cohesion of such a force when mobilized? If experience is any guide in such matters, the answer is that it would not be fit to fight for some considerable time, even if equipment were available.

Under the existing system we have, as has been pointed out in the Press, swollen staffs, not enough fighting formations in being, and too many administrative units and schools. Quite a large proportion of the old regular units which have been retained are simply training cadres where conscripts spend a few months before passing to another regiment, and thence probably to a third before they finish their abbreviated service. The Infantry has lost its county connection in all but name, and is in danger of losing its traditions too.<sup>1</sup> Many regular units with long and honourable records of service have disappeared, and yet the establishment is higher than in 1914 when we were able to put seven regular divisions into the field at once, followed by seven more as soon as they could be brought home and mobilized. Army Estimates for 1914-1915 were £28,845,000; those for 1949-1950 are £304,000,000. Admittedly costs have risen and modern equipment is expensive, but there seems little doubt that the Country is not receiving value in terms of efficiency for this vast expenditure.

#### SUGGESTIONS

To meet our extended commitments in Europe, and the requirements of Imperial defence, we require highly trained regular units and formations, properly equipped

<sup>1</sup> Since this article was written the question of Infantry tradition has been the subject of correspondence and of a leading article in *The Times*. See the issues of 15th, 17th and 20th September.

See also "Tradition in H.M. Ships—a Comparison with the Regimental System" in the *JOURNAL* for August, 1944, p. 280.



and ready—in some cases at a few hours notice. But the Army has also to provide a professional backbone for home defence as well as cadres for second-line formations, all of whom must be experienced and well trained. No other type of army is capable of producing the necessary striking forces and of providing for our additional and vital needs.

Our primary aim, therefore, should be to build up the Regular Army to a strength of 250,000 as a first line. At the same time we should expand the African forces for the defence of our African possessions, and to provide a striking force for employment in tropical areas. Money can be saved for this by reducing the intake of conscripts and by other economies, such as cutting some of the "tail."

The next step is to prepare a second-line army to supplement the regular units allotted to home defence and to provide additional field formations. There are hundreds of thousands of Class "Z" reservists, but neither the cadres nor the organization exist with which to mobilize them. The only framework at present is the Territorial Army, and this is likely to be swamped by the present large intake of conscripts which it is to absorb and train. Moreover, the Class "Z" men will become older and more and more rusty as time goes on, though at the moment the best of them could be used to bring the Territorial units up to war strength in emergency and as reinforcements for regular units. But that is simply a temporary expedient ; we must look further ahead.

It is suggested, therefore, that the second-line army, whose primary role will be the provision of static and mobile formations for home defence on the outbreak of war, and secondly to provide for expansion, should be the Territorial Army. Its peace establishment should be approximately 400,000, about twenty-five per cent. of this number being volunteers and a strong professional cadre ; the balance to be gradually built up by a yearly intake of 50,000 conscripts liable for six years Colour service in the Territorial Army. Until the establishment is reached deficiencies on mobilization could be met by calling up Class "Z" reservists, but an organization for doing so is essential. Thus, the annual contingent for the Army would be reduced by 70,000—a considerable economy.

This yearly intake for the Territorial Army should be trained intensively with regular recruits at re-constituted Regular Army Depots for six months, and be liable for twenty-eight days training with their Territorial units for the following five years. These men should be the best of the annual call-up, illiterates being excluded. In this connection it is for consideration whether the age for joining should remain as at present or be raised to twenty years. If it be necessary for various reasons, such as the difficulty of selection, to call up more than the number indicated, those not chosen for the Army could be put to work on farms or on other tasks of national importance for a year. These men should not be a charge on the Army Estimates though they ought to be earmarked to form labour units on mobilization.

The third step is the organization of a Home Guard from our existing reserves of older war-trained men, and later from those passing out of the Territorial Army after their Colour service. The role of this third-line would be to supplement the Territorial Army and to relieve it of many civil defence and static duties, and eventually to replace some of its field formations at home. A proportion of this force would, of course, have to be on a full-time footing from the outbreak of war.

## CONCLUSION

There are other and possibly better ways of solving the problem than those outlined above as the second and third steps,<sup>3</sup> but the crux of the matter is the rebuilding and training of the Regular Army. Our urgent need is for professional units and formations in being.

It is a fact that well-equipped forces, smaller than those of their opponents, can achieve success if they are of superior quality in leadership, training and mobility. There is no doubt whatever that mere numbers are no indication of operational efficiency.

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance, "The Foundations of Our Home Defence," in the JOURNAL for February, 1949, page 65.

## ARMY REFORMS IN UTOPIA

By MAJOR R. C. W. THOMAS, O.B.E., R.W.K.

**B**Y order of the Prime Minister of the country of Utopia a Common Commission assembled on the 1st January, 1950, to enquire into certain aspects concerning the Utopian Army.

The terms of reference for the Commission required the following matters to be considered :—

- (a) The reasons for the marked increase in the number of resignations of officers.
- (b) The state of morale in the Army.
- (c) Discipline in the Army.
- (d) The standard of living conditions for army personnel.
- (e) Whether army manpower is being used to the best advantage.

The Commission, having heard evidence from various responsible authorities, who were called to appear before them, submitted its report under the headings shown above.

### RESIGNATION OF OFFICERS

The Commission confirms that there has been a notable increase in the number of resignations of Regular Army officers during the last eighteen months. It appears that the majority of these officers are between 28 and 38 years of age, battle experienced, and many have distinguished war records. The Commission considers that the main reasons for these resignations are as follows :—

(a) The present rates of pay and allowances for officers are quite inadequate, when considered in relation to the present-day cost of living. The majority of officers are finding it almost impossible to meet their financial commitments, and there is considerable bitterness due to the fact that they are quite unable to obtain any redress of this grievance, which, it cannot be denied, is more than justified.

(b) As a result of the War and the changed conditions of life, the present-day officer is probably more mature than his counterpart of previous generations; consequently he is extremely ambitious and very anxious to acquit himself well in his chosen career. Many officers complain that they receive little personal guidance in planning their career, and are generally treated quite impersonally, when it comes to such matters as promotion, posting, etc. The Commission considers that the officer has some cause for complaint in this matter, and is entitled to expect to be given regular information as to the official opinion of his capabilities, and how the Army proposes to use his services during the next few years. There is no doubt that a more personal interest in the officer as an individual would be much appreciated, and would give him a greater sense of security and a more contented frame of mind.

(c) The present system of promotion, based mainly on age and seniority, is outdated. Many officers during the War showed marked ability and rose to high ranks, but to-day have to be employed on work that hardly bears any relation to their capabilities, simply because they are considered to be too young or too junior to be promoted to a higher rank. The Commission can appreciate that such a situation does cause discontentment among ambitious officers, and results in many of them considering civilian employment, where a man has a better chance to be employed and paid in accordance with his ability.

(d) The Commission considers that the foreign tour of three years is still too long and should be reduced to two years. Long periods away from home, often resulting in separation from family, is a matter that is a constant concern to all ranks, and causes much mental worry. It is not surprising that a number of officers are almost forced to resign their commissions in order to avoid a complete domestic upheaval when ordered abroad for such a long period as three years.

The Commission is of the opinion that the Army can ill afford to continue to lose the large number of officers who are resigning their Commissions and, if the present rate continues, it appears likely that a very serious position may result.

#### MORALE

In order to try and assess the state of morale, the Commission visited a number of units, specially selected to represent a cross section of the Army. It also interviewed a number of specially selected men. The Commission does not feel that there is any evidence of low morale when this matter is considered on a unit basis, but considers that the position in regard to personal morale of soldiers is far less satisfactory.

The majority of men who were interviewed complained emphatically about the rates of pay, living conditions and the shortage of married quarters. On account of these complaints, they all appeared to be extremely discontented at being in the Army and, as a consequence, the Commission is forced to conclude, that deep down, the morale cannot be said to be as high as it should be. They consider that the position has many dangerous aspects and should not be overlooked by the civil and military authorities.

In addition the Commission was interested to receive a number of comments about the present-day attitude of the Press towards the Army. It was observed that since the introduction of conscription, the national Press appear to have adopted a policy of publicizing, to a marked degree, any irregularity within the Army, as well as giving prominent space to any articles, letters or statements which have an anti-Army bias.

The Commission agrees that there are some grounds for this observation and they feel that, if the Press continue to adopt this policy, there is a real danger that it will indirectly result in a further lowering of morale, not only of soldiers already in the Army, but also of those young men who are waiting to be called up for their national service.

#### DISCIPLINE

The Commission is of the opinion that the standard of discipline in the Army is generally satisfactory, except that there has been a marked increase in the number of cases of dishonesty, desertion, and absence without leave.

The Commission considers that the increase in these crimes is indirectly due to the fact that practically every soldier, like the officer, is extremely short of money not only for himself but for his family. As a consequence many men are tempted into trying to obtain money dishonestly or to absent themselves in order to seek more lucrative employment.

The Commission recommends that this particular aspect of the financial position of the soldier should not be overlooked by the army authorities.



## LIVING CONDITIONS

The Commission considers that the majority of accommodation now being used by the Army is outdated, as well as being in an extremely poor state of repair. This is due to the fact that all army accommodation has been used to over-capacity throughout the years of the War, with the very minimum of maintenance. The Commission considers that drastic improvements are urgently needed in camps and barracks in respect of the following :—

- (a) Modernization of hot water, heating and lighting systems.
- (b) Provision of modern furniture for barrack rooms to include curtains and floor coverings.
- (c) Provision of better and brighter dining halls and canteens.
- (d) Conversion of barrack rooms into cubicle accommodation to provide the soldier with some degree of privacy when off duty.

The Commission is of the opinion that the present living conditions for both officers and men are of an extremely low standard and fail to provide them with the standard of comfort which they are entitled to expect.

Finally the acute shortage of married quarters, thereby keeping soldiers separated from their families, is causing ever-increasing dissatisfaction which is likely to have very serious repercussions if allowed to continue indefinitely.

## MANPOWER

The Commission is aware that it has always been a common complaint that the Army wastes manpower.

It agrees that an enormous number of men are used every day on guards and fatigues, but considers that as long as the standard of living conditions remains as it is, this cannot be avoided. If accommodation and domestic facilities were modernized, a saving of at least fifty per cent. could be made in the number of men required for cleaning, messing, guards, and general fatigues. At the same time the Commission feels that an excessive amount of manpower is being used on administrative duties, which have become necessary due to the fact that a large number of army regulations and methods have become extremely complicated, thus necessitating large staffs to operate.

The Commission suggests that manpower could be saved by the adoption of such methods as follow :—

- (a) Operate the issue of clothing to soldiers on a shop system.
- (b) Operate the payment of soldiers from centralized pay offices on a bank system, with men being allowed to deal direct with these offices.
- (c) Increase the disciplinary powers of Commanding Officers with the object of reducing the number of court-martial and court of inquiry cases which require a great deal of work to prepare.
- (d) Require the civil courts to deal with all cases of men who refuse to accept the law of National Service. At the present time this matter has to be dealt with by the Army and a large number of men have to be used in capturing, escorting and guarding non-reporters, as well as preparing court-martial papers for their trial before army courts.
- (e) Increase the authority of Commanding Officers in interpreting the administrative regulations of the army in such matters as loss, damage, write off, minor repairs, local purchase, etc.

At the present time, the regulations allow Commanding Officers the very minimum of administrative initiative, and require almost everything unusual to be referred to higher authority for approval, often for some action to be taken which it is quite obvious must be approved. As a consequence large staffs are being maintained at various headquarters either preparing cases for submission or giving administrative decisions.

The Commission feels that the large number of personnel being employed on administrative work justifies to some extent the criticism that manpower is wasted, and they recommend that once again this whole question should be reviewed, not only by the army authorities but also by the Civil Departments concerned.

#### CONCLUSION

The Commission is of the opinion that the Army has at the present time many grave problems to overcome and needs far more support from the whole Nation. It appears to the Commission that the ancient saying of "building bricks without straw" is particularly applicable to-day, in that the Army is expected to become highly efficient and organized without being given the materials with which to achieve this object. At the present time, nearly all progress in the Army is once again being balked by a shortage of financial cover, which appears to be the real reason for nearly every difficulty which it is now experiencing.

The Commission feels that if it is considered necessary for the Army to be strong, then the Nation must be made to accept the fact that it needs just as much attention, financial cover, and assistance as any other of our national projects and schemes.

## MILESTONES OF MILITARY AVIATION—1949-50

By

GROUP CAPTAIN G. W. WILLIAMSON, O.B.E., M.C.

**T**HE 40th year of *Jane's All the World's Aircraft*<sup>1</sup> provides us with one more milestone to tell us the stage of development reached by military aircraft: how far they have progressed, and how fast their development is moving. As with previous volumes, it enables the reader to compare the aircraft of the various Powers, including that which Mr. Winston Churchill styles "The Potential Aggressor."

The easiest comparison is that of looks, since almost every aircraft is shown in illustrations taken from excellent photographs, as well as plan, side view, and front elevation in line drawings. That on page 258c shows that the North American F.86A single-seat fighter has wings swept back 35°; the photograph shows it to have a knife-edge wing and slender lines; and in small print well down the page it says "a standard aircraft complete with armament and normal combat equipment established a new World's speed record of 670.981 miles per hour." At that speed the Westinghouse jet engine was developing about 9,000 horse-power. The "Atom-Bomber," described in the review of *Jane* last year, is stated to have flown 2,289 miles at an average speed of 607 miles per hour. Its engines would be developing a total of 50,000 horse-power; and it rather looks as though, at 40,000 feet, it might manage without escort fighters; the only armament is in the tail. The caption to the photographs says "Boeing XB-47 Light Bomber," but as the loaded weight is nearly 100 tons, the caption may indicate a light bomb rather than a light aircraft. The bomb load is 20,000 lbs.

Though not as fast as these, as far as we know, some standard British aircraft are close behind; the Gloster Meteor with two Metropolitan-Vickers turbines has a speed of 585 miles per hour, and a climb from sea level of 7,350 feet per minute; it reaches 35,000 feet in 3 minutes 43 seconds. The same aircraft with two Rolls Avon turbines is stated to reach 40,000 feet in four minutes. The standard Supermarine Attacker, built for the Royal Navy, has a speed of 590 miles per hour and a climb from sea level of 6,350 feet per minute. An Addenda to *Jane* shows the English Electric Canberra High-Performance Bomber, also with two Rolls Avon turbines; no details are given, but it looks right.

Most jet aircraft built by Countries other than the U.S.A. are powered by the Rolls Nene, either purchased or made under licence, and this may apply to one of the two Russian jet fighters illustrated. The other may have German-type turbines mentioned in last year's review in this JOURNAL. The photo of the latter aircraft is not impressive, but it may be some years old, like their turbines.

### AERO ENGINE COMPARISONS

As always, for quality and quantity Great Britain leads the World in aero-engines, but may not continue to do so: in the article reviewing forty years of aviation in the U.S.A., Mr. Glenn Martin refers to the spur of insatiable demands for higher performance and greater output, and goes on to say that in 1948, America turned out 7,000 aircraft. The number in 1949 will be nearly 10,000, including 3,000 warplanes. As recently as 20th October, 1949, the United Aircraft announced the completion of

<sup>1</sup> A review of *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1949-50*, compiled and edited by Leonard Bridgman, published by Sampson Low, Marston & Co. Ltd., price 3 gns.

their 12,000,000 dollar laboratory for jet-engine research; this firm (Pratt and Whitney) is one of five producing large turbines, neglecting those below 1,000 lbs. thrust.

France has four such firms; Canada one—A. V. Roe Canada Limited; Great Britain six; and as regards Russia, Mr. Bridgman says cautiously, "gas-turbine engines based on German designs are known to be in production; there are possibly some original designs."

So the only comparison worth-while is that between Britain and the U.S.A. Counting the Canadian Avro "Chinook" we have ten jet engines, and ten airscrew-turbines, which shows a proper appreciation of these light-weight engines; the U.S.A. has six types of jet engines, and two turboprops.

For forward speeds of less than 500 miles per hour—the speed at which propeller efficiency begins to fall away, the turboprop has great advantages over both piston engine and turbine. Perhaps 3,500 horse-power is the maximum of which piston engines may be capable, and the Rolls H-shaped engine reaches this figure; but Bristol Proteus turboprop gives 6,400 shaft horse-power plus about 1,600 more jet-effect at 400 miles an hour. On the average, the propeller-turbine weighs about half that of the big piston engine, with much the same fuel consumption. Fuel consumption for both piston and turbine-driven propellers is 0.5 pounds per horse-power hour, and twice that amount in jet engines. The operational effect can be shown in a table for three imaginary engines, each of 2,400 maximum horsepower, cruising at 1,800 h.p. :—

#### WEIGHT OF ENGINE AND FUEL

| Type            | Weight in pounds |            | Pounds of engine weight plus :— |             |             |
|-----------------|------------------|------------|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
|                 | Engine           | 1 hr. fuel | 1 hr. fuel                      | 2 hrs. fuel | 3 hrs. fuel |
| Piston ...      | 2,400            | 900        | 3,300                           | 4,200       | 5,100       |
| Turbo prop. ... | 1,200            | 900        | 2,100                           | 3,000       | 3,900       |
| Jet ...         | 600              | 1,800      | 2,400                           | 4,200       | 6,000       |

With two hours fuel, the jet engine loses its weight-advantage over the piston engine; in any flight longer than 40 minutes, the jet loses its weight-advantage over the turboprop; but, of course, the cruising speed of the jet aircraft might be 400 miles an hour against the 300 of the propeller engines.

The availability of so many turbines in this Country, of both jet and propeller types, is a guarantee that within the next three years at least, Britain will maintain her proud position of leading the World in fighter aircraft as well as in turbines. In fact, one depends upon the other.

#### BRITISH LEAD IN COMBAT AIRCRAFT

In modern types of combat aircraft, Britain has 50 per cent. more than the U.S.A.; this American term is used here to cover all the jet fighters as well as what we call "Strike Fighters"—those which carry one or more torpedoes, or bombs and rockets, and are capable of fighting their way home again when these are expended. Almost all British combat aircraft, jet or otherwise, are armed with four 20 mm. cannon; the American Penetration Fighter made by McDonnell is stated to have six, and this is the only fighter with more than the standard British armament. There are many aircraft with six 12.7 mm. cannons, 0.5 inch bore, but the striking effect, neglecting increased rate of fire, is only about half that of the four 20 mm. guns. A Russian jet fighter has two 12.7 mm. and one 30 mm. heavy cannon.



In total—Air Force and Navy together, Great Britain has about 31 fighter types to 21 American; our total includes 12 jet fighters to America's 14. We have 5 for the Navy and 7 for the Air Force, against their 9 for the Navy and 5 for the Air Force.

But it is in types which are economical in fuel that we excel: a total of 19 new types against about 7 in the U.S.A. includes three famous British aircraft with airscrew-turbines, all for the Royal Navy, and this use of very powerful propeller-type turbines is bound to extend.

#### NAVAL AIRCRAFT

A comparison of British and American naval aircraft is really a comparison of the best products of both nations; apparently, in America the Navy get the best of everything, with very little left for the Air Force; but if, in this Country, something really good is produced for the R.A.F., it is almost immediately followed by the corresponding Sea Meteor, Sea Vampire, Sea Hornet, Sea Mosquito or Seafire.

The present Sea Meteor is limited as regards speed by undercarriage openings; but if this is overcome, and the Rolls-Avon turbine is made available for the Navy, the increase in horse-power from 11,000 to about 19,000 should make the Meteor a record-breaker. Another twin-jet aircraft is the Saunders Roe or Saro SR.A1—the first jet-propelled flying boat in the World, a single-seat fighter with four 20 mm. cannon, speed not stated. Of single-engined aircraft, the most striking is the Supermarine Attacker, capable of 590 miles per hour, equipped with arrester hook, accelerator hooks in wheel bays, and rocket-assisted take-off. Cruising at 355 miles per hour, its maximum range is 1,190 miles. No speed details are given of the Hawker P.1040 and its swept-back wing variant P.1052, except that the latter flew 213 miles at an average speed of 618 miles per hour; these aircraft have the Rolls Nene turbine; and a Hawker-patented bifurcated trunk provides two exhausts, leaving the fuselage free for fuel tanks, though there is also provision for the usual drop-tanks. The present De Havilland Sea Vampire, with D.H. Goblin turbine, is capable of 548 miles an hour, and has a range of 620 miles; but there is now a De Havilland Venom, with their Ghost turbine, which is 50 per cent. more powerful than the Goblin; and this fine aircraft may in time replace the Vampire for naval use.

Our five naval jet fighters include two with twin engines; American's nine naval jet fighters include five with twin engines—all engines made by Westinghouse; at 600 miles per hour, these engines would develop 4,800 horse-power each, about half that of the Rolls Avon. They are approximately the same weight and span as the Gloster Meteor, and it may be confidently assumed that a Meteor with twice the horse-power will not be slower than its American rivals. The speed for one of them—the MacDonnell Banshee, is given as 630 miles per hour.

In jet aircraft, for speed, armament, and range, we are not behind the U.S.A. But our Strike Fighters are better than anything shown in this volume, especially the three flying or about to be flown with airscrew-turbines: the Westland Wyvern has an Armstrong-Siddeley Python turbine developing 4,820 horse-power at 375 miles an hour; the Fairey 17 Anti-submarine Monoplane has the Armstrong Siddeley Double Mamba of 3,310 horse-power; the Blackburn Y.A.5 Anti-submarine Monoplane is being fitted with an airscrew-turbine, make and horse-power not stated in this volume.

Nor is there anything in the World with piston engines to better the British twin engine fighters. The De Havilland Sea Hornet, with a speed of 431 miles per hour, and a range of 1,500 miles, has folding wings, arrester and accelerator gear, and

racks under the wings for two 1,000 lb. bombs and rocket projectiles. The Photo-Reconnaissance variant will reach a speed of 467 miles per hour and has a range of 2,050 miles. The Sea Mosquito has a speed of 345 miles per hour with its torpedo, and a range of 1,100. The Bristol Brigand, though it may no longer carry a torpedo, has a speed of 358 miles per hour and a range of 2,800 miles.

To name only three of our single-engined Strike-Fighters: the Supermarine Seafire, with only the 1,490 horse-power of the Rolls Merlin, is rated at 452 miles per hour and a range of 940 miles; Hawker Sea Fury with a Bristol Centaurus engine of 2,480 horse-power does 450 miles per hour, carries two 1,000 lb. bombs, and including combat has a range of 720 miles; the Blackburn with 2,500 horse-power does 342 miles per hour with its torpedo, and will soon be remodelled as B.48 with a turbine.

Though no speed is stated, one American aircraft will compare well with our twin engine fighters: the North American AJ-1 has two Pratt and Whitney engines of 3,500 horse-power each, and for use in emergency an Allison jet-engine in the tail. It must look and feel strange to have at least 3,000 horse-power suddenly added "when necessary"! American "Attack Fighters" compare favourably with our best: the Chance Vought Corsair has a maximum speed of over 450 miles per hour, and carries bombs or rockets as well as radar or night-fighting equipment; the Grumman Bearcat combines a ferrying range of 2,200 miles with a speed of over 455 miles per hour, and will carry bombs up to a total of 2,000 lbs.; the 350 miles per hour Martin Mauler has a range of 1,700 miles and will carry three 2,200 lb. torpedoes and twelve 5-in. rockets, or "a variety of alternative offensive loads."

#### AIR FORCE FIGHTERS

The Royal Air Force has seven up-to-date jet fighters, according to this volume, only one (the new Meteor) with two engines; and about six piston engined fighters—three with two engines. But nearly all of these are the Air Force versions of fast aircraft already mentioned in their naval form—Venom, Vampire, Meteor, Hawker P.1052, Hornet, Mosquito, Fury, Tempest, Spitfire. The jets, as before, are close to 600 miles an hour, or somewhat above it, in their maximum speeds; the long-range Hornet reaches 3,000 miles in one hop, and will do 472 miles per hour; the Mosquito is available as a night-fighter; the Fury with Bristol Centaurus will do 441 miles per hour; the Tempest 440 miles per hour, with a range at cruising speed of 840 miles; and the Supermarine Spitfire with the Rolls Griffon has a maximum speed and range of 450 miles per hour, and 965 miles, respectively.

Comparison with American Air Force jets is difficult, as the fastest aircraft have no speeds shown; but, as stated in an earlier paragraph, North American Sabre, with the General Electric Company's jet engine, has done 670 miles per hour; Lockheed and McDonnell "Penetration Fighters" must be very fast—they are in prototype form at present. Another high-speed prototype is the Northrop Scorpion, painted black and styled "an all-weather fighter." It weighs 32,000 lbs., has two Allison engines of 3,750 lbs. static thrust, or 3,750 horse-power each at 375 miles an hour; it is fitted with comprehensive radar, and night and bad weather equipment.

Single engine jet fighters include Republic Aviation's Thunderjet, stated to be capable of more than 600 miles an hour. Like most American fighters, it has six 12.7 m.m. (or half-inch) guns, and carries eight 140 lb. rockets in retractable mounts under the wings. The same firm have an interesting prototype described as "an experimental high-speed Interceptor Fighter with swept-back wings of variable

incidence and inverse taper, that is, with the chord greater at the tips than at the roots." With a span of only 30 feet, it has the big General Electric jet engine, 5,000 lbs. static thrust, or 8,000 horse-power at 600 miles per hour. The Lockheed Shooting Star is the aircraft originally designed to take the De Havilland jet engine sent over to U.S.A. in 1943; its performance is 605 miles per hour; Service ceiling over 46,000 feet; ferry range 1,100 miles, with the larger of the Allison jet engines, J-33 with 4,600 lbs. static thrust. Lockheed also have a prototype "all-weather fighter" with two seats, and a "penetration fighter" with one, which have very good lines and "supersonic" or very sharp-pointed noses.

The American Air Force have very little to describe, as regards high-speed piston engine aircraft, but that little is good—something like our long-range De Havilland Hornet: it is the North American Twin Mustang, with two fuselages and a 1,600 horse-power Allison piston engine in each. This long-range escort fighter has a maximum speed of 475 miles per hour, a ferry range of 2,500 miles, and a load of four 1,000 lb. bombs.

#### HEAVY JET BOMBERS

In the field of heavy jet bombers, the comparison is a walk-over: U.S.A. has far more and far better bombers than all the rest of the World put together. Our only entrant shown in this volume, as distinct from being up our sleeve, is the Avro Lincoln; in its standard form it has piston engines, but has doubtless been tried out with both jets and airscrew-turbines. *Jane* shows two Russian bombers: one is a Chinese copy of a Boeing B.29 Fortress to the 1940 specification, built in 1943, which perhaps made a forced landing in Russia in 1944; the other illustration is an idealized drawing of a 4-jet bomber, probably using German turbines designed in 1942.

Pride of place must go to the "Atom Bomber," Boeing XB-47, with a speed exceeding 600 miles an hour with Allison turbines of 3,750 pounds thrust; but General Electric 6,000 lb. turbines are replacing these—an increase of 60 per cent. in power which might give as much as 5 per cent. more speed if they are lucky. The bomb load internally stowed is 20,000 lbs.; though the span is only 116 feet, gross weight loaded is 200,000 lbs.

The picture of this "Atom Bomber" in flight, on page 197c, shows an aircraft which, despite its function, could not be described as other than beautiful in its grace and power; but another heavy bomber—the Northrop Flying Wing, is a close second, and is illustrated at the top of page 265c. The Northrop spans 172 feet, and weighs loaded 162,000 lbs.; it is described as a long-range aircraft, though few details are given. The crew number seven, and there are folding bunks for six reserve members, the whole in pressurized nacelle. Like the Boeing, it has at present six Allison turbines. Its armament is worthy of quotation:—

"Two electrically operated four-gun turrets, one above and one below wing, offset to starboard of wing centre-line, and four electrically operated remotely-controlled two-gun turrets, one above and one below each wing between outer engines and wing-tips. Fire-control blister towards end of central nacelle."

The biggest of bombers spans 230 feet, exactly the same as the Bristol Brabazon, and weighs loaded 278,000 lbs. It is the Consolidated Vultee B-36D, at present with six big piston engines supplemented by four Allison turbines; but the big turbines made by General Electric will be used in future production models. There is a crew of fifteen, which includes four reliefs. There are two pressurized compartments



connected by a tunnel provided with a truck for easy communication. It is heavily armed, with six retractable remotely-controlled turrets and a flexible mounting in the nose, fourteen 20 mm. cannon in addition to a 37 mm. cannon in the tail. Speed is not high, 300 miles an hour with present engines; but this bomber could carry 10,000 lbs. of bombs 5,000 miles out, and return to base without landing; or 72,000 lbs. of bombs for shorter distances.

Amongst lighter bombers may be mentioned the North American Tornado—a very handsome aircraft capable of 550 miles an hour, with a service ceiling of 40,000 feet. It spans only 89 feet, and loaded weighs 82,000 lbs.

#### THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME

All the above are conventional aircraft, have flown and are in production; many great firms have research prototypes which at least have conventional engines and space for a pilot. One of them is the supersonic Bell aircraft which reached Mach 1.4—a speed of 800 miles an hour if at 35,000 feet, or over 1,000 at sea level. The rocket engines were on for 2½ minutes, and the flight lasted 8 minutes. The Douglas Aircraft Company's X-3 study aims at 200,000 feet and three times the speed of sound, unpiloted; but they have a Skyrocket which carries a pilot.

Coming developments are admirably summed up in the two leading articles by Sir Frederick Handley Page and Mr. Glenn L. Martin. The former says:—

“During more than four decades in which I have taken a very great interest in aviation and its progress, design trends have been towards larger, faster aircraft with higher wing-loadings. Big size and high speed are desirable merits but only with safety; slow, short-distance landings and take-offs are the characteristics which I shall continue to require in a good aircraft. . . . Wing plan forms have radically changed, and high-speed laminar-flow wing sections have had to be developed. The importance of high-quality surface finish and accuracy of contour demands improvement of the conventional riveted-skin construction. In the future, plastic material may be used generally.”

In the second leading article, Mr. Glenn L. Martin refers to the dramatic character of recent achievements of American aviation, and says:—

“A monstrous flying boat of our own design has a wing span which is 66 per cent. greater than the distance covered on the Wrights' first flight. Its cargo holds are so capacious that they could swallow and lift 91 of the original Wright ships, pilots included.

“A single seaplane, Martin Caroline Mars . . . transported the largest group of personnel ever to travel through the air at one time—269 men with baggage. . . . An all-metal helicopter will have a cabin as large as a DC-4 and a detachable undercompartment comparable in size to a large passenger bus.”

#### THE FORTIETH YEAR

Like the aircraft, the volume itself is bigger and better than ever, with 545 illustrations, 85 per cent. of which are new. The Addenda section is dated 1st October, 1949, and provides illustrations which became available up to that date, but after the book had closed for press. The Editor and the Publishers are to be congratulated on a wonderful achievement. Fred T. Jane died in 1916, but, as the Publishers say in their Preface, the book is a “perpetual monument to his memory.”



## CENTENARY OF THE PUNJAB FRONTIER FORCE

By GENERAL SIR ROB LOCKHART, K.C.B., C.I.E., M.C.

**I**N 1839 the famous Sikh Maharajah Ranjit Singh died, and his kingdom, rent by rival factions, speedily fell into anarchy. In December, 1845, the Sikh Army invaded British India; but the British were prepared, and after some hard fighting the Sikhs were defeated, and this brought the first Sikh war to an end in February, 1846. The Punjab, up to the River Sutlej, and Kashmir and Hazara were annexed to British India.

Amongst other measures taken for the pacification of this newly acquired territory was the creation of a force called "The Frontier Brigade." This consisted of four newly raised regiments of "Sikh Local Infantry," numbered 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th, and a company of artillery. These units were recruited from the newly conquered Sikh territory, largely from ex-soldiers of the old Sikh armies, although by no means all the men were Sikhs. Each had a small nucleus of regular "Native Infantry" and was raised and officered by a handful of British Officers of the "Regular Native Army."

At the same time there was raised in Mardan near Peshawar a "Corps of Guides," consisting of both cavalry and infantry. This unit was designed to provide guides to other troops in the field and to obtain intelligence both within and beyond the borders of British India, West of the River Jumna. For this reason the corps enrolled men of many types. In the words of one XIXth Century writer "the Guides contained men of every shade of moral character and men of no character at all."

But peace was not to last for long. The Sikh chiefs were turbulent and dissatisfied. In 1848, war again broke out. This "second Sikh War" ended in February, 1849, in the complete defeat of the Sikhs, and was followed by the annexation to British India of the whole of the Sikh territories, which extended to the borders of what is to-day the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan.

For the protection of these newly acquired areas Lord Dalhousie, Governor-General in India, on the 18th May, 1849, ordered the raising of a new Force to be called the "Transfrontier Brigade." The units composing this new force were raised in the Punjab in the same way as had been those of the Frontier Brigade in 1846. They comprised five regiments of Punjab Cavalry and five of Punjab Infantry, numbered 1st to 5th in each arm.

This new formation was responsible for a vast area, its front stretching from Hazara in the North to the borders of Sind in the South; a distance of about 700 miles. To assist it, one, at least, Light Horse Field Battery was also raised, although it is not clear whether these gunners actually belonged at this date to the Transfrontier Brigade. The Corps of Guides also co-operated with it from the start.

The new Force was very early in action against the warlike and predatory tribes on the new frontier, and gave proof of its value. But it soon became clear that the Force was not big enough for its task. Accordingly, in 1851, the Transfrontier Brigade was reorganized and enlarged. To it were added the four regiments of Sikh Local Infantry of the Frontier Brigade, the Corps of Guides and two more Light Horse Field Batteries. The title of the Force was changed to Punjab Irregular Force. From the initial letters of these three words came the nickname "Piffer," by which the Force and its members have since been known.

A year or two later was added the Sind Camel Corps, a unit raised in Sind in 1843, at the instance of Sir Charles Napier, on the model of Napoleon's Dromedary Corps in Egypt. They were in fact mounted infantry. On joining the P.I.F. they became the 6th Punjab Infantry, but they retained the word Sind in their title and are to-day the 6th Royal Battalion (Scinde) 13th Frontier Force Rifles of the Pakistan Army. To anticipate events and complete the composition of the Force it seems best to mention here the addition—in 1858—of yet another unit. This was a Gurkha Regiment raised in that year from Gurkhas of the Sikh Local Infantry Regiments and other Punjab units. This regiment became in time the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles F.F.

Thus by 1858 the P.I.F. consisted of :—

The Corps of Guides.

1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Punjab Cavalry.

1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Light Horse Field Batteries (these eventually became "Mountain" Batteries).

1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Sikh Local Infantry.

1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Punjab Infantry.

The Hazara Goorkha Regiment.

It would be tedious to describe the various changes of titles which have occurred, but those who may be interested will find a table at the end of this article.

The Force was directly under the orders of the Government of the Punjab, not of the Commander-in-Chief in India. It had its own Commander and its own Headquarters Staff. This state of affairs continued until 1886, when control passed to the Commander-in-Chief in India.

In 1865 the title of the Force was changed to Punjab Frontier Force (P.F.F.). In 1903, when Lord Kitchener carried out a large-scale reorganization of the Army in India, the P.F.F. ceased to be a separate organization and the units received new titles, but these included the words "Frontier Force" in brackets after them.

It is because the P.F.F. evolved from the Transfrontier Brigade, raised on the 18th May, 1849, that 1949 is regarded as the Piffers' Centenary.

From 1851 to 1903, the Force was cantoned along the new frontier. Its main stations were Abbottabad, Mardan (permanent home of the Guides until 1939), Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, but a large proportion of the Force lived in small isolated outposts based on these main stations.

Except to take part in foreign wars and to share in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, the Force, until 1903, never left the North-West Frontier. Its life was one of constant active service. It lived at instant readiness to turn out in pursuit of raiders or take the field. It prided itself on its mobility and marching powers; the history of every unit contains numerous instances of long and arduous marches, carried out at high speeds, in adverse conditions. Wars; frontier expeditions, varying from a few days to months in duration; blockades; punitive raids and escorts kept the P.F.F. fully occupied. By 1914, units of the Force had taken part in over fifty officially recognized Frontier Campaigns, the Indian Mutiny and five foreign wars (the first and second Burma Wars, the second Afghan War, China (1900-1) and Somaliland, 1903). Names new to the British public became household words in their day and many of them figure in the battle honours of P.F.F. units.

Piffer units played a big part in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny in 1857. The marches of the Corps of Guides and the 4th Punjab Infantry at the height of

an Indian summer from the Frontier to Delhi are matters of history. Altogether no less than nine P.F.F. units took part in the campaign, seven of them taking part in the siege of Delhi.

In the Second Afghan War (1878-80) there were seventeen Piffer units in the field. Lord Robert's artillery on his famous march from Kabul to Kandahar consisted solely of Piffer Mountain Batteries. In the assault at Pekin in 1901, a P.F.F. battalion was in the front line and was one of the first units to enter the city.

In both the World Wars of the present Century, Piffer units took a full share, fighting in practically every theatre of war. In both Wars, especially the second, new battalions were raised and they, too, fought with distinction. Many awards for gallantry were won. These included two V.C.s in the Great War and seven in the last war. Altogether twenty-five members of the Force have been awarded the V.C.

The units of the Force consisted in general of equal proportions of Sikhs, Dogras, Punjabis, Mussulmans and Pathans. The 5th Royal Gurkhas were, of course, all Gurkhas.

With the Partition of the Indian Army in 1947, the bulk of the P.F.F. units were allotted to Pakistan, only two mountain batteries and the 5th Royal Gurkhas being allotted to India, although all the Sikhs and Dogras of the regiments allotted to Pakistan were also transferred to India. The place of these two "classes" in the Pakistan units was taken by Muslim soldiers transferred from units allotted to India.

#### CENTENARY CELEBRATIONS

It was my privilege and good fortune to be invited to attend the Piffer Centenary Celebrations held at Abbottabad in October this year. I therefore saw myself how the units in Pakistan are faring in the new conditions. They are faring very well. I never saw men look fitter, better fed or happier. The morale of all ranks was undoubtedly high. The officers seemed keen and fit, and obviously inspired by a real desire to maintain and improve on old standards and traditions. The officers' messes which I saw looked much as officers' messes always did. All the old silver, pictures, trophies, visitors books and so forth are still in evidence. Such drill, physical training, beating of retreat as I saw were all of high quality.

The celebrations were combined with the traditional annual Piffer Week, when units of the Force compete for the Piffer Football and Hockey Cups. The keenness and spirit of good sportsmanship shown were as good if not better than pre-war. The standard of play was good, that of the football being perhaps higher than before the War.

It seems, therefore, that the traditions of the past and the hopes of the future are in safe hands.

Space does not admit to touch on many other aspects of the P.F.F.'s services to the old India and the British Empire: the famous soldiers and well-known soldier politicians it has produced; the intimate connections of certain units with units of the British, Dominion and American Services; the wonderful work and record of awards won by the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers, N.C.O.s and men of every class.

For a hundred years the units of the P.F.F. have helped to fight the enemies of peace and law and order, and set a high standard of military efficiency. There is good reason to believe that they will continue to do so.

# CHANGES OF TITLES OF UNITS OF PUNJAB FRONTIER FORCE, 1840-1949.

| 1849.                                               | Between 1857 and 1881.                         | 1903.                               | 1921.                                                      | 1922.                                        | 1949.                                                                 |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Corps of Guides ...<br>(both Cavalry and Infantry). | No change ...                                  | Q.V.O. Corps of Guides.             | Q.V.O. Guides Cavalry (F.F.).<br>(See below for Infantry). | 10th Q.V.O. Guides Cavalry (F.F.).           | Guides Cavalry (10 F.F.).                                             |
| 1st Punjab Cavalry                                  | No change ...                                  | 21st (P.A.V.O.) Cavalry (F.F.).     | No change ...                                              | 11th P.A.V.O. Cavalry (F.F.).                | P.A.V.O. Cavalry (11 F.F.).                                           |
| 2nd Punjab Cavalry                                  | No change ...                                  | 22nd (Sam Browne's) Cavalry (F.F.). | No change ...                                              | 12th (Sam Browne's) Cavalry (F.F.).          | Merged in Pakistan Armoured Corps Centre.                             |
| 3rd Punjab Cavalry                                  | No change ...                                  | 23rd Cavalry (F.F.).                | No change ...                                              | Merged in 11th P.A.V.O. Cavalry.             | —                                                                     |
| 4th Punjab Cavalry                                  | Disbanded on reduction of Indian Army in 1881. | —                                   | —                                                          | —                                            | —                                                                     |
| 5th Punjab Cavalry                                  | No change ...                                  | 25th Cavalry (F.F.).                | No change ...                                              | Merged in 12th Sam Browne's Cavalry.         | —                                                                     |
| No. 1 Horse Light Field Battery.                    | Disbanded 1870 ...                             | —                                   | —                                                          | —                                            | —                                                                     |
| No. 2 Horse Light Field Battery.                    | No. 1 Mountain Battery (1870).                 | 21st Mountain Battery (F.F.).       | 101 Mountain Battery (F.F.).                               | 1st Royal Kohat Mountain Battery (F.F.) R.A. | 2nd Royal Kohat Mountain Battery (F.F.) R.P.A.                        |
| No. 3 Horse Light Field Battery.                    | No. 2 Mountain Battery (1870).                 | 22 Mountain Battery                 | 102 Mountain Battery.                                      | 2nd (Derajat) Mountain Battery (F.F.) R.A.   | 2nd (Derajat) Mountain Battery (F.F.) R.I.A.                          |
| No. 4 Garrison Company.                             | No. 5 Garrison Battery (1870).                 | Frontier Garrison Artillery.        | No change ...                                              | No change ...                                | Disbanded in World War.                                               |
| Hazara Mountain Train.                              | No. 4 Mountain Battery (1870).                 | 24 Mountain Battery                 | 104 Mountain Battery.                                      | 4th (Hazara) Mountain Battery (F.F.) R.A.    | 4th (Hazara) Mountain Battery (F.F.) R.I.A.                           |
| Peshawar Mountain Battery (1854).                   | No. 3 Mountain Battery (1870).                 | 23 Mountain Battery                 | 103 Mountain Battery.                                      | 3rd (Peshawar) Mountain Battery (F.F.) R.A.  | Merged in 2nd Royal Kohat Mountain Battery (F.F.) R.P.A. <sup>1</sup> |



|                          |                                             |                              |                                          |                                         |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| 1st Sikh Local Infantry. | 1st Sikh Infantry (1857).                   | 51st Sikhs (F.F.) ...        | Q.V.O. Corps of Guides (F.F.) (Lumsden). | 5th Bn. 12th F.F. No change.            |
| 2nd Sikh Local Infantry. | 2nd Sikh Infantry ...                       | 52nd Sikhs (F.F.) ...        | 51st (P.W.O.) Sikhs (F.F.).              | Regt. (Q.V.O.) Corps of Guides.         |
| 3rd Sikh Local Infantry. | 3rd Sikh Infantry ...                       | 53rd Sikhs (F.F.) ...        | No change ...                            | 1st (Para) Bn. 12th F.F. Regt. (P.W.O.) |
| 4th Sikh Local Infantry. | 4th Sikh Infantry ...                       | 54th Sikhs (F.F.) ...        | No change ...                            | 2nd Bn. 12th F.F. Regt.                 |
| 1st Punjab Infantry      | No change ...                               | 55th Coke's Rifles (F.F.)    | No change ...                            | 3rd Royal Bn. 12th F.F. Regt. (Sikhs).  |
| 2nd Punjab Infantry      | No change ...                               | 56th Punjabi Rifles (F.F.)   | No change ...                            | F.F. Regt. (Sikhs).                     |
| 3rd Punjab Infantry      | Disbanded on reduction of Indian Army 1887. | 57th Wilde's Rifles (F.F.)   | No change ...                            | 4th Bn. 12th F.F. Regt.                 |
| 4th Punjab Infantry      | No change ...                               | 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F.F.) | No change ...                            | 1st Bn. 13th F.F. Rifles (Coke's).      |
| 5th Punjab Infantry      | No change ...                               | 59th Scinde Rifles (F.F.)    | No change ...                            | 2nd Bn. 13th F.F. Rifles.               |
| 6th Punjab Infantry      | No change ...                               | 5th Gurkha Rifles (F.F.)     | 59th Royal Scinde Rifles (F.F.)          | No change.                              |
|                          | Hazara Goorkha Regt. (1858).                |                              | 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles F.F.             | No change.                              |
|                          |                                             |                              | R.P.A.—Royal Pakistan Artillery.         | 5th Gurkha Rifles F.F. (Indian Army).   |
|                          |                                             |                              | R.I.A.—Royal Indian Artillery.           |                                         |
|                          |                                             |                              | This title requires confirmation.        |                                         |

## CYPRUS—THE FIRST ENGLISH OCCUPATION

By M. BROUGHAM

CYPRUS has become increasingly important as a British Colony in view of its strategical position in relation to the general scheme of European defence and its potential value as a base. It is of interest, therefore, to recall the circumstances in which it was first occupied by the English and used as an advance base by an army from Western Europe operating in the Middle East.

It was in the early Summer of 1191 A.D. that Richard, Cœur de Lion, in a brief campaign of fifteen days "won the mastery of Cyprus for the service of God," to quote a contemporary report, and also married his Queen—Berengaria of Navarre, in the Island.

Richard's army, bound for Acre and embarked in upwards of 150 transport vessels, accompanied by forty or fifty fighting galleys, had sailed from Messina on 12th April. The fleet must have presented a magnificent spectacle: in advance were three of the largest transports, called "busses," carrying the king's widowed sister—Queen Joan of Sicily, and his affianced bride—the Princess of Navarre, with their ladies and escort. After these came seven lines of transports, including fourteen ships belonging to the English fleet which had sailed from Dartmouth and which were Richard's particular pride. These vessels, we are told, were splendidly equipped with three spare rudders, three anchors, thirty oars, two sails, triple ropes and a double set of everything except mast and boat. Each carried forty warhorses and forty knights with all their arms and accoutrements, forty foot soldiers and fifteen sailors, with food for all these for one year. Lastly came the galleys, in one of which was the King. These were long, narrow ships propelled by two tiers of oarsmen—the fastest vessels in the fleet. On reaching the open sea, they took the lead, the King's galley ahead of all. A contemporary description says, "the galleys moderated their speed and endeavoured to keep pace with the transports for the protection of the multitude and the comfort of the weak." (Could modern convoy work be better described?) "Every evening the King had a large candle lighted in the lantern of his galley to show the way to the other ships, and if one got out of its course he waited for it to get back. Thus, as a hen leads her chickens out to feed, he led his mighty fleet." But on Good Friday, 12th April, they ran into a bad storm and the ships became separated, and when Richard with the main part of the fleet made Rhodes harbour on 17th April, he found "to his great wrath" that twenty-five ships were missing, including the three with the royal ladies and their escorts.

The King remained in Rhodes until the 22nd, hoping some of the missing vessels would appear, and gleaning some useful information about Cyprus. The nature of this seems to have decided him to sail to that island instead of making straight for his destination—Acre.

Well it was for Joan and Berengaria that he did so, for, after becoming separated from the main fleet in the storm, the Queen's three ships passed between Crete and Libya and tried to make Limassol on the South coast of Cyprus on 24th April; but two were driven on the rocks by a high wind and wrecked, and the men who struggled ashore from them were made prisoners by the Cypriots. Luckily the Queen's ship had remained in the open sea and escaped disaster. The captive crusaders, however, proved too tough a proposition for their jailers and, having managed to get hold of three crossbows, did such good execution with them that, with the aid of men landed from the Queen's ship for the purpose, they overcame the local garrison, and brought

the royal buss into port. The ladies must have been thankful indeed to find themselves in a comparatively safe anchorage again! But they were still in some jeopardy, if not of their lives, at least of their liberty.

At this time the ruler of Cyprus was one, Isaac Commenus, who had been sent there as Governor by the Byzantine Emperor in 1185. Isaac, however, had styled himself "Emperor" of the island, and had ruled as an independent despot for the last six years. Although nominally a Christian he had allied himself to Saladin and, whereas formerly the Franks had been able to obtain supplies from Cyprus, now its ruler "never ceased doing as much ill to Christians as he could." No wonder Richard, hearing all this in Rhodes, had decided to investigate affairs at Cyprus; for besides being, as T. E. Lawrence has described him, "a military architect of genius," the Lionheart appreciated in a high degree what General Wavell calls "the administrative factor" essential to good Generalship. Problems of supply and transport were his constant concern, as accounts of his careful preparation for this Crusade all go to show.

The officers of the Queen's escort were evidently well aware of Isaac's reputation for when that gentleman arrived at Limassol, and sent the royal ladies a pressing invitation to land and partake of his hospitality, they thought it prudent to refuse. The invitation was repeated the next day (3rd May), accompanied by gifts of fruit and wine; but they again refused to leave their ship, though they feared they would have to consent eventually, or be taken by force. It must have been with enormous relief that, on 5th May, they sighted the King's fleet.

Richard had had an adventurous journey, narrowly escaping complete disaster in the Gulf of Abalia in Pamphlia; but weary as his men must have been after their stormy voyage, they did not get much time to rest and refresh themselves. The messengers sent to Isaac by the King as soon as he arrived were rudely received, to which behaviour Richard retorted with the call "To Arms!"—and knights and crossbowmen immediately began crowding into the boats. It was not the happiest of prospects, for the knights especially, to have to fight as foot-soldiers, weighed down with their heavy equipment, against an army on its own soil, with horses and mules. But as one of the pilgrims remarked: "We knew the most about war!"

Between Richard's fleet and the shore there were five of Isaac's armed galleys, and on the beach itself the Cypriots hastily raised a barricade of doors, window-frames, shutters, barrels, casks, shields, benches, boxes—in fact anything that came to hand. Behind the beach rose high rocks with a lofty citadel atop. But Isaac's galleys' crews appeared to have small stomach for a fight and no sooner did Richard's bowmen start shooting at them than they leapt into the sea in a panic, and their galleys were captured and taken out of the harbour to join the rest of the King's fleet. Meanwhile the knights and bowmen, led by the King, were leaping from their boats and assailing the enemy ashore, driving him into the town and the fields. Isaac was seen fleeing on horseback, and though Richard seized a horse himself—"with a sack for a saddle and rope stirrups"—and shouted to him to "come and joust, Sir Emperor!"—Isaac "had no mind for it," and Richard had to be content with capturing his standard.

The town of Limassol surrendered, and Joan and Berengaria came ashore on 7th May, and glad they must have been to move into more comfortable quarters after nearly a month in their sailing buss. The horses were landed next day and the pursuit of Isaac and his army continued; but, mounted on his famous horse, Fauvel,

the Emperor made good his escape to the mountains. Richard issued a proclamation that "all people of the land who did not desire war might come and go in safety, but such as did seek war should have no truce or peace with him." The people were evidently only too glad to "come and go in safety," and preparations were made for the King's marriage and the crowning of his Queen. This took place on 12th May at Limassol, and Berengaria became the only Queen of England never to set foot in her kingdom, though her bones were laid there after her death.<sup>1</sup>

An honoured guest at the ceremony was King Guy of Jerusalem, who had arrived with some of his nobles a day or two previously. He had come to confer with Richard about affairs in Palestine which were going none too smoothly. (The difficult situation to-day between Arabs, Jews and the United Nations would appear only too familiar to the ghost of Cœur de Lion!)

Battles and affairs of state were laid aside for the next few days which were given over to festivities in honour of the Royal marriage, and it looked as if the fighting in Cyprus was over when Isaac sent messengers from his refuge at Nicosia requesting a parley.

The meeting was held "in a garden of fig trees between the Limassol road and the shore." Richard attended in state—a resplendent figure, "dressed in a tunic of rose-coloured samite and a mantle bedight with small half moons of solid silver set in rows, interspersed with shining orbs like suns. He wore a scarlet cap, and bore a gold-hilted sword with a silken belt and a finely-chased scabbard edged with silver. His spurs were gilded, and he was mounted on a Spanish horse of great beauty, his saddle being red, studded with golden and brightly coloured stars, and having on its hinder parts two golden lion-cubs rampant, snarling at each other."

At the meeting Isaac swore fealty to Richard, and promised to accompany him on the Crusade. Also he was to pay 3,500 marks indemnity, for which Richard would hold Cyprus as a pledge. They exchanged "the kiss of peace," which was an empty gesture on Isaac's part, for that night, mounted on Fauvel, he fled to Famagusta and again raised his standard against his lately-sworn liege lord.

Richard sailed round to Famagusta after him while King Guy, with the land forces, took the coast road. Richard was then laid low by one of his periodical bouts of fever—malaria probably, from which he suffered all his life, and King Guy took charge. Isaac was chased in turn from his fortresses at Nicosia and Kantara, but when he heard that his only child, a young girl, had been captured by the Crusaders he surrendered completely, only begging to be spared the indignity of "iron bonds."

Richard, now recovered, received him graciously, and brought his daughter to meet him. He would not entirely let him off the hated bonds, however, but as a sop to his dignity, had his chains made of silver. Isaac was subsequently sent as a prisoner to the fortress of Markab in Tripoli, while his little daughter accompanied the two Queens to Palestine. Richard, of course, kept Fauvel.

Before leaving, the King confirmed to the Cypriots the charter granted to them by the Byzantine Emperors, and restored their laws and institutes. He appointed two Englishmen as governors of the island—Richard de Camville and Robert of Turnham, and charged them to send regular supplies of barley, wheat, sheep and bullocks to his army.

<sup>1</sup> These were among the many precious relics lost when the Royal College of Surgeons' premises were destroyed in an air raid on London in 1941.



Most of the losses to his fleet had been made good from the Cypriot navy, and it was with 163 ships that the King sailed for Acre on 5th June. The route lay via Beyrout and Sidon. Between the last two ports the fleet had the good fortune to sight Saladin's most valuable supply ship, laden with provisions. "A ship of such size that we read of none other so large save the Ark of Noah," as one pilgrim remarked. This vessel the Crusaders succeeded in sinking, largely through Richard's own enterprise and determination. The loss was a serious one to Saladin, as was also that of his base at Cyprus; and it must have been an army well pleased with itself and its lion-hearted leader that landed at Acre on 8th June, 1191.

#### HISTORICAL NOTE

Richard subsequently sold Cyprus to the Knights Templars, who resold it to King Guy de Lusignan of Jerusalem. For nearly three centuries the island was under this dynasty; but in 1489, a widowed Queen, fearful of the increasing power of the Turks, abdicated in favour of her native Venetian republic.

The Venetians remained in possession for over eighty years, when, after fierce fighting, Cyprus was wrested from them by the Turks, whose increasingly oppressive administration lasted for two hundred years.

On 4th June, 1878, Great Britain, by treaty with the Sultan, occupied the island, the Porte retaining the nominal sovereignty and receiving an annual "tribute" of £92,800 a year.

When war with Turkey was declared on 5th November, 1914, Cyprus was formally annexed to the British Crown. The inhabitants were given the opportunity to become British subjects; this was seized with enthusiasm by the Greek-speaking Cypriots and accepted without demur by the majority of their Turkish-speaking compatriots. This annexation was recognised by Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923. The island was elevated to the status of a Colony on 1st May, 1925.

## THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

### DANGER SPOTS OF THE WORLD

**I**T is a curious coincidence that the two greatest dangers to the peace of the World to-day should be caused by a breakaway from the domination of the Kremlin in mid-Europe concurrently with a further vast expansion of Communist influence in the Far East. The firm stand for national sovereignty by Yugoslavia, under the leadership of Marshal Tito, is in marked contrast to the collapse of the so-called "Nationalist" régime in China under Marshal Chiang Kai-shek. Yet each of these events may, all too easily, give rise to further aggression by Russia.

Stalin, like Hitler, dare not lose "face" by a withdrawal—whether diplomatic or strategic, and it is this which is liable to land him and his caucus in a position where they must pursue their aggressive policy even to a point where it may become intolerable to freedom-loving nations. Then history will repeat itself, and war will be inevitable. These are the realities of the World situation to-day, which those nations must face and be prepared to meet, otherwise they will be taken unawares and, once again, have to fight for their lives against desperate odds.

### THE RUSSO-YUGOSLAV DUEL

The Cominform, which has become a kind of Eastern Union Council for the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, threw down the gauntlet to Tito's Yugoslavia in June of last year when it formally expelled that Country from its membership. The reasons given for this expulsion were a conglomeration of accusations which included "deviation" from true Marxism-Leninism on the principal questions of foreign and internal policy and "pursuing a hateful policy towards the Soviet Union." The villains of the piece were declared to be Marshal Tito, M. Kardelj (Vice-Premier), and General Rankovitch (Minister of the Interior).

The real reason for this break was made apparent in a speech by Tito to the Yugoslav National Assembly on 27th December, 1948, from which it was clear that the Kremlin violently objected to his 5-year programme aiming at the industrialization of the Country. Tito alluded to "responsible men" in "certain countries of the people's democracy" making reproachful statements intimating that Yugoslavia ought to "continue only to sow our fields—and, moreover, in the most primitive way"—and to supply raw materials for friendly countries which have a strong industry of their own. He pointed out that his Country had "so much iron ore that we can build up a strong heavy industry of our own and still have a surplus left to give to other countries in exchange for those products we need. . . . The same applies to our copper. Why should we not process our copper . . . and export finished copper goods?" He also referred to bauxite, which they had in great quantities, and other ores, sufficient of which were available to meet their own needs and to give to friends who would help to mechanize and modernize their mines and to build up their heavy industry. He added significantly, "if our allies . . . refuse to help us in this respect, if they violate agreements and commitments which they concluded with us, then we shall have to sell our raw materials elsewhere, even if be to capitalist countries, so that we may buy the machinery we need. . . ." This was, of course, open mutiny against Moscow's dictatorship, made worse by rank heresy to the Russian version of the Communist creed. No wonder Tito and his government have been outlawed from the Comintern.

As dutiful subjects, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have followed Russia's lead and have denounced their treaties of friendship and cancelled their trade agreements with Yugoslavia. Since then, every other kind of pressure short of war has been put on the delinquent, aimed at the overthrow of Tito and his government: propaganda by wireless and in the Russian and the mid-European press; violent Notes from Moscow; troop movements on the frontier; and threats to Macedonia. These have only resulted in a toughening of Tito's resistance and a marked increase in the nationalistic attitude of Yugoslavia; moreover, the trend towards closer relation with the Western Powers, which has automatically come about, refutes the contention of Stalin that Communism and Capitalism cannot exist in the same world—for Tito still adheres to his own brand of Communism.

There can be no doubt about the serious nature of this duel. For the Soviet government it is a challenge to their prestige and they see in the defection of a nation, which they expected to remain an obedient satellite, not only a rift in the iron curtain but, as an industrialized State with valuable raw materials, even a potential military menace, for it must never be forgotten that fear is the basis of the outlook and policy of the Kremlin.

To Yugoslavia it is a serious matter to have to engage in a psychological war and an economic war with all her neighbours except Greece, with Russia using all her influence to egg them on in their vilification and aggression.

In the Western World the situation must cause serious anxiety to the Atlantic Pact nations, for they may have to decide what they are going to do if Yugoslavia is attacked. Whether her subjugation were effected through the medium of one or more Soviet satellites or by the direct assault of Russia with all facilities afforded by them, the results would be the same—the enhanced prestige in Europe generally of the dictatorship in Moscow and the establishing of Russian airfields and naval bases in Yugoslavia, which would seriously threaten France and Italy and the safe passage of shipping through the Mediterranean.

The first trial of strength between the Communist caucus and the Free Nations over the future of Yugoslavia came when, despite the violent and virulent objections of the Soviet representative, the General Assembly of the United Nations, on 20th October, elected that Country to a vacancy on the Security Council. Mr. Vyshinsky declared that the election would not be recognized by Eastern Europe, that it was a "new violation of the Charter," and that it undermined the very basis of co-operation in the United Nations. Nevertheless, it must be obvious now to the Kremlin that they are not going to have things all their own way in this matter and will have to "watch their step" before attempting any new aggression in Europe.

### THE RED MENACE IN THE FAR EAST

What used to be known as the "Yellow Peril" has become the "Red Menace" in the Far East. The Communist Chinese forces continue to overrun the Country and the remnants of the Nationalist Government flit from pillar to post in a vain endeavour to maintain some sort of status.

On the evening of 14th October, the vanguard of General Lin Piao's 4th Field Army entered Canton, followed the next morning by the main body. There was practically no resistance and little disturbance among the civil population. The Chinese National Government had already announced their withdrawal and that it would function from Chung-King, which is described as being now the "co-capital"

with Formosa. This further retreat to a remote town in Western China may well prove a last stand before a complete exodus from the mainland to the island where Marshal Chiang Kai-shek has already taken refuge. It remains to be seen whether, in due course, the Communist high command will attempt an assault by sea and air on Formosa; if they do, the conduct of the operations and its results should be piquant.

The outstanding fact in this steady advance South by the Red forces, so far as we are concerned, is that they are now established on the frontier of a British Colony—Hong Kong, which our Government have expressed their firm determination to protect. Will the new Communist government be content to leave things as they are, or will they try to wrest Hong Kong from us, either by frontal attack or internal eruption? That is the crux of the situation which confronts us, and on the outcome of which will depend the whole of British prestige and security in the Far East.

There can be no doubt that Russia would dearly like to use China as a battering ram to push her chief obstructors in the West from their outposts in the Far East. If Communist infiltration could repeat the initial military successes of Japan and consolidate them, it might mean another huge slice of the World in the power of Moscow.

On the other hand, it remains to be seen whether the new Chinese government will be quite the obedient servants of the Kremlin that those nearer home are. As mentioned in the August JOURNAL, Mao Tze-tung—chairman of "the central People's Government of the People's Republic of China," has admitted that if China is to become an industrialized nation and economically independent this can only be done by trading with the "imperialist" Powers. As a corollary, those Powers must have security for the loading and discharging of their merchant ships.

Hitherto, Shanghai has, of course, been the greatest trading port, not only in China but in the whole of the Far East; but Hong Kong is well placed geographically and Communist China may find it more profitable to let well alone there and not challenge a situation which provides them with a ready-made link for trading with one of their most important customers. If there is any doubt about the wisdom of this course, the strong reinforcements lately made to the British garrison should be a deciding factor.

The diplomatic situation *vis-à-vis* the new Chinese government is necessarily still rather delicate. Russia, naturally, hastened to recognize it, and on 2nd October, broke off relations with the Nationalists and formally accepted the proposal of the "People's Republic" for the exchange of Ambassadors. This was followed by an influx of Russian advisers and technicians.

For reasons of "face" the Communist government would be glad to get British and American recognition; but Dr. Evatt—Australia's Minister for External Affairs, summed up the situation when he said, on 25th October, that while they were in accord with Britain and the United States in wishing to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese people, recognition could not be granted until specific assurances had been given that the territorial integrity of neighbouring countries, notably Hong Kong, would be respected and that the new China would discharge all international obligations.

The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs—Mr. Pearson, was even more pointed when, on the same day, he said that before the new government could be recognized, it must be shown to be independent of external control by any



other State, and must exercise effective control over the territory claimed, which must be well defined.

## THE RECONSTITUTION OF GERMANY

### A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE WEST

The foundations of a Federal Government and Provisional Constitution for Western Germany were laid in June, 1948, when a Six-Power Agreement by Britain, France and the United States—the occupying Powers, and Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg authorized the Military Governors to draw up a Constitution, to be put to the German people in a referendum; concurrently elections for the new Government would take place in each *Land*. A German Parliamentary Council, authorized by this Agreement, started work on the draft of a Basic Law (Provisional Constitution) for a German Federal Republic, on 1st September, 1948.

After much internal disagreement and Communist obstruction, and some disputes with the Allied authorities, the adoption of this Basic Law was ratified by the *Länder* governments and accepted by the Allied Military Governors in May, 1949, the Federal Republic of Western Germany being formally proclaimed at Bonn on 23rd May.

Elections for the first *Bundestag* of the Federal Republic took place in orderly fashion on 14th August last. Of the total electorate of 31,179,422, 78.5 per cent. voted. Of the ten parties represented, the Christian Democratic Union polled the greatest number of votes (31.01 per cent.) and secured 139 out of 402 seats; (the Social Democrats were next (29.22 per cent.) with 131 seats; the Communists (5.73 per cent.) secured only 15 seats. The *Magistrat* of Western Berlin elected eight observers, who will sit in the *Bundestag*, but without voting powers.

The Basic Law is in the nature of a Provisional Constitution pending a definite Constitution for the whole of Germany, which the obstruction of the Soviet Union has prevented up to date. The Law provided for two Houses of Parliament (the *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat*) and for a Federal President, a Chancellor, and a Cabinet. The text, consisting of 146 Articles, was published in Bonn on 5th May. These articles start by asserting the fundamental freedom of man, which it is obligatory on the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary to safeguard. No one may be deprived of his German citizenship or extradited to a foreign country.

### THE NATIONAL FLAG

The flag of the Federal Republic of Germany is black, red and gold—equal horizontal stripes—i.e., the same as that of the former Weimar Republic.

### THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT

The Parliament of the Republic met for the first time on 7th September. The inaugural sessions of both Houses were attended by members of the Allied High Commission, including General Sir Brian Robertson.

On 12th September, Professor Heuss was elected President—the first to occupy that office since the death of Field-Marshal Hindenburg, after which it was abolished by Hitler.

A week later, the Lower House elected Dr. Adenauer Chancellor of the Republic. He is the leader of the largest Parliamentary party.

## THE OCCUPYING AUTHORITIES

Although the Basic Law provides Western Germany with a very large measure of self-government, it does not mean the abrogation of all authority by the three Occupying Powers. It is specifically laid down that "the powers vested in the Federation by the Constitution shall be subject to the provisions of the Occupation Statute"; also that the Federation's very wide powers in the administrative field shall be carefully scrutinized by the Allied High Commission "to ensure that they do not lead to excessive concentration of authority." The police powers provided for by the Constitution are subject to the "specific approval" of the occupying authorities.

## AN EASTERN GERMAN GOVERNMENT

The establishment of a separate government in Western Germany was a severe blow to the policy of the Soviet Government; yet it was that policy which, as *The Times* put it, brought about "the very thing they least wanted and most feared." While paying much lip service to the agreement between the former Allies that German unity should be restored, they have made this impossible by their intransigent attitude towards all attempts by the three Foreign Ministers to bring it about. It is typical of Russian propaganda that they should now be proclaiming loudly that the Western Powers are responsible for "splitting Germany."

Confronted with a *fait accompli*, however, the Soviet Government were forced to take drastic action to save "face," so they decided to set up an Eastern German Government which would be given at least a façade of freedom and authority denied to the Western Government. Aided and abetted by the Russian authorities, the so-called "German People's Council" proclaimed itself in Berlin, on 7th October, to be the *Volkskammer*, or Lower House of the Parliament of the new "German Democratic Republic." This high-sounding title savours strongly of the Communist misuse of the adjective, for there is not, and cannot be under the existing constitution of this Parliament, anything "democratic" about the government of Eastern Germany. No elections have taken place or are to take place until October, 1950. Even then, they may be expected to follow the farcical lines of those to the Congress, held in May last. It is worth noting some of the devices used to secure the results required by the German Communists as these are typical of the means employed to ensure the Soviet domination of suppressed peoples and States.

Voters were presented with a single list of candidates of which half were Communists; but in order to ensure a Communist majority in the Congress, further vacancies were allotted to Communist-controlled organizations and new puppet parties. In order to secure some show of popularity by a good percentage of the electorate, the ballot papers were worded: "I am in favour of German unity and a just peace treaty, I therefore vote for the following . . ." Nevertheless, when the votes were being counted, it was soon apparent that the "Noes" and deliberately spoilt papers would upset the desired result. Orders were therefore given that all blank or spoilt papers should be added to the affirmative votes. Even then further gerrymandering went on before the final count was announced. Such is the mandate of this puppet government of Eastern Germany.

It is, of course, the Russian policy to try to offset the attractions of the Bonn Parliament by pretending that the Eastern Government will be free from foreign tutelage. According to the official newspaper of the Soviet military administration, the new Government will be an "independent German Government responsible to

the German people and not to any High Commissioners," and its activities will "not be curbed by an occupation of uncertain duration"; a peace treaty will be concluded in accordance with the Potsdam agreements; and "after this peace treaty its territory will be free of occupation troops."

Such is the soothing syrup served out from the Kremlin to their side of Germany. But already it is becoming obvious that "things are not really what they seem." The first President of this "Democratic Republic" is Herr Pieck—a dyed-in-the-wool, Russian-trained Communist. The Cabinet is—to quote *The Times* Berlin Correspondent—"little more than a gathering together of the German organizations already created by the Russians for the administration of their zone." But, most important of all to the maintenance of Russo-Communist control of Eastern Germany, is the powerful political police (K.5) and para-military police forces, known to be well armed and already working on the old *Gestapo* lines. The new Constitution gives little guarantee of individual liberty to the Eastern Germans.

All this may savour more of the political than the military aspect of Germany to-day; but, where Russia is concerned, the two are inseparable. Her main object is to maintain or extend the protective barrier of the Communist Iron Curtain, and it may be taken for granted that unless Eastern Germany remains a subservient satellite, like the other fringes of the Curtain, it will not be given even the spurious and specious "freedom" that it has been promised, much less will it be allowed to join hands with Western Germany as a united and truly democratic State.

#### SYRIA

Early on 14th August, Marshal Husni Zaim, the Syrian President, and Dr. Mohsen Berazi, his Prime Minister, were arrested by a group of Army officers led by Colonel Sami Hinnawi, summarily tried by a tribunal of officers sitting as a Supreme War Council, sentenced to death, and executed. At the same time a number of officers and civilians of the Zaim administration were taken into custody, a curfew and censorship imposed, and the frontier closed, though Damascus and other towns remained quiet.

The Supreme War Council, headed by Colonel Hinnawi, then issued a series of proclamations announcing the *coup* by the Army, giving the reasons for its action, and stating that the military authorities had assumed power temporarily and would relinquish it to sincere and loyal political leaders. The proclamations accused Marshal Zaim (who had seized power by a *coup d'état* on 30th March) of having abused his authority, wasted public money, falsified laws, and restricted personal freedom. It was announced on the same day that the Supreme War Council had asked the political parties which had been suspended after Marshal Zaim had seized power to form a national administration, and that Hashem Attasi Pasha had been invited to form such a government.

On 15th August, control was handed over to Hashem Attasi Pasha, who had meanwhile formed a Cabinet, and Colonel Hinnawi stated that he was returning to the Army.

On 17th August, all the restrictions which were imposed after the *coup* on 14th August were lifted.

## CORRESPONDENCE

(Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the JOURNAL or which are of general interest to the Services. Correspondents are requested to put their views as concisely as possible, but publication of letters will be dependent on the space available in each number of the JOURNAL.—EDITOR.)

### THE STILWELL PAPERS

To the Editor of the R.U.S.I. Journal.

SIR,—It would be interesting to know the basis of your reviewer's remarks on Marlborough's bitter feelings towards his Dutch allies which "paled into insignificance" beside the relations between Stilwell and the Chinese. That Marlborough had ample cause for bitterness is, I think, disputed by few except the high Tories and some Dutch, but his repeated and persistent refusal himself to show chagrin or annoyance—even in any marked degree in his private correspondence—had, I understand, long been remarked as one of his most striking attributes. It was partly this patience, which enabled him in the long run to keep the allies in harness, that moved Earl Wavell to give him pride of place among the great captains—for a captain whose diplomacy is as maladroit as Vinegar Joe's will remain one of the minor figures of history, no matter how acute on any subject his private diagnosis may be.

Placidity of bearing and charm of manner were two outstanding characteristics which John Churchill retained to the very end; even when worst harried by his own Country's politicians, the most extreme provocation only roused in him a flicker of expressed annoyance.

R. E. SCULLER, Captain,

5th October, 1949.

Royal Signals.

SIR,—I entirely agree with Captain Sculler's remarks on the difference between a "Great Captain" such as Marlborough, and a "minor figure" such as General Stilwell. The latter never made any attempt to conceal his bitterness; Marlborough succeeded almost entirely in hiding his feelings.

My intention was simply to indicate that Stilwell had infinitely less cause for bitterness than Marlborough. Perhaps my wording was somewhat obscure.

But even a Great Captain has feelings, however much he may conceal them; Marlborough himself, in an official despatch, wrote: "It is very mortifying to find much more obstruction from friends than from enemies"—a remark strangely reminiscent of some of Stilwell's diatribes, but made with far more restraint and justification.

YOUR REVIEWER.

11th October, 1949.

### THE ADMINISTRATION INCUBUS

SIR,—The excellent article by Major H. G. Croly on "The Administration Incubus" in the JOURNAL of August, 1949, contains matter which will be endorsed by all serving regimental officers. With the present-day standard of N.C.O.s generally, both senior and junior, and with the continual turn-over in personnel, it is imperative that regimental officers devote their main, if not their entire, energies towards the training and perfection of their troops. But how many officers to-day, of the rank of Major or Captain and even of Subaltern can say that this is done, or is possible, due to one cause or another?

Major Croly omits, no doubt through lack of space, mention of one of the greatest of "time-consumers"—the financial aspect of regimental life. All units have at least three accounts to maintain—those of the President of Regimental Institute, the Officers' Mess and the Sergeants' Mess. In addition to these is added the responsibility for the pay of the soldier and the Imprest Account.



In many cases P.R.I.—a duty normally fulfilled with ease in the past by the unit second-in-command—has assumed such proportions that a special office, with an officer and staff, has had to be set up by many units, whilst the sight of an officer struggling with accounts at the end of each quarter, and often during the quarter, is all too common. Problems and complications arising from the pay of the soldier have, since the outbreak of the recent war, assumed even greater proportions and again most units have been forced to establish a special organization under an officer to devote its full-time energies towards dealing with these problems and complications.

Regimental accounts require Audit Boards which, though an undoubted necessity, often result in as big a waste of the officer's time as petty Courts of Inquiry due to lack of experience and the "know-how" of both the account holder and the court itself.

To relieve this burden from the regimental officer would it not be more economical in man hours, and in the national interest, to include as part of each major unit an Accountant Officer from the Royal Army Pay Corps who would, in addition to running the financial side of regimental life, be able to act as an adviser to the Commanding Officer on all matters financial, both at home and abroad? I hasten to add that the responsibility of an officer to see that the troops under his command received their correct entitlement of pay would remain unchanged.

With this financial expert at hand, would not the soldier's pay and the regimental accounts be more efficiently run, and would not most Paymasters—Regimental, District and Overseas, welcome such an appointment with open arms?

B. R. JOHNSTON, *Captain,*

*Royal Tank Regiment.*

28th September, 1949.

## GENERAL SERVICE NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE KING

The King received the Chiefs of Staff of the United States of America, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom on 3rd August.

### NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENCE

**VISIT OF THE UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.**—The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff arrived in London early in August to discuss organization for defence under the North Atlantic Treaty. In addition to meeting the British Chiefs of Staff, they met those of Denmark and Norway during their stay in England. Subsequently they visited Paris.

**INITIAL MEETING OF THE DEFENCE COMMITTEE.**—The first meeting of the Defence Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty countries was held in the Pentagon, at Washington, on 5th October. Mr. Louis Johnson, United States Secretary for Defence, was elected first chairman of the Committee.

Among others present were Mr. A. V. Alexander, Minister of Defence, and Air Marshal Sir William Elliott, Senior Service representative at the Ministry of Defence; Mr. Brooke Claxton, Canadian Minister of National Defence; M. Albert Deveze, Belgian Minister of National Defence; Hr. Rasmus Hansen, Danish Minister of Defence; M. Paul Ramadier, French Minister of National Defence; Mr. J. W. F. Schokking, Netherlands Minister of War and Navy; Hr. Jens Christian Hauge, Norwegian Minister of Defence; and Signor Vandolfo Pacciardi, Italian Minister of Defence.

### EXERCISES IN GERMANY

**EXERCISE IN SOLTAU TRAINING AREA.**—An interesting exercise took place from 24th to 28th July in the Soltau training area. The troops taking part were a Danish Brigade Group, a Norwegian Brigade Group and an Armoured Car Squadron, and an Infantry Battalion of the 7th Armoured Division. Neutral Signals were supplied by Headquarters, B.A.O.R.

**EXERCISE *Agility 1*.**—This exercise, which ended during the first week in October, was a preliminary to Exercise *Agility 2*. The troops taking part were the 7th Armoured Division, 2 Group, Royal Air Force and the 4th Belgian Brigade Group.

**EXERCISE *Agility 2*.**—Troops taking part in this exercise, which took place in the Paderhorn area from 9th to 14th October, were the 2nd British Infantry Division, the 7th Armoured Brigade Group, 2 Group, Royal Air Force, the 7th Belgian Brigade Group and United States, French and Norwegian contingents. Two Royal Navy squadrons—one of Fireflies and one of Furies, were included in the air forces.

The Exercise included a night withdrawal, the hasty occupation of a defensive position, counter attacks, and the launching of attacks and exploitation.

The object of *Agility 2* for the Army was to give Commanders and Staffs and all officers and other ranks experience of their role in a large formation under conditions similar to war.

In the air, the object was to practice the control and operation of aircraft in interception missions, fighter ground attack missions in support of land forces, light bomber tactical missions in support of land forces and reconnaissance missions.

The need for ground and air forces to work as one and for the troops to realize the dangers from the air, were points on which particular stress was laid.

**CONCENTRATION AND MARCH PAST.**—On 8th October, the troops taking part in *Agility 2* concentrated in the area North of Sennelager to facilitate inspection of the

composition, weapons and equipment of the formations taking part. There was a march past after the concentration at which the Secretary of State for War—Mr. Shinwell, took the Salute.

### STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES

The sixth of the quarterly statements published by the Ministry of Defence on 23rd August, showed that the strength of the armed forces on 1st July, 1949, was 769,900 compared with 785,000 on 1st April. The total (which included National Service men, the Women's Auxiliary Services, nurses and V.A.D.s) was made up as follows:—

|                     |         |
|---------------------|---------|
| Royal Navy...       | 144,000 |
| Army ...            | 406,000 |
| Royal Air Force ... | 219,900 |

The distribution of National Service men was:—

|                     |         |
|---------------------|---------|
| Royal Navy...       | 14,900  |
| Army ...            | 211,200 |
| Royal Air Force ... | 90,900  |

The total strength of the Auxiliary and Territorial forces on 1st July was 93,900 (88,400 on 1st April) made up as follows:—

|                                          |        |
|------------------------------------------|--------|
| R.N.V.R. ...                             | 4,500  |
| R.M.F.V.R. ...                           | 400    |
| Territorial Army and W.R.A.C. (T.A.) ... | 77,500 |
| R.A.F.V.R. ...                           | 6,600  |
| R.Aux.A.F. ...                           | 4,900  |

The total number of civilians directly employed on work for the Forces on 1st July was 238,700.

### COMMANDANT OF THE IMPERIAL DEFENCE COLLEGE

Vice-Admiral Sir Charles S. Daniel, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., has been appointed Commandant of the Imperial Defence College in succession to Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C. He took up his new duties on 19th September.

### DEMONSTRATION OF COMBINED OPERATION TECHNIQUE

At Eastney, at the end of September, the Amphibious School, maintained by the Portsmouth Group of the Royal Marines, staged demonstrations of the methods of Combined Operations for the benefit of officers studying at the Army Staff College, and others.

### ROYAL TOURNAMENT

A profit of £30,000 was made at the Royal Tournament this year, and this has been handed to Service charities. The profit many years ago was £500. Until now the largest profit has been £27,000.

About 300,000 people saw this year's performances, and the box office was closed many weeks before the tournament began. The tournament will move next year to Earls Court, where more seats will be available. It will be held from 7th to 24th June.

### DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

#### NEW ZEALAND

**COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING.**—The national referendum held on 3rd August resulted in an overwhelming majority in favour of the Government's proposals to institute compulsory military training in New Zealand. The final returns were:—In favour, 533,016; against, 152,443; majority, 380,573.

**MILITARY TRAINING BILL AND TRAINING PLANS.**—It was reported from Wellington on 7th October that the Military Training Bill has been passed by the New Zealand

House of Representatives, and Mr. Jones, Minister of Defence, has announced plans for the inauguration of the compulsory training scheme.

The first camp will be held next May. Nine hundred officers have been selected out of the 1,200 who will be required to take charge of the Territorial Force, which will come into being in 1951 as the men complete their recruit training. Two thousand non-commissioned officers are needed and more than 600 well-trained men have been selected. The Air Force will take 750 trainees each year, and recruits for naval training will be posted to the R.N.Z.N.V.R.

#### EAST AFRICA

A report from Nairobi, dated 3rd August, published in *The Times* of 4th August, stated that taking advantage of the visit of the Commander-in-Chief East Indies Station, the East Africa High Commission was meeting and would begin on 4th August with a review of defence questions.

The Governors of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda constitute the High Commission, but also present for the defence talks would be the British Resident in Zanzibar, the General Officer Commanding East Africa and the Air Officer Commanding.

The report pointed out that recent developments have been the approval of an East African Naval Force, the draft legislation for which was published on 3rd August, which will embrace all four territories and consist of both regular full-time men and part-time volunteers; and the final arrangements to bring into being again the "Kenya Regiment," an all-European Unit to be recruited on a voluntary basis to provide training for the leadership of African battalions in an emergency. The lack of an organization similar to the "Kenya Regiment" for the European residents of Tanganyika and Uganda was also mentioned.

The report added that it was understood that both the military and air Service Chiefs would advise the conference on their plans and special needs in relation to co-ordinated East African defence arrangements.

#### HONG KONG

On 1st October the Ministry of Defence announced the appointment of Lieut.-General Sir F. C. Robert Mansergh as Commander British Forces, Hong Kong, in place of Lieut.-General F. W. Festing who has had to return to the United Kingdom because of ill health.

#### FOREIGN

##### IRAQ

It was reported in *The Times* of 3rd August that test pumping of crude oil has begun on the Iraq Petroleum Company's new 16-inch duplicate line from the Kirkuk field to Tripoli, the refinery centre in the Lebanon. The oil was not being pumped direct from the field but from storage tanks at K.3 (Haditha) where the pipelines to Haifa and Tripoli bifurcate. Full utilization of the new line, which duplicates the original 12-inch line, will be made this year.

##### NORWAY

General Ole Berg, Chief of the Norwegian Combined Defence Staff, visited this Country for 10 days at the end of September as the guest of the Government. He was accompanied by Colonel A. R. Pran, Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian Army, Colonel B. Christopherson, Commandant Designate of the Norwegian Staff College, Major H. F. Zeiner Gundersen, and Lieutenant-Colonel K. G. Treseder, British Military Attaché in Oslo.

On 21st September, General Berg visited Air Marshal Sir William Elliot, Chief Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence; Mr. Henderson, Secretary of State for Air, and Air Marshal Sir Hugh Walmsley, Deputy Chief of Air Staff at the Air Ministry; Mr. Shinwell, Secretary of State for War, at the War Office; and Lord Hall, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser, at the Admiralty.



On 23rd September General Berg, with members of his staff, visited the Naval Gunnery School—H.M.S. "Excellent"—at Portsmouth. They also saw a demonstration shoot at the Fraser gunnery range at Eastney, and went to H.M.S. "Dolphin," the submarine depot.

### TURKEY

It was reported in *The Times* on 6th September, that large-scale manoeuvres by the Turkish Army and Air Force were taking place from 6th to 13th September. President İnönü accompanied by his Chief of the General Staff, and senior officers of both forces, were to follow the operations. British and American officers belonging to the Military Missions were attending.

### UNITED STATES

**CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.**—General Omar Bradley, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, has been appointed the first statutory chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—a post created under the Military Unification Act signed by President Truman on 10th August.

**DIRECTOR OF MILITARY AID PROGRAMME.**—It was announced from the White House on 7th October that the President had nominated Mr. James Bruce, formerly United States Ambassador in Argentina, to be director of the foreign military assistance programme.

**COMMANDANT IN BERLIN.**—Major-General Maxwell D. Taylor, until now Chief of Staff of the United States forces in Germany, has been appointed American commandant in Berlin in succession to Brigadier-General Howley. General Taylor, unlike General Howley, is also in command of the United States garrison. In this way Mr. John McCloy, the American High Commissioner-designate and Military Governor, has sought to underline the importance which is attached to Berlin.

**JOINT EXERCISE.**—A joint Exercise (Exercise "Harvest") took place in the United States Occupation Zone of Germany during the period 6th to 17th September. Units of the United States Navy, Army and Air Force took part. Opposing ground forces consisted of the 1st United States Infantry Division and an enemy ("Aggressor") represented by the United States Constabulary. The major portion of the land action took place in the vicinity of Fulda and in the Nuremberg-Grafenwohr-Munich area.

**ARMED SERVICES PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT.**—Hitherto, each of the Services has had their own Public Relations Department. The Air Force alone had 400 Press representatives whose job it was to boost their own Service. These Departments have now been amalgamated into the Armed Services Public Relations Department, which is intended to serve all three Arms without prejudice.

**INCREASED PAY FOR ALL SERVICES.**—The Armed Forces Career Compensation Bill which, after many months, has finally passed the Senate, raises the pay of all members of the Services by approximately 25 to 30 per cent.

**SOUTH KOREA MILITARY MISSION.**—Although the last United States occupation forces left Korea on 28th June, a military mission of 500 officers and men remained behind to advise the South Korean Army on defence.

### BERTRAND STEWART PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

**SUBJECT FOR 1950.**—The subject for 1950 is:—

"Surprise is among the most potent factors in war."

What is the real meaning of this cliché, and to what extent is it true? What is surprise, and how is it brought about? Compare the deliberate efforts to achieve surprise employed by Napoleon, Von Moltke and Montgomery. In what essential did their methods differ, and what will be the future trends in the technique in achieving military surprise?

**RULES OF THE COMPETITION.**—Copies of the Rules for this Competition can be obtained from the Editor of *The Army Quarterly*, Little New Street, London, E.C.4.

KING EDWARD VII HOSPITAL FOR OFFICERS  
SISTER AGNES FOUNDER

This Hospital was founded in 1899 by Miss Agnes Keyser (Sister Agnes) at her house in Grosvenor Crescent, London, for officers wounded in the South African War. King Edward VII gave it his name and took a great personal interest in it; he was its first Patron. During the forty years up to 1940, thousands of officers of the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force were admitted as patients.

In 1941 Grosvenor Crescent was badly bombed and the Hospital had to be closed. Sister Agnes died a few months later.

On 15th October, 1948, the Hospital was reopened by Her Majesty Queen Mary at Beaumont House, Beaumont Street, London, W.1. It is now open to all regular officers, serving or retired, and to officers who held temporary or emergency Commissions in either of the 1914-18 and 1939-45 Wars. There are 27 beds, 10 of them in multiple wards and the remainder in single rooms.

The standard of nursing and maintenance is very high, yet the cost of beds is extremely moderate—far less than in any comparable institution in London. The ordinary charge for a single room is at present ten guineas a week. The beds in the multiple wards are cheaper, the present rate being seven guineas a week. The extra charges for physiotherapy, X-Ray, etc., are kept at a minimum. A serving officer of the regular forces has certain privileges under the Royal Charter of Incorporation—i.e., he can obtain a free bed in a multiple ward. Patients make their own arrangements for the payment of their physicians and surgeons. A Medical Officer is attached to the Hospital, and any officer can obtain occasional advice from him free of charge.

The Hospital takes acute surgical and medical cases only. Patients who are not really ill cannot be admitted—e.g., officers wishing to convalesce or in need of a room for a "rest."

The Hospital relies for a considerable portion of its income on annual subscriptions from individual officers and from units of the three Services. At present there are about 6,000 individual subscribers. The minimum subscription for all new individual subscribers is £1 a year. Many old subscribers pay much less than this, and the Council of the Hospital is always grateful if any old subscriber decides to increase his subscription to the rate at present in force. The Hospital has been disclaimed by the Minister of Health and receives no assistance of any sort from the Government. The costs of running a hospital of this class at the present time are very heavy and many more subscribers are required.

The Council has as its object the provision of accommodation to subscribers at the lowest possible cost to the patient. The charges made in the Hospital are kept constantly under review, and it is hoped that if the number of subscribers substantially increases it will be possible to reduce the fees. Any officer or unit wishing to subscribe is asked to apply for a banker's order form to the House Governor, Beaumont House, Beaumont Street, London, W.1. Donations are also very gratefully received.

## NAVY NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE KING

The following officers have been appointed as Naval Aides-de-Camp to the King from 9th July, 1949 :—

Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, C.B., D.S.O., R.N., in place of Captain F. R. Parham, D.S.O., R.N., promoted to Flag Rank.

Captain J. Terry, C.B.E., M.V.O., R.N., in place of Captain C. A. E. Stanfield, R.N., placed on the Retired List.

Captain J. P. Wright, D.S.O., R.N., in place of Captain P. V. McLaughlin, D.S.O., R.N., promoted to Flag Rank.

Captain H. W. Williams, R.N., in place of Captain A. C. Chapman, C.B.E., R.N., placed on the Retired List.

Captain R. M. J. Hutton, C.B.E., D.S.O., R.N., in place of Captain C. T. Addis, D.S.O., R.N., placed on the Retired List.

Captain S. H. Paton, C.B.E., R.N., in place of Captain R. M. Dick, C.B.E., D.S.C., R.N., promoted to Flag Rank.

Captain L. A. K. Boswell, D.S.O., R.N., in place of Captain S. M. Raw, C.B.E., R.N., promoted to Flag Rank.

Captain I. M. R. Campbell, D.S.O., R.N., in place of Captain E. M. C. Abel Smith, C.V.O., R.N., promoted to Flag Rank.

The Rev. R. T. Venn, M.A., Chaplain, R.N., has been appointed Honorary Chaplain to the King in succession to the Rev. H. E. Gick, B.A., K.H.Ch., R.N., placed on the Retired List, 31st July, 1949.

#### THE DUKE OF EDINBURGH

On 4th August, it was announced in Naval Appointments that H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh had been appointed to H.M.S. "Chequers," leader of the First Destroyer Flotilla, Mediterranean Fleet, as First Lieutenant, to date 18th October, 1949.

The "Chequers" is commanded by Captain J. E. H. McBeath, R.N.

#### BOARD OF ADMIRALTY

**FIRST LORD.**—The First Lord of the Admiralty, Viscount Hall, accompanied by his Naval Secretary, Rear-Admiral P. B. R. W. William-Powlett, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., and the Secretary of the Admiralty, Sir John G. Lang, K.C.B., left Northolt by air on 25th July to visit ships of the Mediterranean Fleet and Naval Establishments at Malta, returning on 8th August.

**FIRST SEA LORD.**—The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser of North Cape, G.C.B., K.B.E., visited the R.N. Air Station, Yeovilton, on 24th September to open an Air Display.

**THIRD SEA LORD.**—The Third Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral M. M. Denny, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., with the Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet, Vice-Admiral (E) Sir Denys C. Ford, K.C.B., C.B.E., made a series of visits to Tyneside shipbuilding and engineering firms on 10th and 11th August.

**FIFTH SEA LORD.**—The Fifth Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral Sir George E. Creasy, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., on 14th September, opened the Ilchester housing estate on which fifty houses are being built for personnel of the R.N. Air Station at Yeovilton, Somerset.

## FLAG APPOINTMENTS

On 3rd August, the Minister of Defence announced that Vice-Admiral Sir Charles S. Daniel, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., would be Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, in succession to Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.

On 8th August, the Admiralty announced the appointment of Rear-Admiral A. Day, C.B.E., D.S.O., to be Flag Officer Commanding British Naval Forces in Germany, and Chief British Naval Representative in Allied Control Commission, in succession to Rear-Admiral S. H. T. Arliss, C.B., D.S.O., to date 17th August, 1949.

On 17th August, it was announced that Rear-Admiral F. R. Parham, C.B.E., D.S.O., was to be Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, in succession to Rear-Admiral Sir William G. Agnew, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O. and Bar, to date 21st October, 1949.

C.-IN-C. PLYMOUTH.—Admiral Sir Rhoderick R. McGrigor, K.C.B., D.S.O., is to be Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth, in succession to Admiral Sir Robert L. Burnett, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., to date March, 1950.

C.-IN-C. HOME FLEET.—Admiral Sir Philip L. Vian, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O. and two Bars, is to be Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, in succession to Admiral Sir Rhoderick R. McGrigor, to date January, 1950.

F.O.C. AUSTRALIAN FLEET.—Rear-Admiral J. A. S. Eccles, C.B.E., has been lent to the Royal Australian Navy, as from 18th August, 1949, as Flag Officer Commanding His Majesty's Australian Fleet, in succession to Rear-Admiral H. B. Farncomb, C.B., D.S.O., M.V.O., Royal Australian Navy, to date about 1st October, 1949.

The following announcements were made on 14th October :—

CHIEF OF STAFF, HOME FLEET.—Rear-Admiral C. C. Hughes-Hallett, C.B.E., to be Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, in succession to Captain (Commodore, First Class) W. W. Davis, D.S.O., R.N.; the appointment to take effect in January, 1950.

FAR EAST STATION.—Rear-Admiral W. G. Andrewes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., to be Flag Officer Commanding, 5th Cruiser Squadron, and Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station, in succession to Vice-Admiral A. C. G. Madden, C.B., C.B.E.; the appointment to take effect in January, 1950.

FLAG OFFICER (SUBMARINES).—Rear-Admiral S. M. Raw, C.B.E., to be Flag Officer (Submarines), in succession to Rear-Admiral G. Grantham, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.; the appointment to take effect in January, 1950.

The following announcements were made on 20th October :—

FOURTH SEA LORD.—The King has approved the appointment of Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.S.O., to be a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty, Fourth Sea Lord and Chief of Supplies and Transport, in succession to Vice-Admiral H. A. Packer, C.B., C.B.E., to date June, 1950.

DEVONPORT DOCKYARD.—Rear-Admiral P. K. Enright, C.B., C.B.E., to be Admiral-Superintendent, H.M. Dockyard, Devonport, in succession to Vice-Admiral R. S. G. Nicholson, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., to date 16th February, 1950.

ORDNANCE BOARD.—Rear-Admiral P. V. McLaughlin, D.S.O., to be Senior Naval Member and Vice-President (Naval) of the Ordnance Board, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir Harold R. G. Kinahan, K.B.E., C.B., to date 27th February, 1950.

FLAG OFFICER, MALAYA.—Rear-Admiral H. W. Faulkner, C.B.E., D.S.O., to be Flag Officer, Malaya, in succession to Rear-Admiral C. Caslon, C.B., C.B.E., to date February, 1950.

## PROMOTIONS AND RETIREMENTS

The following were announced on 2nd August :—

Admiral Sir William G. Tennant, K.C.B., C.B.E., M.V.O., to be placed on the Retired List, to date 3rd August, 1949.



Vice-Admiral Sir Wilfrid R. Patterson, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.B.E., to be promoted to Admiral in H.M. Fleet, to date 3rd August, 1949, and reappointed.

Rear-Admiral P. Ruck-Keene, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., to be placed on the Retired List and promoted to Vice-Admiral on the Retired List, to date 3rd August, 1949.

Rear-Admiral P. W. B. Brooking, C.B., D.S.O. and Bar, to be promoted to Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet, to date 3rd August, 1949, and reappointed.

The following was announced on 22nd September :—

Vice-Admiral Sir Vaughan Morgan, K.B.E., C.B., M.V.O., D.S.C., to be placed on the Retired List, to date 23rd September, 1949.

The following was announced on 6th October :—

Rear-Admiral M. J. Mansergh, C.B., C.B.E., to be promoted to Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet, to date 30th September, 1949. This promotion was made in the vacancy caused by the death of Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas H. Troubridge.

#### OBITUARY

Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Troubridge, K.C.B., D.S.O., died on 29th September at Middle Oakshott, Hawkley, Hampshire, at the age of 54. During the Second World War he commanded the aircraft carrier "Furious" during the campaign in Norway and in other operations of the Home Fleet. From June, 1941, he was in command of H.M.S. "Nelson," and from February, 1942, of the aircraft carrier "Indomitable" in Madagascar and Malta convoy operations. At the landings in North Africa in November, 1942, he was Commodore Commanding the Centre Task Force which covered the assault on Oran. As Flag Officer Commanding Overseas Assault Forces in 1943, he took part in the landings in Sicily and Italy. In the invasion of Southern France in August, 1944, he commanded the escort carrier squadron which provided air cover. Since the War he had been Fifth Sea Lord (Air); Admiral (Air) at Lee-on-Solent; and Flag Officer (Air) and Second-in Command, Mediterranean. The last-named appointment he relinquished in November, 1948, owing to ill-health.

#### H.M.S. "AMETHYST"

An account of the escape of the "Amethyst" from the Yangtze will be found in the JOURNAL for August, 1949, p. 458.

On 1st August, the Admiralty announced that the King had approved the immediate award of the D.S.O. to Lieutenant-Commander Kerans for gallantry, skill and determination while in command of the "Amethyst" in the planning and execution of her daring passage down the Yangtze River when she escaped from Chinese military forces.

The "Amethyst" arrived at Hong Kong on 3rd August. She left for home on 9th September, and was due at Plymouth on 1st November. The Lord Mayor of London and the Court of Common Council invited her officers and men to luncheon in the Guildhall.

#### EXERCISES AND CRUISES

HOME FLEET.—In mid-September, the Home Fleet proceeded to Invergordon for a month's intensive weapon and tactical training. Certain ships were afterwards detached for combined assault and anti-submarine exercises, while others visited ports on the East Coast of Scotland, the Clyde area and Lamlash, and on the West Coasts of England and Wales. The Fleet was due to disperse to its home ports in mid-November for the ships to carry out self-refits before giving Christmas leave.

VISIT TO GHENT.—At the invitation of the Belgian Government the fishery protection vessel "Truelove," Commander A. S. Jackson, R.N., visited Ghent between 11th and 14th August, to take part in celebrations in connection with the thousandth anniversary of the city. The ship passed through the twenty-mile long Canal which links Ghent with the Scheldt.

**M.T.B. CRUISE.**—During September M.T.B.s 5518, 5008, 1030 and 1027 from H.M.S. "Hornet"—the Coastal Force base at Portsmouth, made a cruise round Britain with the object of stimulating naval recruiting. Their route included Penzance, Bristol Channel ports, Holyhead, Belfast, Oban, the Caledonian Canal, Inverness, East Coast ports, and Newhaven—a distance of just over 1,600 miles.

**MEDITERRANEAN.**—The cruiser "Newcastle," flagship of Admiral Sir Arthur Power, Commander-in-Chief, and the frigate "Surprise" arrived at Istanbul on 1st September, on a four-day official visit. On 3rd September, the Commander-in-Chief was received in audience by President İnönü at the Dolmabahçe Palace on the Bosphorus, where the President was on holiday. Other units of the Fleet visited ports in France, Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Algeria and Tunisia.

The training cruiser "Devonshire," which left Plymouth on 16th September, made her Autumn cruise to the Mediterranean, visiting Gibraltar, Porto Conte (Sardinia), Villefranche, Sorrento, Augusta, Malta, and Palmas Bay (Sardinia). On board were 270 cadets, 175 from the Royal Navy and the remainder from Dominion Navies, Egypt and Burma.

**CHINA.**—H.M.S. "London," Captain P. G. L. Cazalet, R.N., which was damaged in action in the Yangtse in April while attempting to assist H.M.S. "Amethyst," returned to the Nore in September. Off Sheerness on the 6th, she was welcomed by Mr. John Dugdale, on behalf of the Board of Admiralty, and by Admiral Sir Henry Moore, Commander-in-Chief at the Nore. After discharging ammunition and fuel, the "London" arrived at Chatham on the 8th. Next day the Lord Mayor of London paid her a State visit and addressed the ship's company.

**AMERICA AND WEST INDIES.**—The cruiser "Glasgow"—flagship, and the submarine "Tally Ho" took part in August in celebrations of the Bi-Centenary of the City of Halifax, Nova Scotia. Ships of the Royal Canadian and United States Navies were present. The Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies Squadron, Vice-Admiral R. V. Symonds-Tayler, unveiled plaques in honour of five Canadian-born Admirals of the Royal Navy.

In the latter half of September the Commander-in-Chief in the "Glasgow" visited New York, Annapolis and Norfolk, Virginia.

In July, H.M.S. "Snipe," Commander C. G. Walker, R.N., visited Ciudad Trujillo, the capital of the Republic of Santo Domingo, and was hospitably entertained. Commander Walker was received by the President of the Republic before the ship left for Port Au Prince, Haiti.

**SOUTH ATLANTIC.**—The South Atlantic Squadron of the Royal Navy took part in exercises in September with units of the South African Naval and Air Forces. In a tactical exercise, Royal Navy and South African frigates defended a convoy against a raider, represented by the cruiser "Nigeria." Gunnery and air exercises and a combined operations landing also took place. Besides the "Nigeria" the ships included the "Actaeon," "Nereide" and "Briton" and the South African ships "Good Hope" and "Transvaal."

Flying the flag of the Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral E. D. B. McCarthy, the "Nigeria" visited Beira, Portuguese East Africa, in July. Among the entertainments provided was a trip to a game reserve.

#### PERSONNEL

**RETIRED PAY AND PENSIONS.**—An Order in Council of 28th July, published in the *London Gazette* on 5th August, introduces revised rates of service retired pay and pensions for naval officers and ratings retired or pensionable on or after 18th December, 1945. An Admiral of the Fleet will be eligible for half-pay at the rate of £1,800 a year. Retired pay for R.N. or R.M. officers may range from £375 for a Lieutenant with 20 years' service

to £1,500 a year for an Admiral or General with 30 years' service. The revised rates apply only to officers holding permanent or regular Commissions, and not to officers holding temporary or short service Commissions. Provision is made for additions to retired pay for service in paid acting rank. An officer who retired on retired pay before 19th December, 1945, and who gave service during the War which began on 3rd September, 1939 (whether before or after his retirement) may be allowed a re-assessment of his existing retired pay in respect of such service, subject to certain conditions.

**ORDNANCE INSPECTION OFFICERS' PAY.**—In the House of Commons on 12th July, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. W. J. Edwards, said that the Admiralty had now reached agreement with the Treasury on the proposed salary scales of pay for officers in the Naval Ordnance Inspection Department. The scales would now be: Chief Inspector of Ordnance, £1,700; Group A, £1,400 to £1,500; Group B, £1,175 to £1,350; Group C, £975 to £1,125; Group D, £800 to £950. They would be antedated to 1st January, 1947.

**ROYAL NAVAL DEFENCE SCHOOL.**—On 30th August, the Admiralty announced that the Damage Control and Fire-Fighting Training Schools of the Royal Navy, established at Stamshaw, near Portsmouth, were to be amalgamated with the Chemical Warfare Training Establishment into the Royal Naval Defence School. Under the unified command of Captain C. W. Greening, D.S.C., R.N., the School was commissioned on 1st September, with the name of H.M.S. "Phoenix."

**CHAPLAINS' UNIFORM.**—The King has approved that all Chaplains entered in the Royal Navy on or after 3rd November, 1948, are to wear naval uniform. Chaplains entered before that date will retain the option of wearing naval uniform or civilian clerical attire. The existing practice under which chaplains have no naval rank and wear no badges of rank will continue.

**CADETS' SEA TRAINING.**—The destroyers "Sluys" and "Cadiz," which joined the Mediterranean Fleet at Malta on 24th August, brought a party of 24 cadets of the three pre-Service organizations on a 13-day visit to fighting forces there. The party included eight Sea cadets, seven Army cadets, and nine Air Training Corps cadets.

#### MATERIAL

**H.M.S. "DARING."**—The launch took place at Wallsend-on-Tyne on 10th August, in the presence of the First Lord, of H.M.S. "Daring," from which a new class of large destroyers takes its name. The "Daring" is 390 feet long and has a beam of 43 feet. She is of all-welded construction and will incorporate features based upon lessons learned in the late war. Her armament will include six 4.5-in. and six smaller guns, and two pentad torpedo tubes. Amenities for the ship's company will include electric cooking apparatus in the galleys, an electric laundry, modern bathroom facilities, centralization in the preparation and cooking of food, and mechanical labour-saving facilities for cleaning ship.

**H.M.S. "OWEN."**—A new surveying vessel—H.M.S. "Owen," the third to be completed since the War—completed her trials in August. Like her predecessors, the "Dampier," now in the Far East, and the "Dalrymple," now in the Mediterranean, she is named after a well-known surveyor—Vice-Admiral William Fitzwilliam Owen, one of the founders of the Naval Surveying Service and known for the work he performed between 1821 and 1826 in mapping sections of the African coastline. Commanded by Commander H. Menzies, R.N., formerly a liaison officer in the Hydrographic Department, the "Owen" will proceed to the Persian Gulf on her first commission.

**UNDER-WATER CINE-PHOTOGRAPHY.**—A new technique in under-water cine-photography has been developed by the Admiralty for obtaining graphic records of submerged wrecks, submarines, submerged parts of ships, fish and other forms of marine life. The technique is developed from the frogman method of diving, with self-contained breathing apparatus and web-like rubber shoes, used during the late war. Sponsored by the Admiralty Departments of the Director of Boom Defence, who is responsible for

naval salvage, and the Director of Physical Research, a small team of divers carried out trials in the Mediterranean during the latter part of 1948 and early in 1949. Results were so picturesque that the shots were handed to the Crown Film Unit for inclusion in a film feature issued in September through the Central Office of Information entitled *Wonders of the Deep*. In addition to grim pictures of the wreck of the "Breconsaire" and shots of fish and cameramen swimming in clear water, there is a series showing the submarine "Auriga" submerged and firing a torpedo.

**MALTA DOCKYARD.**—During a visit to London in August, Dr. Boffa, Prime Minister of Malta, had two interviews with the First Lord of the Admiralty on the subject of the discharge of workpeople from Malta Dockyard. The First Lord pointed out that the spreading of the discharges over some eight months was a substantial concession designed to ease the problem of the local Government. The Admiralty could not undertake to keep in employment men for whom there was not work and for whom there was no money to pay, and this applied equally to all the Royal Dockyards and naval establishments. In the years between the Wars the numbers of workpeople in Malta Dockyard averaged about 7,000. The number employed in 1938 was 8,000. The number in employment when the decision was made to discharge 1,200 to 1,300 men was 12,500, so that, even after the full programme of discharges has been completed, the number will still be substantially higher than in 1938, and the wages bill in the Dockyard will be three times as large, i.e., £2,500,000 as compared with £800,000. It is the policy of the Admiralty to increase the amount of commercial repayment work undertaken in Malta to the maximum extent possible, and if the measures now being put into operation by the Dockyard authorities are successful the number of discharges may well be reduced by 200 or 300 men.

**MERCHANT SHIP REPAIRS.**—The procedure for licensing merchant ship repairs, which had been in operation since the Admiralty made an order on 31st January, 1940, under Defence Regulation 55, was abolished from 1st October, 1949. When the War ended the merchant ship repair industry was faced not only with the arrears of repairs and special surveys which had accumulated during hostilities but also with the reconversion to trade of the many ships taken up for trooping and other war service. In addition, raw materials and components were scarce, and the continued control of the amount of work in merchant ships was therefore essential. In the four years since the War the industry has broken the back of its immediate post-war task, and the restriction order of 1940 is no longer necessary.

**RESERVE FLEET FLAG SHIP—A CORRECTION.**—In Navy Notes in last quarter's JOURNAL, mention was made of the replacement of the "Ausonia" as flagship of the Reserve Fleet by H.M.S. "Duke of York." The Notes also stated that the "Ausonia" is a sister ship of the "Britannic." This is incorrect, as she is one of the former "A" Class of Cunarders, all steamers, whereas the "Britannic"—a more modern vessel—has only one sister ship, the "Georgic," both having Diesel engines and squat funnels.

The original Note was taken from an Admiralty News Summary.

#### NAVAL AVIATION

**RECORD MALTA FLIGHT.**—Led by Lieutenant-Commander W. R. MacWhirter, D.S.C., R.N., a flight of four Hawker "Sea Fury" aircraft, flying in formation, on 19th July made what is claimed to be an international record for a flight from London to Malta. They took off from London Airport at 11.46 a.m. G.M.T., crossed the starting line nearly four minutes later, and landed at the R.N. Air Station, Halfar, Malta, at 3.18 p.m. G.M.T.—a flight of three hours, 28 minutes. The aircraft were flown out as part of the normal replenishment programme. The distance from London to Halfar is 1,310 miles.

**R.N.V.R. AIR TRAINING.**—R.N.V.R. air squadron pilots are to be given training afloat in aircraft carriers. The first to do this training was No. 1832 Squadron from Culham, near Oxford, which embarked in H.M.S. "Implacable"—flagship of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, on 13th July, for ten days training at sea. In



September, No. 1830 Squadron from Abbotsinch, near Glasgow, No. 1831 Squadron from Stretton, near Warrington, and No. 1833 Squadron from Bramcote, near Nuneaton, embarked in H.M.S. "Illustrious" for similar training. (See also ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE.)

**NATIONAL SERVICE MEN.**—On 8th August, the Admiralty announced that, with a view to supplementing the reserve pool of specialists in Naval Aviation, there is to be tried out, as a preliminary measure, a scheme of training National Service men as pilots and observers. The number so trained is to be limited to ten—seven pilots and three observers, selected from volunteers. During their air training they will be Midshipmen, R.N.V.R., and after completion of one and a half years full-time training they will be required to continue part-time training as permanent members of the R.N.V.R.

**CADETS' GLIDER TRAINING.**—Thirty Cadets from the R.N. College, Dartmouth, concluded a five-day course of gliding instruction at the end of August at the R.N. Air Station, Culham, officially known as H.M.S. "Hornbill." They were chosen from among eighty applicants among the senior Cadets at the College, and all proved unusually apt. The object of these experimental courses is to interest Naval Cadets with a view to bringing more recruits into Naval Aviation.

**ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT.**—Details were released on 26th September of two new anti-submarine aircraft—the Fairey 17, made by the Fairey Aviation Company, and the Blackburn Y.A.5, made by Blackburn and General Aircraft. The Fairey 17 is the first aircraft to make use of a paired airscrew turbine. It is fitted with an Armstrong-Siddeley Double "Mamba," which gives 2,540 h.p. plus 770 lb. of thrust for take-off, and has a maximum combat power of 3,500 h.p., plus 280 lb. of thrust at 400 miles an hour. The Blackburn Y.A.5 is fitted with a Rolls-Royce "Griffon" piston engine, more powerful than the famous "Merlin," which powered the Battle of Britain "Hurricanes" and "Spitfires."

#### MISCELLANEOUS

**KING ABDULLAH.**—King Abdullah of Jordan visited the Navy at Portsmouth on 19th August, and inspected H.M.S. "Excellent," Gunnery School, H.M.S. "Vernon," Torpedo School, and H.M.S. "Implacable," Home Fleet flagship. The King took luncheon with the Commander-in-Chief—Admiral of the Fleet Sir Algernon Willis, in H.M.S. "Victory."

**TROPHY FOR AMERICAN DONOR.**—A gift of the history board of H.M.S. "Icarus," showing the battle honours of this destroyer of the "Intrepid" class, has been accepted by Mr. A. S. Vernay, of New York, at present living at Nassau, Bahamas, in recognition of his exceptional interest in the "Icarus" and his wartime generosity to the ship. Mr. Vernay "adopted" her and over a number of years gave more than £1,000 for the welfare of her company.

**NEW CUSTOMS FLAG.**—The Commissioners of Customs and Excise, with the concurrence of the Admiralty, have approved a new Customs flag which has been flown on all Customs vessels since 6th August. It is a Blue Ensign with a gold-coloured portcullis and chains surmounted by a crown. The old Customs flag was a Blue Ensign with a plain gold crown.

**NEW VARNE LIGHTSHIP.**—The Varne sandbank in the Straits of Dover, eight miles South-South-West of Folkestone, had been marked since the end of the War by a lighted buoy until 10th August, when a new lightship was placed there. The former Varne lightship was severely damaged by German aircraft on 14th August, 1940, during the Battle of Britain, and floated up channel for some distance before a destroyer had to sink it by shellfire.

**OSMOND BROCK MEMORIAL.**—On 24th July the entrance arch to the Navy aisle at Portsmouth Cathedral was dedicated by Bishop Neville Lovett as a memorial to Admiral

of the Fleet Sir Osmond de Beauvoir Brock, Chief of Staff, Grand Fleet, from 1916 to 1919, and afterwards Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth. Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield unveiled a commemorative tablet.

### ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE

**NORWAY CRUISE.**—Members of the Humber and Tyne Divisions of the R.N.V.R. left on 23rd July, for a joint cruise to Norway. The Motor Minesweeper 1090, Captain A. H. Davies, V.R.D., R.N.V.R., manned by members of the Tyne Division, and H.M.S. "Humber," Commander W. Lambert, R.N.V.R., manned by members of the Humber Division, met at a rendezvous in the North Sea and sailed in company to Stavanger, arriving on the 25th. After a stay of two days they went on to Bergen. They left Bergen on 3rd August, arriving back at their home ports on the 6th.

**NORWAY FLIGHT.**—Members of No. 1832 Air Squadron, R.N.V.R., made a week-end flight to Norway at the end of August. This was the first visit to a foreign Country by an R.N.V.R. Air Squadron, and coincided with Norwegian air exercises. The ten "Seafire" type 17 aircraft left Culham on 26th August, and flew to Oslo via Eindhoven and Sylt. After refuelling, they arrived at Gardamoen airfield on the morning of the 27th. During the week-end the visitors were taken on a sight-seeing flight in aircraft of the Norwegian Air Force. Captain Anthony Kimmins, O.B.E., R.N., accompanied the Squadron in his capacity of Honorary Commander, R.N.V.R.

Members of the Sussex Division, R.N.V.R., visited Norway at the same time on a normal training cruise in their seagoing tender, the Motor Minesweeper "Curzon," Commander A. D. Bruford, V.R.D., R.N.V.R. The "Curzon" sailed from Newhaven to Newcastle-on-Tyne, and left there on 23rd August for Oslo with air maintenance personnel and stores for No. 1832 Squadron.

### ROYAL MARINES

**RETIREMENT.**—General Sir R. A. Dallas Brooks, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., to Retired List (16th July, 1949).

**HOME FLEET EXERCISE.**—At the invitation of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Rhoderick R. McGrigor, K.C.B., D.S.O., the Commandant-General, Royal Marines, Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Hollis, K.B.E., C.B., visited the Home Fleet at Invergordon from 29th September to 1st October, to witness a 36-hour military exercise by Royal Marines of the Home Fleet.

**R.M.F.V.R. TRAINING.**—A Wing of the Bristol Centre of the Royal Marine Forces Volunteer Reserve carried out week-end training in H.M.S. "Vanguard" on 10th and 11th September. It included six officers and 23 other ranks. This was the first occasion on which this Reserve, formed in November, 1948, had had the opportunity to train in one of H.M. ships, as a general introduction to Royal Marine duties afloat.

**GUESTS OF U.S. MARINES.**—Sixty musicians of the Royal Marine Band, Portsmouth, with their Director of Music—Major F. V. Dunn, M.V.O., R.M.—on concluding an engagement at the Canadian National Exhibition at Toronto, were guests of the United States Marine Corps from 11th to 13th September, at Headquarters at Quantico, Virginia, before returning to the United Kingdom. The Band, with two tons of instruments and other equipment, was flown by its American hosts from Toronto on the 11th, and gave a concert to the U.S. Marine Corps that evening. Next day the Band gave a special concert for television in Washington, D.C., 40 miles from Quantico. On the 13th, it paraded for the U.S. Marines before leaving by air for Montreal to embark for home.

### DOMINIONS AND COMMONWEALTH NAVIES

#### AUSTRALIA

**WASHINGTON STAFF.**—Rear-Admiral H. B. Farncomb, C.B., D.S.O., M.V.O., Royal Australian Navy, on relief by Rear-Admiral J. A. S. Eccles as Flag Officer Commanding H.M. Australian Fleet, in the normal course of rotation of senior appointments in the

Navy, is to assume the appointment of Head of the Australian Joint Service Staff in the United States and Australian Naval Representative and Naval Attaché, Washington, early in 1950.

**SUBMARINES FOR A/S TRAINING.**—Arrangements have been made between H.M. Government and the Governments of Australia and New Zealand to base three submarines of the Royal Navy at Sydney, New South Wales, for the anti-submarine training of ships of the Royal Australian Navy, Royal New Zealand Navy and units of the Royal Navy based in the Far East. Two of the submarines—H.M.S.s "Telemachus" and "Thorough"—will probably leave the United Kingdom in November and arrive in Australia in January, 1950. The third will follow later.

Mr. W. J. F. Riordan, Minister for the Navy, explained in Canberra on 27th September that the acquisition of the aircraft carrier "Sydney" necessitated the provision of facilities for anti-submarine training in Australia, as submarine hunting was the task of the "Firefly" aircraft of the "Sydney." Crews of destroyers and small craft should also be trained in submarine detection. Until now the Australian Navy had carried out only periodical anti-submarine exercises with the help of visiting submarines from the Far Eastern Fleet.

### NEW ZEALAND

**AUSTRALIAN CRUISE.**—The cruiser "Bellona" and five frigates of the New Zealand Squadron, under the command of Captain D. Hammersley Johnston, R.N., arrived at Sydney at the beginning of October to take part in exercises with the Australian Fleet, the first of which was held from 7th to 15th October, off Jervis Bay. The New Zealand Squadron was to remain in Australian waters until 19th November, and was to visit Melbourne and Hobart.

### INDIA

**TRANSFER OF DESTROYERS.**—On 28th July the destroyer "Rotherham" was transferred at Portsmouth from the Royal Navy to the Royal Indian Navy, and renamed H.M.I.S. "Rajput" by Lady Willis. On 9th September the destroyer "Raider" was similarly transferred at Plymouth, and renamed H.M.I.S. "Rana" by Lady Burnett. With the "Redoubt," transferred on 4th July as the "Ranjit" (see the August issue of the JOURNAL), the vessels will join the 11th Destroyer Flotilla under the command of Captain A. Chakravarti, R.I.N.

**BOMBAY DOCKYARD.**—The appointment was announced on 9th September of Captain E. F. Pizey, R.N., to be lent to the Royal Indian Navy as Captain-Superintendent, Bombay Dockyard (3rd September).

### PAKISTAN

**DESTROYERS TRANSFERRED.**—The destroyers "Onslow" and "Offa" have been acquired by the Royal Pakistan Navy from the Royal Navy. The "Onslow" was formally handed over at Plymouth on 30th September by Lord Hall, First Lord of the Admiralty, to the High Commissioner of Pakistan. The "Offa" was due to be handed over at Plymouth by the Commander-in-Chief on 3rd November.

**BRITISH CO-OPERATION.**—Speaking at the transfer of the "Onslow" Lord Hall said the Government were most anxious to do what they could to help to build up this new Navy. They had that day announced a practical example. At the invitation of the Government of Pakistan, British Forces would take part in a combined operations exercise which the Staff College at Quetta would be carrying out in October in the Karachi area. The Royal Navy would be represented by the cruiser "Mauritius" and the Royal Air Force would provide a heavy bomber squadron.

## CEYLON

FIRST MINESWEEPER.—On 7th October, Mr. Senanayake, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, received from Vice-Admiral C. H. L. Woodhouse, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, the minesweeper "Flying Fish," a gift from His Majesty's Government. The vessel, which was renamed the "Vijaya," was built in Canada in 1944, and will be the Ceylon Navy's first ship, with a seagoing complement of six officers and 83 men, entirely Ceylonese, in whose training Vice-Admiral Woodhouse has taken a personal interest.

## FOREIGN NAVIES

## ARGENTINE

VISIT TO GREENWICH.—The Argentine training cruiser "La Argentina," Captain Juan Basso, carrying 120 cadets under training, arrived at Greenwich on 1st September, and remained for a week. She was open to visitors on 3rd and 4th September. A full programme of sight-seeing tours and entertainments arranged for her officers and men included a reception at Admiralty House, Whitehall, and a party given by Admiral Sir Henry Moore, Commander-in-Chief at the Nore, on board H.M.S. "President," off Victoria Embankment. After leaving Greenwich the ship was to visit ports in France, Spain and Italy.

MINESWEEPER LOST.—On 28th September, the Navy Ministry in Buenos Aires reported that the minesweeper "Fournier," with a crew of 77, was missing in the South Atlantic. On 3rd October, the ship was reported wrecked in the Straits of Magellan, 60 miles South of the Chilean port of Punta Arenas. Two days later it was announced that hope had been abandoned of finding any survivors. The Chilean naval patrol boat "Lautaro" brought to Punta Arenas the bodies of the captain, second-in-command, one petty officer and two sailors.

## FRANCE

UNDER-WATER CRUISE.—A French submarine, the former German U.2518, fitted with a schnorkel apparatus, arrived in Toulon on 8th September from Lorient, having made the whole voyage submerged in 17 days, at an average speed of five to six knots. Off the Balearic Islands the schnorkel apparatus was withdrawn and the submarine dived deep for 91 hours. The Paris Correspondent of *The Times* said that no untoward incidents were reported during the voyage and the crew were all in good condition, in spite of having to spend the whole time at a temperature of between 83° and 85° F. In the engine rooms the average temperature was 104° F. The greatest hardships, according to the crew, were the prohibition of smoking, the inability to have fresh-water shower baths, and boredom. Each man read about fifty of the hundred detective stories taken on board at Lorient by the commander—Lieutenant de Vaisseau Guerard—but he said that the men missed a daily news sheet such as had been issued in British submarines engaged on similar long submersions.

## ITALY

BUILDING PROGRAMME.—A naval building programme estimated to cost 50 milliard lire (about £20,000,000) is to be carried out by Italy between 1950 and 1955. This was announced by Signor Pacciardi—Minister of Defence—in the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 27th September. According to the Rome Correspondent of *The Times*, the programme includes the reconstruction of two cruisers, the "Luigi di Savoia" and the "Duca degli Abruzzi," and the building of two light anti-aircraft ships, six destroyers specially adapted for defence against aircraft and submarines, one convoy escort, fast motor gunboats, and lagoon and coastal vessels for supporting an army holding a sea front. The programme must necessarily be a modest one, added the correspondent.



Italy must keep within what commentators in Rome term the "narrow and unjust limits" of the peace treaty, under which she pledged herself not to lay down any war vessels before 1st January, 1950, and her total tonnage was limited to 67,500 tons, while the construction of aircraft carriers, submarines, motor torpedo boats and assault craft was prohibited. It is pointed out that Italy, being unable to build submarines and assault craft, has concentrated on light surface vessels suitable to the Mediterranean but not to oceanic waters.

#### JAPAN

NAVY CHIEF ACQUITTED.—On 6th September, a military tribunal at Tokyo found Admiral Soemu Toyoda—Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff at the end of the War—"Not Guilty" on charges of war crimes, and acquitted him.

#### NORWAY

PORTLAND VISIT.—The Norwegian submarines "Utsira" and "Utvaer" and the escort vessel "Sarpen" arrived at Portland on 16th July on a courtesy visit of six days. Commander S. Valvatne, Head of the Norwegian Submarine Division, was the Senior Officer of the group.

#### SWEDEN

NEW CONSTRUCTION.—Vice-Admiral Stroembæck, Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Navy, announced in September that the Fleet is to be strengthened. He intended to ask Parliament for the equivalent of about £700,000 to build four 600-ton submarine chasers of an all-Swedish design, with a speed of 25 knots, and equipped with modern listening devices, anti-aircraft guns and a formidable load of depth charges. Twenty further vessels of this type were planned. Sweden, he said, needed at least twelve more first-line destroyers, which would double her present strength. Her engineers were also working on a new type of directed torpedo which may be able to hit targets up to 20 miles away.

#### TURKEY

DESTROYERS FROM U.S.A.—In addition to the two destroyers from the United States Navy transferred to Turkey in April, as recorded in the August issue of the JOURNAL, page 481, two more, the "Lansdowne" and "Lardner," were delivered to Turkey and officially taken over on 18th August, under the Truman plan for American military aid.

#### UNITED STATES

SUBMARINE "COCHINO" LOST.—The submarine "Cochino" sank early on 26th August, after two explosions, in international waters in the Arctic, 150 miles from the North coast of Norway. During rescue operations in heavy seas, six seamen of a sister submarine—the "Tusk"—were swept overboard and drowned. A civilian technician in the "Cochino" also lost his life. The "Cochino" was completed in 1948. She was equipped with schnorkel apparatus and formed part of the American Fleet on a training cruise.

VISIT TO SPAIN.—The first American naval squadron to enter a Spanish port since early in 1940, paid an informal visit to the naval base at El Ferrol from 3rd to 8th September. It included the heavy cruiser "Columbus," flying the flag of Admiral Richard L. Conolly, Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, the anti-aircraft cruiser "Juneau," and the destroyers "Bordelon" and "Stribling." The "Columbus" afterwards returned to Plymouth and the other three ships to the Mediterranean. The visit was made to repay that of the Spanish schoolship "Juan Sebastian Elcano" to Annapolis in March last.

## ARMY NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE KING

The King presented new Colours to the 1st Battalion, Irish Guards, at Buckingham Palace, on 27th July.

His Majesty has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointment, dated 9th September, 1949 :—

H.M. The Queen to be Colonel-in-Chief The Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment.

The Queen, as their Colonel-in-Chief, inspected the Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards) at The Dale, Chester, on 19th October.

The Princess Margaret, as Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, inspected the 1st Battalion, The Highland Light Infantry, at Fort George, on 15th October.

The Duke of Gloucester visited Combined Cadet Forces Camps at Poulton, near Chester, and Kimmel Park, near Rhyl, on 28th July.

On 20th August, the Duke of Gloucester, as Colonel-in-Chief, accepted the Freedom, of the City of Aberdeen on behalf of The Gordon Highlanders.

On 25th October, the Duke of Gloucester visited the Officer Cadet School at Mons Barracks, Aldershot, and took the Salute at the Passing-Out Parade.

The Princess Royal, Colonel-in-Chief, Royal Corps of Signals, visited the 63rd Lines of Communication Signal Regiment at Haxland Camp, Exbury, on 18th July.

Her Royal Highness subsequently visited Mercury House, Bournemouth, and unveiled a Memorial Stone to the memory of the Officers and Other Ranks of Royal Signals who gave their lives during the World War, 1939-45.

On 30th August, the Princess Royal, Controller Commandant, inspected a Territorial Camp of the Women's Royal Army Corps at Rolston, near Hornsea, in Yorkshire. On 7th October, Her Royal Highness attended a Conference of the Women's Royal Army Corps in York.

The Duchess of Gloucester, Colonel-in-Chief, attended a Parade of The Northamptonshire Regiment and a Service at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Northampton, on 24th July.

On 20th October, the Duchess of Gloucester arrived at Vienna by air and, as Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, inspected the 1st Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment during her visit.

The King has approved the following appointments :—

TO BE AIDES-DE-CAMP TO THE KING.—Brigadier (temporary Major-General) C. R. A. Swynnerton, D.S.O., late Infantry (22nd June, 1949), vice Brigadier (Hon. Major-General) A. G. Salisbury-Jones, C.M.G., C.B.E., M.C., retired; Brigadier J. F. D. Steedman, C.B.E., M.C., late R.E. (8th July, 1949), vice Brigadier G. J. Eaton-Mathews, C.B.E., retired; Brigadier J. B. Churcher, D.S.O., late Infantry (17th July, 1949), vice Major-General T. J. W. Winterton, C.B., C.B.E., promoted; Brigadier R. A. Riddell, C.B.E., late Infantry (4th September, 1949), vice Colonel (Hon. Major-General) N. Clowes, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., retired.

TO BE COLONELS COMMANDANT.—Of the Royal Army Service Corps, Major-General Sir Harold R. Kerr, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., late Royal Army Service Corps, retired pay (11th October, 1949), vice Major-General M. S. Brander, C.B., O.B.E., M.I.Mech.E., resigned.

## APPOINTMENTS

ROYAL HOSPITAL, CHELSEA.—General Sir Bernard C. T. Paget, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., appointed Governor (27th October, 1949), in succession to General Sir Clive Liddell, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.

WAR OFFICE.—Brigadier N. W. Duncan, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Director Royal Armoured Corps, with the temporary rank of Major-General (14th August, 1949).

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) C. G. Greaves, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Director of Movements, with the temporary rank of Major-General (10th September, 1949).

Lieut.-General J. F. M. Whiteley, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., appointed Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (14th September, 1949).

Major-General J. C. F. Holland, C.B., D.F.C., appointed Chairman of a Special Committee (14th September, 1949).

Major-General C. M. Barber, C.B., D.S.O., appointed Director of Infantry (10th October, 1949).

Major-General K. G. McLean, C.B., appointed Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War (November, 1949).

Brigadier C. S. Sugden, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Director of Personnel Administration, with the temporary rank of Major-General (November, 1949).

Brigadier W. G. Pidsley, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., appointed Director of Army Education (December, 1949).

Brigadier S. W. Joslin, M.B.E., B.A., M.I.Mech.E., appointed Director of Mechanical Engineering, with the temporary rank of Major-General (January, 1950).

Major-General R. H. Bower, C.B.E., appointed Director Land/Air Warfare (January, 1950).

MINISTRY OF SUPPLY AND AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION.—Lieut.-General Sir Kenneth N. Crawford, K.C.B., M.C., appointed Controller of Supplies (Munitions) (14th September, 1949).

UNITED KINGDOM.—Colonel (temporary Brigadier) G. S. Hatton, D.S.O., O.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff, Southern Command, with the temporary rank of Major-General (26th June, 1949).

Brigadier K. F. MacK. Lewis, D.S.O., M.C., appointed Commander, 4th Anti-Aircraft Group, with the temporary rank of Major-General (23rd July, 1949).

Major-General F. R. G. Mathews, C.B., D.S.O., appointed President No. 1 Regular Commissions Board (15th August, 1949).

Major-General H. E. Pyman, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Commander, 56th Armoured Division (T.A.) (18th August instead of July, 1949, as previously reported).

Major-General C. M. F. White, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Commander, Catterick District (1st September, 1949).

Brigadier H. A. Hounsell, C.B.E., appointed Commander, 3rd Anti-Aircraft Group, with the temporary rank of Major-General (1st October, 1949).

Brigadier J. M. S. Pasley, C.B.E., M.V.O., appointed Commander, 1st Anti-Aircraft Group, with the temporary rank of Major-General (October, 1949).

Major-General J. A. Gascoigne, C.B., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C. London District (early 1950).

GERMANY.—General Sir Brian H. Robertson, Bart., G.B.E., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., appointed British High Commissioner for Germany (20th September, 1949).

Temporary Brigadier A. G. O'C. Scott, C.B.E., appointed Commander, Hamburg District, with the rank of Major-General (January, 1950).

MALTA.—Major-General G. W. E. Heath, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., appointed G.O.C. Troops (November, 1949).

FAR EAST LAND FORCES.—Major-General G. C. Evans, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., appointed a Divisional Commander (6th June, 1949).

Lieut.-General Sir John Harding, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., appointed Commander-in-Chief (28th July instead of August, 1949, as previously reported).

Lieut.-General Sir E. C. Robert Mansergh, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., appointed Commander, British Forces, Hong Kong (October, 1949).

AUSTRALIA.—Major-General A. J. H. Cassels, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Chief Liaison Officer, United Kingdom Service Liaison Staff, Melbourne (January, 1949).

WASHINGTON.—Brigadier S. N. Shoosmith, D.S.O., O.B.E., appointed Deputy Commander, Army Staff, British Joint Services Mission, with the temporary rank of Major-General (November, 1949).

WOMEN'S ROYAL ARMY CORPS.—Senior Controller Dame Mary Tyrwhitt, D.B.E., A.D.C., Director Women's Royal Army Corps, to continue in her appointment until 31st December, 1950.

#### PROMOTIONS

The following promotions have been announced:—

*General.*—Lieut.-General to be General:—Sir G. Ivor Thomas, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., Colonel Commandant, R.A. (6th July, 1949).

*Lieut.-General.*—Major-General to be Lieut.-General:—J. F. M. Whiteley, C.B., C.B.E., M.C. (27th June, 1949):

*Major-Generals.*—The following temporary Major-Generals or Brigadiers to be Major-Generals:—R. L. Brown, C.B.E. (14th June, 1949); H. E. Pyman, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (27th June, 1949); T. J. W. Winterton, C.B., C.B.E., A.D.C. (17th July, 1949); C. M. F. White, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (28th July, 1949); N. V. Watson, C.B., O.B.E. (20th August, 1949); J. L. P. Haines (11th September, 1949); W. O. Bowen, C.B., C.B.E., M.I.E.E. (12th September, 1949); G. F. Johnson, C.B.E., D.S.O. (29th September, 1949).

The following Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals:—G. S. Hatton, D.S.O., O.B.E. (26th June, 1949); K. F. MacK. Lewis, D.S.O., M.C. (23rd July, 1949); N. W. Duncan, C.B.E., D.S.O. (14th August, 1949); C. G. Greaves, C.B., C.B.E. (10th September, 1949); H. A. Hounsell, C.B.E. (1st October, 1949).

#### RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired:—Major-General M. W. M. MacLeod, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (17th July, 1949); Major-General R. G. Fielden, C.B., C.B.E. (28th July, 1949); Major-General P. G. Calvert-Jones, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (20th August, 1949); Major-General G. P. B. Roberts, C.B., D.S.O., M.C. (11th September, 1949); Major-General C. E. N. Lomax, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (12th September, 1949); Major-General R. T. O. Cary, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (29th September, 1949); Major-General W. D. A. Williams, C.B., C.B.E. (8th October, 1949); Major-General Sir F. R. Roy Bucher, K.B.E., C.B., M.C. (9th October, 1949); Major-General W. R. C. Penney, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (12th October, 1949); Lieut.-General Sir Frederick G. Wrisberg, K.B.E., C.B. (12th October, 1949); Major-General H. J. Parham, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (29th October, 1949).

The following General Officer has retired but was retained on the Special List (Ex-Indian Army) British Army to 30th June, 1949, while employed with the Defence Staff, Commonwealth Relations Office:—General Sir Geoffrey A. P. Scoones, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.(Gen.) (23rd May, 1948).



## MOVES AND RELIEFS

ROYAL ARMoured CORPS.—Three Royal Armoured Corps regiments have joined the British Army of the Rhine from the United Kingdom during the Autumn. These regiments, the Bays, 7th Hussars and 15/19 Hussars, have relieved the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group.

INFANTRY.—The War Office has announced that the following routine reliefs of Infantry battalions will take place in the Winter period 1949-50 :—

1st Battalion The Northamptonshire Regiment at present in Austria will relieve 1st Battalion The Cameronians at Trieste.

1st Battalion The Cameronians will relieve the 1st Battalion The Buffs in Hong Kong.

1st Battalion The Buffs will relieve the 1st Battalion The Royal Irish Fusiliers in the Middle East.

1st Battalion The Royal Irish Fusiliers will relieve the 1st Battalion The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers in Gibraltar, who will return to the United Kingdom.

TROOPING CHANGES.—The War Office has announced that The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers who have been in the Far East since January, 1948, will shortly relieve the Gloucestershire Regiment who have been stationed in Jamaica since January, 1947.

Before proceeding to the West Indies, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers will spend about six weeks in Northern Ireland.

The Gloucestershire Regiment are expected to reach this Country in time for Christmas.

## THE PARACHUTE REGIMENT

The War Office has announced that the Parachute Regiment on ceasing to be a component part of the Army Air Corps now becomes an integral part of the Infantry of the Line. The title of the Regiment will remain unaltered.

This decision was promulgated in a Special Army Order giving H.M. The King's approval for the change by Royal Warrant dated 9th August, 1949.

The Parachute Regiment will now take its place in The Infantry of The Line after The Green Jackets Brigade.

## REGULAR ENGAGEMENTS : NEW TERMS

On 24th September, the War Office announced new terms of regular engagements. In addition to those now obtaining, which are 5 years with the Colours and 7 years with the Reserve, and 12 years with the Colours, there will be two new types :—

(a) *All Regular Volunteers*

Seven years with the Colours and five years with the Royal Army Reserve.

(b) *National Servicemen only*

Three years with the Colours and nine years with the Royal Army Reserve, open to :—

(i) serving National Servicemen who have completed six months' full-time service ;

(ii) men who have completed their full-time National Service, providing they enlist within six months of their discharge from such service.

(c) *Conversion*

A man enlisted on any regular engagement may convert to another engagement with longer Colour service, at any time after he has completed one year's service as a regular soldier.

These new regular engagements have been introduced with the general object of widening the field of regular recruiting. They will also enable certain high-grade Army tradesmen while still serving to qualify for trade union recognition in trades requiring a minimum of five years' experience in the trade. This will improve their prospects both within the Army and on return to civil life.

#### PORT WING ROYAL ENGINEERS TRANSPORTATION CENTRE

The Training School of that branch of the Royal Engineers which deals with the operation and construction of ports and with inland water transport known as the Port Wing of the Royal Engineers Transportation Centre, was opened to the public on 10th September.

It is situated on the mud flats at Marchwood on the New Forest shore of Southampton Water, a former base for stores for the Normandy invasion, where Mulberry harbours were assembled. The Marchwood establishment is extensive and is equipped with jetties, workshops, and ships. In due course it will have barracks attached to it.

Here men are trained either to build new harbours or take over and put into working order existing harbours, and to perform any other of the many jobs connected with putting troops ashore. Every aspect of the work, from pile driving to stevedoring, is taught. To a considerable extent the men who go to Marchwood for training follow civil occupations connected with shipping and dock work, and a supplementary reserve, for which recruits are wanted, is being built up from this source. Those who join this reserve do a fortnight's training yearly at Marchwood and have no other drills to attend. National Servicemen are also given the specialist training which the Port Wing provides.

#### TERRITORIAL ARMY

##### TRAINING AND RECRUITING

**STAFF OFFICERS' POOL.**—The War Office has announced that the Territorial Army is forming a pool of technical staff officers and technical intelligence staff officers. Released officers with wartime experience of such duties are offered T.A. General List commissions in their old rank; they will do 15 days' training a year with regular units or appropriate establishments and, during that time, will receive full pay and allowances. There will be neither evening nor week-end training.

**AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING.**—The Army's only Territorial amphibious unit—No. 102 Amphibious Column of the R.A.S.C., with headquarters at Slatterbridge Camp in the Wirral, carried out its annual camp training on the Morfa at Harlech, beside the Royal St. David's golf course, at the end of July.

**BRIDGE BUILDING.**—After working for five week-ends, Sappers from Bridgwater and Plymouth, attached to the 116th Army Engineer Regiment, T.A., have rebuilt the 2,000-year-old stone bridge across the River Barle at Tarr Steps, near Dulverton, Somerset. During the War, a large portion of the bridge was washed away in a winter storm.

**W.R.A.C. ORDNANCE UNITS (T.A.).**—Territorial Ordnance units of the W.R.A.C. were at Trawsfynydd, in the Welsh mountains, at the end of July. Here they gained practical experience in relating their unit training to the conditions of a large depot.

**RECRUITING.**—At the end of August the total strength of the Territorial Army, including the Women's Royal Army Corps (T.A.) but excluding the Active Army regular cadre serving with T.A. units, was 78,405. The figure on 31st July was 77,972.<sup>1</sup>

#### APPOINTMENT OF DEAN, MILITARY COLLEGE OF SCIENCE

The War Office announced, on 25th September, that Sir Reginald Stradling, C.B., M.C., D.Sc., F.R.S., has been appointed Dean of the Military College of Science to succeed the late Professor C. H. Lander, C.B.E.

<sup>1</sup> The figure was 79,398 on 30th September.

This post was established experimentally when the Military College of Science was reorganized, and its continuance indicates both the value of Professor Lander's work and the importance attached by the War Office to retaining the services of a senior scientist as Dean of the College.

Sir Reginald Stradling served in the Royal Engineers in 1914-18 and has had a distinguished career as a Civil Engineer, both academically and in the Government service.

In the War he was Chief Adviser on Research and Experiments for the Ministry of Home Security and played an important part in work on minimizing the effects of enemy air raids.

His other appointments include Director of Building Research, the post which he now resigns.

#### SOUTH AFRICAN WAR JUBILEE

Some 2,000 veterans of the South African War gathered in London on 16th and 17th July to remember the outbreak of that war 50 years ago. Their commemoration culminated on 17th July in a parade and march in the City and a service in St. Paul's Cathedral. Field-Marshal Lord Wavell, Mr. Churchill, the Earl of Athlone, and the Lord Mayor of London, all of whom served in South Africa, were present. Australians, Canadians, South Africans, New Zealanders, and Tasmanians took part, marching with members of the South African War Veterans' Association from all over Great Britain.

Fifty members of the South African War Veterans' Association marched from Horse Guards into the Mall on 9th October, to lay two wreaths on the Royal Artillery Memorial to the fallen of that war.

#### WAR MEMORIALS

**THE HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY.**—A carillon of eight bells in the tower of Holy Trinity Church, Windsor, was dedicated on 16th October as a Memorial to the officers and men of the Household Cavalry who fell in the second World War. Major-General the Earl of Athlone, Colonel of the Life Guards, and Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood, Colonel of the Royal Horse Guards, with detachments of the regiments attended the service, and the majority of the congregation consisted of old comrades and the relatives of the fallen.

**THE QUEEN'S BAYS.**—A new and portable War Memorial in commemoration of all ranks who lost their lives in the Wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45, which will travel with the Regiment wherever it goes, was unveiled by the Queen, Colonel-in-Chief of The Queen's Bays, at The Dale, Chester, on 19th October. The Memorial was dedicated by the Chaplain-General to the Forces, Canon F. Ll. Hughes.

**THE SUFFOLK REGIMENT.**—A casket containing a Book of Remembrance recording the names of 1,545 officers and other ranks of The Suffolk Regiment who died in the War was unveiled on 31st July by Field-Marshal Lord Wilson in St. Mary's Church, Bury St. Edmunds. The memorial service and reunion was attended by nearly 2,000 members, their wives and families.

**THE ROYAL WELCH FUSILIERS.**—Past and present officers and men of The Royal Welch Fusiliers were present at Wrexham on 20th August at the unveiling of a Memorial to men of the regiment who fell in the Second World War. The ceremony was performed by the Colonel of the Regiment, Brigadier E. O. Skaife, and the dedication service was conducted by the Bishop of St. Asaph.

**THE RIFLE BRIGADE.**—The Books of Remembrance in which are written the names of officers and men of The Rifle Brigade who have laid down their lives in the service of their Country, and the Memorial Panels bearing the names of Riflemen who have rendered conspicuous service to the Regiment, were unveiled in Winchester Cathedral on 19th October by the Duke of Gloucester, Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, and dedicated by the Bishop of Winchester.

**THE ROYAL MILITARY POLICE.**—A Memorial Arch and Book of Remembrance to commemorate all ranks of the Corps of Royal Military Police who fell in the late war were unveiled and dedicated at Inkerman Barracks, Woking, on 18th July. General Sir Miles Dempsey, Colonel Commandant of the Corps, unveiled the Memorial, and the service was conducted by the Chaplain-General, Canon F. Ll. Hughes.

#### MISCELLANEOUS

**THE KING'S GUARD AT BALMORAL.**—The King's Guard at Balmoral was provided this year by the 1st Battalion The Highland Light Infantry from Fort George. For the first time since 1938 the guard was dressed in ceremonial order, claymores were carried and medals were worn. It was also the first time for 140 years that The Highland Light Infantry has worn the kilt in ceremonial order, the kilt having been reintroduced as dress for the regiment in April, 1947.

**THE PRIME MINISTER VISITS ALDERSHOT AREA.**—On 11th October the Prime Minister—Mr. C. R. Attlee, visited the Aldershot Area. In the morning, at Bordon, he saw young soldiers of the Light Infantry Training Battalion (1st Battalion The Somerset Light Infantry) engaged in various activities. In the afternoon, after lunch in the Royal Engineers mess in Aldershot, he visited the 3rd Training Regiment, Royal Engineers.

**TOURS OF C.I.G.S.**—Field-Marshal Sir William Slim left England by air on 9th October for a visit to the Middle East and the Far East. On his way to the Far East he visited Pakistan and India.

**PYJAMAS FOR THE ARMY.**—On 26th August the War Office announced that pyjamas are being issued to all other ranks in tropical and semi-tropical countries. In the United Kingdom, Germany, and other countries with temperate climates pyjamas will be given at first to Warrant Officers and N.C.O.s only. As soon as larger quantities of the necessary heavier material become available the issue will be extended to all other ranks in temperate climates. In due course each man will receive two pairs.

**CADETS' WEEK-END RIFLE MEETING.**—There were over 650 entries for the National Rifle Association annual cadets' week-end meeting held at Bisley on 1st and 2nd October. This is the second time the meeting has taken place and the attendance showed a considerable increase over last year. The Inter-Cadet Challenge Cup was won by the Army Cadet Force with 627. The Air Training Corps was second with 581.

### DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

#### AUSTRALIA

**NEW CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF.**—It was reported from Melbourne on 11th October that Lieut.-General S. F. Rowell, C.B., C.B.E., has been appointed Chief of the General Staff by the Commonwealth Government. The appointment becomes effective on 16th April, 1950, when Lieut.-General V. A. H. Sturdee, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., retires.

**PROMOTIONS.**—The promotions to Lieut.-General of Major-General (temporary Lieut.-General) S. F. Rowell, C.B., C.B.E., Vice-Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Chairman of the Military Board, and Major-General (temporary Lieut.-General) H. C. H. Robertson, C.B.E., D.S.O., C.-in-C. B.C.O.F. in Japan, have been notified in the *Commonwealth Gazette*, both to date 1st October, 1948.

Colonel (temporary Major-General) R. H. Nimmo has been promoted to Major-General, with effect from 1st October, 1948.

**STRENGTH OF MILITARY FORCES.**—The Minister for the Australian Army, the Hon. Cyril Chambers, has announced that the full strength of the Australian military forces is now more than 31,000. Figures up to 17th August showed that full-time duty enlistments for the Australian Regular Army totalled 15,038, and for the Citizen Military Forces 16,056. In addition the training of more than 25,000 members of the Cadet Corps is now well advanced.



**BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCES.**—The Minister for the Army has also announced that the strength of the Australian component of the B.C.O.F. in Japan is approximately 2,250. Since the commencement of the Occupation to 30th June, 1949, 11,076 men have returned to Australia from Japan for discharge and constitute a valuable trained reserve that could be called upon in emergency.

**ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE.**—Applications for admission to the 1950 Course of the Royal Military College has closed with 128 applicants for the 60 normal vacancies. In addition, two applications for Service entries have been received from soldiers of the Australian Regular Army. The normal entry Course is of four years' duration and is restricted to young men between 16 and 20 years of age, of the required educational and medical standards. The successful Service entries who enter for a three years' Course must be members of the Australian Military Forces, must be over 19 years of age and must qualify in military and civil subjects.

**SCHOOL OF TACTICS AND ADMINISTRATION.**—The first Course of the newly established School of Tactics and Administration at Seymour (Victoria) opened on 8th August, when 40 officers of the Australian Regular Army began a Junior Officers Course.

**ARMY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES.**—The Australian Regular Army, recognizing the additional need for scientific, technical, trade and specialist qualifications, is offering increased educational opportunities for both its officers and other ranks. Selected members will undertake courses at universities, technical colleges and similar establishments throughout Australia; they may also be attached to leading industrial organizations and to Government Departments. The Courses will be limited to subjects primarily of value to the Army and appropriate to the probable future employment of the Army students. Certain Courses will be authorized only after a bond has been entered into by the student who will undertake to serve in the Army for a specified period after the completion of the Course.

**POLISH EX-SERVICEMEN BECOME AUSTRALIANS.**—It was reported from Hobart on 9th October that one hundred and ninety-four Polish ex-Servicemen, who took the oath of allegiance on that date, became Australian citizens at Butler's Gorge, where they had helped to build the Clark dam, the largest single arch concrete dam in Australia, the purpose of which is to increase the supply of water to the state hydro-electric undertaking. About 700 persons attended the ceremony. The new Australians are all former members of General Anders's army, and many fought alongside the A.I.F. at Tobruk.

### CEYLON

It was reported from Colombo on 14th September, that the Government of Ceylon is taking the initial steps for the formation of the Ceylon Army which will include units of the following Arms of the Service:—

Artillery, Signals Corps, Infantry, Army Service Corps, Army Ordnance Corps, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Medical Corps, Provost Corps and Engineer Works Services.

An Engineer unit may be formed later.

Ten cadets are being sent to Sandhurst immediately for training.

In order to provide the necessary advice, assistance and instruction during the period of formation, a small number of British Army Officers and N.C.O.s will be seconded to the Ceylon Army for periods up to two years.

By the end of 1950 it is expected that the strength of the Army will be 70 officers and 610 other ranks, approximately. Expansion will be progressive over a period of years until a final strength of approximately 3,000 all ranks is reached.

**FOREIGN  
FRANCE**

**FRENCH OCCUPATION ZONE.**—Important Army manoeuvres took place recently in the northern part of the French occupation zone—the Rhineland-Palatinate. The main exercise was concerned with forcing a passage across the Moselle in the region of Bernkastel. M. Max Lejeune, Secretary of State for the Army, attended the manoeuvres with Lieut.-General Sir Charles Keightley, commanding the British Army of the Rhine, General Hubner, commanding the American zone forces, General Buron, of the Belgian Army, General de Lattre de Tassigny, and General Revers, Chief of the French General Staff.

**C.-IN-C. INDO-CHINA.**—General Carpentier has been appointed Commander-in-Chief in Indo-China, in succession to General Blaiot. General Carpentier was French Chief of Staff in North Africa in 1943, and then successively Chief of Staff to the French expeditionary corps in Italy and to the First Army in the French campaign. Since 1946 he has been commanding troops in Morocco.

**GREECE**

On 30th August units of the Greek 8th Division closed the Communist forces' remaining escape routes into Albania by taking the heights of Steno, Golio, and Kamenik in the southern Grammos. Air reconnaissance showed, however, that large numbers crossed the border during the night.

Sporadic fighting continued in the Grammos area as the Nationalist forces searched for rebels who had gone into hiding. Their dead comrades and captured weapons and stores were counted in their multitudes, but it will be some time before the value of the Greek Army's victory can be estimated. The rebels who crossed into Albania went in disorderly fashion, carrying at the most their small arms, but unless the Albanian authorities intern them they may be expected to enter Greece at some other point to create a nuisance.

**EGYPT**

It was announced by the War Office on 12th October that an Egyptian Mission consisting of Mahmoud Tawfiq Ahmed Pasha, the Under Secretary of State for War, Abdul Rahman El Sawi Bey, the Under Secretary of State for Air, El Sayid Abdul Wahid Bey, the Under Secretary of State for Finance, and their staff, would shortly be paying a goodwill visit to England lasting about a month, during which they would discuss matters regarding equipment for the Egyptian Army.

**UNITED STATES**

On 12th August, President Truman appointed General Joseph Lawton Collins to succeed General Omar Bradley as Chief of Staff of the Army. General Collins, who is 53, has been Vice-Chief of the Army Staff. He commanded the United States 7th Army Corps in the invasion of Normandy.

## AIR NOTES

### GREAT BRITAIN

#### H.M. THE QUEEN

The Air Ministry announced on 2nd August, that Her Majesty the Queen had graciously accepted the appointment of Honorary Air Commodore of No. 600 (City of London) Squadron, R.Aux.A.F., and No. 2600 (City of London) Light Anti-Aircraft Squadron, R.Aux.A.F. Regiment. Her Majesty paid her first visit to No. 600 (City of London) Squadron, R.Aux.A.F., at Biggin Hill, on Saturday, 29th October.

#### APPOINTMENTS

**AIR MINISTRY.**—Air Commodore O. K. Griffin, C.B.E., to be Director of Postings (B) at the Air Ministry, vice Air Commodore I. L. Wincer, C.B.E. (October, 1949.)

Air Marshal Sir Leslie N. Hollinghurst, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.F.C., has been appointed to the Air Council as Member for Personnel, vice Air Marshal Sir Hugh W. L. Saunders, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., D.F.C., M.M., who will become Inspector-General of the Royal Air Force. (31st October, 1949.)

Air Marshal Sir Aubrey B. Ellwood, K.C.B., D.S.C., to be Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, vice Air Marshal Sir Hugh S. P. Walmsley, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.B.E., M.C., D.F.C. (February, 1950.)

Air Marshal Sir William F. Dickson, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C., has been appointed to the Air Council as Member for Supply and Organization, vice Air Chief Marshal Sir George C. Pirie, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., D.F.C., LL.D. (March, 1950.)

**HOME.**—Air Commodore S. N. Webster, C.B.E., A.F.C., to be Senior Air Staff Officer at Headquarters, Coastal Command, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal, vice Air Vice-Marshal K. B. Lloyd, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C. (1st September, 1949.)

Air Commodore D. W. R. Ryley, C.B.E., to be Commanding Officer, R.A.F. Station Henlow, Bedfordshire. (September, 1949.)

Air Commodore G. B. M. Rhind to be Director of Servicing Research and Development at the Ministry of Supply. (September, 1949.)

Group Captain F. W. P. Dixon, M.B.E., M.B., B.S., F.R.C.S., F.R.C.S.(Edin.), D.O.(Oxon.), to be Consultant in Surgery to the R.A.F. Central Medical Establishment, London, with the acting rank of Air Commodore. (September, 1949.)

The Rev. John R. Appleyard to be Principal United Board Chaplain, R.A.F., vice the Rev. W. R. Marshal, K.H.C. (September, 1949.)

Air Vice-Marshal R. M. Foster, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., to be Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Reserve Command, with the acting rank of Air Marshal, vice Air Marshal Sir Alan Lees, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., A.F.C. (1st October, 1949.)

Air Vice-Marshal T. A. Warne-Browne, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.C., to be Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Maintenance Command, with the acting rank of Air Marshal, vice Air Marshal Sir Cyril B. Cooke, K.C.B., C.B.E. (15th October, 1949.)

Air Vice-Marshal C. R. Steele, C.B., D.F.C., to be Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Coastal Command, with the acting rank of Air Marshal, vice Air Marshal Sir John W. Baker, K.C.B., M.C., D.F.C. (January, 1950.)

Air Marshal Sir Hugh P. Lloyd, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., D.F.C., to be Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, vice Air Marshal Sir Aubrey B. Ellwood, K.C.B., D.S.C. (February, 1950.)

**U.S.A.**—Air Vice-Marshal G. E. Gibbs, C.I.E., C.B.E., M.C., to be Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Military Staff Committee, United Nations Organization, New York. (29th October, 1949.)

Air Chief Marshal Sir George C. Pirie, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., D.F.C., LL.D., to be Head of the Air Force Staff, British Joint Services Mission to the U.S.A., vice Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles E. H. Medhurst, K.C.B., O.B.E., M.C. (March, 1950.)

MIDDLE EAST.—Air Commodore C. E. H. Allen, C.B., D.F.C., to be Senior Technical Staff Officer at Headquarters, Middle East Air Force, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal, vice Air Vice-Marshal T. A. Warne-Browne, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.C. (23rd July, 1949.)

Air Vice-Marshal V. E. Groom, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., to be Air Officer Commanding No. 205 Group, Middle East Air Force, vice Air Vice-Marshal G. S. Hodson, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C. (October, 1949.)

Air Marshal Sir John Baker, K.C.B., M.C., D.F.C., to be Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Air Force, vice Air Marshal Sir William F. Dickson, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C. (February, 1950.)

MALTA.—Air Commodore N. H. D'Aeth, C.B.E., to be Air Officer Commanding, Air Headquarters, Malta, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal, vice Air Vice-Marshal C. R. Steele, C.B., D.F.C. (November, 1949.)

EAST AFRICA.—Air Commodore E. D. H. Davies, C.B.E., to be Air Officer Commanding Air Headquarters, East Africa, vice Air Commodore A. G. Bishop, C.B.E., A.F.C. (September, 1949.)

FAR EAST.—Air Vice-Marshal R. L. Ragg, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C., to be Senior Air Staff Officer at Headquarters, Far East Air Force, vice Air Vice-Marshal F. F. Inglis, C.B., C.B.E. (26th July, 1949.)

Air Vice-Marshal F. J. Fogarty, C.B., D.F.C., A.F.C., to be Commander-in-Chief, Far East Air Force, with the acting rank of Air Marshal, vice Air Marshal Sir Hugh P. Lloyd, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., D.F.C. (November, 1949.)

CEYLON.—Air Commodore F. L. Pearce, C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., to be Air Officer Commanding Air Headquarters, Ceylon, vice Air Commodore A. R. Wardle, C.B.E., A.F.C. (September, 1949.)

PAKISTAN.—Group Captain G. B. Keily, D.F.C., A.F.C., to be Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Group, Royal Pakistan Air Force, with the Acting rank of Air Commodore. (September, 1949.)

#### PROMOTIONS

The Air Ministry announced on 20th September, the promotion of the following Air Vice-Marshals (Acting Air Marshals) to the rank of Air Marshal with effect from 1st July, 1949:—

Air Marshal Sir Aubrey B. Ellwood, K.C.B., D.S.C., Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command.

Air Marshal Sir John W. Jones, K.C.B., C.B.E., Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Technical Training Command.

Air Marshal P. C. Livingston, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C., F.R.C.S., F.R.C.S.(Edin.), L.R.C.P., D.P.H., D.O.M.S., K.H.S., Director-General of R.A.F. Medical Services.

#### RETIREMENTS

Air Marshal Sir Alan Lees, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., A.F.C., to date 1st October, 1949.

Air Marshal Sir Cyril B. Cooke, K.C.B., C.B.E., to date 5th October, 1949.

#### OBITUARY

Air Commodore G. Bartholomew—Air Attaché at the British Embassy in Turkey, was killed on 14th August, in a Turkish military aircraft which crashed soon after taking off from Etimesud airport. He was buried at Ankara with full military honours on 16th August.



## CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF

Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Chief of the Air Staff, visited Canada and the United States between 17th September and 17th October. He was invited by the Canadian Government to be present on 30th September, at the ceremony of the presentation to the Royal Canadian Air Force of the memorial gates erected at Trenton, Ontario, in commemoration of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff to the U.S.A.F., also extended an invitation to Lord Tedder to visit stations and establishments of the U.S.A.F. before going on to Canada.

Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor is making an extensive tour of R.A.F. Units of the Middle East and Far East Air Forces, and is visiting Greece, South Africa, India and Pakistan, before assuming the appointment of Chief of the Air Staff on 1st January, 1950.

## ORGANIZATION

**R.A.F. FLYING COLLEGE.**—The three R.A.F. Empire Schools—those of Flying, Air Navigation and Air Armament, are being amalgamated to form the R.A.F. Flying College at Manby, Lincolnshire, to open in January, 1950. The College will work under the direction of the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Flying Training Command—Air Chief Marshal the Hon. Sir Ralph Cochrane, with Air Commodore A. McKee as its first Commandant. Each Course, of about thirty officers, will last twelve months.

The new College will give selected officers practical instruction and experience in a combined course of flying, navigation and the use of weapons in all-weather conditions. The "Empire" outlook of the three schools which have pooled their knowledge and resources to form the new Course will be retained by Commonwealth representation on the instructing staff and on the Course.

Students will study the theory of combatant flying and will practise in the air on the latest types of aircraft the most up-to-date techniques of high altitude, high speed, all-weather flying, navigation and the use of weapons. During the later stages of the Course, students will fly to various parts of the World to undertake such work as the study of flying in tropical and arctic conditions. They will also spend periods at experimental establishments following the progress of specific scientific projects.

**ADVANCED FLYING SCHOOL.**—At No. 203 Advanced Flying School—the all-jet training school of R.A.F. Flying Training Command, young officers and airmen destined to become pilots of Fighter Command, learn to fly jets. When they first arrive they are given dual instruction on the Meteor 7, and then fly the single-seat Meteor 4 or Vampire. Here, they learn to fly at 600 m.p.h. and climb at 5,000 ft. a minute. They are taught the full significance of Mach numbers and the effects of compressibility, and encounter the strain imposed by high speed flight both on pilot and machine.

Before going to the Advanced Flying School, pupils have already completed 200 hours flying training at a Flying Training School. The first 100 hours of basic flying training has been done on Prentices, and the second 100 hours in the applied stage—where the basic flying skill is applied to navigation, formation flying, etc.—on Harvards. After completing the applied training the pupil fighter pilot formerly progressed to a Spitfire, and did his tactical and operational training on this type. He then "converted" to either a Meteor or a Vampire jet fighter. In the former case he would normally be given a twin-engined experience on the Oxford. Now, pupils from Flying Training Schools will go straight on to the Meteor 7 jet trainer without any single-seat piston fighter experience.

The Advanced Flying School at Driffield is solely concerned with teaching pupils to fly and handle jet fighters. Operational and tactical training in the use of the aircraft as a weapon of war will be given at an Operational Conversion Unit, from which the pilot will be posted direct to an operational fighter squadron.

On arrival at Driffield the pupils are grouped into two squadrons according to whether they will eventually go to Meteor or Vampire squadrons. Members of both squadrons

are first given dual instruction on the Meteor 7, and will make their first jet "solo" flight in this type. The Meteor squadron will then pass on to the Meteor 4 and the Vampire squadron to the Vampire 1.

One unusual result of this change in the training programme will be that the few pilots who may be posted to squadrons still using piston fighters such as the Tempest, Spitfire or Hornet, will have to complete a conversion course back from the 600 m.p.h. Meteor to a piston-engined type some 150 m.p.h. slower.

**REFRESHER COURSES FOR OFFICERS RETURNING TO THE R.A.F.**—Re-entrant Officers' Training Courses of three weeks duration are to be held at the R.A.F. Station, Spitalgate, Lincolnshire, to bring up-to-date a returning officer's knowledge of subjects common to every branch of the R.A.F., emphasis being placed on traditions and customs of the Service, etiquette and bearing. The maximum number of officers attending each course will be sixty. Officers who have completed more than six months service since their return to the R.A.F., and officers who have completed a junior course at the Officers' Advanced Training School since their return will not normally be required to attend.

**THE R.A.F. MISSING RESEARCH AND ENQUIRY SERVICE**, known throughout Europe as M.R.E.S., has been disbanded. A few officers are now handing over to the Imperial War Graves Commission the Air Force graves of the late war. From its inception in Paris in November, 1944, M.R.E.S. was commanded by Group Captain E. F. Hawkins, D.S.O., O.B.E., who has now retired from the Royal Air Force with the disbandment of the Service.

At the end of the War there were over 41,000 members of the Royal Air Force and the Dominion and Allied Air Forces who had been lost on operations from the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean or the Middle East. Nearly 23,000 have been located and identified, and of the remainder between 12,000 and 17,000 are considered to have been lost at sea. No fewer than 82 per cent. of those buried in graves marked "Unknown Airman" have been identified, after painstaking research by M.R.E.S. teams.

**R.A.F. REGIMENT (MALAYA).**—The formation of the R.A.F. Regiment (Malaya) was completed in August when, at the R.A.F. Station, Sembawang, Air Vice-Marshal F. J. Mellersh, Air Officer Commanding Air Headquarters, Malaya, took the salute at the passing-out parade of No. 95 Squadron—the last squadron to be raised for the Regiment. Formed on 1st January this year, the R.A.F. Regiment (Malaya) is composed of Malaysians in five rifle squadrons, with British officers.

#### PERSONNEL

**RE-ENGAGEMENT.**—Airmen and airwomen in ground trades who have outstanding records now have a chance of being re-engaged for long service in their fifth or sixth year of initial engagement (instead of in their ninth year) with a view to qualifying for a pension. Under the revised procedure they may apply to re-engage on completing four years whole time service and those with an average record can expect to be re-engaged in the seventh, eighth or ninth year of service. The minimum qualifying time for pension is 22 years total reckonable service. The normal upper age limit is 55.

**COMMISSIONS.**—A further fifty Commissions in the Secretarial branch and fifty-four in the R.A.F. Regiment are to be offered to men doing their National Service in the Royal Air Force. These are in addition to the 570 Commissions a year at present open to airmen for the period of their National Service in the Equipment, Secretarial and Education branches and the R.A.F. Regiment.

**AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL OFFICERS.**—A number of additional Air Traffic Control Officers are required by the end of this year, and applications are invited from released R.A.F. officers below the age of 45, willing to serve either in the United Kingdom, or in the R.A.F. Commands overseas, including B.A.F.O., Germany.

**CARRYING OF CANES BY R.A.F. OFFICERS.**—The Air Ministry has announced that canes may now be carried by station commanders at all times, and officers commanding

flyng, administrative and technical wings at stations. Officer-instructors at recruit and technical training schools may carry them while on parade or on duty within the station bounds only.

The canes, which will be bought by the officers at their own expense, are to be of the swagger type, 24 inches long, and covered in black leather. The question of allowing all R.A.F. officers to carry canes will be considered later.

**MARKSMAN'S BADGE.**—To encourage rifle shooting and to foster a higher standard of marksmanship in the R.A.F., it has been decided to introduce a marksman badge, to be awarded annually to those, other than officers and warrant officers, who reach the qualifying standard in the annual range practice.

#### WOMEN'S ROYAL AIR FORCE

Her Royal Highness, the Duchess of Gloucester, as Air Chief Commandant of the W.R.A.F., visited Germany on 17th October, on a tour of W.R.A.F. units. She was accompanied by Dame Felicity Hanbury, Director of the W.R.A.F., and was met by Air Marshal T. M. Williams, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, B.A.F.O.

Two new commissioning schemes in the W.R.A.F. have now been introduced, the first for women with professional qualifications and experience, the second for women of good general education without career training.

Under Scheme I, women possessing a University degree or equivalent professional qualification are eligible for commissioning in the Technical branch, and women who have passed the intermediate professional qualifications may be commissioned in the Equipment and Secretarial branches. These entrants will all undergo training as officers.

Under Scheme II, the candidate will enlist as an airwoman, do her professional and officer training as a Cadet and be commissioned on successfully completing this training. This scheme applies to the Equipment and Secretarial branches.

Under both schemes Commissions will be initially for five years active list service and four years reserve service. A gratuity at the rate of £65 a year is payable on the completion of the period of active list service. Officers may apply for an extension to ten years short service. Throughout their short service commission, officers may be recommended for permanent Commissions.

#### MATERIAL

**AIRFIELD CLASSIFICATION.**—A new system of classifying airfields according to the length and strength of their runways has been introduced. Formerly airfields were classified by the general description of the types of aircraft for which they were thought to be suitable, e.g., "heavy bomber." In future, a four-figure number will be used, the first two figures indicating the length of the runway in hundreds of feet, and the second two figures indicating the load which the surface can support when applied in the form of a single wheel, in thousands of pounds. Thus a runway with a classification number of "60/50" has a length of 6,000 feet and will support a single-wheel load up to 50,000 lbs. A simple calculation is required to convert the all-up weight of any type of aircraft into an equivalent single-wheel load figure.

**OVERSEAS AERODROMES TESTED.**—The Air Ministry Works Directorate has almost completed a comprehensive testing programme to determine the runway strength of overseas airfields. During the past eighteen months the runways of more than sixty airfields in nearly twenty different Countries have been tested.

**VARSITY TRAINER.**—The Vickers Varsity T.1 new crew trainer, is designed to facilitate the instruction, in one aircraft, of navigator/bomb-aimers, pilots and signallers. For pilot-training, the Varsity provides side-by-side dual controls. Positions for the navigator and signaller are included in the pilots' flight-deck. Prone positions for the air-bombing instructor, his pupil, and practice bombs are contained in the underslung "pannier" between the flight-deck and the spar.

## RESERVE FORCES

**AIR COMMODORE OF NO. 502 (ULSTER) SQUADRON.**—The Air Ministry announced on 9th August, the appointment of Captain the Rt. Hon. Sir Basil Brooke, Bart., C.B.E., M.C., D.L., M.P., as Honorary Air Commodore of No. 502 (Ulster) Squadron, R.Aux.A.F., No. 2502 (Ulster) Light Anti-Aircraft Squadron, R.Aux.A.F. Regiment, and No. 3502 (Ulster) Fighter Control Unit, R.Aux.A.F.

**TRANSFERS TO FIGHTER COMMAND.**—Twenty fighter squadrons of the R.Aux.A.F. were transferred to Fighter Command on Tuesday, 1st November. Since their reconstitution in 1946, the squadrons have been under the control of Reserve Command for both training and administration. They have now reached a sufficiently high standard of training to be transferred to the Command which would control them in time of war, and the main administrative problems which attended the re-formation of the squadrons have been resolved.

Under the new arrangement Fighter Command will be responsible for training, operations and administration. Reserve Command will remain responsible for recruiting, conditions of service and all dealings with Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Associations. The squadrons will remain at their present airfields, and existing local associations and links with cities and counties will not be affected. They have been allocated, as geographically suitable, to the Fighter Groups, and their operational efficiency will be the responsibility of the Fighter Sectors.

**JET FIGHTERS.**—To No. 500 (County of Kent) Squadron, R.Aux.A.F., has been given the distinction of being the first squadron to be equipped with jet fighters. The aircraft are Gloster Meteor 38, plus two Mark 7 two-seaters.

**SYNTHETIC TRAINER.**—A synthetic trainer, simulating air attacks of any size, from a lone raider to a mass raid of 1,000 bombers, has been developed to give plotters of the R.Aux.A.F., Fighter Control Units, practice in the early warning system and raid reporting, without the need for flying aircraft. The trainer is virtually a radar station, with two cathode-ray tubes on which may be read the bearing and height of approaching aircraft. Pre-determined "blips" can be superimposed on the screens to behave in a similar manner to those on a normal live station. As they are pre-determined, the operator's accuracy in interpreting their behaviour can be checked.

**ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS.**—All areas still need more volunteers. The lower age limit for new volunteers is 16 and the upper limits are 45 for service at Centres and 55 for service at Posts. In August, applications to join the Corps were 154 women and 141 men. In September, 89 women and 174 men joined up.

Some 3,000 members took part in an exercise on Sunday, 14th August, over the Corps' Midland area, ranging from Durham in the North to Bury St. Edmunds in the South and Derby in the West. Eleven R.O.C. operations rooms and 450 posts were manned.

All Observer posts West of the Pennines between Manchester and Carlisle were manned by men and women of the Royal Observer Corps on Sunday, 9th October, in the first exercise held under war-time conditions in that region since the end of the War.

## AIR TRAINING CORPS, SINGAPORE

The first squadron of a new voluntary organization—the Malayan Air Training Corps, has been formed at Singapore, on similar lines to the A.T.C. in this Country. It is open to youths between 16 and 18 of all communities who are British or Federal citizens. Members will be training in a range of flying subjects as a preliminary to entering the R.A.F. or civil aviation.

## EXERCISE "BULLDOG"

Exercise "Bulldog," designed primarily to give experience to Bomber Command in day and night attacks on defended targets, was planned to take place between 7 p.m.,



23rd September, and dawn, 27th September. Adverse weather conditions over the whole Country led to the first action having to be postponed until 1 p.m. on the 24th, and resulted in a number of diversions.

Attacking forces consisted of Lincoln, Lancaster and Mosquito squadrons of Bomber Command, Mosquito squadrons of the British Air Forces of Occupation in Germany, and B-29 and B-50 Groups of the U.S.A.F. Third Air Division under Major-General Leon W. Johnson. Hornets were drawn from Fighter Command to operate with the attackers and Meteors to simulate high speed jet bombers.

Defending forces, commanded by Air Marshal Sir Basil E. Embry, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Fighter Command, comprised squadrons of the R.Aux.A.F., French, Netherlands and Belgian Air Forces in addition to Regular fighter units. Regular and Territorial Regiments of Anti-Aircraft Command, under General Sir G. Ivor Thomas, took part.

The Exercise was under the general direction of Air Marshal Sir Aubrey Ellwood, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command.

It will be several weeks before the staffs of the Services concerned have sifted reports, drawn conclusions and assessed results to their satisfaction. All the Commanders-in-Chief have expressed satisfaction with the preliminary results, and were enabled to try out new ideas and modifications, amongst which were the use of fighter escorts for Meteor-bombers, the "liquidating" of all Commanding Officers within one Group, and the manning of a complete sector by R.Aux.A.F. personnel.

#### END OF THE BERLIN AIRLIFT

The last Dakota to operate into Berlin on Operation "Plainfare" landed at Gatow on 23rd September. On 1st October, the American Operation "Vittles" ended. A ceremony, attended by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Trenchard, was held in Berlin on 23rd September, to mark the closing stages of the Air Lift.

#### OTHER FLIGHTS AND EXERCISES

**BATTLE OF BRITAIN WEEK.**—The Royal Air Force commemorated the Battle of Britain with a London Fly-Past in which 200 aircraft took part, led by the last serviceable Hurricane piloted by Air Vice-Marshal S. F. Vincent, C.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C., a former Battle of Britain pilot.

For the first time since the inception of Battle of Britain Week, the Royal Air Force at Gibraltar gave a special display there on Saturday, 17th September. A De Havilland Hornet 3 of R.A.F. Fighter Command set up a new Gibraltar-to-London speed record of 435.823 miles an hour. The aircraft, which had been participating in the celebrations at the Rock, flew from Gibraltar to Bovingdon, Hertfordshire, in 2 hours 31 minutes 36 seconds.

On 11th September, a R.A.F. Bomber Command Lancaster dropped a R.A.F. Ensign, the Union Jack and the French Tricolore on the original dropping zone near Limoges, France, as part of the commemoration ceremonies in honour of the men and women of the French Resistance and comrades from the Allied Forces who gave their lives during the War.

The Sunday, which was the last day of the Battle of Britain Week, was observed as R.A.F. Sunday.

**GOODWILL VISIT TO SCANDINAVIA.**—Between 17th and 25th August, eight Meteors made a goodwill visit to Norway and Sweden, where they were guests of the Royal Norwegian and Royal Swedish Air Forces, and during which time they demonstrated the Meteor 4.

**COASTAL COMMAND RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISE.**—On 1st November, six general reconnaissance Lancasters from No. 210 Squadron, R.A.F. Coastal Command, were due to leave their Cornwall base for the Far East, to train under the operational and ad-

ministrative control of Air Headquarters, Far East Air Force. The aircraft, each with a crew of seven, will carry out an exercise in air mobility, reinforcement flying, and maritime reconnaissance. In addition, the crews will exchange views on operational doctrine with local Naval and Air Force authorities.

**BRITISH AIR FORCE OF OCCUPATION, GERMANY.**—On 16th August, B.A.F.O. staged a full-scale demonstration at the R.A.F. Station, Gutersloh, Westphalia—the biggest R.A.F. tactical air display to be held in Germany. It was attended by Chiefs of Staff from Great Britain, the United States and Western European Countries.

## DOMINIONS

### CANADA

The R.C.A.F. Station at Bagotville is to be brought up to operational requirements, for which a two-and-a-half million dollar building programme has been undertaken. Bagotville was an active R.C.A.F. Station during the War, but it has not been used as a permanent base for some years.

### AUSTRALIA

Speaking at the annual meeting of the Air Force Association (Victorian Division), the Australian Minister for Air—the Hon. Arthur S. Drakeford, said Australia should have an air force of 13,000 members by 1952. He added that the necessity for a highly organized and efficient force must be realized, if Australia were to be prepared for another emergency. At the end of the War, in 1945, the membership of the Royal Australian Air Force was 183,000.

**EX-R.A.F. TRADESMEN ENLISTED IN THE R.A.A.F.**—Thirty ex-Royal Air Force tradesmen have been attested in the United Kingdom as members of the Royal Australian Air Force, and have embarked for Australia.

### INDIA

The Royal Indian Air Force has introduced the "all-through" training system, as employed by the R.A.F. The three colleges at Coimbatore, Jodhpur and Ambala have been combined into two academies at the two latter stations. Trainee pilots posted there will undergo 39-week courses of instruction, receiving at least 100 hours basic flying training.

## FOREIGN

### NORWAY

The Royal Norwegian Air Force held a series of exercises between 30th August and 4th September. R.A.F. Lincolns and Lancasters made day and night attacks on Norway in an attempt to pierce the Country's air defences.

### SWEDEN

After a year of extensive flight testing, the Saab J29 single-seat jet fighter has been accepted for production. The Swedish Air Force has placed an order for five hundred. They are powered by Swedish-built de Havilland Ghost gas-turbines.

### TURKEY

The Turkish Air Force took part recently in the Autumn manoeuvres of the Turkish armed forces. These included for the first time an operation involving the transportation by air of an infantry battalion and an artillery battery over a distance of about 150 miles, followed by the dropping of supplies to these troops on the ground.

A Turkish fighter squadron paid a goodwill visit to Cyprus during June. This was returned in September by a fighter squadron of the Royal Air Force.

## UNITED STATES

COMPOSITION OF THE U.S.A.F.—As a result of the recent cut in the U.S.A.F. budget appropriations of 800,000,000 dollars, the U.S.A.F. has to be replanned with 48 instead of 58 groups. According to the Chief of Staff, General Vandenberg, its composition will be as follows :—

- 4 Strategic Bomber Groups of B-36's.
- 10 Medium Bomber Groups of B-29's and B-50's.
- 6 Strategic Recce. Groups, 2 to be equipped with RB-36's, remainder with RB-29's and RB-50's.
- 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Group.
- 1 Light Bomber Group equipped with B-45 jet bombers.
- 20 Fighter Groups.
- 6 Troop Carrier Groups.

A TACTICAL AIR FORCE.—According to an American technical publication, relations between the U.S. Air Force and the Army have, until recently, been strained on the subject of tactical air support for the latter. General Omar Bradley pointed out that the Marines enjoyed an air support of 21 squadrons for two ground divisions, which was more than the Army ever had in the 1939-45 War except on the Normandy beachhead.

The U.S.A.F. has now created a Tactical Air Force with headquarters at Pope Field, Fort Bragg, N.C., for "close co-operation with the Army in joint air-ground training manœuvres." No combat units have been definitely assigned to the Tactical Air Force yet; for the purposes of these manœuvres, groups will probably be lent temporarily from Continental Air Command.

B-50S IN BRITAIN.—Boeing B-50A Stratobombers and Superfortresses of the 43rd Bomb Group (Medium) U.S. 8th Air Force arrived in England at the end of August for 90 days training, and replaced the B-29s of the 98th Bomb Group (M) which returned to the United States in the Summer.

AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT.—A survey, recently made by American industry analysts, gives some interesting data showing the comparison of a typical 1937 medium bomber with a 1949 light jet bomber.

|                                               | 1937<br><i>Medium Bomber</i> | 1949<br><i>Light Bomber</i>                     |
|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Wing span ... ..                              | 95 ft.                       | 89 ft.                                          |
| Length ... ..                                 | 62 ft.                       | 75 ft.                                          |
| Gross weight ... ..                           | 30,000 lbs.                  | 82,000 lbs.                                     |
| H.P. at sea level ... ..                      | 2,400 h.p.                   | 22,100 h.p. (translation of jet thrust to h.p.) |
| Top speed ... ..                              | 215 m.p.h.                   | 540 m.p.h.                                      |
| Bomb load ... ..                              | 9,000 lbs.                   | 22,000 lbs.                                     |
| Total man-hours for experimental contract ... | 103,700 hours                | 1,263,000 hours                                 |

B-36 BOMBER PERFORMANCE.—Details of the performance of the Convair B-36 intercontinental bomber were given to the House Armed Services Committee and published in the Press in August.

The top speed of this aircraft exceeds 435 m.p.h., and an altitude of more than 50,000 ft. has been attained by the prototype equipped with two pod nacelles housing four 5,200 lb. thrust turbo-jets.

A B-36D of the Strategic Air Command has flown, non-stop and without aerial refuelling, well over 10,000 miles with a bomb load of 10,000 lbs., which was dropped well beyond the 5,000 mile mark.

A B-36B has flown 6,000 miles at over 40,000 ft. at an average speed of 300 m.p.h. This mission, it was remarked, covered considerably more mileage above 40,000 ft. than would be required for maximum penetration to Russian targets.

It is planned to purchase 28 B-36's during the fiscal year 1950, and 51 more in 1951.

**FLIGHT REFUELLING.**—The Boeing Aeroplane Company has developed a new flight refuelling system for the B-50 Superfortress. It consists of a rigid pipe connection between the bomber and the tanker, with a pump which permits a considerably faster fuel flow than the gravity system which is at present in use.

The B-45 light tactical bomber, which previously had eight refuelling points and consequently took over four hours to refuel, is now fitted with only one refuelling point, which enables it to be flight refuelled and cuts refuelling time on the ground down to rather less than 30 minutes.

Owing to the success of the flight refuelling experiments carried out earlier in the year, several B-50 squadrons have been increased by the addition of a few B-29 tanker aircraft and their potential range is consequently considerably extended.

**NEW TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT.**—The U.S.A.F. has recently taken delivery of its first XC-99 transport aircraft. This is the transport version of the B-36 and on its proving flights carried a payload of 100,000 lbs.—claimed to be the biggest payload carried by any heavier-than-air aircraft. The XC-99 is at present fitted with six reciprocating engines, but experiments are being carried out to fit it with turbo-propeller engines.

**TRACK-TREAD UNDERCARRIAGE.**—Experiments were recently carried out on a B-50 Superfortress with a track-tread type of undercarriage to enable the aircraft to be used from unimproved airfields. This experiment was so successful that trials with the same type of gear are to be carried out with the B-36.



## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

### GENERAL

**Survey By Starlight.** By Ralph Neville. (Hodder and Stoughton, London.) 10s. 6d.

Although written in lively narrative form, this is a true account of some of the adventures and achievements of a Combined Operations Reconnaissance and Pilotage Party in the Mediterranean during the late war.

It was the duty of these parties to carry out a survey of the approaches to the beaches on which assault landings were to take place, running lines of soundings, obtaining information about the nature of the bottom, probing for and marking down mines, tank traps and other underwater obstructions, and even penetrating the enemy's coast-line defences. The completeness and accuracy of this information had a vital bearing on the planning of a landing and would make all the difference between its success and disaster.

But that was not all; when the moment came it was the C.O.P.P. people who had to guide the spearhead of the assault and who therefore had the chief responsibility for putting invading forces ashore at the right places.

Some of the risks attendant on this work can be imagined, but Lieutenant Neville shows in detail what they really involved and the tremendous demands they made on the courage, initiative and physical endurance of those who, like himself, participated in them. His story deals essentially with the landings in Sicily and at Salerno, but is typical of similar work elsewhere.

Scarcely less exciting and dangerous was the transport of the C.O.P.P. by submarine, which had to take the party close enough to the enemy coast for them to paddle in in a collapsible canoe. To this, too, he does justice.

The author has a delightfully simple and human way of spinning his yarn, and this book is as readable as it is instructive. Much of this dare-devil work was, and may be again, unavoidable; but one is left with the impression that it could have been lightened considerably if in peacetime the making of charts and the drawing of maps of potential enemy coasts had not been in two separate water-tight departments. Have we, after two major wars, learnt at least one obvious lesson?

**The Junks and Sampans of the Yangtze.** Two Volumes. By G. R. G. Worcester.

(Published by order of the Inspector General of Customs, Shanghai. Agents for Great Britain—Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., London.)

Mr. Worcester was formerly a River Inspector of Chinese Maritime Customs and has therefore had special opportunities for studying his subject, of which he is one of the greatest living authorities. These fine volumes supplement his two earlier works—*The Junks and Sampans of the Upper Yangtze* and *Notes on the Crooked Bow and Crooked Stern Junks of Szechwan*, with which they now provide the most comprehensive and authoritative record of Chinese nautical archaeology ever published.

Although, as their titles imply, they are essentially concerned with the craft described, yet they are in great part literature of value to every student of China and the Chinese way of living, for the Yangtze flows through the very belly of that vast Country, fertilizing the immense alluvial plain which, with China's Sorrow—the great Hwang-ho, it has built up in the course of centuries and for the last ninety years (since the Hwang-ho swung North of Shantung) has gone on building up alone. Here dwell most of China's teeming millions. To them the Yangtze is not only the water of life, it is the bearer of immense burdens, the grinder of corn, the means of locomotion, and a pleasure haunt. It is a gigantic river—in length, in breadth and, at certain seasons and places, in depth.

In Volume I of his latest work Mr. Worcester deals with the craft of the Estuary and Shanghai Area, and in Volume II with the craft of the Lower and Middle Yangtze and its tributaries. But he goes further afield, historically to describe the now vanished war

junks of mediaeval and early Hong Kong days, and geographically to include several strictly speaking sea-going junks, now also only too swiftly departing from scenes where they have been familiar sights for centuries. This will, of course, add to the value of these books in the years to come, when it may otherwise be difficult to find details of some of these perishable and common yet vital instruments and vehicles of earlier Chinese civilization.

There are, too, chapters of lasting importance to nautical archaeology in general. For instance, at the beginning of Volume I the author deals with such subjects as "The Chinese Junk in History, Art and Literature," "Various Methods of Propulsion," "Masts and Sails," "The Chinese Compass" and "Anchors and Rudders."

As a preface to these chapters there are a helpful "Synoptical Table of Chinese Dynasties" and "Nautical Chronological Table." The rest of this volume deals with various types of craft, grouped either functionally or geographically, e.g. "The Yangtze Estuary," "Fishing Sampans," etc.

Volume II opens with the junks of the Yangtze River—as distinct from the estuarine craft covered in the previous volume. Particularly valuable are the sections on the different types of balanced lugsails met with on the Yangtze and its associated waterways—on the Upper Yangtze they often use a form of square sail with roller-reefing of a type to be found elsewhere only on the Nile. Here, too, we find details of the methods of stepping the masts, the preservation of the hulls, decorations, and remarks on the influence of taxation upon design; also about the varieties and volume of the cargoes carried. The succeeding chapters describe the types of junk met with on the Lower Yangtze, Middle Yangtze and its tributaries; the craft of the aboriginal Miao Tribesmen—who are unlike the Chinese both in their speech and customs—and the Rice Junks and War-Junks.

The Chinese have a reputation for being ingenious and they are splendid seamen, as anyone knows who has served on the China coast. Their fishing craft will often outsail the fastest yacht and their sailing lighters fore-reach to an uncanny degree in the sluicing waters off the Shanghai bund. Some of their secrets are set down in these books, which are beautifully illustrated with sketches—animated and characteristic—with photographs and with beautifully clear, scale line-drawings. They will certainly shatter many cherished illusions about junks: it would be invidious to cite examples, but whether to admire most the plain, practical brain behind the *Liang-chuch-t'ou* or "Two-section" junk of the Grand Canal, which bends in the middle at sharp turns it is otherwise too long to negotiate, or the sweet artistry that devised the enchanting silhouette of the "*To-lung-fu-ch'uan*" or "gondola-bow" junk, of the Poyang Lake, with its water-lines so shaped that the crew could manhandle it over the boulder-strewn shallows, must be left to the curious to decide or to the contentious to dispute.

The production of these two volumes is as admirable as their composition is masterly.

#### NAVY

**Brassey's Naval Annual, 1949.** Edited by Rear-Admiral H. G. Thursfield. (William Clowes and Sons, London.) 30s.

The sixtieth number of *Brassey* may, it is feared, be something of a disappointment to some of those who study it regularly for, although it contains some excellent chapters, as has been expected of it ever since the 'eighties, there are certain omissions which, at the present time, are noticeable not only because a really authentic article is invaluable to professional men whose views vary, but because *Brassey* is such a text book to the general public who are sadly in need of expert education at the present time. Conspicuous among the omissions is the all-important subject of Personnel—in certain foreign navies as well as the British, whose problems deserve a full section to themselves. The regulations and alterations in routine, as far as the Royal Navy is concerned, are dealt with in a form which is admirable for reference, but it is a pity that major problems are not dealt with more fully and frankly. It is true that this may owe something to the prevailing official

reticence. The other omission which will disappoint many people is that of a section dealing with the Merchant Navy, the importance of which—and the public cannot be too often reminded of the fact—is as great to-day as ever, whether in peace or war.

Nevertheless, this Annual contains seven good chapters. The first is the 'Influence of Sea Power To-day' by the Editor, a carefully thought out exposition of several important phases of the subject which is still very poorly understood by most people. Captain Altham supplies the second chapter on The Naval Year—a feature which is particularly valuable nowadays when newspapers are so small, and often so disinterested in Service information that many people miss naval items of importance. It makes a particularly good section for reference. Lieutenant-Commander P. K. Kemp does the same for 'Foreign Navies' in Chapter III, a very large proportion of it naturally being devoted to the U.S. Navy. "Volage" in his chapter on 'Three Dimensional Naval Defence' packs a great deal of information into a small compass and, as usual, carefully introduces some points and phrases which will promote discussion.

In view of the inter-Service controversy which has recently arisen across the Atlantic, the Editor's chapter on the U.S. Defence Structure is very timely, although it was written before the recent unhappy events. Commander (E) A. Funge Smith revives a feature which has been omitted far too long, although that was obviously unavoidable, and gives a very illuminating account of 'Progress in Naval Engineering' during the last twelve years. Finally, Lieutenant W. H. Kennett, R.N.V.R., supplies a chapter on the 'New Naval Science' which, if it is familiar ground to the serving officer, is very informative to the shoregoer or the retired officer of a former generation.

The reference section and the pictorial section which follows it are on the traditional *Brassey* lines followed for many years. A great deal of work has been put into the details, particularly in the foreign navies of which, with the exception of Russia, it appears to be easier to get authentic details than of the Royal Navy. It is, however, rather surprising to see diagrams of battleships already on the scrap-heap retained in these pages.

Official statements, Navy Estimates and other Blue Books and Command Papers are always useful to have in permanent form.

#### ARMY

**Ack-Ack.** By General Sir Frederick Pile, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C. (Harrap.) 18s.

On 11th November, 1918, the anti-aircraft defences of Great Britain comprised 469 guns and 622 searchlights. Two years later "the whole organization of the defences, with the exception of a small school of anti-aircraft artillery for the Regular Army, had completely disappeared." Twenty years later it required the calculated indiscretion of a young M.P.—Mr. Duncan Sandys, who happened also to be a junior officer of a Territorial anti-aircraft unit, closely followed by the Munich crisis, to bring the Government of the day to a full sense of its responsibilities for providing the necessary manpower, money and equipment to ensure adequate A.A. defence of this Country against the growing might of the *Luftwaffe*. It is as well to be reminded of such facts in these days, and no one is better qualified to do so than General Sir Frederick Pile, who throughout the late war was G.O.C.-in-C. Anti-Aircraft Command.

"Tim" Pile, like so many other distinguished military commanders, comes of Irish stock, and like some others who have in the fullness of their time attained high distinction, he all but failed on academic grounds to enter his profession. He scraped into "the Shop" bottom of the list, and was duly commissioned into "the Gunners" in 1904. A chance meeting with Major-General "Boney" Fuller led to his transfer to the Royal Tank Corps shortly after the 1914-18 War. The subsequent part which he played in the building up of our armoured tactics and technique between the two Wars (but lightly touched on by the author) no doubt stood him in good stead when later he assumed command of "the most highly technical Army that ever wore khaki."

The outbreak of war in September, 1939, found our A.A. defences still far below the minimum requirements. Although the respite provided by the "phoney war" enabled considerable leeway to be made up, when the real test came after Dunkirk radar for gun laying (the G.L. set) was only just coming into production and had not yet passed the stage of "teething troubles." The problem of hitting the unseen target was as yet not fully solved.

Whilst the author, typically and generously, pays full homage to the predominant part played by the R.A.F. in the Battle of Britain, his own score of 164 aircraft destroyed in the month of August, 1940, furnishes striking evidence as to the increasing efficiency and strength of his own Command. Yet a month later, when the heavy night raids on London started, he writes: "London was inadequately defended . . . the defences at night were technically entirely unfitted for dealing with any but the bombers of twenty years earlier."

After three nights of ineffective aimed fire, the General called together his commanders and gave orders that next night every gun was to fire every possible round. The resulting "barrage" not only raised the morale of the Londoners, which was not astonishing, but apparently astonished the enemy, "for although few of the bursts can have been anywhere near the target, the heights of aircraft steadily increased as the night went on, and many of them turned away before entering the inner artillery zone."

By the end of the month the Battle of Britain had been virtually won. In November, the *Luftwaffe* started to transfer its main weight to the provinces. Although grievous damage was inflicted, the pressure of attack was gradually dwindling. For A.A. Command the battle of the scientists was just starting. Everything depended on improved methods of radar control to enable the gun and searchlight to engage an unseen target by night and in cloud, and to guide the night-fighter to his target. The author pays handsome tribute both to the team of scientists whom he had gathered round him under Professor P. Blackett, and also to the research work carried out at their own expense by some of the leading manufacturers of scientific instruments.

Although the Battle of Britain had placed A.A. Command firmly in the public and official eye, with the result that new equipment was coming forward in a steady flow, there remained the ever-pressing problem of manpower to meet the expansion programme. It was General Pile who suggested the employment of women in operational roles. The opposition to this "breath-taking and revolutionary proposal" was great, but by the late Spring of 1941, he had won the day and the experiment of mixed batteries was soon pronounced an unqualified success. Thereafter the proportion of mixed to male batteries steadily increased. The final triumph of the A.T.S. came in October, 1944, when five mixed Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiments were posted to 21st Army Group for the defence of Antwerp.

But the shortage of manpower was not the only problem facing A.A. Command. Throughout 1942 and 1943, the *Luftwaffe* endeavoured to compensate for its dwindling strength by varying its tactics. The "tip and run" raids and the so-called "Baedeker" raids created fresh problems for the defence. The author's account of this period is, of necessity, mildly technical and statistical. The non-technical reader need have no qualms: the language is simple and the matter digestible. It was a testing time and was to provide milestones along that road of scientific achievement which enabled A.A. Command to enter the battle of the flying-bombs with confidence and emerge victorious. The description of this battle almost warrants the use of that much overworked epithet—thrilling. The triumph of the Gunners can be recorded in figures. In the last phases of the battle they destroyed approximately three times the number of flying-bombs that got through to the target area of London.

The author gives some entertaining and often amusing accounts of the leading personalities he encountered during the War. He discloses frankly and critically the mistakes and weaknesses of his own Command.



*Ach-Ack* deserves a wide circulation, not only amongst military readers, but also amongst "the customers"—the men and women of Britain on whose heads fell the brunt of the air battle and on whose courage and endurance ultimate victory depended. The photographic illustrations are quite first-class.

**An Outspoken Soldier.** By Lieut.-General Sir Giffard Martel, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (Sifton Praed.) 21s.

On opening this book one is left in no doubt as to the author's intention, for on the first page he writes: "This book is definitely provocative. . . . There is no other way of stimulating the type of thought that leads to progress." With the first statement we wholeheartedly agree. The second statement is open to argument. Provocation may provide the reader with good exercise in mental gymnastics, but balanced argument is more likely to stimulate constructive thought, and this book leaves the impression that the author's enthusiasm, time and again, outstrips his capacity for impartial judgment based on sound argument.

Lieut.-General Sir Giffard Martel has, throughout his career, been a noted pugilist, both in and out of the ring. One is strongly tempted to dismiss the book with the comment that it is an all-in contest, Martel versus all-comers, fought under "Q" rules; "Q" standing for Q Martel and not Queensberry. But we must resist the temptation. For Q—the soldier, sportsman and author, cannot be dismissed so lightly. On his past record and achievements he demands respect, and despite its impish quality and obvious defects this volume is a not unimportant contribution to the literature of war—in particular of armoured war.

Between the two great wars Martel was one of the leaders of that band of "crusaders" (the term is their own) who fought tooth and nail to maintain the lead in armoured warfare which we had attained in 1918. That they failed was no fault of theirs, and the author's statement that the Germans started the late war with a five-year lead in armour over ourselves is no exaggeration.

This serious handicap was mainly in the fields of production and training. In design we had made remarkable progress in the few years before the outbreak of war. Martel's contribution in this sphere was no mean one. At his own expense and with his own hands he built the first light tank, which became the forerunner of the bren carrier. He followed this experiment with an Austin 7 chassis modified to act as a long-range light reconnaissance vehicle, and it was due to his efforts that the War Office acquired one of the three models of the Christie tank with its remarkable suspension, which was afterwards incorporated into our own designs.

The outbreak of war found Major-General Martel in command of the famous 50th Northumbrian Division. It was the first Territorial Army Division to cross to France and the last Division to leave the beaches at Dunkirk. Under the author's command and assisted by two weak tank battalions (the only tank battalions in the B.E.F.) the Division led the unsuccessful breakthrough South of Arras on 21st May, 1940. The advance thrust 10 miles into the German Armoured Division's communications and created for von Rundstedt a "critical moment" before the situation was restored by Rommel and a large force of dive-bombers.

It was Martel's last experience of command in the field. In December, 1940, he was promoted Lieut.-General and appointed Commander of the Royal Armoured Corps, with the task of raising and creating our new armoured forces. The creation of this unusual appointment was due to the courage and foresight of the then C.I.G.S.—General Sir John Dill. The choice of Commander was a wise one. Martel found ample scope for his creative and organizing ability. The Army reaped the benefit from the speed and efficiency with which our armoured forces were raised and trained, and led in the later stages of the War.

As Commander R.A.C. the author had no hand, save in a consultative capacity, in the design and production of armoured vehicles. This obviously irked him and he strongly criticizes the policy of the dual-purpose tank as opposed to separate types for cruiser and infantry purposes. Somewhat surprisingly he blames Field-Marshal Montgomery largely for this policy, and his criticisms of the same commander for his handling of armour at El Alamein are in keeping with the title of the book. His criticisms would be more convincing if the arguments he deduces had been less one-sided.

In the Spring of 1943, Martel was sent to Russia as head of the Military Mission. His method of handling the Russians was to be tough with them. How far these tactics succeeded in the long run it is difficult to assess, but the fact remains that he gained their confidence sufficiently to be allowed to visit various parts of the front, a privilege denied to his predecessor and successor. Quite clearly his methods did not meet with the approval of the Foreign Office. The chapters devoted to Russia, which he had previously visited with General Wavell in 1936, are amongst the most interesting.

The book is largely autobiographical. The author covers a wide range of subjects: from Afghanistan to amateur sport; from Russia to reform of the War Office. He writes provocatively throughout, but if one separates the wheat from the chaff, there will be found much of interest and a good measure of value. It seems a pity that the proofs were not read with greater care.

#### REGIMENTAL HISTORIES

**The 10th Royal Hussars in the Second World War, 1939-45.** Compiled under the direction of a Committee. (Gale and Polden, Ltd., Aldershot.) 10s. 6d.

A foreword to this volume by His Royal Highness The Duke of Gloucester, Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, is followed by a short Introduction which contains remarks that no reader of the book can pass over without at least some mental answers. These replies, it is felt, will take the line that the future historian will be lucky indeed for such a record to which he can refer; that the compilers deserve much praise for the apparent completeness of the story; and that few could fail to note the spirit of comradeship which prevailed, and the co-operation which took place with those many others with whom the Regiment served and to whom much space is given.

So numerous are the episodes which this book contains, it must be sufficient here to record that the Regiment took part in the attempt by the 1st Armoured Division to stem the German advance South of the Rivers Somme and Seine in 1940, including the action at Huppy; in five major actions in Middle East (Eighth Army) between 23rd January, 1942, and 29th March, 1943; in the final attack in Tunisia (1st Army) between 22nd April and 13th May, 1943; and in five major actions in Italy between 4th September, 1944, and 25th April, 1945. Many of these actions were prolonged.

The end of the story, which is followed by appendices including the Roll of Honour and Honours and Awards, leaves the Regiment at Lubeck on the Baltic after spending a short time in Trieste and in Austria.

This notice would be incomplete without reference to the excellence of the twenty-seven sketch maps included in the book. Simple and clear, they enable the reader to follow the text with but little turn of page.

**History of the 13th/18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary's Own), 1922-1947.** By Major-General Charles H. Miller, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (Chisman, Bradshaw, Ltd.) £2 2s.

Dedicated to Her Majesty Queen Mary, Colonel-in-Chief 13th/18th Royal Hussars, and containing a foreword by Field-Marshal Viscount Alexander, this most interesting history covers the period from the amalgamation of the 13th and 18th Hussars in Aldershot on 9th November, 1922, until the Regiment arrived in Aldershot again on 23rd October, 1947.

Commencing with an outline of the histories of the 13th Hussars and the 18th Hussars, the author continues with the story of the Regiment's travels and experiences between 1922 and 1938, when varying periods of time were spent in Aldershot, Edinburgh, Egypt, India and Shorncliffe.

There follows, in the next six chapters, a stirring account of the Regiment's exploits during the recent war which tells of the 1939-1940 period as Mechanised Divisional Cavalry to the 1st Infantry Division in France and Belgium; of training in England first as an Armoured and then, from 1943-44, as a D.D. Regiment; and of how, in 1944, it led the assault on the Normandy Bridgehead and fought thence across France and Belgium to Holland and into Germany. The due measure given to those with whom the Regiment fought adds much interest to these pages.

The final chapter deals with life in occupied Germany from 1945 to 1947, and of the return to England to reorganize before moving to Benghazi.

This well-presented book contains many first-rate illustrations and maps, and the several appendices include the Roll of Honour and the Honours and Awards.

**The History of the Cheshire Regiment in the Second World War, 1939-45.** By Arthur Crookenden. (W. H. Evans, Sons & Co., Ltd., Chester.) 25s.

This comprehensive war history of the seven Battalions and the Depot of the Cheshire Regiment is divided into six parts. Each of the first five parts contains the story of one Battalion of the Regiment with appendices, while the sixth covers the activities of two Battalions with appendices, and the Depot. Finally space is devoted to General Appendices which include the Roll of Honour, biographies of officers killed in action, Honours and Awards, and a note on medals.

Thus, under this admirable arrangement, the reader finds a continuous narrative of the exploits of the 1st Battalion in Libya, Malta and North-West Europe; of the 2nd Battalion in France, 1939-40, Africa (via Cyprus, Palestine, Syria and Iraq), Sicily and from Normandy to Holland; of the 4th Battalion in France, 1939-40; of the 6th Battalion in Africa and Italy; of the 7th Battalion in France, 1939-40, and Italy; and of the 5th and 30th (originally the 8th) at home and in Italy, and the Depot.

Being a Machine Gun Regiment, companies of the Battalions seldom fought under the direct orders of their own Commanding Officers, but were generally detached to Brigades or to Infantry Battalions. This fact is well illustrated by a glance at the excellent index which contains the titles of some 36 Brigades and over 60 Regiments.

Other features of the book are the unusual number of photographs of individual officers, N.C.O.s and men, and 36 extremely good maps.

## ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

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\*THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY. Supplement. January 1901-December 1911. Edited by Sir Sidney Lee. Medium 8vo. 739 pages. (Oxford University Press, first published 1912, reprinted 1939.) 35s.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL HISTORY. (Stevenson Memorial Lecture No. 1.) By Earl Wavell. Medium 8vo. 21 pages. (Oxford University Press, 1949.) 2s.

DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939. Third Series. Volume II. 1938. Edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, assisted by Margaret Lambert. Royal 8vo. 692 pages. (H.M.S.O., 1949.) 21s.

PAX BRITANNICA. By F. A. Voigt. Large Post 8vo. 576 pages. (Constable, 1949.) 25s.  
A collection of modern political studies of Poland, Yugoslavia and Greece.

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PERSONNEL SELECTION IN THE BRITISH FORCES. By Philip E. Vernon and John B. Parry. Demy 8vo. 324 pages. (University of London Press, 1949.) 20s.

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# AIR

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








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